ML17325A642
| ML17325A642 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/26/1988 |
| From: | Foster J, Matthew Smith, Snell W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17325A643 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-88-06, 50-315-88-6, 50-316-88-07, 50-316-88-7, NUDOCS 8803070370 | |
| Download: ML17325A642 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1988006
Text
U-S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Reports
No. 50-315/88006(DRSS);
50-316/88007(DRSS)
Docket Nos.
50-315;
50-316
Licensee:
Company
1 Riverside Plaza
Columbus,
OH
43216
Licenses
No. DPR-58;
Facility Name:
Donald C.
Cook Nuclear
Power Plant, Units
1 and
2
Inspection At:
Donald C.
Cook Site,
Bridgeman,
Inspection
Conducted:
January
25-29,
1988
Inspectors:
Ja
E. Foster
m Leader
Dat
Date
Approved By:
William Snell, Chief
E
r
P
par
ness
Section
Date
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on Januar
25-29
1988
Re ort No. 50-315/88006
DRSS:50-316/88007
DRSS
Areas Ins ected:
Routine,
unannounced
inspection of the following areas of
the Donald C.
Cook
Nuclear
Power Plant emergency
preparedness
program: action
on previously-identified items;
emergency
plan activations;
LER review;
operational
status of the emergency
preparedness
program;
dose
assessment;
notifications and communications;
shift staffing and augmentation;
emergency
preparedness
training; licensee
audits;
and maintaining emergency
preparedness.
The inspection
involved two
NRC inspectors.
Results:
One violation was identified related to
10 CFR 50, Appendix
E (E)
(9d) requirements
for communication testing.
8803070370
880229
ADOCK 05000315
Q
DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
- 'W
"A.
"R.
- K.
kJ
"R.
- C
AG
AJ
- B
"T ~
AT
A.
W.
D.
J.
G.
R ~
G.
J
~
D.
Smith, Jr., Plant Manager
Blind, Assistant Plant Manager
Loope,
IMP -
Krieger,
Emergency
Planning Coordinator
Baker, Operations
Superintendent
Matthias, Administration Superintendent
Rischling, gC/Administration Compliance Coordinator
Gibson, Assistant Plant Manager
Huerter,
AEPSC gA Supervisory Auditor
Ross,
Computer Science
Kriesel, Tech.
Superintendent
Arent, Operations
Paris,
Computer Science
Svensson,
Lic. Act. Coordinator
Postlewait,
Technical
Engineering
Support
Hershberger,
Corporate
Barker,
AEPSC guality Assurance
Stoner,
IMP Computer Science
Yount,
IMP Office Administration
Wojcik,
IMP Technical Physical.
Science
Tollas, Shift Supervisor
Heathcote,
Unit Supervisor
Peak, Shift Technical Advisor
McElligott, Supervisory
gA Auditor
Leibel, Manager
5 Tech. Staff Senior Instructor
"Personnel
listed above attended
the exit meeting
on January
29,
1988.
2.
Licensee Actions on Previousl -Identified 0 en Items
(Cl osed)
Open Item (50-315/86002-01;50-316/86002-01):
The
representativeness
of the onsite meteorological
tower should
be
determined to characterize
meteorological
conditions to
approximately
10 miles from the site.
Considerable
licensee
action
has taken place
on this item.
Analysis indicated that the near-site
tower alone was not characteristic
of offsite weather conditions.
Three meteorological
towers,
one lakeside
and
2 off-site towers are
now available, utilizing a
VAN computer having the capability to
use
a full Phase
"B" dispersion
model.
The system is currently
scheduled
to be fully functional in July,
1988.
This item is
closed for the purpose of updating the item,
and will now be tracked
as
Open Item No. 50-315/88006-01;
50-316/88007-01.
b.
(Closed)
Open
Item (50-315/86002-02;
50-316/86002-02):
Lack of the
EP program to have three trained individuals designated
for each
emergency
response
position.
The organization
was reviewed
and
appeared
acceptable
for the purpose of having three persons
trained
for each position.
