ML17326B360
| ML17326B360 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Miller H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17326B359 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-88-03, 50-315-88-3, 50-316-88-04, 50-316-88-4, NUDOCS 8804060196 | |
| Download: ML17326B360 (2) | |
Text
NOTICE OF VIOLATION Indiana Michigan Power Company Docket Nos.
50-315 50-316 As a result of the inspection conducted on January 11-14 and 25-28,
- 1988, and in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C - General Statement of Policy, and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions (1987), the following violation was identified:
10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, as implemented by the D.
C.
Cook Operations equality Assurance
- Program, requires that design control measures be provided for verifying or checking the adequacy of design including design changes.
Contrary to the above, the licensee failure to ensure that adequate design control measures were provided as follows:
a.
The licensee failed to perform adequate initial design reviews regarding electrical isolation between the Local Shutdown and Indication (LSI) panels.
Consequently, a local fire could have opened the feeder breaker without isolating the fault between the LSI panels.
This could have led to the loss of all control room T-Hot and T-Cold t'emperature indication.
b.
The licensee implemented design changes to Unit 1 (on December 29, 1987) and to Unit 2 (on December 30, 1987) to correct design deficiencies associated with electrical isolation between LSI panels (see Violation
- a. above).
During reviews of these design
- changes, the licensee failed to verify the coordination between the LSI panel feeder breaker and the newly installed fuses.
Consequently, a circuit fault could have opened the feeder breaker without isolating the fault between the LSI panels.
This could have led to the loss of all control room T-Hot and T-Cold temperature indication.
C.
The licensee discovered (on September 17, 1987) during a Safety System Functional Inspection (SSFI) review, that a fuse-breaker miscoordination existed on each safety-related 250 VDC bus for both units.
Thus, in the event of a fault in certain Balance of Plant (BOP) cables, which would involve distribution panels from both i ndepen'dent trains, a loss of control power on both independent trains of related Essential Safety System (ESS) panels could have occurred.
ESS loads that could have been affected were certain containment isolation valves, reactor head vent valves, post-accident sampling valves, and steam generator stop valve dump valves.
This is a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement I).
8804060i96 880330 PDR ADOCK 050003i5 9
Notice of Viol ati on r
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, you are required to submit to this office within thirty days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation in reply, including for each violation:
( 1) corrective action taken and the results achieved; (2) correction action to be taken to avoid further violations; and (3) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
Consideration may be given to extending your response time for good cause shown.
Dated
>/~/ir u ert J.
Ni er, Director Division of Reactor Safety