ML17332A407
| ML17332A407 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 11/14/1994 |
| From: | John Hickman Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Fitzpatrick E AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER SERVICE CORP., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| References | |
| TAC-M83609, TAC-M83610, NUDOCS 9411220305 | |
| Download: ML17332A407 (4) | |
Text
November 14, 94 Mr. E.
E. Fitzpatrick, Vice President Indiana Michigan Power Company c/o American Electric Power Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, OH 43215
SUBJECT:
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE IPEEE FOR DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, UNIT NOS.
1 AND 2 (TAC NOS.
M83609 AND M83610)
Dear Mr. Fitzpatrick:
A meeting was held at our offices on October 25,
- 1994, between members of your
- staff, NRC and contractor reviewers to discuss the D.
C.
Cook IPEEE.
Based on that meeting you have made significant improvements in the IPEEE since our initial audit of the IPEEE at the Cook site in July.
A few questions came up at the October meeting for which your staff did not have immediate answers.
Therefore, enclosed is a list of additional requests for information based on the discussion at that meeting.
Please advise me if you anticipate it will take more than 90 days to respond to these questions.
Please call me at (301) 504-3017, if you have any comments or questions.
Sincerely, ORIGINAL SIGNED BY John B. Hickman, Project Manager Project Directorate III-1 Division of Reactor Projects III/IV Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Docket Nos.
50-315 and 50-316
Enclosure:
RAI cc w/encl:
See next page DISTRIBUTION:
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Mr. E.
E. Fitzpatrick Indiana Michigan Power Company CC:
Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 801 Warrenville Road Lisle, Illinois 60532-4351 Attorney General Department of Attorney General 525 West Ottawa Street
- Lansing, Michigan 48913 Township Supervisor Lake Township Hall Post Office Box 818 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 Al Blind, Plant Manager Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Post Office Box 458 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector Office 7700 Red Arrow Highway Stevensville, Michigan 49127 Gerald Charnoff, Esquire
- Shaw, Pittman, Potts and Trowbridge 2300 N Street, N.
W.
Washington, DC 20037 Mayor, City of Bridgman Post Office Box 366 Bridgman, Michigan 49106 Special Assistant to the Governor Room 1
State Capitol
- Lansing, Michigan 48909 Nuclear Facilities and Environmental Monitoring Section Office Division of Radiological Health Department of Public Health 3423 N. Logan Street P. 0.
Box 30195
- Lansing, Michigan 48909 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Hr. S.
Brewer American Electric Power Service Corporation 1 Riverside Plaza
- Columbus, Ohio 43215
Additional Re uests for Information Re ardin the Individual Plant Examination of Externall Initiated Events IPEEE Based on Meetin with Licensee on October 25 1994 Fire:
2.
3.
4.
Assuming a zero frequency of fire for a compartment (as was done for the three cable vaults) is not acceptable practice.
The conditional core damage frequency from loss of all cables in any of the three cable vaults is equal to 1.0, without any recovery actions.
Please provide an analysis of the recovery actions assuming complete loss of all cables in each of the three cable vaults (individually).
There is a potential for turbine building fire to damage cabinets in fire zones 41 and 42A, simultaneously.
This is due to the normally open roll-up door separating zone 42A from the turbine building.
Please provide an analysis of the plant response given simultaneous damage to all cables and equipment in these two rooms.
Human error analysis from Seabrook was used for the control room fire analysis in the IPEEE fire addendum.
Since it is important for understanding the ability of the plant operating staff to deal with fire events in areas where a large number of safety-related systems may be
- affected, please provide the basis for using the Seabrook human error analysis for D.
C.
Cook scenarios.
The main feedwater cables have not been traced at D.
C. Cook.
The assumption that for some zones/areas, the Power Conversion System (PCS) may survive is not well founded.
Please provide clarification as to the contribution of the main feedwater to the screened out Fire zones/areas and the significant core damage scenarios.
Seismic:
Please describe the rationale for selection of the ll components for seismic fragi1ity re-evaluation.
Justify how this rationale insures that all components likely to control plant seismic capability and severe accident risk (both for core damage and for radioactive release) have been considered in the re-evaluation.
2.
3.
Please provide the data, calculations, and results for the seismic fragility re-evaluations that were performed for the 11 selected components.
Please provide a description of the development of soil-structure interaction (SSI) margin factors used in the fragility re-evaluations.
Justify the basis for not generating new in-structure spectra for development of the SSI margin factors.
Explain how these SSI margin factors have been applied.
E. Fitzpatrick 5.
6.
7.
Please provide an explanation as to why the 600 VAC transformers, RPS
[reactor protection system]
- panels, turbine building pedestal and 250 VDC system have dropped out of the dominant contributor list, whereas cable trays have been introduced to this list.
Please provide a discussion of how the IPEEE seismic addendum addresses/impacts the containment performance assessment.
Other than the list of dominant contributors identified for core damage frequency, what are the dominant contributors to containment failure (i.e., early release or large late release) and failure of accident mitigation systems?
Do the new fragilities alter the containment performance insights presented in the original IPEEE submittal?
Please provide a discussion of the peer review process and its results as applied to the seismic addendum/re-evaluation.
For all recommended actions/fixes identified in the seismic IPEEE walkdowns (including all items documented by the licensee's walkdown contractor),
please provide a table delineating the recommended action/item, its analysis and/or treatment in the seismic IPEEE process, and its disposition status.