This was accomplished for several
positions
by
having corporate
personnel
trained
as the third individual for a
position.
This item is closed.
C.
(Closed)
Open Item (50-315/86040-01;
50-316/86040-01);
No formalized
training module for dose calculations
and assessment
had been
included in the training program.
A formalized dose
assessment
training module
(RP-C-GE63,
Revision 0) for "Offsite Oose
assessment-Computer"
(using
a mainframe
computer for calculations)
has
been
developed
and training conducted.
The module lesson plan,
handouts,
mini-scenarios
and classroom
exam were reviewed.
A
personal
computer
based
dose
assessment
system is planned for the
"
future.
Protective Action Recommendation
calculations
have also
been
computerized
and initial training of personnel
is in process.
This item is closed.
d,
(Open)
Open Item (50-315/87006-01;
50-316/87006-01):
Exercise
Weakness;
Inadequate
discussion
of Protective Action
Recommendations
due to delay in performing dose calculations
using
a manual
dose calculation method.
Improvements
have
been
made in
this area,
as noted above.
This item will remain
open
pending
demonstration
of improved capability in an Exercise.
3.
Activations of the Licensee's
Emer enc
Plan
A review of licensee
and
NRC records indicated that six activations of
the licensee's
Emergency
Plan
had taken place since the last routine
inspection.
On November 26,
1986,
an Unusual
Event was declared at
1701 hours0.0197 days <br />0.473 hours <br />0.00281 weeks <br />6.472305e-4 months <br />,
in
accordance
with the plant's
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) due to
a
reactor
shutdown being required
by Technical Specifications
(TS) when
both Unit
1 diesel
Generators
were declared
out of service.
On April 8,
1987,
an Unusual
Event was declared at 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />
when
calculations
indicated that unidentified reactor coolant
system
leakage
exceeded
that specified
by Technical Specifications.
On June
10,
1987,
an Unusual
Event was declared at
1955 hours0.0226 days <br />0.543 hours <br />0.00323 weeks <br />7.438775e-4 months <br />
when
an
was felt on-site.
On June
15,
1987,
an Unusual
Event was declared at
1855 hours0.0215 days <br />0.515 hours <br />0.00307 weeks <br />7.058275e-4 months <br />
when
a
reactor
shutdown
was required
by Technical Specification 3.0.3 due to the
lack of operability of both trains of the containment
spray
system.
On July 23,
1987,
an Unusual
Event was declared at
1725 hours0.02 days <br />0.479 hours <br />0.00285 weeks <br />6.563625e-4 months <br />
when
a
potentially contaminated,
injured
man was transported
to
a local
hospital.
On August 3,
1987,
an Unusual
Event was declared
at 0820 hours0.00949 days <br />0.228 hours <br />0.00136 weeks <br />3.1201e-4 months <br />
when
two
unit diesel
generators
were declared
out of service.
This event
was
preplanned,
as it was previously
known that both diesel
generators
would
be out of service.
Documentation
related to each activation was available at the plant site,
in various locations,
but was not rapidly retrievable.
Discussion with
licensee
personnel
indicated that procedures
which would provide for the
collection and review of emergency
event documentation
had not been
finalized.
The lack of such collection and review indicates that the
licensee
is not analyzing actions
taken during actual
events.
Documentation
related to each activation was reviewed
and found to be
acceptable.
During the inspection,
a review of Licensee
Event Reports
(LERs)
generated
during 1987 was performed to determine if events
had been
properly classified per the plant's
Emergency Action Levels (EALs).
The
following LERs were reviewed:
LER No. Unit
Brief Descri tion
87-001
87"002
87-003
87-004
87-005
87-006
87-007
87-008
87-009
87-010
87-013
87-014
87-015
87-016
87"017
87-018
87"019
87"020
87-021
87-022
1
1
1
1 (UE)
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Liquid Effluent Nonitors Improperly Calibrated
Non-representative
Blowdown Sample
Failure
To Restore
Heat Trace Circuit Required
By T.S.
