ML17342A362
| ML17342A362 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/03/1986 |
| From: | Brewer D, Elrod S, Peebles T NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17342A360 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-85-42, 50-251-85-42, NUDOCS 8601130186 | |
| Download: ML17342A362 (15) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1985042
Text
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UNITEDSTATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30323
Report Nos.:
50-250/85-42
and 50-251/85-42
Licensee:
Florida Power
and Light Company
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33102
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
License Nos.:
DPR-31 and
Facility Name:
Turkey Point 3 and 4
Inspection
Conducted:
Novem
r 12
December
9,
1985
Inspects~:~T.
A. Peebles,
Se ior Resident
Inspector
5
+D.
R. Brewer, Resident
Inspector
Accompanying Personnel:
L. Watson
t
Approved by:
S ep
n A. Elrod, Section Chief
Division of Reactor Projects
3
3 lail
Date
igned
'2I I9R
Date
S gned
Dat
Signed
SUMMARY
Scope:
This routine,
unannounced
inspection entailed
169 direct inspection
hours
at the site, including 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of backshift inspection,
in the areas
of licensee
action
on previous inspection findings, annual
and monthly surveillance,
mainten-
ance
observations
and reviews,
operationil
safety,
engineered
safety features
walkdown, independent
inspection,
and plant events.
Results:
Violation - Failure to meet the requirements
of Technical Specification
(TS) 6. 8. 1.
'
860i130186
860207
ADOCK 05000250
9
REPORT DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Employees
Contacted
C.
C
A'D
T.
J.
J.
B.
D.
D.
"R.
R.
AJ
0.
R.
E.
V.
R.
R.
p.
W.
J.
J.
L.
A'R
W.
J.
D.
G.
T.
G.
M. Wethy, Vice President - Turkey Point
J.
Baker, Acting Vice President - Turkey Point,
T. Young, Acting Plant Manager - Nuclear
D. Grandage,
Operations
Superintendent
- Nuclear
A. Finn, Operations
Supervisor
Crockford, Assistant Operations
Supervisor
Webb, Operations/Maintenance
Coordinator
L. Jones,
Technical
Department Supervisor
A. Abrishami, Inservice Test (IST) Supervisor
Tomaszewski,
Plant Engineering Supervisor
A. Chancy,
Corporate
Licensing
Arias, Regulation
and Compliance Supervisor
L. Teuteberg,
Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
Hart, Regulation
and Compliance
Engineer
W. Kappes,
Maintenance
Superintendent
- Nuclear
E. Suero, Electrical Maintenance
Supervisor
A. Longtemps,
Mechanical
Maintenance
Supervisor
F.
Hayes,
Instrument
and Control (IC) Maintenance
Su
A. Kaminskas,
Reactor
Engineering Supervisor
G.
Mende,
Reactor
Engineer
E. Garrett,
Plant Security Supervisor
W. Hughes,
Health Physics Supervisor
C. Miller, Training Supervisor
M. Donis, Site Engineering Supervisor
M. Mowbray', Site Mechanical
Engineer
C. Huenniger,
Start-up Superintendent
H. Reinhardt,
Acting Quality Control
(QC) Supervisor
J. Acosta, Quality Assurance
(QA) Superintendent
Bladow, Quality Assurance
Supervisor
A. Labarraque,
Performance
Enhancement
Program
(PEP)
W. Hasse,
Safety Engineering
Group Chairman
M. Vaux, Safety Engineering
Group Engineer
C. Grozan,
Licensing Engineer
Traczyk, Fire Protection
Department
0. Kelly, Maintenance/Technical
Training Supervisor
pervisor
Manager
Other
licensee
employees
contacted
included
construction
craftsmen,
engineers,
technicians,
operators,
mechanics,
electricians
and security
force members.
~Attended exit interview
2.
Exit Interview
The
inspection
scope
and
findings
were
summarized
during
management
interviews held throughout
the reporting period with the Plant Manager-
Nuclear and selected
members of his staff.
An exit meeting
was
conducted
on
December
13,
1985.
The areas
requiring
management
attention
were reviewed.
One violation was identified:
Failure to meet the requirements
of TS 6.8. 1 in that procedures
were
not properly implemented for removing
a nuclear instrument
from service
and for completing
prerequisites
for starting
a
steam
generator
pump (paragraph
7) (250/85-42-01).
