ML17325A554
| ML17325A554 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 12/18/1987 |
| From: | Alexich M INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. (FORMERLY INDIANA & MICHIG |
| To: | Murley T NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| AEP:NRC:0838AD, AEP:NRC:838AD, GL-83-28, NUDOCS 8712230102 | |
| Download: ML17325A554 (36) | |
Text
REQULAT INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION KSTEM (RIDS)
DOCKET 8 05000315 05000316
SUBJECT:
Responds to 871111 request
%or mod of info re ATWS Mitigation Sgs Actuation Circuitrg plant-speciFic design concerning Generic Ltr 83-28. Implementation package to be provided bg end of-May 1988.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
A055D COPIES RECEIVED: LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: OR/Licensing Submittal:
Salem ATWS Events GL-83-28 NOTES:
ACCESSION NBR: 8712230102 DOC. DATE'7/12/18 NOTARIZED:
NO FACIL: 50-315 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Planti Unit ii Indiana 8c 50-316 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Power Planti Unit 2i Indiana Sc AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION ALEXICHOR M. P.
(formerly Indiana h Michigan Ele RECIP. NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION MURLEYiT. E.
Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 LA WIQQINGTONi D COP IES LTTR ENCL 1
0 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD3-3 PD COPIES LTTR ENCL 3
3 INTERNAL: ARM/DAF/LFMB NRR/DEST/ESB NRR/DEST/PSB NRR/DLPG/GAB NRR/PMAS/ILRB 01 1
0 1
1 1
0 0
1 0
1 1
NRR LASHER' NRR/DEST/ICSB NRR/DEST/RSB, NRR/DOEA/GCB OQC/HDS1 RES/DE/EIB 1
1 1
1 1
0 0
1 1
EXTERNAL:
LPDR NSIC 1
1 1
1 NRC PDR TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 20 ENCL 13
0 lt I
I I
indiana Michigan Power Company P.O. Box 16631 Columbus, OH 43216 AEP:NRC'0838AD 10 CFR 50.62 Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos.
50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.
DPR-58 and DPR-74 GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ANTICIPATED TRANSIENT WITHOUT SCRAM (ATWS) MITIGATION SYSTEMS ACTUATION CIRCUITRY (AMSAC) ADDITIONALINFORMATION U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555 Attn:
T.
E. Murley December 18, 1987
Dear Dr. Murley:
The purpose of this letter is to respond to your staff's November 11, 1987 telephone request to modify the information on our AMSAC plant specific design.
Attachment 1 to this letter is an iteration of our responses to the 14 items in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report dated September 24, 1986 that addresses the generic design of AMSAC.
We have modified these responses to include the additional information requested by telephone.
Please note that items 2, 7,
11, and 13 have not changed.
Attachment 2 contains our logic diagram for the AMSAC.
Originally we had envisioned using four control switches.
As a result of our human factors review, we will be using only two control switches as shown on the diagram.
We believe the two switches contain the same capability as the four switch configuration and some consolidation is achieved.
In confirmation of our telephone conversation, the Westinghouse variable timer design will be used in our Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant specific design.
We plan to use the Foxboro Spec 200 Micro Control Card, N2CCA-S, to:
(1) perform the lag function on the turbine impulse chamber pressure signals from the pressure transmitters (MPC253 and MPC254),
(2) auctioneer high the two lagged signals, and (3) perform the timer function.
An input
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Dr. T. E. Murley AEP:NRC:0838AD contact to the card will be provided from the 3 out of 4 low feedwater relay logic.
After we have received a low feedwater flow signal and we have successfully completed the timing period, the N2CCA-S will provide an output to the initiate relays via one of the relay output isolators.
The variable timer performance characteristic will be within the Westinghouse-specified acceptable limits.
Attachment 3 is a graph showing initiation timer delay vs.
power level, which was published by Westinghouse.
We also acknowledge your comment concerning double fuses on the AMSAC inverter input power source.
The double fusing feature will be incorporated in the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant final AHSAC design.
We intend to have the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant specific design.
completed by the end of April 1988.
We also hope to have all vendor information available by the end of April 1988.
Therefore we believe we will be able to provide you with our implementation package by the end of May 1988.
This document has been prepared following Corporate procedures which incorporate a reasonable set of controls to ensure its accuracy and completeness prior to signature by the undersigned.
