ML17341B584
| ML17341B584 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 01/04/1983 |
| From: | Robert E. Uhrig FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Varga S Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| L-83-5, NUDOCS 8301110574 | |
| Download: ML17341B584 (8) | |
Text
gc-c 5 Zncem REGULATORY 1
RMATION DISTRIBUTION SYS (BIDS) 1 ~
t AOCESSION NBR:8301110574 DOC ~ DATE: 83/01/04 NOTARI'ZED; NO DOCKET FACIL:50-250 Turkey Point Planti Unit 3E Florida.Power -and Light 'C 05000250
.,50 251 Turkey Point.Plants Unit Qi 'Florida Power and Light 'C 05000251 AUTHBYNAME'UTHOR AF F Il IATION UHRIGpR ~ E ~
Florida Power 8 'Light Co ~
>REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION YARGAgS,A,"
Operating Reactors Branch 1
SUBJECT:
Forwards response to NRC 821105 1 tr L safety evaluation re util proposal to address potential si.ngle failure of two ECCS valves, DISTRIBUTION CODE:
AOO IS iCOPIES 'RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:. Q TITLE:
OR Submittal:
General Distribution NOTES'ECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME NRR ORB1 BC 01 INTERNAL: ELD/HOSE N
ORAB REG F
L OQ COPIES LTTR ENCL 7
7 i0 1
0 1
1 RECIPIENT ID'ODE/NAME NRR/DL D IR NRR/DSI/RAB RGN2 COPIES LTTR ENCL 1,
1 1
1 1
1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NRC PDR NTI' 09 02 b
6 1
1 1
LPDR NSIC 03 05 1
1 1
- TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED; LTTR 23 ENCL 21
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P OX 14000, JUNO BEACH, FL 33408 FLORIDAPOWER & LIGHTCOMPANY January 4,
1983 L-83-5 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Steven A. Varga, Chief Operating Reactors Branch bl Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Mr. Varga:
Re:
Turkey Point Units 3
8 4
Docket Nos.'0-250 In 50-251 Sin le Failure -
ECCS Valves We have reviewed your letter dated November 5, 1982, which contained the Staff's Safety Evaluation of our proposal to address the potential single failure of two ECCS valves.
This letter also requested information'con-cerning our LOCA procedures and valve positioning.
Our responses
.to the question identified in the letter are attached.
Should you or your staff have any additional questions on this subject, please contact us.
Very truly yours, Robert E. Uhrig Vice President Advanced Systems 5 Technology REU/PLP/cab cc:
J.
P. O'Rei lly, Region II Harold F.
Rei s, Esquire PNS-LI-83-005 830iii0574 830i04 PDR ADOCK 05000250 P
PDR PEOPLE... SERVING PEOPLE
Re:
Turkey Point Units 3
8 4
Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Sin le Failure - ECCS Valves uestion la A nuclear or nuclear-turbine operator must be assigned to each of the two Motor Control Centers such that successful action on the part of either operator is sufficient to allow switchover to recirculation.
Res onse la Step 5.2 of Emergency Operating Procedure 20001 (E-1) requires the nuclear operator (N.O.) and the nuclear turbine operator (N.T.O.) to perform the necessary breaker 'actions.
(}uestion 1b These operators should be dispatched to their respective NCCs as soon as LOCA has been identified.
Res onse lb The control room operators are required to monitor RWST level closely.
They will require the N.O. and the N.T.O. to proceed to the respective MCCs when a low-level is imminent.
During this type of postulated
- event, the N.O.
and N.T.O. could be more affectively used for other duties while the RWST level is still above the low-level alarm.
(}uestion 1c They should have no other responsibilities until switchover to'recirculation is complete.
Res onse lc Once dispatched to the respective NCCs, the N.O.
and N.T.O. have no other responsibilities until swi tchover to recirculation is complete.
(}uestion 1d Power should not be rei nstated unti l the low-level
( 115,000 gal) on the RWST is reached.
Res onse 1d Our procedure says that the breaker closing evolution should be started before the low-level alarm is reached and that it must be completed before the low low-level alarm is reached.
It is our opinion that the risk of inadvertent opening of these valves during the relatively short time period between arrival of the operators and the low-level alarm is low, and that it is more important to emphasize that the power must be restored by the low low-level alarm.
A
Page 2
Turkey Point Units 3
8 4
Docket Nos. 50-250, 50-251 Sin le Failure - ECCS Valves question le This procedure should be emphasized in the training and.requalification of nuclear operators and nuclear-turbine operators.
Res onse le This procedure is emphasized in the training and requalification of nuclear operators and nuclear turbine operators.
uestion 2
Single continuous positi ve indication for valves 862 MB, 863 A8B and 864 AEB could be provided.
In addi tion, the procedures used for removal of power from the above valves shall include the requirements for visual verifi-cation of the proper valve posi tion prior to power removal.
Res onse 2
We are still considering the issue of conti nuous positive i ndication of these valves in the control room.
We will provide an update response on the item by February 15, 1983.
In addi tion, if this amendment is approved we will revise our procedures to require visual verifi,cation of the proper valve position of these valves prior to power removal.
question 3
The responses to our request for confirmation of the items identified in our letter dated October 13, 1982.
Res onse 3
Our confi rmation of the items in the October 13, 1982, letter was provided in our letter (L-82-499) dated November 10, 1982.
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