ML17332A227
| ML17332A227 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 07/19/1994 |
| From: | Kropp W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17332A226 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-94-13, 50-316-94-13, NUDOCS 9407260188 | |
| Download: ML17332A227 (24) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1994013
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report Nos.
50-315/94013(DRP);
50-316/94013(DRP)
Docket Nos. 50-315" 50-316
License Nos.
Licensee:
Company
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus,
OH
43216
Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear
Power Plant, Units
1 and
2
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site,
Bridgman, NI
Inspection
Conducted:
June
4 through July 1,
1994
Inspectors:
J.
A. Isom
D. J. Hartland
D. L.
S epard
Approved By:
W. J.
opp, Chief
React
Projects
Section
2A
Date
e
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection from June
4
1994
throu
h Jul
1
1994
Re ort Nos.
50-315
94013
DRP .50-316
94013
Areas
Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
safety inspection
by the resident
inspectors of action
on previous inspection findings; operational
safety
verifications; onsite event follow-up; current material conditions;
housekeeping
and plant cleanliness;
safety assessment/quality
verification;
maintenance activities;
and surveillance activities.
Results:
In the eight areas
inspected,
one violation was identified that
pertained to repeated
packing failures with a test selector valve associated
with the main steam stop valve (paragraph
5.a).
Four non-cited violations
were identified during the inspectors'ER
review.
The following is
a summary of the licensee's
performance during this
inspection period:
Plant
0 erations:
0
The licensee's
performance
in this area
was good.
The modification performed
on the Unit 1'control
room that included installing computer consoles
at
operators'esks,
was useful for trending parameters
and for entering action
requests.
Also, the new digital controllers allowed increased
precision in
control of equipment in service.
The inspectors
also observed
one of the five
9407260i88 940720
ADOCK 0500031S
operating
crews during the annual
dynamic simulator requalification sessions
and noted that the crew performed very well using the Emergency Operating
Procedures
(EOP).
The operators
displayed excellent
command
and control
and
communications.
Also, the inspectors
noted that the licensee's
line
management
was involved in the evaluation sessions.
Maintenance
and Surveillance:
The licensee's
performance in this area
was adequate.
The
electricians'erformed
a thorough investigation
and repaired
a safety-related
motor-operated
valve in the safety injection, system.
However,
a violation was-
identified concerning the repetitive packing failure of a Unit 2 main steam
test selector valve over a period of two years that resulted in several
entries into four hour Limiting Condition of Operations
(paragraph
5.a).
The
inspectors
were concerned
because
neither the licensee's staff nor program
identified this repetitive packing failure as
a candidate for the forced
outage
maintenance list.
An unresolved
item was identified concerning the
failure to identify this rework in a Condition Report.
The inspectors
determined that the repair to the Unit
1
ATWS Mitigation System
Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) was performed satisfactorily.
The inspectors
also
noted that the licensee
took additional action to ensure that the system
outage time would be minimized in the future.
DETAI S
Persons
Contacted
"A. A.
K. R.
- L
J.
E.
. R. K.
D. C.
- T. P.
P.
F.
- D. L.
T. K.
- P
G
- J. S.
L. H.
- G. A;
Blind, Plant Manager
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager-.Production
Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager-Technical
Rutkowski, Assistant
Plant Manager,
Support
Gillespie,
Executive Staff Assistant
Loope,
Executive Staff Assistant
Beilman, Maintenance
Superintendent
Carteaux,
Training Superintendent
Noble, Radiation Protection Superintendent
Postlewait,
Design
Changes
Superintendent
Schoepf,
Project Engineering Superintendent
Wiebe, guality Assurance
and Controls Superintendent
Vanginhoven, Site Design Superintendent
Weber,
Plant Engineering Superintendent
- Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted
on July 5,
1994.
The inspectors
also
had discussions
with other licensee
employees,
including members of the technical
and engineering staffs, reactor
and
auxiliary operators,
shift engineers
and foremen,
and electrical,
mechanical
and instrument maintenance
personnel,
and contract security
personnel.
ction on Previous
Ins ec ion Findin s (92701)
a.