Sincerely, M.
. Ale hach Vice President Attachments cc:
John E. Dolan (w/o attachments)
W.
G. Smith, Jr.
- Bridgman (w/o attachments)
R.
C. Callen (w/o attachments)
G. Bruchmann (w/o attachments)
G. Charnoff (w/o attachments)
NRC Resident Inspector
- Bridgman (w/attachments)
A. B. Davis
- Region III (w/attachments)
'I
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 1
~Diversla "The plant specific submittal should indicate the degree of diversity that exists between the AMSAC equipment and the existing Reactor Protection System.
Equipment diversity to the extent reasonable and practicable to minimize the potential for common cause failures is required from the sensors output to, but not including, the final actuation device, e.g., existing circuit breakers may be used for the auxiliary feedwater initiation.
The sensors need not be of a diverse design or manufacture.
Existing protection system instrument sensing lines,
- sensors, and sensor power supplies may be used.
Sensor and instrument sensing lines should be selected such that adverse interactions with existing control systems are avoided."
~Res onse We will sense the feedwater flow from the existing flow transmitters, FFC-211, FFC-221, FFC-231, and FFC-241.
The AMSAC power permissive signals will be sensed from the existing turbine first stage pressure transmitters, MPC-253 and MPC-254.
Please note that the associated instrument sensing lines and sensor power supplies will be used.
The logic and sensing equipment will be a combination of Foxboro Spec.
200 card's,'
Foxboro Spec.
200 micro card, Agastat Timer, and GE HFA auxiliary relays.
These components are totally separate and different models from the existing reactor protection system (RPS).
These devices will be arranged such that adverse interactions with the RPS logic and the RPS output relays will be prevented.
2.
Lo ic ower su lies "The plant specific submittal should discuss the logic power supply design.
According to the rule, the AMSAC logic power supply is not required to be safety-related (Class 1E).
- However, logic power should be from an instrument power supply that is independent from the reactor protection system (RPS) power supplies.
Our review of additional information submitted by WOG indicated that power to the logic circuits will utilize RPS batteries and inverters.
The staff finds this portion of the design unacceptable, therefore, independent power supplies should be provided."
R~es onse (No Change)
We wi.ll use the existing N-train battery and use an AMSAC inverter which will not be used to power any RPS loads.
The
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 2
N-train battery is independent of the station batteries which power the RPS inverters.
The logic power supply will be direct current from the N-train battery and the bistables will be powered from the AMSAC inverters.
3.
Safet -related interface "The plant specific submittal should show that the implementation is such that the existing protection system continues to meet all applicable safety criteria."
~Res onse The AMSAC system inputs will be isolated by analog isolatois such that a failure in the AMSAC system will not result in a failure of'RPS.
We are adding another analog current to the current isolator to the four feedwater flow loops (FFC-211,
- 221, 231, and 241) and the turbine first stage pressure loops (MPC-253 and 254).
These devices will connect to the Foxboro Spec.
200 logic processing equipment.
Please note that we plan to power these isolators from the existing reactor protection system cabinet power supplies.
This was recommended by the NRC in their Safety Evaluation Report on the generic Westinghouse design.
Relay coil/contact isolation at the AMSAC output will prevent failures within AMSAC from being propagated into the safeguards actuation circuits.
Please see the attached GE publication 7382, dated March 22, 1982, for the Relay Standards (Attachment 4).
Page 2
of the Relay Standards provides the surge withstand capability, which far exceeds the 120V AC and 250V DC control power associated with AMSAC.
"The plant specific submittal should provide information regarding compliance with Generic Letter 85-06,
'Quality Assurance Guidance for ATWS Equipment that is not Safety-Related.'"
~Res onse The applicable portions of the Quality Assurance Program as set forth in the "Updated Quality Assurance Program Description for the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant" (FSAR Chapter 1.7) will be
Attachment 1 to AFP:NRC:0838AD Page 3
applicable to those items of AMSAC equipment designated Class IE.
We believe we will meet the intent of Generic Letter 85-06.
5.
Maintenance b
asses "The plant specific submittal should discuss how maintenance at power is accomplished and how good human factors engineering practice is incorporated into the continuous indication of bypass status in the control room."
R~es ense AMSAC will be disabled for repair and maintenance.
This will be accomplished through a bypass switch whose status will be continuously displayed in the control room.