Unit Shutdown
Due to
RCS Coolant Leakage,
Per T.S.
T.S.
RCS Pressure/Temperature
Limits Exceeded
ESF Actuation (Main Steam
Line Isolation)
Hissed
Event Initiated Surveillance
Reactor Trip Due To Extreme High Steam Generator
Level
Reactor Trip Signal
Due To High Turbine Exhaust Pressure
Reactor Trip Signal
Due To High Turbine Exhaust Pressure
Ice Buildup In Ice Condenser
Flow Passages
Failure
To Comply With Technical Specifications
Refueling Hanipulator Crane
LCOs Not Verified
ECCS Flow Imbalance
Caused
By Normal Fluctuations
Changes
To Pressurizer
Level Set Values
Fire Rated Assemblies
And Dampers
RCS Flow Less
Than Required During Refueling
Lack Of Isolation Between
BOP And Safety System
Loads
Reactor Trip Due To Feedwater
Flow/Steam
Flow Mismatch
Potential Violation Of ESF Instrumentation
LCO
87"001
87-002
87-003
ESF Actuation, Inadvertent
Opening Of Trip Breakers
Ice Buildup In Ice Condenser
Flow Passages
Bistables
Not Tripped During Instrumentation Calibration
87-005
87"006
87"007
87-008
87-009
87-010
87-011
87"012
87-013
2
Turbine Trip/Reactor Trip Due To Condenser
Vacuum Loss
2
Reactor Trip Due To Low-Low Steam Generator
Level
2 (UE) Improperly Performed T.S. Surveillance
(Cont. Spray)
2
Reactor Trip Due To Reactor Coolant
Pump Undervoltage
2
Reactor Trip Due To Extreme High Steam Generator
Level
2
Radiation Monitor Inoperable Without Compensatory
Sample
2
Ice Buildup In Ice Condenser
Flow Passages
2
ESF Actuation By Personnel
Error
2
Inadvertent
Opening Of Reactor Trip Breakers
2
Reactor Trip Caused
By Turbine Trip (P-13 Setpoint)
All LER events
were found to be properly classified
as either
an Unusual
Event (UE), or not falling under the
Emergency
Plan event classification
scheme
(no Emergency Action Level
had been met).
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from commitments
were identified.
However,
the following item should
be considered
for
improvement.
Documentation
related to each
emergency
plan activation should
be
gathered
into a file specific to the activation.
Included should
be
notification sheets,
condition reports, shift logs, notes,
related
memoranda
or other documentation
as appropriate.
Each activation should
be reviewed for identification and correction of problems
and
summarized.
Documentation
as to identified problems,
problem tracking and corrective
action taken
should
be included in the file package.
4.
0 erational
Status of the
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Pro
ram
82701
a.
Emer enc
Plan
and
Im lementin
Procedures
Also 82204
The licensee's
procedures
related to onsite
and offsite protective
action decisionmaking
were adequate
and
unchanged
from those in use
during the previous inspection.
A review of the
Emergency
Plan
and Procedures,
demonstrated
that
the authority and responsibility to make protective action
recommendations
were clearly delineated.
Procedures
necessary
to
assess
and analyze
emergency conditions
and to make
recommendations
to protect the public and onsite workers were adequately
documented.
b.
Readiness
of Facilities
The inspectors
toured the Technical
Support Center
(TSC),
Operational
Support Center
(OSC),
and the Emergency Operations
Facility (EOF).
All were .located
as described
in the emergency
plan and procedures
and were being adequately
maintained in an
operational
state of readiness.
0
It was noted that improvements
had been
made in the
TSC since the
last='inspection.
A large, electronic
copyboard
had been installed,
providing the capability to rapidly document
comments
placed
on the
board'. 'ighting had been
improved by the addition of track
lighting on both sides of the room,
and various computer displays
had been repositioned,
providing additional free space.