Closed
Unresolved
Item 50-316 94009-02 DRP:
Re ack of
est
Selector Valve
2-MMO-240:
b.
Main Steam Stop
Dump Valve Test Selector,
2-MM0-240, was repacked
several
times between
1992 and
1994.
The inspectors
reviewed this
matter
and closed it based
on
a violation described
in paragraph
5.a. of this report.
Closed
Unresolved
Item 50-315 93018-01:
Low AFW Bearing Oil
Condition
The inspectors
were concerned that the low oil condition found on
the Unit 2 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
pump during
a plant
tour
on September
2,
1993; would result in inadequate
bearing
lubrication to the pump.
The inspectors
observed
the testing
performed
by the system engineer
on the spare auxiliary feedwater
pump to determine the minimum oil quantity needed to ensure
sufficient bearing lubrication.
This test verified that there
was
adequate oil in the reservoir to provide lubrication to the
bearings.
The inspectors
discussed
the results of this testing in
more detail in paragraph
4.a. of NRC inspection report
50-315/93019(DRP);50-316/93019(DRP).
This item is closed.
0
~5
~ W
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
Plant 0 erations:
~
~
~
The licensee
ope rated both units up to full power during the inspection
period, with no significant operational
problems noted.
The licensee
reduced
power
on Unit 2 to 55 percent
on June
10,
1994, to repair
a weld
leak on an "East" main feed
pump suction instrument line.
The licensee
returned Unit 2 to full power on June
12,
1994.
a 0
0 e
tio l
S
et
Ve if catio
(71707)
The inspectors verified that the facility was being operated
in
conformance with the licenses
and regulatory requirements,
and
that the licensee's
management
control system
was effective in
ensuring
safe operation of the plant.
On a sampling basis the inspectors verified proper control
room
staffing and coordination of plant activities; verified operator
adherence
with procedures
and technical specifications;
monitored
control
room indications for abnormalities; verified that
electrical
power was available;
and observed
the frequency of
plant and control
room visits by station
management.
The
inspectors
reviewed applicable logs
and conducted
discussions
with
.control
room operators
throughout the inspection period.
The
inspectors
observed
a number of control
room shift turnovers.
The
turnovers,were
conducted
in a professional
manner
and included log
reviews,
panel
walkdowns, discussions
of maintenance
and
surveillance activities in progress
or planned,
and associated
LCO
time restraints,
as applicable.
The inspectors
had the following
observations:
b.
~
The reactor operators
found,the
new Unit
1 control
room
modification, with the computer consoles
at
operators'esks,
was useful for trending parameters
and for entering
action requests.
Also, the new digital controllers allowed
increased
precision in control of equipment in service.
~
The inspectors
observed
one of the five operating
crews
during the annual
dynamic simulator requalification sessions
and noted that the crew performed very well using the
Emergency Operating
Procedures
(EOP).
The operators
displayed excellent
command
and control
and communications.
Also, the inspectors
noted that the licensee's
line
management
was involved in the evaluation sessions.
Onsite Event
Fo low-u : (93702)
During the inspection 'period, the licensee
experienced
an event,
which required
prompt notification of the
NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72.
The inspectors
pursued the event onsite with licensee
and/or other
NRC officials.
The inspectors verified that any
required notification was correct
and timely.
The inspectors
also
verified that the licensee initiated prompt and appropriate
actions.
The specific event was
as follows:
On June
23,
1994, the licensee
made
a
1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> report in accordance
with 10 CFR 73.71
and Generic Letter 91-03 after they determined
that'nescorted
access
would have
been denied to a contractor
individual based
on developed
information.
The individual was
temporarily employed during the recent Unit
1 refueling outage.
The inspectors will review the licensee's
LER to verify that
adequate
root cause for the event is determined
and that effective.
corrective actions
are taken to minimize recurrence.
c.
Curre t Materia
Cond tio : (71707)
The inspectors
performed general
plant as well as selected
system
and component
walkdowns to assess
the general
and specific
. material condition of the plant, to verify that work requests
had
been initiated for identified equipment problems,
and to evaluate
housekeeping.
