ML17338A474
| ML17338A474 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Turkey Point  |
| Issue date: | 12/15/1978 |
| From: | Robert Lewis, Verdery E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17338A471 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-250-78-30, 50-251-78-30, NUDOCS 7901310132 | |
| Download: ML17338A474 (8) | |
See also: IR 05000250/1978030
Text
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTASTREET, N.W.
ATLANTA,GEORGIA 30303
Report Nos.:
50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
Docket Nos.:
50-250
and 50-251
License Nos.:
and DPR-41
Licensee:
Florida Power and Light Company
P.
0.
Box 013100
9250 West Flagler Street
Miami, Florida 33101
Facility Name:
Turkey Point Units
3 and
4
Inspection at:
Turkey Point Site, Florida City, Florida
Inspection
conducted:
December 5-7,
1978
Inspector:
E.
H. Verd ry
Approved by~~
~< R.
C. Lewis, Chief
Reactor Projects
Section
No
~
2
Reactor Operations
and Nuclear Support Branch
/z- Ja= ~
Date
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on December
5-7
1978
(Re ort Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30)
'P."
with Technical Specification safety limits, limiting system safety settings
and limiting conditions for operation,
followup of reportable
occurrence
and outstanding
items.
The inspection involved 20 inspector-hours
onsite
by one
NRC inspector.
Results:
In the three areas
inspected,
no items of noncompliance
or devia-
tions were identified in two areas;
one apparent
item on noncompliance
was
identified in one area (infraction - failure to follow procedures
for
lineup of Boric Acid Recirculation
System
(250/78-30-01) - paragraph I-5)
0
4t
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
DETAILS
Prepared
. Verdery, React
Inspector
eactor Projects
Section
No.
2
Reactor Operations
and Nuclear
Support Branch
Date
Dates of Inspection:
December 5-7,
1978
Reviewed by:
R.
C. Lewis, Chief
~ ~~reactor Projects
Section
No.
2
Reactor Operations
and Nuclear
Support
Branch
1.
Persons
Contacted
Florida Power
and Li ht
Com an
-H. E.
-"J. K.
-"J. E.
-D.
W.
"J
P
"V
B
A. E.
R. J.
""G. D.
-J.
W.
-"R. E.
-P. J.
~J.
R.
Yaeger,
Plant Manager
Hays, Plant Superintendent,
Nuclear
Moore, Superintendent,
Nuclear Operations
Jones,
equality Control Supervisor
Mendieta,
IRC Department
Supervisor
Wager, Operations
Supervisor,
Nuclear
Siebe,
Assistant
Manager
OgA,
(GO)
Spooner,
gAO Supervisor
Whittier, Licensing Engineer,
General Office
Brown, Assistant
Manager,
Systems
gA (GO)
Garrett,
Plant Security Supervisor
White, Maintenance
Superintendent
Pendland,
Licensing Engineer,
General Office
The inspector
contacted
several
operators
and technical
support person-
nel not listed.
"'Denotes
those attending
the exit interview.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous
Ins ection Findin s
Not Inspected
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
3.
New Unresolved
Items
None Identified
4.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with the licensee
representatives
denoted in para-
graph
1 at the conclusion of the inspection
on December
7,
1978.
The
scope
and findings of the inspection
were discussed.
During the exit
interview the senior licensee
representative
was informed that one
unresolved
item had been identified during the inspection relating to
the lineup for recirculation of the Boric Acid Storage
Tanks.
Subse-
quent to the inspection
on December
12,
1978,
the inspector
telephoned
the licensee
and informed him that the unresolved
item had been
upgraded
to an item of noncompliance
based
upon discussions
with regional
management.
The licensee
recognized
the problem
and had implemented
temporary corrective action.
Emer enc
Borate Flo
ath Durin
Boric Acid Stora
e Tank
(BAST)
Recirculation
During a review of licensee
compliance with Technical Specifications,
on December 5,
1978 the inspector identified an apparent violation of
T.S. 3.6.b.4 involving the
Chemical
and Volume Control System.
The
inspector
determined that the licensee
was routinely isolating the
normal
and emergency
borate
flowpath to the unit 3 reactor
from the
BAST.
This lineup was necessitated
by continuing seat
leakage
through
Emergency
Borate Valve No. 350.
Flow from the running Boric Acid
Transfer
Pump must be isolated
from valve 350 to prevent inadvertent
boration of the Unit 3 during recirculation of the
BAST A.
OP 2601.1
CVCS Boric Acid System Valve Alignment, specifies
a valve lineup which
would have both transfer
pumps
3A and
3B lined up to take
a suction
on
BAST A for Unit 3 through the filter, correspondingly transfer
pumps
4A and
4B are lined up for BAST C for Unit 4 through the Unit 4 filter.
BAST B is specified to remain isolated
from all transfer
pumps
and
receive
continuous recirculation
from the newly installed "mini
recirc" pumps.