A test of
the Health Physics
Network (HPN) telephone
and
ENS in the
TSC and
EOF indicated that they were in good working order.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from
commitments
were identified.
Or anization
and
Mana ement Control
Also 82204
A major reorganization of the onsite
Emergency
Preparedness
function has taken place
since the last inspection.
The Emergency
Response
Coordinator
now reports to the Assistant Plant Manager,
Technical
Support.
A new Emergency
Response
Coordinator
was
selected
in August,
1987.,
and
assumed
the duties of the position in
September,
1987.
A review of the organizational
structure of corporate
and plant
staff indicated
no changes
were
made that would effect the ability
of plant personnel
to protect the health
and safety of the public.
A review of training and qualification records of Emergency
Response
Organization
personnel
was performed
and all individuals
were determined qualified to fulfilltheir responsibilities.
A review was conducted of Revision
6 of the Emergency
Plan
and its
corresponding
Implementing Procedures
(EPIPs).
There were
no major
changes
made to the program which would affect the overall status
of emergency
preparedness.
At the time of this inspection all of
the EPIPs involved in the complete rewrite of the Emergency
Plan
Implementing Procedures
begun in 1985 were implemented.
These
changes
had been
reviewed by the site review committee
and had
proper management
approval.
Revisions to the Plan
and
were
submitted to the
NRC within 30 days
as required
by 10 CFR 50.54 (q).
Current copies of the Emergency
Plan
and Implementing Procedures
were available in the Emergency
Response
Facilities
and Control
Room.
The Emergency
Plan Administrative Manual
(EPAM) which was in the
development
process
during the November
1986 routine inspection
was
not completed at the time of this inspection.
Originally this
manual
had
a June,
1987 completion goal.
Specifically, chapters
7
"Facility Maintenance"
and 8 "Oocumentation"
had not been
completed.
Therefore,
an effective maintenance
program,
checklists,
administrative
procedures
and
a tracking system were
not in effect.
The lack of administrative
procedures
and tracking system (to track
action items, routine items, other items resulting
from drill and
exercise critiques,
and items from NRC reports)
has led to
inadequate
program management
demonstrated
by the omission of
required monthly communication testing of the
ENS and
HPN telephone
systems
as noted in Section
7 of this report.
The licensee
committed
to develop
adequate
Emergency
Plan Administration Procedures
for
implementation within 90 days,
to ensure that
a state of operational
readiness
is obtained
and maintained.
This will be tracked
as
Open
Item No. 50-315/88006-01.
The
1988
Emergency
Information brochure
was published in pocket
calendar
form in conjunction with Berrien County Sheriff's office
and the Michigan State Police.
This brochure
was mailed by the
licensee
to all Michigan customers
on
December
9,
1987.
Brochures
were
hand delivered to all motels,
nursing
homes,
and marinas wi'thin the emergency
planning
zone
during the week of January
18,
1988.
A review of offsite support
training and meeting records indicated adequate
coordination
and
interface
was part of the overall
emergency
response
program.
Letters of Agreement with offsite support agencies
were current
and
indicated
no changes
in organizations
or support.
replacement
is scheduled
to take place at Unit
1
later this year.
Discussion with licensee
personnel
indicated that
consideration
had been given to the possible
impact that this
effort would have
on emergency
preparedness.
Personnel
involved in
the replacement effort will have designated
assembly/accountability
areas,
should'plant
evacuation
be necessary.
Licensee
personnel
also indicated that they were considering
a request to suspend
certain
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) for Unit 1 for the timeframe
when it was defueled.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from
commitments
were identified.
k
Emer enc
Pre aredness
Trainin
Also 82206
The overall training program
has
had minor changes
since the
previous routine inspection.
A selection of training records
were reviewed,
and
no deficiencies
were identified.
The lesson
plan for "Emergency Plan Overview" for manager
and
technical staff training (TS-C-CS17)
and related
handouts
was
reviewed
and found acceptable.
A written test is included
as
a
part of this training module, with a passing
grade of 8(C required.
