ML17331B297

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Amends 176 & 161 to Licenses DPR-58 & DPR-74,respectively, Revising TS in Accordance W/Guidance of GL 90-06
ML17331B297
Person / Time
Site: Cook  American Electric Power icon.png
Issue date: 03/09/1994
From: Marsh L
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:
Shared Package
ML17331B298 List:
References
GL-90-06, GL-90-6, NUDOCS 9403160297
Download: ML17331B297 (21)


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<<<<g4 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555.0001 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-315 DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

1 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. f76 License No.

DPR-58 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the licensee) dated April 16,

1991, as supplemented January 6,
1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act),

and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; D.

The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.

The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

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2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment,.

and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-74 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,

as revised through Amendment No. 176

, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COHHISSION pgA~

L. B. Harsh, Director Project Directorate III-I Division of Reactor Projects - III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications

'ate of Issuance:

ilarch 9.

1994

ATTACHMENT TO ICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 176 TO FACILITY OPERATING LIC'ENSE NO.

DPR-58 DOCKET NO. 50-315 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE 3/4 4-31 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-35 3/4 4-36 B 3/4 4-7 B 3/4 4-13 INSERT 3/4 4-31 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-35 3/4 4-36 B 3/4 4-7 B 3/4 4-13

REA T R

LANT Y TEM VERPRE RE PR TE Tl Y

LIMITIN NDITI F

R PE AT 3.4.9.3 At least one of the following overpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Two power operated relief valves (PORVs) with a lift setting of less than or equal to 435 psig, or b.

One power operated relief valve (PORV) with a liftsetting of less than or equal to 435 psig and the RHR safety valve with a liftsetting of less than or equal to 450 psig.

'd*5 h

U

  • f yRCS Idl i

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to 152'F, and Mode 6 when the head is on and fastened to the reactor vessel and the RCS is not vented through a 2-square-inch or larger vent, or through any single blocked open PORV.

ACTI N:

With one of two PORVs required by item a above or either the PORV or RHR safety valve required by item b above inoperable, either restore the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within a total of 32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />.

Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status.

b.

With both PORVs and the RHR safety valve inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and the RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.

C.

With the RCS vented per ACTION a or b above, verify the vent pathway at least once per 31 days when the pathway is provided by a valve(s) that is locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in the open position; otherwise, verify the vent pathway every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

In the event either the PORVs, the RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate an RCS pressure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 30 days.

The report shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of the PORVs or vents on the transient, and any corrective action necessary to prevent recurrence.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4-31 AMENDMENTNO. SS, 167, I 76

EA T R

LANT SY TEM SURVEILLANCERE UIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

Performance of a CHANNELFUNCTIONALTEST on the PORV actuation channel, but excluding valve operation, within 31 days prior to entering a condition in which the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter when the PORV required OPERABLE.

b.

Performance of a CHANNELCALIBRATIONon the PORV actuation channel at least once per 18 months.

C.

Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> when the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements for ASME Category B valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

e.

Determining the emergency air tank OPERABLE by verifying:

At least once per 31 days, air tank pressure greater than or equal to 900 pslg.

Air tank pressure instrumentation OPERABLE by performance of a:

(a)

CHANNEL FUNCTIONALTEST at least once per 31 days, and (b)

CHANNELCALIBRATIONat least once per 18 months, with the low pressure alarm setpoint greater than or equal to 900 psig.

4.4.9.3.2 The RHR safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a.

'erifying that the RHR system suction is aligned to the RCS loop with the valves in the flow path open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> when the RHR safety valve is being used for overpressure protection.

b.

Testing in accordance with the inservice test requirements for ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4-32 AMENDMENTNO. H, 164,176

REACTOR COOLAN SYSTEM RE-IEF VA VES OPERATING M.:ING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4,1'hree po~er operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves sha'1 be OPERABLE.

APPLICABI ITY:

MODES 1, 2,

and 3.