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any of the materials
provided
to or reviewed
by the
inspectors
during this inspection.
The licensee
acknowledged
the findings without dissenting
comments.
3.
Licensee Action on Previous
Inspection Findings
(92702)
a ~
Performance
Enhancement
Program
(PEP)
The licensee
has
decided
to augment
the existing
PEP to place addi-
tional
emphasis
on
maintenance
and
design
control
areas.
A more
detailed
discussion
of the augmentation
plan is contained in licensee
letter
of
December
6,
1985,
written in response
to the
findings of Inspection
Report 250,251/85-32.
The principal
program
elements
identified for augmentation
in the maintenance
area
concern
=
maintenance
procedures
(including post-maintenance
testing
and indepen-
dent verification), controls
over plant work orders
(PWOs), training
and experience
of maintenance
personnel,
and
development
of improved
predictive maintenance
techniques.
The program elements
identified in
the design
control
area
concern
enhanced
vendor surveillance,
recon-
stitution of safety
system
design
bases,
standard
engineering
package
implementation,
and formulation of a integrated
design review team.
A
partial itemization of the augmentation
plan is as follows:
The
PEP will incorporate
formal post-maintenance
testing criteria
into
PWO and maintenance
procedures
to improve the level of detail
associated
with corrective
and preventive maintenance.
The
PEP will incorporate
a program to expedite
the reduction of
the IC
PWO backlog.
This includes
extended
work hours, contractor
support
and staffing increases.
The
PEP will incorporate
maintenance
training
on
automated
maintenarice
tracking systems,
work controls
and post-maintenance
testing.
b.
Previously Identified Items
(Closed)
Inspector
Fol 1owup
Item (IFI) 250,
251/85-24-06
- Review
Adequacy
of Engineering
Evaluation for Emergency
Diesel
Generator
Operability.
The engineering
reviews associated
with the
emergency
diesel
generator
hot engine
alarm
have
been evaluated
and found to be
adequate.
Graphs
for engine inlet
and outlet coolant temperatures
indicate
that
the
diesel
generator
was
not operated
outside
the
recommended
temperature
band.
Maintenance
program
improvements
are in
progress
which are
intended
to increase
awareness
of alarm conditions
and minimize the time required to initiate repairs.
(Closed) Violation 250,
251/85-02-03 - Failure to Obtain
gC Approval
Prior to Beginning Maintenance
on Safety-Related
Equipment.
Numerous
maintenance
work orders
have
been
reviewed
between
January
and December
1985.
The failure to obtain
the
required
gC approvals
prior to
beginning
the
work has
not
been
a recurring
problem
and is
not
considered
programmatic.
The licensee's
response
to the Notice of
Violation (L-85-130) was reviewed
and found to be adequate.
(Closed)
IFI 250/84-39-04
and 251/84-40-03
- Degraded
Communications
Between
the Control
Room
and Diesel
Room.
The flashing light circuit
for the
emergency
diesel
generator
telephone
has
generally
been
adequately
maintained
during the past year.
Increased
emphasis
has
been
placed
on maintaining the circuit to facilitate communications.
Additional communication
enhancements
are
being installed
as part of
the alternate
shutdown
panel
modification.
The
licensee
has
also
improved
the reliability of the
loudspeaker
system
in the
diesel
generator
room.
Communications
capabilities
between
the control
room
and the diesel
generator
room appear to be satisfactory.
(Closed)
IFI 250/84-35-05
and
251/84-36-05
- Reactor
Trip Bypass
Breakers
Susceptible
to Inadvertent
Local Operation.
The reactor trip
bypass
breaker
pushbuttons
have
been protected
from accidental jarring
and operation
by a plastic cover.
The cover is held in place
by tape.
During the past year the breakers
have not been inadvertently operated
and therefore the plastic covers
appear to be adequate.
(Closed)
IFI 250/84-34-09
and
251/84-35-09
- Operator
Headsets
for
Surveillance.
Headsets
have
been
obtained
and
are
being utilized
during the performance of surveillances.
For high noise areas,
such
as
(AFM) room, the headsets
have
been successfuly
used
while connected
to
hand
held radios.
In the control
room,
headsets
have
been
used during engineered
safety feature surveillance
procedures.
The headsets
have
improved the ease of communication.
t
4.