We have completed a
human factors review and Attachment 5 contains the figure showing the future switch locations and configurations which are consistent with the results of the review.
The switch will be used by plant operators, and plant procedures will be written to incorporate proper operating and maintenance sequences.
6.
. 0 eratin b
asses "The plant specific submittal should state that operating bypasses are continuously indicated in the control room; provide the basis for the 70% or plant specific operating bypass level; discuss the human factors design aspects of the continuous indication; and discuss the diversity and independence of the C-20 permissive signal (Defeats the block of AMSAC)."
~Res onse We will have continuous indication in the control room when AMSAC is in the bypass mode.
We understand that the 70% operating bypass level addressed in the NRC question has been revised to 40%.
The Westinghouse Generic Design contains the basis for the 40% power operating bypass level and the diversity and independence of the C-20 permissive signal.
As a result of the Human Factors
- Review, an indicating light will be used to display the status of the C-20 Permissive Signal in the control room.
The C-20 will enable AMSAC above 40$ power.
Please see Attachment 5 for switch locations/configurations.
The operating bypass switch will be under administrative controls to be specified in relevant plant procedures.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 4
7.
Means for b assin "The plant specific submittal should state that the means for bypassing is accomplished with a permanently installed, human
- factored, bypass switch or similar device, and verify that disallowed methods mentioned in the guidance are not utilized."
~Res onse (No Change)
We will utilize a permanently installed switch for bypassing AMSAC.
We will not be using any disallowed methods to place AMSAC in bypass.
The disallowed methods consist of pulling fuses, lifting leads, tripping breakers, or physically blocking relays.
On-line testing of the logic portion of the circuits will be done by use of this bypass switch.
Relay output testing will be done on an off-line basis.
8.
Manual initiation "The plant specific submittal should discuss how a manual turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater actuation are accomplished by the operator."
~Res onse At the component level, the operator can manually trip the turbine and manually actuate auxiliary feedwater from the control room.
Manual initiation of AMSAC at the system level will be accomplished through a control switch.
Please see Attachment 5
for the switch configurations and locations which resulted from our Human Factors Review.
9.
Electrical inde endence from existin reactor rotection s stem "The plant specific submittal should show that electrical independence is achieved.
This is required from the sensor output to the final actuation device at which point non safety-related circuits must be isolated from safety related circuits by qualified Class 1E isolators.
Use of existing isolators is acceptable.
- However, each plant specific submittal should provide an analysis and tests which demonstrates that the existing isolator will function under the maximum worst case fault conditions.
The required method for qualifying either the existing or diverse isolators is presented in Appendix A."
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 5
~Res ense AHSAC logic and power supply are independent of the RPS logic and power supply.
The AHSAC alarms will be annunciated on annunciators that are powered from the existing control room 125 Vac annunciator bus.
The AHSAC analog inputs will be from existing sensors which are powered from existing RPS power supplies.
Please refer to our response to Appendix A (reference AEP:NRC:0838Z and AEP:NRC:0838V dated June 25, 1987 and November 7,
1986, respectively) for information on the isolators submitted previously.
Please note that the new electrical current repeaters (I/Is),
which serve as isolation devices, will be located in the appropriate RPS cabinets and they will be powered by existing RPS cabinet power supplies.
AHSAC implementation will not degrade any of our existing RPS separation criteria.
10.
Ph sical se aration from existin reactor rotection s stem "Physical separation from existing reactor protection system is not required, unless redundant divisions and channels in the existing reactor trip system are not physically separated.
The implementation must be such that separation cri.teria applied to the existing protection system are not violated.
The plant specific submittal should respond to this concern."
~Res onse The RPS separation criteria will remain unaffected by AHSAC.
We will follow existing practices regarding this issue.
The input cables from the I/Is to the Foxboro Spec.
200 cards will be run in channel associated trays and will conform to existing fire protection guidelines'.
The output cables running from the initiating relays (IR1, IR2, IR3) will be run with their respective safety associated trays.
Where cables leave trays to enter cabinets (housings, etc.)
they will be in conduits, such that the separation requirements are maintained, per our existing practices.
11.
Environmental uglification "The plant specific submittal should address the environmental qualification of ATWS equipment for anticipated operational occurrences only, not for accidents."
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 6
~Res onse (No Change)
We will be placing the new equipment for the AMSAC system in a controlled environment in the control room.