The licensee
has
implemented
a program which includes all of the
basics of the Institute for Nuclear
Power Operations
(INPO)
training guidelines.
A job analysis is first performed
on the job
for which training is under development,
identifying the job
requirements
and tasks
performed.
Then,
a lesson
plan is developed
to cover the requirements
and teach the required tasks.
As a part
of the above,
reviews are
underway to determine which of the
emergency
plan positions require specific training,
and which
positions only require
normal training (emergency duties are
virtually identical to routine duties).
All licensed
personnel
receive
emergency
preparedness
training as
part of the routine requalification training program,
except those
whose job analysis
has indicated that specific training is not
required
(such
as mechanical
or electrical
department
personnel).
A new training facility, including classrooms,
administrative
offices, mechanical
and electrical
shops,
and
a plant simulator has
been
completed
since the last inspection.
The plant control
room
simulator was complete
and undergoing testing.
A room adjacent to
the simulator will be utilized to simulate the Technical
Support
Center,
the first such facility in Region III.
This should
be
an
aid in increasing
the realism of annual
emergency
exercises.
As noted below,
one shift of Control
Room personnel,
consisting of
the Shift Supervisor,
Assistant Shift Supervisor
and the Shift
Technical Advisor, all members of the emergency organization,
were
interviewed to establish their knowledge of an'd ability to
implement the Emergency
Plan
and implementing procedures.
All of
the individuals were adequately
knowledgeable
and displayed
an
ability to implement the procedures
in relation to accident
classification
and escalation,
notification and protective action
recommendations.
Inde endent Reviews/Audits
Also 82210
The licensee's
guality Assurance
group performs
an audit every
12 months, to meet the requirements
of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
Individuals assigned
to perform the audit are to have
no
responsibilities for implementing the Emergency
Response
Program.
It was confirmed through record review that the audit had been
performed within 12 month periods.
Licensee
procedures
provide for
the conduct,
documentation,
and corrective action associated
with
audits.
Audit Report
NSORC-136,
documenting
the licensee's
1987 annual
audit of Emergency
Preparedness
was reviewed.
The audit was
conducted
during February 23-27,
1987,
by a team consisting of an
Audit Team Leader
and three auditors.
The previous audit
(NSDRC-125) was conducted during February,
1986.
Audit NSDRC-136 did not identify any noncompliance
with licensee
procedures
or commitments.
There were four Recommendations,
and
five "points of information"
listed in the Audit Summary Report.
A portion of the audit dealt with the adequacy
of the interface
with State
and local governments.
Documents
indicated that State
of Michigan and local (Berrien County) representatives
were advised
of the availability of the audit on September
1,
1987,
as per the
requirements
of 10 CFR 50.54(t).
Quality Assurance Audit QA-87-06 was also reviewed.
This audit
documented
the observation of the Emergency
Plan Exercise
held
on
February
10,
1987 by seven
QA Auditors.
The audit was conducted
from an "observations
only" standpoint,
and
no response
to the
report was required,
although several
recommendations
and weaknesses
from the Exercise
were provided in the text of the report.
Quality Assurance
Surveillance
Report 12-87-207
addressed
"Emergency
Plan Control
and Reference
Material Libraries",
and was
conducted
between
November 30,
1987
and
December
16,
1987.
One
Condition Report (12-12-87-2016)
was issued relative to document
control
and availability in the Technical
Support Center
(TSC). It
was also
recommended
that the
TSC reference
material library be
inventoried
and updated to controlled status.
Discussion with Quality Assurance
personnel
indicated that few
surveillances
were performed in the area of emergency
preparedness,
but the surveillance
program
was under revision,
and
such
survei llances would be considered.
It was
recommended
that
surveillances
be performed
on documentation of Emergency
Plan
activations,
required communications tests,
equipment maintenance,
and tracking of exercise critique items.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from
commitments
were identified.
5.
Emer enc
Detection
and Classification
82201
A team of Control
Room personnel,
consisting of a Nuclear Shift
Supervisor
(NSS),
a Nuclear Assistant Shift Supervisor
(NASS),
and
a
Shift Technical Advisor (STA) was interviewed.