AC.:0:::

a W'"h one cr more PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat

leakage, 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either resto e the PORV(s) to OPERABLE status or close the assccia e" block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s);

otherw'se, be in a least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SH.'."O'W".w'-h'n the follow'ng 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

Wi:h cne PORV 'noperable due to causes other than excessive seat e,

i=bin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> e'ther restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or

=se the associa=ed block valve ard remove power from:he block valve; c=herw'se be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hcurs and in HOT SH '".DOWN w'hin 'he following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

nit.". =<<o PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORVs to OPERAB E status or close he associated block valves and remove power from the block valves; restore at least one of the inoperab'e PORVs to OPERABLE status w'=h'n the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT S.ANDBY within the next 6

ho.rs and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

".. ee PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE sta=

s or close the block valves and remove power from the block valves anc e

'"., HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the f"llo 'ng 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the block va've to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV in manual control, or close the block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

with two or three block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> apply the provisions of ACTION e above to one of the block valves and, for the remain'ng inoperable block valve(s), either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or place the associated PORV(s) in manual control; res ore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour; restore at least two block valves to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />; otherwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

COOK NUC'AR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4-35 AMENDMENT NO. ESb,

ERS, 176

REACTOR COOLAN SYSTEM LIM.TING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued g ~

With PORVs and block valves not in the same line inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore the valves to OPERABLE status or close and de-energize the associated block va've and p'ace the associated PORV in manual control in each respective I'ne.

App'y the portions of ACTION c or d above, relating to the OpERA..GNA MODE, as appropriate for two or three lines unavailable.

h.

The p ovis'ons o

Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

8"R...r-

- ~

ac v=q sha

be In ad"'tion to the recu'ments of Specifica ion 4.0.5, each pORv demons=rated OPERAB E:

'eas" once pe 3'ays by performance of a CHA::NE FUNCTIONAL

.ES., excng va've operation, and A: 'east once per 18 months by operating the PORV through one cc.-..piete cvcle o full travel during MODES 3 or 4, and At 'east once per 18 months by operating solenoid air control va'ves and check valves in PORV control systems through one comp'e e cycle of full travel, and d.

At least once per 18 months by performing a

CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4."..2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 92 days bv ope.ating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel

n'ess he b'ock valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION or d

n Specification 3.4.11.-

4.4.11.3 The emergency powe supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves achro gh a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are ene g'zed by the onsite diesel generators and the onsite plant batteries.

This testing can be performed in con)unction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.e and 4.8.2.3.2.d.

COOK NUC EAR PLANT - UNIT 1 3/4 4"36 AMENDMENT NO ~

Lggp ging, 17K

E

EA T R LANT Y TEM The 32 EFPY heatup and cooldown curves were developed based on the following:

1.

The intermediate shell plate, B4406-3, being the limiting material with a copper and nickel content of.15% and.49%, respectively.

2.

The fluence values contained in Table 6-14 of Westinghouse's WCAP-12483 report, "Analysis of Capsule U From the American Electric Power Company D. C. Cook Unit 1 Reactor Vessel Radiation Surveillance Program," dated January 1990.

3.

Figure 1, NRC Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2 The shift in RT>DT of the reactor vessel material has been established by removing and evaluating the material surveillance capsules installed near the inside wall of the reactor vessel in accordance with the removal schedule in Table 4.4-5.

Per this schedule, Capsule U is the last capsule to be removed until Capsule S is to be removed after 32 EFPY (EOL).

Capsule V, W, and Z will remain in the reactor vessel, and will be removed to address industry reactor embrittlement concerns, ifrequired.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shown on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance with the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and cooldown and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated within the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITYof two PORVs, or of one PORV and the RHR safety valve, ensures that the RCS will be protected from pressure transients which could exceed the limits of Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 when one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 152'F.

Either PORV or RHR safety valve has adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization when the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP with the secondary water temperature of the steam generator less than or equal to 50'F above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a charging pump and its injection into a water solid RCS.

Therefore, any one of the three blocked open PORVs constituted an acceptable RCS vent to preclude APPLICABILITYof Specificatio'3.4.9.3.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-7 AMENDMENTNO. SS, 167, 176

l

REACTOR COOLANT TEM BASES 3 4.4.11 RELIEF VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) accident and for plant shutdown.

During the recovery process for a SGTR event, availability of the PORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed.

One PORV is sufficient for this purpose.

Therefore, two of three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other being available to depressurize the RCS.

The PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant system pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves.

Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OPERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Specification 3.4.9.3.

The PORVs have remote manually operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a PORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of RCS pressure.

The electrical power for both the PORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling. It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system.

Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a

common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths.

Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fai.l closed.

This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path.

