ML17334A574
| ML17334A574 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/26/1997 |
| From: | Richards S NRC (Affiliation Not Assigned) |
| To: | Fitzpatrick E INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17334A575 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-97-201, 50-316-97-201, NUDOCS 9712030221 | |
| Download: ML17334A574 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1997201
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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMlSSlON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 2055&4001
Noverber 26,
1997
Mr. E.
E. Fitzpatrick
Vice President-
Nuclear
500 Circle Drive
Buchanan,
Michigan 49107-1395
SUBJECT:
DONALD C.
COOK,
UNITS
1
& 2 DESIGN
INSPECTION
{NRC INSPECTION
REPORT
NO. 50-315,
316/97-201)
Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:
From August
4 through September
12,
1997,
the staff of the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission
{NRC), Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
(NRR),
Events Assessment,
Generic
Communications
and Special
Inspection
Branch,
conducted
a design inspection at the D. C.
Cook Nuclear
Power Plant,
Units
1
& 2, of the Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR) system,
the Component
Cooling
Mater
{CCM) system,
and their support-interface
systems.
The inspection
team
consisted of a team leader
from NRR and five contractor engineers
from the
Stone
& Mebster Engineering Corporation
{SMEC).
The primary objective of the
design inspection
was to evaluate
the capability of the selected
systems to
perform the safety functions required
by their design
bases,
the adherence
of
the systems
to their design
and licensing bases,
and the consistency
of the
as-built configuration
and system operations with the Updated Final Safety
Analysis Report
{UFSAR).
The findings of the inspection
were discussed
during
an exit meeting
on September
12,
1997,
and are presented
in the enclosed
report.
The team identified
a number of issues
concerning
design
and procedural
control, safety evaluations,
engineering
judgement, operability
determinations,
and consistency
between the
UFSAR and
Technical Specifications
(TS).
Some of these
issues
affected the ability of
the systems
to perform their safety functions.
Examples of these
issues
are
listed below.
(2)
Revisions
made in 1992 to the emergency
operating
procedure for the
manual
swapover
from the refueling water storage
tank
(RMST) to the
containment recirculation
sump during
a loss of coolant accident created
a single failure vulnerability that potentially could have
caused
both
trains of the centrifugal charging
and safety injection pumps to be
kp-I
Operational
changes after 1988, permitted the plant to operate
above the
design basis ultimate heat sink temperature
of 76'F without your staff
having performed
a
10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation,
and without considering
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Mr. Fitzpatrick
Novarber
26,
1997
the impact this would have
on overall plant operation.
As a result,
an
apparent
unreviewed safety question
and unanalyzed
condition was created
in )988,
when the plant operated for 22 days with an averaged
ultimate
heat sink temperature
of 81'F, creating the potential for safety-related
equipment in the control
room to not perform its safety function under
design basis
assumptions.
{3)
The licensee
documented
in a letter to the
NRC, dated
December
29,
1978,
containment
sump enhancement
modiFications that consisted of installing
five 3/4-inch vent holes in the roof of the containment recirculation
sump.
However, the
UFSAR was not updated to reflect these
changes,
and
the vent holes
were in excess
of the 1/4-inch
sump particulate retention
design basis
value.
In addition,
these
vents were sealed
in 1996
and
1997 without performing
a
10 CFR Part 50.59 evaluation,
and without an
adequate
understanding
oF the commitment
made to the
NRC to maintain
vents in the containment recirculation
sump.
(4)
During the Unit 2 1996 refueling outage,
both
CCW and
ESW trains were
r moved from service contrary to the assumptions
contained
in Chapter
9
e
of the
UFSAR, with the intention by your stafF of performing
a dua 1
CCW/ESW train outage.
Although the dual train outage
was not fully
sustained
as originally planned
by your staff, this operational
condition would have placed the plant at increased risk, outside of its
design basis,
and in an unanalyzed
condition.
Th t
am also identified examples
involving:
(1) failure to account for
instrument bias
and establish
the proper refueling water storage
tank
(RW
)
and containment level setpoints
necessary
to preclude
premature
manual
switchover
and subsequent
potential vortexing in the containment
sump,
{ )
failure to remove fibrous insulation material
from containment
cable trays,
that could potentially be swept into and block in excess of the design value
of 50 percent of the containment recirculation
sump screen
area,
and {3) the
creation of a common-mode failure vulnerability that could potentially clog
redundant trains of ECCS throttle injection valves
and containment
spray
nozzles.