Walkdowns included
an assessment
of the buildings,
components,
and systems for proper identification and tagging,
accessibility, fire and security door integrity, scaffolding,
radiological controls,
and any unusual
conditions.
Unusual
conditions included but were not limited to water, oil, or other
liquids on the floor or equipment;
indications of leakage
through
ceiling, walls or floors; loose insulation; corrosion;
excessive
noise;
unusual
temperatures;
and abnormal ventilation and
lighting.
The inspectors
noted
no unusual
conditions during this
inspection period.
d.
Housekee
in
and Plant Cleanliness:
The inspectors
also monitored the status of housekeeping
and plant
cleanliness
for fire protection
and protection of safety-related
equipment
from intrusion of foreign matter,
and identified no
problems in this area.
Housekeeping
was considered
very good
during this inspection 'period.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Safet
Assessment
ual't
Verification: (40500
and 92700)
'ce
see
Eve t Re ort
ER
Follow-u : (92700)-
Through direct observations,
discussions
with licensee
personnel,
and
review of records,
the following event reports
were reviewed to
determine that reportability requirements
were fulfilled, that immediate
corrective action was accomplished,
and that corrective action to
prevent recurrence
had
been or would be accomplished
in accordance
with
Technical Specifications
(TS):
I
Closed
LER 315 93001:
Fuel handling exhaust
fan charcoal filter bed
alarm inoperable
due to moving alarm to new annunciator location.
On Parch
30,
1993, the technicians
disabled the "Fuel Handling Exhaust
'an Charcoal Filter Fire or Abnormal" alarm during
a modification to the
plant fire protection system.
When the operators
recognized
the fact
that the -problem with the alarm circuity placed the plant in Technical
Specification action statement 3.3.7.b.,
required compensatory
action to
station
a fire watch was taken.
As corrective actions,
the licensee
revised several
Plant Nanager
Procedures
that dealt with modifications
to require
a review of the modification activities to determine the
impact on Technical Specifications required'ystems.
In the past,
the
'esponsibility for this review was not clearly delineated
between the
maintenance
planner or the project engineer.
Additionally, as-a
lessons
learned,
the engineering
department
gave training on this
LER to other
project engineers.
The failure to properly implement the fire
protection modification resulted in a TS violation of fire watch
requirements.
However, this violation was not cited because
the
licensee identified the problem and initiated appropriate corrective
actions.
Therefore,
pursuant to the criteria spec'ified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B(2), no notice of violation will be issued.
This item is closed.
Closed
LER 315 93003-LL:
Fire watch patrols not established
per TS
due to personnel
error.
On July 2,
1993,
a reactor operator placed the Unit
1 fire detection
monitor alarm switch in the "off" position to reset
a standing
The switch was inadvertently left in that position for
over
7 hours8.101852e-5 days <br />0.00194 hours <br />1.157407e-5 weeks <br />2.6635e-6 months <br />.
In the "off" position, visual
and audible alarms
associated'ith
the pyrotronics fire detection
system would not alarm in
the control room.
The operators
were unaware of the mispositioned
switch and did not take compensatory
actions required
by TS.
Upon
discovery,
the operators
returned the switch to the "on" position,
and
toured the affected
alarmed 'areas.
No fires were discovered.
The
licensee
determined that the root cause
was operator error.
As
corrective action, the licensee
took the appropriate
administrative
actions with the personnel
involved.
h
This event involved
a violation of TS 3.3.3.7;
however,
the event
had
minimal safety significance
because
a fire system actuation or C02
header pressurized
alarm would still annunciate
in the control
room for
the areas
provided with fire suppression
capabilities.
In addition,
routine security guard patrols
and operator tours were, conducted
in the
areas that are monitored
by the fire detection
system but do not have
fire suppression
capabilities.
The licensee
proper ly reported the event
and took appropriate corrective action.
Therefore,
pursuant to the
criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, Section VII.B(2), no
notice of violation will be issued.
This,item is closed.
Closed
LER 315 93002-LL: Assumptions for high energy line break
(HELB)
not met due to use of low temperature
thermal links to maintain required
vent area.