The team exhibited
adequate. familiarity with the
Emergency Action Levels (EALs) when asked
to classify several
abnormal plant conditions.
The
knew that his
undelegatable
responsibilities
included declaring
an emergency,
and that
he was procedurally required to approve all related initial notification
messages
to Federal,
State,
and county officials.
This team was well
aware of the regulatory time limits for initially informing offsite
officials following any emergency declaration.
Some minor confusion initially developed
as to the requirement for an
evacuation of nonessential
site personnel
at the declaration of a Site
Area Emergency.
Procedure
PMP 2080
EPP. 104, Section 4.8 (Page
2) does
not indicate that
such
an evacuation
is required.
Procedure
PMP 2081
EPP. 103, Section 4.2. 1 does clearly indicate that this is
a requirement.
0
0
Records
review indicated that the annual
review of EALs with offsite
officials was conducted
in October,
1987.
Attendees
also heard
presentations
on the provisions for formulating offsite offsite
Protective Action Recommendations
(PARs)
and for notifying offsite
officials following any emergency declaration.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from commitments
were identified.
Protective Action
82202
The shift of operating
personnel
interviewed
above
was also adequately
familiar with procedural
requirements
related to onsite
and offsite
protective action decisionmaking.
The
knew that his undelegatable
responsibilities
included authorizing
emergency
exposure limits for
onsite -volunteers
sent to perform lifesaving and vital equipment repair
tasks,
and making
a Protective Action Recommendation
(PAR) to offsite
authorities within 15 minutes following any General
Emergency
declaration.
The team
was adequately familiar with procedural
requirements
for assembly
and accountability for all onsite personnel.
The team was readily able to use procedural
guidance to formulate
a
correct offsite
PAR when given
a set of abnormal plant conditions.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from commitments
were identified.
Notifications and Communications
82203
Selected
procedures
were reviewed.
It was determined that the licensee
had the capability to notify and communicate
among the appropriate
licensee
personnel, offsite agencies
and authorities,
and the general
public in the event of a radiological
emergency.
A review of test
and maintenance
documentation of the Prompt Notification
System
was conducted for the period January
1987 thru December
1987.
The System
was in place
and maintained.
Required monthly tests
were
activated
and monitored by state authorities with problems reported to
the licensee,
who maintained the system.
A review of communication test procedures
PMP 2082
EPP.005
revealed
an
out of date telephone
number for the testing of the
HPN telephones.
Licensee
personnel
indicated that this would be corrected.
Licensee
emergency
plan
and implementing procedures
require monthly test
of ENS and
HPN telephones
in the
TSC and
EOF in accordance
with 10 CFR 50
Appendix
E requirement.
Documentation of these tests
was reviewed for
the period January
1987 thr u December
1987.
Documentation
revealed that
contrary to these
requirements
responsible
licensee
personnel
had not
tested
the
ENS and
HPN telephones
in the
TSC and
EOF for the time period
of July 1987 thru December
1987.
The inspector
tested
the telephones
10
during
a tour of the
ERFs and found they were operational
at the time of
the inspection.
During this time frame operations
personnel
tested
the
communi'cations
equipment located in the
TSC only, but failed to document
this and inform the Emergency
Planning Coordinator,
the responsible
licensee
representative.
The
EP Coordinator
was newly appointed
to the
position in July,
1987,
and
had failed to perform. monthly communication
testing.
The omission of monthly testing of these
telephone
lines is
a
violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix
E and is contrary to licensee
Emergency
Plan
and Procedure
requirements.
The violation will be tracked
as
Item
No. 50-315l88006"02.
In response
to an improvement item documented
in November
1986, the
licensee
had copied the
NRC Notification form attached
to Information
Notice 85"78 and added it to Operations Instruction
PMI 7030, "Condition
Reports
8 Plant Reportability", as Attachment 4.
This form is completed,
notifications are
made,
and then the form is attached
to the Condition
report and distributed for review.