The actual valve of alignment of this system varied
significantly from the lineup specified in OP 2601.1.
On December 5,
1978,
the day shift nuclear operator
had isolated
the normal injection
flowpath by closing valves
342 and
341
and leaving the
3B transfer
pump lined up on BAST B. The evening shift nuclear operator
on the
same
date demonstrated
to the inspector
the lineup which he routinely
made during recirculation of the
A BAST.
This lineup involved shifting
the suction
and discharge
of the
3B transfer
pump from BAST B to BAST
A prior to isolating the discharge
of the
3A transfer
pump.
The
latter lineup would insure that the required injection flowpath remained
lined up during recirculation in accordance
with T.S. 3.6.b.4.
The
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
lineup used
by the day shift nuclear operator
would require nuclear
operator action to restore
the required injection flowpath.
Neither
of these
two lineups
was covered
by an approved plant procedure.
Further discussions
with other nuclear plant supervisors
and nuclear
control center operators
revealed that they were not aware, in all
cases
of the varied lineups which were being used.
The lineup is further complicated
by the fact that the mini-recircula-
tion pumps
have experienced
multiple seal failures
and are therefore
not used to continuously recirculate
the Boron Injection Tank.
The inspector
expressed
his concern that the normal
and emergency
boration flow paths
on Unit 3 have been routinely isolated without
proper administrative control or approved plant procedures.
The
licensee
indicated that isolation of a manual valve in a system required
to be operable
did not, in their previous interpretation of the Technical
Specifications,
make that system or flowpath inoperable, particularly
where operator action from the control
room was necessary
to initiate
emergency
or normal boration.
Based
upon review of this situation
with Regional Office management,
the failure to properly control the
Boric Acid System Valve alignment in accordance
with an approved
procedure
or proper administrative controls
has
been designated
an
infraction (250/78-30-01).
In response
to the concern identified by the inspector,
the licensee
issued
a Special Instruction on December
6,
1978, specifying the
correct Boric Acid System lineup to preclude interruption of one of
the
two required boric acid injection flowpaths.
The flowpath from
the Refueling Water Storage
Tank was not affected by this lineup.
The
licensee
indicated that valve 350 would be repaired during the fo~tB-
coming Unit 3 refueling outage.
6.
Limitin Conditions for 0 eration
Safet
Limits
and Limitin
Safet
S stem Settin
s
The inspector
reviewed operating records,
surveillance
records,
and
performed visual observations
and discussions
with licensee
personnel
to ascertain
compliance with various Technical Specification requirements.
Specifically, the inspector
reviewed the following records for the
month of August 1978:
a.
Minimum Equipment Lists, Units
3 and
4
b.
Nuclear Control Center Operator's
Data Sheets,
Units
3 and
4
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
c.
Selected Strip Chart Records for:
Over Power Flux, Channels
325
and
326
Nuclear Flux, Channel
353
Loop Cold Leg Temperature,
Channel
324
d.
Nuclear Control Center Operator's
Chronological Logbook, Unit 3
e.
Nuclear Operator
Log Sheets
No items of noncompliance
were identified.
7.
Re ortable Events Follow-U
The following reportable
event
was reviewed to ascertain
that:
Reporting requirements
of Technical Specification 6.9.2
were met;
Corrective action
was taken
as required
by Appendix
B to
The event
was reviewed
and evaluated;
and
The facility was operated within the requirements
of 10CFR 50.59
and the Technical Specification
subsequent
to the event.
50-251/78-15:
Boron Injection Tank Concentration
I,ow.
8.
Re ional Office Review of Re ortable Events
Reportable
events
described
below were reviewed at the Regional Office
to verify that:
Regional Office initial screening
actions
were completed
based
on
assessment
of the reportable
event notification.
Details were clearly reported to the
NRC as required
by Technical
Specifications,
Licensee
conditions or regulations.
Reporting requirements
have been met.
The cause
appeared
accurate
and
was supported
by report details.
Corrective actions
appeared
appropriate
to correct the cause.
The generic applicability to other components,
similar systems
or
activities within the facility has
been considered.
A
~
~
RII Report Nos. 50-250/78-30
and 50-251/78-30
The Licensee
Event Report
(LER) form was completed
and the responses
appeared
to be appropriate.
The Regional Office has
assessed
the generic applicability of the
LER (e.g.,
to the affected plant and other plants).
The review included review of Technical Specifications
and the following
event reports:
a.
50-250/78-12:
Condensate
Storage
Tank Low Level
b.
50-250/78-13:
Condensate
Storage
Tank Low Level
c.
50-250/78-15:
Hydraulic Snubber Failures
d.
50-250/78-16:
Intake Cooling Water
Pump Failure
e.
50-251/78-13:
Condensate
Storage
Tank Low Level
f.
50-251/78-14:
Condensate
Storage
Tank Low Level
The above event reports
were closed
and the inspector
had no further
questions.