There are no high-energy lines present in the area; therefore, special 10 CFR 50.49 environmental qualification will not be needed.
12.
Testabilit at ower "Measures are to be established to test, as appropriate, non safety related ATWS equipment prior to installation and periodically.
Testing of AMSAC may be performed with AMSAC in bypass.
Testing of AMSAC outputs through the final actuation devices will be performed with the plant shut down.
The plant specific submittals should present the test program and state that the output signal is indicated in the control room in a manner consistent with plant practices including human factors."
R~es onse We plan to perform end-to-end tests at every refueling outage.
Testability at power has been incorporated into the design to allow for reasonable post maintenance operability testing.
Note:
Testability at power does not include the ability to exercise the final actuation relays/devices.
Plant procedures will cover AMSAC testing.
When we are in the bypass/test/disable
- mode, there will be continuous indication in the control room.
13.
Com letion of miti ative action "AMSAC shall be designed so that, once actuated, the completion of mitigating action shall be consistent with the plant turbine trip and auxiliary feedwater circuitry.
Plant specific submittals should verify that the protective action, once initiated, goes to completion, and that the subsequent return to operation requires deliberate operator action."
~Res onse (No Change)
The Westinghouse Owners Group low feed flow design delays the unlocking of AMSAC (C-20 signal) for 60 seconds to allow AMSAC initiation to follow through to completion.
The WCAP-10858 provided the basis for this design.
Its implementation will be consistent with existing plant turbine trip and existing auxiliary feedwater control circuit requirements.
Attachment 1 to AEP:NRC:0838AD Page 7
Initial plant checkout testing will verify that once initiated, AMSAC will go to completion.
Our design requires a deliberate action from the operator to reset the AMSAC system.
AMSAC system will be continuously monitored in the control room.
14.
Technical S ecifications "Technical specification requirements related to AMSAC will have to be addressed by plant. specific submittals."
~Res ense As agreed in our November 11, 1987 telephone conversation, technical specifications are not relevant to AMSAC.
(All references to technical specifications in our submittals AEP:NRC:0838V of November 7,
1986 and 0838Z of June 25,
- 1987, are inappropriate and should be disregarded).
Attachment 2 to AEP:NRC:0838AD
RCTACIIMENT 2 to AEP:NRC:
0838AD AMSAC LOGIC DIAGRAM INlllATE ALISAC 0
INDICATE AMSAC INITIATED ERRRQZR TEST RRLRR (ARI)
INDICATE AMSAC TEST SUCCESSFUL INDICATE AMSAC ENABLED LEGEND:
COMMAND S60 SECONDS
+VARIABLE llMER ABOVE 40K POWER LEVEL (C-20)
(PERMISSIVE)
AMSAC DISABLED AMSAC IN BTPASSflEST AlARM (IN CONTROL ROOM (LN CONTROL ROOM
~
RRR ROT 12 l 4 12 S 4 NORMAL LOW FEEDWATER LOOP FLOW SIMULATED LOW FLOW CHANNELS FEEOWATER FLOW MASTER SWITCH IN TEST MODE LIANUAL INITIATE DIS-ABlED NORMAL 101-ALI-2 MODE SWITCH BYPASS/TEST TIME DELAY ON ENER012NG
~ llME DELAY DEPENDENT ON POWER LEVEL PROCESS/CONTROLS
Attachment 3 to AEP:NRC:0838AD
ATTACHiKNT 3 to AEP:ViRC 0838AD ACCEPTABLE RANGE ao FIGURE 3-8: AMSAC VARIABLETIME DELAY
Attachmerit 4 to AEP:NRC:0838AD
ATTACHMENT 4 to AE RC 0838AD '3. of 3)
PROTECTIVE RELAYS Relay Standards
/CtlZ r/r:/I /trl~~
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c&/ 8//co@'r
/>o~:A t'>-'wc(z 1NTRODUCTlON CONTENTS 7382 Page i March 22. )98.