One violation of regulatory requirements
was identified.
Also, the
following item should
be considered for improvement.
Implementing Procedure
should
be revised to reflect the
correct commercial
telephone
number for the
HPN telephone.
'hift Staffin
and Au mentation
82205
The licensee's
minimum shift staffing and functional capabilities
were
reviewed
and it was concluded that the emergency
response
organization
met the guidelines of Table B-1 of NUREG-0654,
Revision
1.
A review of shift augmentation drill records for September
30,
1987
indicated that due to inadequate
telephone
line capabilities
and
inadequate
procedures
the licensee
would not have
been able to staff the
TSC or
EOF within the required time frame.
The
TSC Director and
Manager positions were not staffed.
After a review of drill records the
Emergency
Preparedness
Coordinator determined that additional trunk line
capabilities
were necessary,
and procured
them the next day.
Personnel
designated
as
TSC Directors
and
EOF Managers
were
on site at a meeting
and were not aware that they could respond.
Actions to address
the lack of staffing were adequate,
however,
a second
augmentation drill was not conducted to verify licensee's ability to meet
staffing requirements.
The licensee's
Emergency
Plan
and corresponding
Implementing Procedures
require
semi-annual
shift staffing augmentation
drills.
On January
28,
1988 the inspector
requested
an offhours shift
augmentation
test.
Following a review of test documentation it was
determined that the licensee
was able to meet minimum staffing
requirements
of Table 8-1 of NUREG-0654.
Licensee
personnel
indicated
that in order to ensure
constant
minimum staffing capability notification
procedures
and the corresponding call out list would be reviewed
and
modified.
Consideration
would be given to selection of minimum staff to
activate
an
emergency
response facility, prioritizing the call-out list
by distance
from the plant,
and call out drills would take credit for
those already on-shift at the time of the drill.
This will be tracked
as
Open Item No. 50-315/88006-03.
By procedure,
the call-out list of emergency
personnel
is updated
quarterly.
The notification system
and call-out procedures
were
adequately
described.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
form commitments
were identified.
Dose Calculation
and Assessment
82207
The equipment
and procedures
to be used for dose
assessment
were
reviewed.
A formalized dose
assessment
training module
(RP-C-GE63,
Revision 0) for "Offsite Dose assessment-Computer"
(using
a mainframe
computer for calculations)
has
been developed
and training conducted.
A
personal
computer
based
dose
assessment
system is planned for the future.
The lesson
plan, handouts,
mini-scenarios
and classroom
exam were
reviewed.
Protective Action Recommendation
calculations
have also
been
computerized
and initial training of personnel
is in process.
Procedure
PHP 2081
EPP.305,
"Protective Action Recommendations"
(Revision 2) adressing
the
above, is in the review process.
No violations of regulatory requirements
or deviations
from commitments
were identified.
Licensee Action on
NRC Information Notice 87-59 "Continuous
Communications
Following
Emergency Notifications" was issued
by the
NRC on November
16,
1987.
The
Notice clarified the role of the
NRC in emergency
response,
and
reinterate
the responsibility of each licensee
to maintain adequate
personnel
on shift to permit conti'nuous
communications with the
NRC in an
emergency without diminishing the ability to react to an emergency.
No
response
or specific action was required by the Notice.
Licensee
documentation
indicated that the Notice had been distributed to
appropriate
personnel
on January ll, 1988.
Licensee
procedures
(PMP 2080
EPP. 106) provide for the contingency that one individual may
have to be continuously involved with communicating to the
NRC during an
emergency classified
as
an alert or higher classification.
Exit Interview
30703
The inspectors
met with the licensee
representatives
denoted
in
Paragraph
1 on January
29,
1988.
The inspectors
summarized
the scope
and results of the inspection
and discussed
the likely content of the
inspection report.
The licensee did not indicate that any of the
information disclosed during the inspection could be considered
proprietary in nature.
12
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