On July 9,
1993, during
a review of assumptions
used in environmental
qualification related analysis,
the licensee
discovered that doors to
the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater
(TDAF'W) pump rooms
and the
adjacent
hallway might close following a HELB.
The licensee
purposely
maintained the doors
open to prevent pressurization
of the rooms
following a postulated
break of the four-inch 'steam supply lines to the
TDAFW pumps.
The licensee
determined that the original
HELB analysis for the
pump rooms only considered
a four-second
blowdown interval.
However,
a
subsequent
analysis
concluded that, since
a small line break would not
cause
any auto safety system actuation,
the accident could progress for
several
minutes.
This could result in the melting of thermal links used
for fire protection
and the closing of the doors.
With the doors shut,-
the
TDAFW pump rooms,
and possibly the adjoining East
(E) motor-driven
(HDAFW) pump rooms
as well, would become
pressurized.
This is contrary to the assumptions
in the
HELB analysis
as stated
in the
FSAR.
As immediate corrective action,
the licensee
blocked the doors
open
and
established
compensatory
TS-required fire watches.
As long-term action,
the licensee installed fusible links with higher temperature
ratings.
This event involved
a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion
III, "Design Control"; however,
the event
had minimal safety
significance
because
an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater
(AFW) system would not occur during
a rupture of the
TDAFW pump steam
supply line.
In addition, the licensee
determined that,
except for a
very small break,
the differential pressure
across
the doors would
prevent complete closure.
Operators
would then
be able to isolate the
break by closing valves from the control room.
The licensee
also
properly reported the event
and took appropriate corrective action.
Therefore,
pursuant to the criteria specified in 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix
C,Section VII.B(2), no notice of violation will be issued.
This item
is closed.
Closed
316 93006-
Exceeded
TS
LCO action time limit due to
time required for repair of charging
pump.
On July 6,
1993, the licensee
secured
the West
(W) centrifugal charging
pump
(CCP) due to degraded
performance.
After some troubleshooting,
the
licensee
determined that the
pump was inoperable
and the rotor assembly
needed to be replaced.
In anticipation that the repairs
would exceed
,the
TS
LCO time limit, the
NRC granted
a notice of enforcement
discretion
(NOED) on July 9,
1993.
The licensee
returned the
pump to
service
on July 10,
1993.
Upon disassembly of the rotor assembly,
the licensee
discovered that the
pump shaft
was cracked.
Although the cracks
were attributed to high
cycle low amplitude fatigue failure, the licensee
was unable to
determine the root cause of the failure.
As corrective action, the
licensee initiated
a design
change to install
some vibration monitoring
equipment
on the
CCPs.
In addition, the licensee
was evaluating
adjustments
to the surveillance
schedule to minimize pump starts.
This
item is closed.
Closed
Licensee
E e t
e
o t No.
This LER, dated
September
20,
1991,
was submitted to advise the
NRC that
a contractor
employee with
past positive fitness-for-duty
(FFD) test results
was granted
unescorted
access
to the D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant.
.10 CFR 26.27(a) requires
a management
and medical determination of
fitness for duty to be performed if an individual granted
unescorted
access
has
had previous positive
FFD test results.
also
requires
such
an evaluation to be completed prior to granting of
unescorted
access.
Contrary to this requirement,
the management
and medical determination
of fitness for duty was not completed prior to the granting of
unescorted
access for the individual because
the individual
and employer
did not advise the licensee of the past positive
FFD test results.
The
licensee identified the violation and initiated aggressive
corrective
actions
and
an investigation into the incident.
We have determined that
=
the violation meets the criteria of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, 'Section
VII,B(2) for a non-cited violation. (Refer to Inspection
Report
No. 50-
. 315/ 91020(DRSS);
50-316/91020(DRSS),
dated July 23,
1992, for related
information).
This item is closed.
Four non-cited violations were identified.
identified.