All General Electric protective relays in this handbook, unless otherwise noted, are designed and manufactured in accordance with the ANSI/IEEEstandard C37.90 that applies to protective relays. To better under.
stand the application, design, rating and se-lection of protective relays, certain parts of the American National Standard (ANSI) and IEEE standard will be summarized for easy reference. This summary should help guide the relay engineer regarding service conditions, standard ratings and other ap-plication requiremalts, but is not intended as a substitute for a reference to the com-plete standard.
usvol Sernce ConCht>>ns 4oteIQ~wreht ond Volloee Masimwll desiah Ior olt relays Ac ond dc ovskory relays Mole ond carry rotine for tnPPOIQ CohtoCfl tnppvsf contacts dvty cyde Oieectnc tests by mohvtactvrer 0>>tectric tests by vser Svree Witttstond Copobaty (SWC)
Fon transient lest 4ad'>> Freavency Interferedce (4fl)
S<<snic Ovo4raot>>hs
~ Oots tf Eawpment (or Nvdeor. Power Geherohhe Slonohs S<<shee lestinQ ol protecnre ond ovsXory relays Eiectnc Power System Device fvnct>>n nwhbers ANSI/IHE C37.90.1978 Standards Ior friars ond 4 stay systems ANSI/IEH.C37,90.1978 ANSI/IHE C37.90 1978 ANSI/IEEf C37.90 1978 ANSI/lfEE C37.90 1978. stand CI7.90O GE its>>vse test (IfH standard ender preparer>>h)
GE evt>>vse test (IHE stondord ender preparotionI IHE 323 1974. Standard for Ovoffyine Oats IE Eau'ament (or Nvdeor Power Geheronne 5tot'>>ns former)y IEE f. 501, how tffE C37.98 5<<snwc yes>>8 ol leiays ANSI C37,2 7382 Pace No Hb7383 Voltoae Cwrent (Al REFERENCE STANDARD ANSI/IEEE C37.90 - 197g "Standards for Relays and Relay Systems" Scope and Limitations The standards and references that follow apply primarily to relays and relay systems used to control power switchgear.
What is a Relay'P relay is "an electrical device designed to respond to input conditions in a pre.
scrib)fd manner, and after specified condi-tions are met, to cause contact operation or similar abrupt change in associated electric control circuits."
Usual Service Conditions:
Relays must be suitable for operation un-der the following:
(a) The ambient temperature of the air immediately around the relay case or other enclosure shall be within the limitsof -20C to +55C.
(b) The altitude shall not exceed 5000 II (1500 meters).
Ratings (o) Standard current and voltage rat-ingsThe standard current and voltage ratings for relays shall be as follows:
(b) Allowable vorlatlon from rated voltage protective relays which are de-signed to bc energized continuously with ac voltage shall operate without damage at rat.
ed frequency with voltage not more than 10 percent above rated voltage, but not ncces.
sarily in accordance with temperature rise limits established foroperation at rated volt-age.
(c) Maximum design voltage or cur-rantThe maximum design voltage or cur-rent for all
- relays, other than voltage~peratcd auxiliary relays, shall be equal to the rated voltage or current of the relay. This is the highest rms alternating or direct voltage or current at which the relay is designed to be energized continuously without exceeding the allowable tempera-ture rise for the class of insulation (Many GE relays are designed to continuously car-ry current in excess of the rated current).
(d) Range of operating voltage for auxiliary reloys dc auxiliary relays, which may be continuously energized for indefinite periods, dc power supplies, and auxiliary relay circuits with dc voltage rat-ings, shall be able to withstand the max-imum design voltage without exceeding thc allowable temperature rise.
These relays shall operate successfully over a range from g0 percent ofrated voltage to the maximum design voltage. Ac auxiliary relays shall be able to withstand 110 percent of rated volt-age without exceeding the allo~able tem-perature rise. These relays shall operate successfully over a range from 85-110 per-cent of rated voltage.
Table 1
4ared Volts 24 48 125 250 Masenvm Oesien Volts 28 Sb 140 280 (e) Make and Carry Ratings for Trip-ping Contacts (revised 1978) a tripping contact is designed for the purpose of ener-For dc auxiliary relays, relay power sup-ply, or auxiliary relay circuits with dc volt-age ratings, the maximum design voltage shall be as shown in Table l.
gizing a power circuit breaker trip coil Ac (rms) 120 240 40 zc 125 250 Ac (nns)
The maximum design voltage for ac aux-The contact shall make and carry 30 am-iliary relays shall be 110 percent of rated pares for at least 2000 operations in a pre-voltage.
scribed duty cycle.
- C)onper/r/nce Jvhe Fa lpyp alee.
