ML17328A594
| ML17328A594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/09/1990 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A593 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9003020154 | |
| Download: ML17328A594 (7) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SAFETY EVALUATION BY TIIE OFFICE OF. NUCLEAR REACTOR REGL'LATION FELATED TO AMENDIIENT tt0.131 TG FACILITY GPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-58 AND AVEIIDVEt>T fl0.116 TC FACILITY (IPERAT"ttG LICENSE NO.
DPR-74 ItIDIANAttlCVIGAN POllER COMPANY DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLAtiT UNITS ttOS.
1 AND 2 DOCKETS NOS, 50 315 AND 50 316 1
0 ItiTRODUCTION By letter dated tlay 30, 1986, the Indiana Yichigan Power Company (the licensee)
I.equested apprcval of amendments to the Donald C.
Cook Units 1 and 2 Plant Technical.Specifica1.ioris.
The proposed changes reflect the alternate safe
.hutdown requireme'nts cf Appendix R to 10 CFP, Part 50.
Specifically, safe shutdown following a fire is achieved via urit cross ties for the essential service water, componerit cooling water, auxiliary feedwater,,
and the chemical ard volume controI systeIIis.
The amendrI.ents would establish additionalperabi Iity and surveillance requirervents for these systems because of thF.
reliance cn sharirIg to erisure post-fire safe shutdcwn.
The licersee also requested a charge in the technical specifications associated with maintaining ar excore rieutron instr uII.ent channel available.
Py lette) datec June 23, 1986, the Iicensee submitted a revision whict clarifies the applicability of Specification 3.0.4 to the alternate shutdown capability
-nid proposes the irrplenientation cf fire watches in the unit for which alternate shutdown capability is unavailable.
By letter dated-March 2, 1988, the licensee rFquest&d approval of the technical spe cifi ca tion an'endments to restore a
I:aragraph iri the Bases pertainirig to fire suppression systems which was inadvertently deleted previously.
These three submittals were revised and ccmbined into a simple submittalI dated Jure 16, 1988.
The major difference between the June 16, 1988, subIIiittal and the previous submittals was a change in the action statenients.
The action statement of the previous submittal
=-required tt e licensee to submit a report to the NPC if equipment for post-fire safe shutdown was out of service. for more than 30 days.
In the June 16, 1988 submittal, the action statement was revised to require that at least one flow path be restored to operable status within 7 days, or provide equivalent shut-down capability and return at least one flow path to available status within the next 60 days.
The June 16, 1988, submittal also included a proposed chanoe to the Pases which clarified that fire watches would not be implemented in areas protected by carbon dioxide fire suppression systems during testing cf the systems which may result in carbon dioxide discharge, or after the dis-charge of a 'system wher: carbon dioxide levels may represent a personnel hazard.
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The June 16, 1988 submittal was revised by a letter dated January 23, 1989.
The proposed change invclves removing two of the four reactor coolant system (RCS) iodide range hot leg and cold lec temperature indications from the local shutdown indication (LSI) panels.
- 2. G DISCUSSION The licensee's approach to post-fire safe shutdown capability relies upon the availability of the above referenced systems from the non-fire-affected urit through unit cross-ties.
The proposed technical specification changes require portions of these shared systems to be operable regardless of that unit's operating status, as long as the opposite unit is in Yiode I, 2, 3, or 4 (except for the auxi liarv feedwater, which is required to operable in l~ode 1, 2, ard 3
only).
This would ensure the availability of,minimum post-five safe shutdown capability during all operating modes.
The proposed change identified the applicable lirriiting condition for operating including the action statement and survei>lance requirements.
The other changes proposed in the licensee's Yay 30 and June 23, 1986 letters pertain to n aintaining an excore neutron instrument channel available.. This is a
new instrument in each unit which wi 11 indicate neutron level over all power ranges.
It. i. powered from thc cpposite unit ard has read-out capability remote to the control room.
.The '.icensee's Yarch 2, 1988, proposed charge would restore a paragraph in the Bases under fire suppression systems that had been inadvertently deleted.
The deleted portion addressed the situation in which low pressure carbon dioxide fire suppression systeri: is isolated for personnel protection to permit entry for maintenance and other activities and stipulates the qualifications of the fire watch patrol that must be implemented when the fire suppression system is deactivated.
In their Jure 16, 1988, submittal, the licensee revised the proposed action statement for systems required for post-fire safe*shutdown to require that at
'.east one flow path be restored to operable status within 7 days, or provide equivalent shutdown capability and return at least one flow path to available status within the next 60 days.. If this cannot be accomplished, the affected unit must be in hot standby within the next 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and in hot shutdown within the following 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
A revision to the June 16, 1988 submittal was provided in a letter dated January 23, 1989.