Unresolved
Items
No unresolved
items were identified during this inspection.
5.
~
G.
Monthly and Annual Surveillance Observation
(61726/61700)
The inspectors
observed
TS-required surveillance testing
and verified the
following:
that the test procedure
conformed to the requirements
of the TS,
that testing
was performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures,
that test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
that limiting conditions for operation
(LCOs) were met, that test results
met acceptance
criteria requirements
and
were
reviewed
by personnel
other than the individual directing the test,
that
deficiencies
were
identified,
as
appropriate,
and
were
properly
reviewed
and resolved
by management
personnel
and that
system restoration
was
adequate.
For completed
tests,
the inspector verified that testing
frequencies
were met and tests
were performed
by qualified individuals.
The inspectors
witnessed/reviewed
portions of the following test activities:
Unit 4 reactor trip breaker testing in accordance
with IE Bulletin 85-02
Units 3 and
4 control
room inaccessibility walk-through
Unit 4 periodic flux map
Units 3 and 4 accumulator valve 883R throttle setting verification
Within this area,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
Maintenance
Observations
(62703/62700)
Station maintenance activities
on safety-related
systems
and components
were
observed
and reviewed to ascertain
that they were
conducted in accordance
with approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,
industry
codes
and
standards
and in conformance with TS.
The following items
were
considered
during this review,
as
appropriate:
that
LCOs were
met while components
or systems
were removed
from service;
that approvals
were obtained prior to initiating work; that activities were
accomplished
using
approved
procedures
and were inspected
as applicable;
that procedures
used
were
adequate
to control the activity; that trouble-
shooting activities were controlled and repair records accurately reflected
what took place; that functional tests
and/or calibrations
were performed
prior to returning
components
or systems
to service;
that
gC records
were
maintained;
that activities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
that
parts
and materials
used were properly certified; that radiological controls
were properly implemented; that
gC hold points were established
and observed
where required; that fire prevention controls were implemented;
that outside
co~Praetor
force activities
were controlled in accordance
with the approved
gA program;
and that housekeeping
was actively pursued.
The following maintenance activities were observed
and/or reviewed:
Units 3 and 4 motor operated
valve grease
replacement
AFW manual isolation valve repairs
Motor operated
valve environmental qualification inspections
Accumulator fill line inspection
and valve 883R isolation
AFM pump governor oil evaluation
Within this area,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
Operational
Safety Verification (71707)
The inspectors
observed
control
room operations,
reviewed applicable logs,
conducted
discussions
with control
room operators,
observed shift turnovers
and confirmed operability of instrumentation.
The inspectors verified the
operability of selected
emergency
systems,
verified that maintenance
work
orders
had
been
submitted
as required
and that follow-up and prioritization
of work was
accomplished.
The inspectors
reviewed tagout records, verified
compliance
with
TS
LCOs
and verified the return to service of affected
components.
By observation
and direct interviews, verification
was
made that
the
physical security plan was being implemented.
Plant housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and implementation of radiological
controls were observed.
Tours of the intake structure
and diesel,
auxiliary, control
and turbine
buildings
were
conducted
to observe
plant equipment conditions
including
potential fire hazards, fluid leaks
and excessive
vibrations.
The
inspectors
walked
down accessible
portions of the following safety-
related
systems
on Unit
3
and
Unit 4 to verify operability
and proper
valve/switch alignment:
Component Cooling Water
4160 volt and 480 volt Switchgear
Nuclear Instrumentation
Drawers
Refueling Mater Storage
High Head Safety Injection
Control
Room Vertical Panels
Standby feedwater
System
On
November
30,
1985, during a shutdown of the Unit 3 reactor,
source
range
nuclear
instrument
N-32 failed to automatically
energize
as reactor
power
entered
the
source
range.
The
instrument
was
taken out of service
by
removing the
two instrument
power
supply
fuses.
The
fuses
were
then
reinstalled
to determine
whether or not improved, fuse contact would restore
the
instrument
power.
The
instrument
did energize
and the
power surge
resulted
in a false
high source
range flux signal spike which exceeded
the
instrument's trip setpoint,
actuated
the reactor
protection
system
and
opened
the
reactor
trip breakers.
All control
rods
had previously
been
fully inserted.
'I
)
~
An independent
review of this event
was conducted
by the resident inspector.