QA 700, 701, 711 7'ls, 722, 723, 731 737 CW72A. 4, C, O. E SW72A, 4, C. O. f, f (C/C7
()oto srrb/ecr to cfnmpe wrl/Iavrnar/ce g gR ggALO ELECTRIC
tb ATTACtANENT i to AERCi 0838AD (2 of 3
t 82 Page'2 March ll. 19$ 2 PROTECTIVE RELAYS Relay Standards Dielectric Tests General Dielectric tests between cir-cuits, and dielectric tests between circuits and relay frame, shall be considered as rou-tine tests. Dielectric tests across open con.
tacts shall be considered as design tests.
Dietectric tests are not required across con-tacts with surge-suppression components, nor across solid-state output circuits; when these are used, the Surge Withstand Capa-bility (SWC) test should be substituted for the dielectric test.
Standard Tat Voltage Relays rated 600 volts and below shall withstand for one minute a low.frequency alternatingwurrent voltage test of twice rated voltage plus 1000 volts with a minimum of 1500 volts.
Ouranon af Teat Valtage The test voltage for all relays shall be ap-plied continuously for a period of 60 sec-onds.
As an alternate, to be made at the point ofmanufacture only, it is permissible to test any relay for one second at a value of 20 percent higher than the standard 60 second test voltage.
Olelectrlc Tests by Vsers Dielectric tests, in accordance with the standard, may be made by the user on new relays only, to determine whether specifica-tions arc fulfilled.New relays arc defined as those which have not been in service and are not more than onc year old from date of shipment and have been suitably stored to prevent deterioration.
Additional dielectric tests may be made, using 75 percent of the standard test volt-age, at the point ofinstallation to determine the practicality of placing or continuing the device or equipment in service.
faints of Application of Voltage The test voltage of insulation to ground and between circuits shall be applied succes-sively between each clcctric circuit and all other electric circuits, and between each electric circuit and the metal frame of the relay. The test voltage across open contacts shall be applied to thc relay terminals which connect to the contacts.
Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Tests The surge withstand capability (SWC) is a daign test for relay systems and, in par-ticular static relays The purpoM ofthis test is to apply to the terminals of the relay system a standardized test wave shape that is representative of surges observed and measured in actual in-stallations. In order to pass this test, relay systems must be able to withstand the ap-plied surge without damage to components and without operating incorrectly.
Surge Withstand Capability (SWC) Wave Shape and Characteristics The SWC test wave is an oscillatory wave, with a frequency range of 1.0 MHz to 1.S MHz, voltage range of 2.S kV to 3.0 kV crest value of the liat half cycle peak, and envelope decaying to 50 percent ofthe crest value of the first peak in not less than 6 fzs from th>> start of the wave. The source impedance of the surge generator used to produce the test wave shall be 150 ohms g 5 percent. The test wave to be applied to test specimen at a repetitive rate of not less than 50 tests per second for a period of not less than 2.0 seconds.
MOTE: (1) All voltage and time values refer to the open circuit condition of the surge genera.
tor.
(2) Time period and repetition rate have been chosen to cover equipmcnt which is used on 50 Hertz as weil as 60 Hertz systems. The SWC test shall be applied to ih>> relay as specified in ANSI C37.90.
FAST TRANSIENT TEST (Ref: W. C. Koiheimer and L. L. MankolT. Pro-tection ofRelays fromTheir Etcctrical En3iiron-ment - Georgia Tech Relay Conference, 1977)
The Fast Transient test simulates the surges due to the interruption of inductive devices such as auxiliary relay coils. alarm bell coils, solenoids, ctc. These surges are localized in effec, being attenuated by a fcw tens of feet of circuit from the source.
Laboratory experiments
- show, however.
that this surge presents a very real hazard to solid state equipment in the circuit<lose to it, possibly causing false operation or dam-age to semiconductor devices.
This "fast transient," produced by inter-rupting the current through an auxiliary relay coil or a breaker trip coil, has risc times in the 5 nanosecond range and power in the tens ofkilowatts range. When subject-
<<d to such a transient, many semiconductor devices can be degraded such that failure may occur at a later time.
"When measured open circuit, the surge generator shall produce pulses having a risc time of5 nanoseconds or las to a peak value of +5000 volts. The test voltage shall be applied to the relay as specified in ANSI C37.90 for the SWC test."