Maintenance Surveillance:
(62703
8 61726)
Maintenance Activities:
(62703)
No deviations
were
Routinely, station maintenance activities were observed
and/or
reviewed to ascer tain that they wer e conducted in accordance
with
approved
procedures,
regulatory guides,and
industry codes or
=
'tandards,
and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were also considered
during this review:
limiting conditions for operation
were met while components
or
systems
were removed from service;
approvals
were obtained prior
to initiating the work; functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior to returning components
or systems
to
service; quality control records
were maintained;
and activities
were accomplished
by qualified personnel.
P
The inspectors
observed
portions of the following activities
and
did not identify any deficiencies:
JO¹ R0018201,
Preventive
Maintenance
on Plant Air Compressor
1-OHE-41
JO¹ R0018176,
Preventive
Maintenance
on the Unit 2 North
Control
Rod Drive Mechanism Motor Generator
JO¹ C0021351,
Repair valve leakby on containment
spray
additive tank sample valve,
1-CTS-115
The inspectors identified concerns with the following maintenance
acti'vities:
1)
Re ack of Test Selector
Va ve
2-MNO-240
On Hay 25,
1994, the licensee
entered
a four hour Limiting
Condition for Operation
(LCO), as required
by Technical Specification (TS) 4.7.1.5. 1, to repack main steam stop
valve
(MSSV) dump valve test selector,
2-HHO-240.
TS 4.7. 1.5.1
was entered
because
repacking of the valve results
in isolation of one of the two dump valves associated
with
an
HSSV.
The inspectors
reviewed the maintenance
history
of valve 2-MHO-240 and determined that the valve was
repacked six times since the last refueling outage in 1992.
The repetitive packing failure on valve 2-MNO-240 was caused
by a pitted valve stem.
The inspectors'eview
of the maintenance
history determined
the following:
On July 8,
1992,
an operator identified that 2-HHO-240
had
a packing leak.
Because
the stem was badly
pitted, the mechanics
determined that Chesterton
packing,
which has
good sealing characteristics,
could
not be installed
and conventional
packing
was used.
The licensee initiated Action Request
(AR) ¹25594 to
replace the pitted valve stem.
The AR was scheduled
for the
1994 refueling outage
because
valve 2-HHO-240
-could not be isolated from the main steam header.
From December
1992 to May 1994, the mechanics
repacked
valve 2-MHO-240 five times with varying degrees
of
success.
Although repacking the valve initially
stopped the leak, the leak would recur due to the
repositioning of 2-HHO-240 during monthly surveillance
testing
on the
MSSV dump valves.
0
The number of times the valve was repacked,
the number
of LCO entries,
and the Unit 2 forced outage
dates
were
as follows:
7/12/92
7/15/92
7/21/92
8/01/92
8/18/92
9/25/92
11/10/92
12/23/92
5/11/93
8/04/93
8/09/93
ll/04/93
1/23/94
1/24/94
4/06/94
3/24/94
4/09/94
5/25/94
Valve repacked
Forced Outage-Node
5
Forced outage-
Node
5
Forced outage-
Node
5
Valve Repacked-
4hr
LCO
Valve Repacked-
4hr
LCO
Forced outage-
Mode
5
Valve Repacked-
4hr
LCO
Forced outage-
Node
5
Valve repacked
Forced outage-
Node
4
Valve Repacked-
4hr
LCO
On Hay 17,
1994, the most recent packing leak was
identified on 2-MNO-240.
Due to concerns
on the
possible affect on the associated
HSSV closure time,
the operators, issued Condition Report
(CR) 94-1049
on
Nay 24,
1994.
The operators
were also concerned that
a gross failure of the packing could result in an
NSSV
closure
and subsequent
Based
on these
concerns,
the operators
monitored
dump valve
pressures,
and guidance
was provided to the operators
in the shift turnover log on actions to be taken in
the event that the
HSSV started to drift closed.
Because of these
concerns
raised
by the operators,
the
maintenance
repack activity, initially scheduled
to be
worked at about 4:00
PM on Nay 25,
1994,
was completed
earlier in the day.
The licensee's
current programs
would not typically
identify rework activities such
as the repetitive
repacking of.2-HH0-240 that occurred from July 1992 to
May 1994.