It was
determined
that the source
range nuclear instrument
was
removed from
service
in
a manner contrary to the requirements
of Off-Normal Operating
Procedure
(ONOP)
12108,
Source
Range
Nuclear Instrumentation
Malfunction,
dated
August 22,
1984.
ONOP 12108 requires
(section 5.2.1) that
a failed
instrument
be taken
out of service
by placing the level trip switch in the
bypass
position.
This prevents
the failed instrument from supplying
a trip
signal
to the
reactor
protection
system
and,
consequently,
prevents
the
expected
signal
spike, that occurs
upon initial instrument energization,
from tripping the reactor.
On December
4,
1985,
during
a heatup of the Unit 3 reactor,
the
AFW system
automatically initiated,
as required,
on loss of the running main feedwater
pump.
The
3B main feedwater
pump tripped on low suction pressure
due to its
manually operated
suction valve being closed.
The
pump
ran for approxi-
mately fifteen seconds
before tripping; during that time the logic circuit
was
completed for an
AFW pump start
on loss of the operating
main feedwater
pump.
The
AFW system performed
as required.
Operating
Procedure
3-0P-074,
Steam
Generator
Pump,
dated
September ll, 1985,
requires
(section
5. l. 1) that the condensate
system
be
aligned
for
normal
operation
in
accordance
with procedure
3-0P-073,
Condensate
System,
as
an initial condition prior to starting
a
steam
generator
pump.
It was determined that the control
room operator
thought that
procedure
3-OP-073
was
completed
when actually it was only
partially completed.
Consequently,
the
3B feedwater
pump was started with
its suction valve shut.
The events
of November
30 and December 4, 1985, constitute failures to meet
the requirements
of TS 6.8. 1, which requires that written procedures
and
administrative policies
be established,
implemented
and maintained that meet.
or exceed
the
requirements
and
recommendations
of sections
5.1 and 5.3 of
and Appendix
A of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33.
Appendix
A of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.33
recommends
that written procedures
be established
covering operation of the nuclear
instrument
system
and the
system.
The failure to properly implement procedures
relative to
the nuclear
instrument
and
main feedwater
systems
are
two examples
which
comprise Violation 250/85-42-01.
This violation applies to Unit 3 only.
Several
additional
discrepancies
were
noted relative to monitoring control
room equipment status:
a.
On December
5,
1985,
a
PWO tag
(048504)
was
observed
next to Unit 3
protection
bistable
FC
474 for one of three
steam line high flow
channels.
The tag indicated that the bistable circuit was placed out-
of-service
on
December
4,
1985.
The bistable
was not in the tripped
position
as
would normally
be the
case for a failure.
The on-shift
~ ~
b.
reactor
operator
was
not
aware that the tag existed
and could not
immediately identify whether
the bistable
was out-of-service
or not.
No entry
had
been
made in the
Equipment Out-of-Service
Log.
Conse-
quently, although the control
room operator
suspected
that the bistable
had
been
repaired,
there
was
no
record of the maintenance
action
available in the control
room.
An IC supervisor
was contacted
and
he
confirmed that the bistable
had
been repaired
on the preceding shift.
The control
room operator
did not receive
any information about the
corrective action during his turnover prior to coming on shift and
he
had not noticed the tag during the normal performance of his duties.
On December
9, 1985,
a reactor protection
system status light for power
above the permissive
(P-10) setpoint
was observed to be extinguished
on
Unit 3.
The reactor
operator
was not aware of the discrepancy until
informed by the inspector.
A check revealed that the light bulbs for
the indicator had burned out.
C.
On
December
9,
1985,
the Unit 4 control
rod
speed
indicator
was
observed
to indicate
40 instead
of the required
72 steps
per minute.
The reactor
operator
was not aware of the discrepancy
and could not
explain the
abnormal
indication.
It was subsequently
deter'mined that
the indicator
was stuck at the
40 steps
per minute position and when
freed it returned to the actual setpoint of 72 steps
per minute.
The inspector
discussed
these
occurrences
with the Operations
Superin-
tendent.
In each
case,
prompt investigation
and correction of the
discrepancy
was
accomplished.
The inspector
expressed
concern that
control
room
awareness
was
not receiving
the
emphasis
required to
identify equipment
discrepancies
at their inception.
The Operations
Department
continues
to emphasize
the
need for diligent monitoring of
all control
room indications.