The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radiation environment, In addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capability exists to perform thi.s venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consi.stent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirement,"

November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specificati.on and not enter into an hCTION statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 1 B 3/4 4-13 hMENDMENT NO. HI, IRP, 176

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D.C. 20555 0001

~

~ 4 INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY DOCKET NO. 50-316 ONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No. i6i License No.

DPR-74 l.

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:

A.

The application for amendment by Indiana Michigan Power Company (the

'Iicensee) dated April 16,

1991, as supplemented January 6,
1993, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.

The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission; C.

D.

E.

There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations; The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.

2.

Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No.

DPR-58 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical S ecifications The Technical Specifications contained in Appendices A and B,

as revised through Amendment No.

161

, are hereby incorporated in the license.

The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications.

3.

This license amendment is effective as of the date of issuance.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION L. B. Harsh, Director Project Directorate III-I Division of Reactor Projects III/IV/V Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment:

Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:

liarch 9.

"F994

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT N0.151 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.

DPR-74 DOCKET NO. 50-316 Revise Appendix A Technical Specifications by removing the pages identified below and inserting the attached pages.

The revised pages are identified by amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

REMOVE 3/4 4-29 3/4 4-30 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-33 8 3/4 4-10 8 3/4 4-11 INSERT 3/4 4-29 3/4 4-30 3/4 4-32 3/4 4-33 8 3/4 4-10 8 3/4 4-11

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM OVERPRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.9.3 At least, one of the folloving ovcrpressure protection systems shall be OPERABLE:

a.

Tvo pover operated relief valves (PORVs) vith a lift setting of less than or equal to 435 psig, or b.

One pover operated relief ~alve (PORV) vith a lift setting of less rhan or equal to 435 psig and the RHR safety valve vith a lift setting of less than or equal to 450 psig.

APPLICABILITY: Mode 5 vhen the temperature of any RCS cold leg is less than or equal to 152 F, and Mode 6 vhen the head i,s on and fastened to the reactor vessel and the RCS is rot vented through a 2-square-inch or larger vent, or through any single blocked open PORV.

ACTION:

Pith one of tvo PORVs required by item a above or e,ither the PORV or RHR safety valve required by item b abo~e inoperable, either (1) restore the inoperable PORV or RHR safety valve to OPERABLE status vi.thin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />, or (2) complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a 2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORU, vithin a total of 32 houxs.

Maintain the RCS in a vented condition until the inoperablc PORV or RHR safety valve has been restored to OPERABLE status, b.

Vi.th both PORUs and thc RHR safety valve inoperable, complete depressurization and venting of the RCS through at least a

2-square-inch vent, or through any single blocked open PORV, vithin 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.

Maintain thc RCS in a vented condition until both PORVs or one PORV and thc RHR safety valve have been restored to OPERABLE status.

c

~

Vith the RCS vented pcr ACTION a or b above, verify the vent pathvay at least once per 31 days vhcn the pathvay is provided by a valve(s) that is locked,

sealed, or othervi.se secured in the open position; othervise, verify the vent pathvay every 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

d.

In the event either the PORVs, thc RHR safety valve or the RCS vent(s) are used to mitigate a

RCS prcssure transient, a Special Report shall be prepared and submitted to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 vithin 30 day!.

The rcpoxt shall describe the circumstances initiating the transient, the effect of thc PORVs or vents on thc transient and any coxrcctive action necessary to prevent recurrence.

e

~

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 4-29 AMENDMENT NO.

89, 16>

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.4.9.3.1 Each PORV shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST on the PORV actuation

channel, but excluding valve operation, vithin 31 days prior to entering a condition in vhich the PORV is required OPERABLE and at least once per 31 days thereafter vhen the PORV is required OPERABLE

~

/

b.

Performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION on the PORV actuation channe't least once per lS months.

c.

Verifying the PORV isolation valve is open at least once per 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> vhen the PORV is being used for overpressure protection.

d.

Detez ining the emergency air tank OPERABLE by verifying:

l.

At least once per 31 days, air tank pressure greater than or equal to 900 psig.

2.

Air tank pressure instrumentation OPERABLE by performance of a:

(a)

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST at least once per 31 days, and (b)

CHANNEL CALIBRATION at least once, per 1S months, vith the lov pressure alarm setpoint ) to 900 psig.

4.4.9.3.2 The RHR safety valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

Verifying that the RHR system suction is aligned to the RCS loop vlth the valves in the fiov path open at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> vhen the RHR safety valve is being used for overpressure protection.

b.

