ML17328A169
| ML17328A169 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 08/16/1989 |
| From: | Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Burgess B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17328A167 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8909290057 | |
| Download: ML17328A169 (5) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137 AUG l 6 1989 ATTACHMENT gl IR 889025/89025 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Bruce L. Burgess, Chief, Projects Section 2A (D. C.
Cook AIT Team Leader)
FROM:
SUBJECT:
William L. Forney, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor projects AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) CHARTER Enclosed for your implementation is the Charter for the inspection of the events associated with the Donald C.
Cook Unit 2 Degraded Control Room Instrument Distribution (GRID) Bus and the subsequent reactor trip which occurred on August 14, 1989.
This charter is prepared in accordance with the NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0325.
The objectives of the AIT are to communicate the facts surrounding this event to Regional and Headquarters management, as well as to identify and communicate any generic safety concerns related to findin s and conclusions of the onsite ins ection.
g P
If you have any questions regarding implementation of the enclosed
- Charter, please contact Mr.
W. Axelson of my staff (FTS 388-5574) or me directly.
Enclosure:
AIT Charter cc w/enclosure:
cc w/enclosure:
A. B. Davis, RIII C. J. Paperiello, RIII H. J. Miller, RIII G.
M. Holahan, NRR C. J.
Haughney J.
A. Zwolinski, NRR J.
W. Clifford, EDO E. L. Jordan, AEOD C. E. Rossi, NRR S. A. Yarga, NRR
- SRI, D.
C.
Cook Md'~
William L. Forney, Depu
>rector Division of Reactor Projects, 8909 90057 890929 PDR ADOCK 050003l 5 6
PNU
AUGMENTED INSPECTION TEAM (AIT) CHARTER D.C.
COOK UNIT 2 REACTOR TRIP AHD LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL You and your team are to perform an inspection to accomplish the following.'evelop and validate the sequence of events associated with the August 14, 1989 degraded Control Room Instrument Distribution (GRID) bus Ho. 4 and subsequent reactor trip and loss of various safety and non-safety related instrumentation and control functions.
2.
Determine the root cause of the GRID No. 4 bus failure (i.e., degraded voltage failure)', its associated damage to electrical components within the circuitry, and other failures of BOP equipment and components identified after the trip.
This will include:
a.
cause of blown fuse to H44 power range nuclear instrumentation b.
cause of control rod bottom light failure of 2 control rods 3.
5.
Determine the root cause failure of the east feedpump inboard check valve, its maintenance and surveillance
- history, and adequacy of the licensee's evaluation to knowingly operate with the check valve in a degraded state.
Determine the scope,
- depth, and adequacy of the types of routine survei llance performed on the CRID system to ensure operability.
Determine adequacy of GRID alarm response procedures and post trip surveillances to ensure that electrical fault identification is properly evaluated.
6.
7.
8.
Review instrumentation and control loads supplied by CRIDs No.
1, 2, and 3 to determine if design vulnerability exists similar to the one identified during this event, specifically the loss of all WR S/G level indications for all 4 S/Gs, and a vulnerability which could result in a significant operational event.
Determine adequacy of operator response to this event particularly as it related to EOP implementation.
This wi 11 include interviews with licensed operators onshift and the operator making the CRID No. 4 bus transfer.
Review past CRID performance history for similar failures with particular emphasis toward "troubleshooting" the system for electrical faults and root cause evaluation.
9.
Determine the adequacy of operator actions during the transient to restore power to safety and non-safety related instrumentation and control functions from the faulted CRID No. 4 bus prior to determination of the cause of the electrical fault.
AITS Charter 10.
Evaluate the findings and identify those for which generic issues may be applicable, and provide recommendations to regional management.
ll.
Evaluate the accuracy and completeness of the official 10 CFR 50.72 report to NRC Headquarters, specifically as it relates to smoke smell in the Control Room and operator actions to put CR ventilation on recirculation.
II 12.
Assure that the licensee has identified all equipment which failed as a
result of the event or was previously inoperable and affected the outcome of the event.