RADIO FREQUENCY INTER-FERENCE (RFI)
Approximate Frequencies below 550.
Mhz used by Electric Utilities in the USA Send%hi F
27 37 4'sa 173 2ia22O 220 22$
4Sth470 470 5l2 GtiEEni SOnd, QOa 0 GtIEEnt Son4 Gott E Gti28nt aond, Gott A lond Ntoitzo A study has indicated that the possibility of misoperation of a protective or control device to radiated electromagnetic interfer-ence is a function of the following:
1 ~
Field intensity and frequency of radia-tion.
2.
Sensitivity of the affected circuitry to radiation.
3.
Coupling eAiciency resulting from de-vice construction, lead configuration, etch'n in-house test to check the security of static relays against false tripping is now used.
(Recommended Guide Form Speafication)
"The relay shall not be damaged nor ex-hibit spurious output when subjected to a radio frequency susceptibility test, over a frequency range of25 - 500 megahertz with a field strength mcasurcd at the front face of the relay, of 7.0 volts per meter. For these tests the relay is energized and connected for normal operation."
All new relay designs are subjected to this "fast transient" as a design-proof test. It was found that relays which survive the SWC test may fail the "fast transient" test.
(Recommend Guide Form Specification)
"The test shall be the application for two seconds of at least 60 pulses per second at each polarily from a surge generator having a source impedance ofabout 7S ohms resist-o EttETtdo Ettfo Atto Id, IP7d iuw.
(c/C7 CFIIERSI l% El. ECTRIC
ATTACK4ENT 4 ro AEs RCi 083GAD
(
3 of 3)
PROTECTIYE RELAYS Relay Standar s
7382 Page 3 June 1$, 1979 STANDARD FOR QUALIFYING CLASS 1E EQUIPMSNT FOR NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION STATIONS>>
IEEE323-1974A Guide for the Qualification of Class lE Class IE - The safety classification of the electric equipmcnt and systems that are es-sential to emergency reactor shutdown, or are otherwisc essential in preventing signifi-cant release of radioactive material to the environment.
Testing - Outline of procedures which can be used to seismically qualify equipment by test.
Proof Testing
~ To qualify equipment for a particular application.
Fragility Testing - To qualify equipment by determining its ultimate capability.
SEISMIC TESTING OF RELAYS>>
IEEE C37.98 (Formerly IEEE-501}
standard to establish procedures for determ.
ing the seismic capabilities ofprotcctivc and auxiliary relays by fragility and testing.
In order to define the conditions for fragility testing of rehtys, parameters in three separate areas must be specified.
(a) Bectrical settings and inputs to the relay.
(b) The change in state deviation in oper-ating characteristics or other change ofper-formance which constitutes failure.
(c) The seismic vibration environment to be imposed during test.
Typical Fratfiflty Teat Tests are conducted with biaxial multi~
frequency broadband vibrations applied to thc shaker table.
The standard response spectrum (SRS) of the vibrational stimulus (See Figurc 1) is plotted as a percentage of IOO C9 IO X
OI-tsj tsj CJ
~e I
4 25%
250%
ZP 4G IOOe/o IO FREQUENCY Hz 5% DAMPING IOO the Zero Period Acceleration (ZPA). The 1.0 Hz point is 2S% of the ZPA, the 4.0 to 16.0 HZ band is 2SOFo of the ZPA and 33.0 HZ and above is equal to the ZPA. Thc range ofmaximum amplification of acceler-ation, 4.0 to 16.0 HZ, has been designed to most realistically match the range of peak acceleration input to the relays by equip-ments and paneh on which they are mount-ed.
The stimulus is increased in amplitude until failure occurs (per Item b, above) or thc limits of the shaker table are reacherL The fragility level of a relay or device is defined as the maximum ZPA level. ex-pressed in Gs, that can be applied without causing failure.
'elays for Class 1E duty are tested and quali-fied on a selective basis only. For informadoo on specific relay types contact your local Gen-eral Electric sales office.
fig. 1. Multi-frortwncybrood-band standard response spectrvm shape (SRS) for relay wltts ZtA teNet of 4 Oa aA'en. 701. 702. ti1.1 is. 722. tea. Tsi.is)
Attachment 5 to AEP:NRC:0838AD
ATTACHMENT 5 to AEP:NRC:
0838AD (1 of 3)
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