The licensee's
process
to identify and
evaluate
adverse
trends
was
a
CR as described
in
procedure,
PHI-7030, "Corrective Action," Revision 20.
This procedure
required that maintenance
rework
performed within a three month period
be documented
by
a CR.
Generally,
these
types of rework issues
can
be
identified by the maintenance
planner during
a review
of the maintenance
history for the component.
However,
on this occasion,
the planner did not
identify the two most recent repacks
as rework and did
not issue
a condition report.
This matter is an
unresolved
item pending further
NRC review (50-
316;94013-01)
Additionally, because
most of the valve 2-HMO-240
repack activities were performed at about six month
10
Jy4
d4
intervals,
the inspectors
concluded that work on 2-
HMO-240 would not be identified as rework by the
"Corrective Action" program.
The system engineer
also
did not identify the stem replacement
as
a work
activity that was required to be performed to prevent
repeated
repacking of this valve.
Based
on discussions
with licensee
personnel
and
review of records,
the inspectors
concluded that the
licensee failed to correct the root cause (pitted
stem) for repeated
packing problems with valve 2-HMO-
240.
The licensee's
failure to take action to correct
the root cause of the repeated
on valve
2-HH0-240, which resulted in emergent entries into a
4
hour
LCO, is considered
a violation of Criterion XVI
of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix
B (50-316/94013-02(DRP)).
2)
IMO-316:
On June
26,
1994, the inspectors
observed
the
electricians'nvestigation
and repairs of valve IHO-361 on Unit 1.
This
motor-operated
valve
(HOV) provides the backup cross-connect
capability between the residual
heat
removal
and the safety
injection systems.
The operators initiated job order
(JO)
C00024672
because
the valve would not close unless
the
handswitch
was held in the "close" position during
a
surveillance.
When working properly,
once the handswitch is
taken to the close position, the seal-in feature of the
control circuit will provide power to the
HOV until .it is
fully closed.
Once the valve is shut, the torque switch
removes
power from the
HOV.
The inspectors
observed that the replacement of the closure
contacts in the motor control cubicle by the electricians
was performed well and with attention-to-detail.
Wiring
removal
and installation forms were used properly and wires
were neatly wrapped with tie-wrap after the repair.
After
wires were reconnected
to the contacts,
the electricians
also verified that the wires were properly secured.
Additionally, the ele'ctricians verified electrical interlock
checks
between the open
and closure circuits and measured
contact resistances
to'verify proper operation.
The inspectors
also noted good involvement by the first
level supervisor in this work activity.
The supervisor
provided
comments
and oversight during the repair period.
After the auxiliary contacts
were replaced,
the operators
tested
the valve and found that the replacement of the
contacts did not correct the problem.
The operators still
needed
to hold the switch in the close position in order to
ensure that the valve would fully close.
The supervisors
0
4k
and the electricians
performed further investigation
and
postulated that the other in-series contact,
the torque
switch contact,
could be intermittently cycling during valve
operation.
During this portion of troubleshooting,
electricians
observed
blue arc on two of the torque switch
contacts while the valve was in motion.
This indicated that
contacts
on the torque switch did not make full contact
during the valve movement.
Although the initial repair was
unsuccessful,
the inspectors
noted that the electricians
successfully identified the cause of the problem.
The licensee
replaced
the torque switch and the spring pack
assemblies.
Once these parts were replaced,
the valve
operated properly.
3)
AHSAC
The inspectors
determined that the repair to the Unit
1
anticipated transient without scram
(ATWS) Nitigation System
Actuation Circuitry (AHSAC) was performed
satisfactorily.
The inspectors
also noted that the licensee
took additional
action to ensure that the system outage time would be
minimized in the future.
The licensee
placed the system in bypass,
which rendered
ANSAC inoperable,
on Nay 30,
1994, after failure of a
controller in the circuitry.
The licensee initiated AR0
0072215 to repair the system within 21 days.
A few days
later, the licensee
upgraded
the start work date to June
10,
but could not replace the controller until June
13 due to
a
delay in planning the job.
The licensee calibrated
and
returned the system to service
on June
17,
1994.