Testing in accordance vith the inservice test requirements for ASME Category C valves pursuant to Specification 4.0.5.

COOK NUCLEAR PlhNT - UNIT 2 3/4 4-30 AMENDMENT NO. 89, 151

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM RELIEF VALVES - OPERATING LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.4.11 Three power operated relief valves (PORVs) and their associated block valves shall be OPERABLE.

APP ICABTLITY:

MODES 1 ~ 2, and 3.

AO.

ON:

a

~

Wi"'.". one cr more PORVs inoperable because of excessive seat leakage,

h ' 'our either restore the PORV ( s ) to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valve(s) with power maintained to the block valve(s);

otherwise, be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SH"."OwN "'thin the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

W' cre PORV inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

eakage, i-h n 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORV to OPERABLE status or c'ose the associated block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the fOllOWing 6 hOurS

~

Co With t"o PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat leakage within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the PORVs to OPERABLE status or close the associated block valves and remove power from the block valves; restore at least one of the inoperable PORVs to OPERABLE status w'th'n the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> or be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6

hours and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

With.hree PORVs inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, w'thin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore at least one PORV to OPERABLE status or close the block valves and remove power from the block valves and be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

e.

W'th one block valve inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> either restore the block valve to OPERABLE status, or place its associated PORV in manual control, or close the block valve and remove power from the block valve; otherwise be in at least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />

~

with two or three block valves inoperable, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> apply the provisions of ACTION e above to one of the block valves and, for the remaining inoperable block valve(s), either restore the block valve(s) to OPERABLE status, or place the associated PORV(s) in manual control; restore at least one block valve to OPERABLE status within the next hour; restore at least two block valves to OPERABLE status within the following 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />'therwise be in HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in HO.

SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3~4 4-32 AMENDMENT NO, Hg, Jg7, )6]

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION Continued With PORVs and block valves not in the same line inoperable due to causes other than excessive seat

leakage, within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> restore the valves to OPERABLE status or close and de-energize the associated block valve and place the associated PORV in manual control in each respective line.

Apply the portions of ACTION c or d above, relating to the OPERATIONAL MODE, as appropriate for two or three lines unavailable.

h.

The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.

SURVE LLANCE REQU REMEN S

4.'.11.1 In addition to the requirements of Specification 4.0.5, each PORV I

".a.

be demo."strated OPERABLE:

A=

east once per 31 days by performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL ES.,

exc'uding va've operation, and b.

A" least once per 18 months by operating the PORV through one comp'ete cycle of full travel during MODES 3 or 4, and c.

At least once per 18 months by operating solenoid air control valves and check valves in PORV control systems through one comp'ete cycle of full travel, and d.

At least once per 18 months by performing a

CHANNEL CALIBRATION of the actuation instrumentation.

4.4..2 Each block valve shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 82 days by ope.ating the valve through one complete cycle of full travel unless the block valve is closed in order to meet the requirements of ACTION b,

c, or d in Specification 3.4.11.

4

~ 4

~ '1.3 The emergency power supply for the PORVs and block valves shall be demonstrated OPERABLE at least once per 18 months by operating the valves through a complete cycle of full travel while the emergency buses are energized by the onsite diesel generators and the onsite plant batteries.

This testing can be performed in con)unction with the requirements of Specifications 4.8.1.1.2.e and 4.8.2.3.2.d.j t The provisions of Technical Specification 4.0.8 are applicable.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 3/4 4 33 AMENDMENT NO.

1$l, Egg, I$9, 161

REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM BASES The actual shift in the reference temperature of surveillance specimens and neutron fluence is established periodically by removing and evaluating reactor vessel material irradiation survcillancc specimens and dosimetry installed neer the inside vali of the reactor vessel in the core area.

The heatup and cooldovn limit curves of Figures 3.4-2 and 3.4-3 include predicted a

usm d]ustments for this shift in RT at the end of 12 EFPY, as vali as ad)ustments NDT for possible errors in the pressure and temperature sensing instruments.

The 12 EFPY heatup and cooldovn curves vere developed based on the following:

1.

The pro)ected fluence values established by specimen analysis.

2.

Intermediate shell plate C5556-2 being the limiting material as determined by Position 1 of Regulatory Guide 1.99, Revision 2, with a copper and nickel content of 0.15% and 0.57't, respectively.