On September
8,
1997, your staff initiated
a dual unit shutdown,
and issued
a
notification of an unusual
event
{NOUE), as
a result of the inability to
demonstrate
to the team that the
ECCS system would have performed its safety
function during post-LOCA conditions
under all postulated
accident
scenarios.
On September
19,
1997, the
NRC issued
a conFirmatory action letter listing
many of the issues
identified during this inspection.
Although Items
1, 2,
and
4 listed above
had
been
known and documented
by your
staff,
no apparent effective action was taken to correct the problems or their
root causes.
The team concluded that
a contributing cause to these
issues
and
others identified in the enclosed report was that prior to this inspection,
I
o
Mr. Fitzpatrick
Nov8iber 26,
1997
your staff had
an apparent
lack of understanding
of what constitutes
the
plant's design basis,
the role of the
and
how each of these
are
affected
We expect that your staff will evaluate
the applicability of the results
and
specific findings of this inspection to other systems
and components
throughout the plant.
In addition, your staff should evaluate
the findings of
this inspection against your February 6,
1997 response
to the
NRC 50.54(f)
letter concerning
the adequacy
and availability of design
bases
information.
Please
provide
a schedule,
within 60 days, detailing your plans to complete
the corrective actions for the open items listed in Appendix A to the enclosed
report.
This schedule will enable
the
NRC staff to plan for the reinspection
and closeout of these
items.
.
Docket Nos.:
50-315
and 50-316
Original signed by
Stuart A. Richards,
Chief
Events Assessment,
Generic Communications,
and Special
Inspection
Branch
Division of Reactor
Program
Management
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
In accordance
with 10 CFR 2.790(a),
a copy of this letter and the enclosure
will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
Any enforcement
action
resulting from this inspection will be handled
by
NRC Region III via separate
correspondence.
Should you have
any questions
concerning the enclosed
inspection report,
please
contact the project manager,
Mr. John
B. Hickman at
(301) 415-3017.
1
Sincerely,
Enclosure:
Inspection
Report 50-315,316/97-201
cc w/enclosure:
See next page
- SEE PREVIOUS
CONCURRENCE
DOCUMENT NAME:
A:iCOOK.RPT
To receive
a co y of this docwent,
indicate in the box C=Co y u/o attachment/enclosure
E=Co y with attachment/enclosure
N = No copy
OFFICE
PECB
PECB
PDI II-3
C:PECB
NAME
DATE
JThom son*
11
24 97
DPNorkin*
11 12/97
GHMarcus*
11 06 97
SARichards
ll 3
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OFFICIAL RECORD
COPY
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DISTRIBUTION:
',Docket File 50-315
E 316
I
PUBLIC
PECB R/F
BSheron
JWRoe,
SARichards,
DNorkin,
TTHartin,
EGAdensam,
RSavio,
JBHickman,
CBoyle,
FDBrown, SRI
HJHiller, Region I
CEHehl,
Region I
JTWiggins,
Region I
ARBlough, Region I
LAReyes,
Region II
JRJohnson,
Region II
JPJaudon,
Region II
.DNCollins, Region II
ABBeach,
Region III
CDPederson,
Region III
JCaldwell,
Region III
GEGr'a'nt,
Region III
EWHerschoff,
Region
IV
, TPGwynn,'egion
IV
AHowell,.-Regi on IV
RAScarano,
Region
IV
,';Inspection
Team
,iACRS (3)
,,OGC.(3).
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E. E. Fitzpatrick
indiana Michigan Power Company-
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
Units 1 and 2
Regional Administrator, Region III
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
801 Warrenville Road
Lisle, IL 60532-4351
Attorney General
Department of Attorney General
525 West Ottawa Street
Lansing, Ml 48913
Township Supervisor
Lake Township Hall
P.O. Box 818
Bridgman, Ml 49106
AI Blind, Site Vice President
Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant
1 Cook Place
Bridgman, Ml 49106
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspector's Office
7700 Red Arrow Highway
Stevensville, Ml 49127
Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge
2300 N Street, NW.
Washington, DC 20037
Mayor, City of Bridgman
P.O. Box 366
Bridgman, Ml 49106
Special Assistant to the Governor
Room
1 - State Capitol
Lansing, Ml 48909
Drinking Water and Radiological
Protection Division
Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality .
3423 N. Martin Luther King Jr Blvd
P.O. Box 30630 CPH Mailroom
Lansing, Ml 48909-8130
Steve J. Brewer
Indiana Michigan Power Company
Nuclear Generation Group
500 Circle Drive
Buchanan, MI 49107
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