Although AHSAC is not Technical Specification required
equipment,
the
NRC addressed
the need for licensees
to
repair the system in a prompt manner in Information Notice 92-06.
Survei
ce
ct'v'ties:
(61726)
During the inspection period, the inspecto} s observed technical
specification required surveillance testing
and verified that
testing
was performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures,
that
test instrumentation
was calibrated, that results
conformed with
technical specifications
and procedure
requirements
and were
reviewed,
and that any deficiencies identified during the testing
were properly resolved.
The inspectors
witnessed
portions of the following surveillances:
- 1-IHP-4030.STP.411,
"Reactor Trip SSPS
Logic and Reactor Trip
Breaker Train "B" Surveillance Test," Revision
3
12
C
0
- 2-IHP-4030.STP.511,
"Reactor Trip SSPS
Logic and Reactor Trip
Breaker Train "B" Surveillance Test," Revision
2
2-0HP-4030.STP.015,
"Full Length Control
Rod Operability Test,"
Revision
4
- 1-0HP-4030.STP.018,
Stop Valve
Pump Valve
Surveillance Test," Revision
One violation and one unresolved
item were identified.
No deviations
were identified.
Unresolved
Items
Unresolved
items are matters
about which more information is required in
order to ascertain
whether they are acceptable
items, violations, or
deviations.
An unresolved
item disclosed during the inspection is
discussed
in paragraph
5.a.
Neetin
s and Other Activities:
Exit Interview: (30703)
The inspectors
met with the licensee
representatives
denoted
in
paragraph
1 during the inspection period
and at the conclusion of the
inspection
on July 5,
1994.
The inspectors
summarized. the scope
and
results of the inspection
and discussed
the likely content of this
inspection report.
The licensee
acknowledged
the information and did
not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection
could be considered
proprietary in nature.
13
i
%1
)I J
ENCLOSURE
SYNOPSIS
OF OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS RESULTS
(BARTLETT NUCLEAR, INC.)
On June ll, 1992, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
(NRC), Office
of Investigation (OI), Region III (RIII), initiated an investigation to
determine if Bartlett Nuclear,
Inc. (BNI), Plymouth; Massachusetts,
deliberately failed to complete required
access
authorization
screening
and fitness-for-duty background investigations
and deliberately provided
false information to
NRC licensees
regarding those
background
investigations
in an effort to obtain unescorted
access for certain
BNI
'echnicians.
Initially OI provided investigative assistance
to the
NRC: RIII
Safeguards-Section
and the Incident Response
Section during their
evaluation of potential
immediate public health
and safety
considerations
related to this allegation
(reference
OI Case File No.
A3-91-020).
This investigation,
which included records
reviews at BNI, examination
of NRC licensee's
audits of BNI, and interviews of current
and former
BNI employees,
revealed
one instance of a BNI security specialist
having
falsified a background investigation of a BNI employee.
The employee's
improprieties were initially discovered
by an audit conducted
by the
Southern
Nuclear Operating
Company
(SNOC).
BNI.responded to the audit
finding and completed
a full reexamination of all the background
investigations
where the employee
had performed
any functions.
The BNI
corrective actions,
which included allowing the employee to resign,
were
examined
by an NRC:RIII security specialist
and
no other instances
of
falsification were discovered.
The BNI program
as currently designed
was noted
as adequate
by the NRC:RIII physical security specialist.
Interviews of current
and former BNI employees
revealed there
had been
no training or work orientation in performing background investigations
that explained or documented
the importance of the background
investigation related to the process of granting unescorted
access
to a
nuclear plant.
This investigation essentially
showed that the
allegation that background investigations
in one instance
had
been
falsified was true.
However, the available evidence
was insufficient to
conclude that this falsification was done deliberately to allow any BNI
technician to gain unescorted
access
when they otherwise would not have
been eligible for such access.
Also, the available evidence
was
.insufficient to conclude that any BNI officials knowingly or
deliberately falsified any background investigations
or requests
for
unescorted
access for BNI technicians
at
NRC licensed nuclear
power
plants.
14