The pressure-temperature limit lines shovn on Figure 3.4-2 for reactor criticality and for inservice leak and hydrostatic testing have been provided to assure compliance vith the minimum temperature requirements of Appendix G

to 10 CFR 50.

The number of reactor vessel irradiation surveillance specimens and the frequencies for removing and testing these specimens are provided in Table 4.4-5 to assure compliance with the requirements of Appendix H to 10 CFR Part 50.

The limitations imposed on pressurizer heatup and, cooldovn and spray water temperature differential are provided to assure that the pressurizer is operated vithin the design criteria assumed for the fatigue analysis performed in accordance vith the hSME Code requirements.

The OPERABILITY of tvo PORVs, or of one PORV and the RHR safety valve ensures that the RCS vill be protected from pressure transients vhich could exceed the limits of hppendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 vhen one or more of the RCS cold legs are less than or equal to 152 F.

Either PORV or RHR safety valve has 0

adequate relieving capability to protect the RCS from overpressurization vhen the transient is limited to either (1) the start of an idle RCP vith the secondary vater temperature of thc steam generator less than or equal to 50 F

above the RCS cold leg temperatures or (2) the start of a charging pump and its in]ection into a water solid RCS, Therefore, any one of the three blocked open PORVs constitutes an acceptable RCS vent to preclude APPLICABILITYof Specification 3.4.9.3.

3 4.4.10 STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY The inspection and testing programs for hSME Code Class 1,

2 and 3

components ensure that the structural integrity of these components vill be maintained at an acceptable level throughout the life of thc plant.

To the extent applicable, the inspection program for these components is in compliance vith Section XI of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-10 AMENDMENT NO. gg,

l28, 161

REACTOR COOLANT TEM BASES 3 4.4.11 RELIEP VALVES The power operated relief valves (PORVs) may be operated manually to control reactor coolant system pressure for the steam generator tube rupture accident and for plant shutdown.

During the recovery process for a SGTR event, availability of the PORVs to reduce primary pressure is assumed.

One PORV is sufficient for this purpose.

Therefore, two of three PORVs are required to be OPERABLE with one valve assumed to fail and the other being available to depressurize the RCS.

The PORVs also operate automatically to control reactor coolant system pressure below the setting of the pressurizer code safety valves, thereby reducing challenges to these valves.

Two of the three PORVs are equipped with backup air supplies which must be OPERABLE when these valves are being relied upon for low temperature overpressure protection per Specification 3.4.9.3.

The PORVs have remote manually operated block valves which may be used to isolate a stuck-open PORV or a PORV with excessive seat leakage and to unblock an isolated PORV to allow it to be used for manual control of RCS pressure.

The electrical power for both the PORVs and the block valves is supplied from an emergency power source to ensure the ability to close this possible RCS leakage path to maintain the integrity of the reactor coolant pressure boundary.

3 4.4.12 REACTOR COOLANT VENT SYSTEM The Reactor Coolant Vent System is provided to exhaust noncondensible gases and/or steam from the primary system that could inhibit natural circulation core cooling.

It has been designed to vent a volume of Hydrogen approximately equal to one-half of the Reactor Coolant System volume in one hour at system design pressure and temperature.

The Reactor Coolant Vent System is comprised of the Reactor Vessel head vent system and the pressurizer steam space vent system.

Each of these subsystems consists of a single line containing a

common manual isolation valve inside containment, splitting into two parallel flow paths.

Each flow path provides the design basis venting capacity and contains two 1E DC powered solenoid isolation valves, which will fail closed.

This valve configuration/redundancy serves to minimize the probability of inadvertent or irreversible actuation while ensuring that a single failure of a remotely-operated vent valve, power supply, or control system does not prevent isolation of the vent path, The pressurizer steam space vent is independent of the PORVs and safety valves and is specifically designed to exhaust gases from the pressurizer in a very high radiation environment.

In addition, the OPERABILITY of one Reactor Vessel head vent path and one Pressurizer steam space vent path will ensure that the capability exists to perform this venting function.

The function, capabilities, and testing requirements of the Reactor Coolant Vent System are consistent with the requirements of Item II.B.1 of NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirement,"

November 1980.

The minimum required systems to meet the Specification and not enter into an ACTION statement are one vent path from the Reactor Vessel head and one vent path from the Pressurizer steam space.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT - UNIT 2 B 3/4 4-11 AMENDMENT NO.

82 151