8.
Engineered
Safety Features
Walkdown (71710)
The inspector verified operability of the emergency
diesel
generator
system,
which is
common .to Units
3
and
4 by performing a complete
walkdown of the
accessible
portion of the
system.
The following specifics
were
reviewed
and/or observed
as appropriate:
a ~
b.
C.
that the licensee's
system lineup procedures
matched plant drawings
and
the as-built configuration;
that the equipment conditions
were satisfactory
and
items that might
degrade
performance
were identified and evaluated
(e.g.
hangers
and
supports
were operable,
housekeeping
was adequate,
etc.);
that instrumentation
was properly valved-in
and functioning and that
calibration dates
were not exceeded;
d.
that
valves
were in their proper
positions,
breaker
alignment
was
correct,
power
was available,
and
valves
were
locked/lockwired
as
required;
e.
local
and
remote position indication
was
compared
and
remote instru-
mentation
was functional;
and
breakers
and
instrumentation
cabinets
were
inspected
to verify that
they were free of damage
and interference.
Within this area,
no violations or deviations
were identified.
9.
Independent
Inspection
During the report period the inspectors
routinely attended
meetings
with
licensee
management
and monitored shift turnovers
between shift supervisors,
shift
foremen
and
licensed
operators.
These 'meetings
included daily
discussions
of plant operating
and testing activities as well as discussions
of significant problems
or incidents.
As a result,
the inspectors
reviewed
potential
problem
areas
to independently
assess
their importance to safety,
the
adequacy
of proposed
solutions,
any improvements
or progress,
and the
adequacy
of corrective actions.
The inspector's
reviews of these matters
were not limited to the defined inspection
program.
Independent
inspection
efforts weye conducted
in the following areas:
AFW system proposed
Technical Specifications
Maintenance
management
controls
Accumulator fill line support requirements
Environmental qualification of motor operated
valises
AFW system
improvement plans
Nuclear instrument operability requirements
Standby feedwater
system
proposed
Technical Specifications
Review of Turkey Point TS upgrade
program
Periodically,
the
inspectors
attended
the daily morning planning meeting
which is conducted
by the Plant Supervisor - Nuclear.
Within this area,
no violations or deviations
werq identified.
10.
Plant Events
(93702)
An independent
review was conducted of the following events.
On
November
29,
1985, the licensee
reported that portions of the Unit 3 and
Unit 4 accumulator fill lines
were not seismically qualified.
The lines
supply water
from the refueling water storage
tank to the accumulators
through the safety injection pumps
and associated
hot leg injection piping.
The safety injection hot leg piping is classified
as
3 inch diameter,
class
B, safety-related,
and seismically
supported.
The accumulator fill lines
are
shown
on drawings
as
1 inch diameter,
nonsafety-related,
class
D piping.
The class
D pipe is not required to
be seismically supported but is manu-
factured from the
same material
as the class
B pipe.
Nonseismically
supported
pipe
is
normally
separated
from seismically
supported
pipe
by at least
one closed isolation valve.
This prevents
the
failure of the nonseismically
supported
pipe from creating
an
unexpected
flowpath that
could divert water from its intended destination.
It was
determined
by the licensee that isolation valves
3-883R and 4-883R had been
maintained
in the normally-open position for many years.
Consequently,
a
failure of the accumulator fill line for either unit could have resulted in
an unanticipated
flow diversion path during post-accident
hot leg injection.
The valves
were shut on November 26,
1985.
Subsequently,
a safety analysis
was performed
which justifies operating with the valves throttled open to
allow a
maximum of 50 gallons per minute flow which would permit the remote
filling of the accumulators
from the control
room.
The
licensee
is evaluating
the safety
significance
of this event.
An
independent
evaluation is being conducted
by the
NRC staff.
On November
30,
1985,
a personnel
error resulted
in the actuation of the
Unit 3 reactor protection
system
when
a source
range nuclear instrument
was
taken
out of service
in a manner inconsistent
with approved
procedures.
This event is discussed
in detail in paragraph
7 of this report.
On December 4, 1985,
a personnel
error resulted in the actuation of the Unit
system
when the
3B main feedwater
pump tripped
due to
an
improper
valve alignment.
This event is, also
discussed
in detail
in
paragraph
7 of this report.
y
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4
4
I