The proposed change involves removing the wide range hot leg and cold leg temperature indications of RCS loops I and 3 from the local shutdown indication (LSI) panels.
The wide range hot leg and cold leg temperature indications of reactor coolant system locps 2 and 4 would still be supplied to the LSI panels.
As discussed in the next section, this change is necessary in order to meet the Category 1 redundancy criteria of Regulatory Guide 1.97, Revision 3 for the reactor vessel level indication system (RVLIS).
3.O EYALUATION In its safety evaluation concerning Appendix R compliance dated November 22, 1983, tl:e taff accepted the licensee's concept of relying upor, the safe shutdown systems in the opposite (fire unaffected) unit to ensure required shutdown
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functions provided that acceptable technical specifications were developed and implemented to ensure that these systems would be available in the event of a fire in one unit.
Thc licensee's proposed amendments address the operability of those shared systems relied upon for post-fire safe shutdcwn in the necessary plant ope'rating modes.
In addition, the survei llarce requirements arid 7-day acticn statement are consistert with the guidarice in the Staridard Technical Specifications and past precedert for post-fire safe shutdown systemis.
The staff concludes, therefore, that shutdown systemis ale acceptable.
With regard to the proposed techniical specification cha'rige concerning maintaining operability cf ari excore neutron instrument charriel indeperdent of the contrcl room, the staff finds this charige acceptable as this instrument satisfies the
'ost-fire alterratc shutdown criteria for monitoring reactivity.
With regard to the change to the Bases pertainirg to the testing of the carbori dioxide fire suppressicn
- system, the staff agrees that the presence of a fire watch in areas where carbon dioxide could be cr has beeri discharged represents a perscnrel hazard.
Therefore, clio irating the need for a fire watch during these occasions is considered acceptable.
With regard to the licenisee's Narch 2, 1988 letter, the proposed change would merely restore language that had originally been part -of the Bases but had been inadverte>>tly removed.
The revised wording permits deactivation of the carbon dioxide fire suppression system for personnel protection when entry into the area of coverage is required provided an appropriate alterrative fire watch is posted.
The staff concludes that this proposed charge isonsistent with staff fire protection guidel',"es, arid is, therefore, acceptable.
I Wide range hot leg and cold leg temperature are necessary safe shutdown indications because the difference between the temperatures is used by operators, tc verify natural circulation.
Currently, all eight RTD's'(one hotleg and one cold leg per loop) are powered by a single diesel backed bus.
Indication fromi RTD's on RCS loops 1 and 4 are available at LSI-5 and LSI-4.
Indication from RTD's for RCS loop 2 and 3 are available at LSI-6 and LSI-4.
and 3 provide an cutput signal to RVLIS as well as to the LSI panels., In order to meet the Regulatory Guide 1.97 requirements for RYLIS, the RTD outputs from RCS loops 1 and 3 would no longer b'e supplied for LSI and the RTD's would be powered by independent control room instrument distribution (CRID) panels.
RTD's for loops 2 and 4 will remain powered from a sirgle diesel-backed bus.
The change wi 11 eliminate the redundancy of wide range temperature indication on LSI-5 and LSI-6 and reduce the riumber of indications on LSI-4 frcm four to two.
Thus, wide range temperature indication would be available for either loop 2 or loop 4 ir, the event of a single fire.
The staff has reviewed the liicensee's justification for the proposed change and concurs that the charige does not have significant impact on 10 CFR 50 Appendix R
ccmpliance cr plant safety.
Based on the above evaluation, the staff concludes that the licensee's technical specification changes regarding post-fire safe shutdown systems avai labi lity and carbon dioxide suppression system operabi lity as delineated in letters dated Yay 30 and June 23,
- 1986, and Harch 2, 1988, ard as amended by
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letter dated June 16, 1988 are consistent with staff fire protection guidelines and are, therefore, acceptable.
The revision proposed in a letter dated January 23, 1989 is also acceptable.
- 4. 0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION
,. These amendments involve a change in requirements with respect to the installation or, use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and changes to the surveillance requirements.
The staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the
- amounts, and no significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure.
The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that these amendments involve no significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordingly, these amendments meet the eligibility criteria for. categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b),
no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prep'ared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
- 5. 0 CONCLUSION Me have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of these amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of -the public.
Date:
February 9,
1990 Principal Contributor:
D. Kubicki, SPLB