ML17325A071
| ML17325A071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 04/17/1987 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17325A069 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8704300207 | |
| Download: ML17325A071 (9) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 SP,FETY EYPLUATIO.'I BY THE OFr".ICE OF lIUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATIZW PEI ATED TO Al","D!'EtlT!!0. >O7 TO FACILITY OPERATI!iG LICESIISE NO.
DPR-58 ItiDIAIN AND V!ICHIGAN ELECTRIC CONPA!IY DONALD C.
COOK NIJCI EAR PLAhlT UNIT NO.
1 DOCKET NO. 50-315 I NTP,ADIJCT II;N By letter dated January 9, 1987, (and through subsequent telephone conferences) the Indiana and Ilichigan Electric Company (licensee) submitted a request to amend the Technical Specificatiors tTSl of the D. C.
Coo'k, Unit 1.
The arrend-ment proposal calls for the one-time extension of certain surveillances current-ly required to be conducted at the end of the 18 month period (cycle 9) which was initiated following the last refueling outage.
The aff'ected surveillances are as follows:
Il TS 4.8.2.3.2.d - Battery service test required at least every 18 months (during shutdown) verifyinq adequacy of batteries to ser vice and main.ain emergency loads.
(TS 4.8.?.4.2 is included as part of this r'equest because it references TS 4.8.2.3.2.d).
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Enoineered Safety Features (ESF) response time testin (i)
TS 4.5.l.d - accumulator isolation valves - SI actuation (ii)
TS 4.5.2.e - Emergency Core Cooling System - automatic valves, ',
centrifugal charging pump, safety injection pump, residual heat removal pump - SI actuation
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(iii)
TS 4.6.2.1.c - containment spray automatic valves and pumps high high containment pressure actuation (iv)
TS 4.6.2.2.c.?
- spray additive system automatic valves high high containment pressure actuation (v)
TS 4.6.3. 1.2 - containment isolation valves on Phase A and Phase 8
isolation signals; containment purge and exhaust valves and containment purge and exhaust isolation signals.
(vi)
TS 4.7.3.1.b - component cooling water automatic valves - SI actuation signal (vii)
TS 4.7.4.1.b - essential service water automatic valves - SI actuation (viii)
TS 4.7.5.1.e.2 - control room ventilation - SI actuation (ix)
TS 4.7.6. 1.d.3 -
ESF ventilation - high high containment pressure actuation 3)
TS 4.8.1.1.1.b - Reserve Power transfer Test - (TS 4.8. 1.2 is included as part of this request because it references TS 4.8.1.1.1.bl
/
4)
Table 4.3-4, (TS 3.3.3.3l item 1.a, Channel calibration for strong motion triaxial accel erographs.
5)
Table 4.3-7, Calibration of Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV~, block valve position indicator - limit switches.
6l Table 4.3-7, item 14, Calibration, of acoustic monitor 7)
TS 4.4.4.2, Testinq pressurizer heaters from the emeraency power supply 8)
TS,4.6.5.354, Testing ice condenser inlet doors and door position monitoring system.
9)
TS 4.6.5.5, Testing of containment penetration seals These extensions are being sought because the length of the refueling cycle has been extended beyond its originally projected 18 month duration due to the cum-ulative impact of (I) a licensee imposed limit of operation at 90 percent of rated thermal power and {2) forced outages of 41 days and 10 days each.
(
Re licensee's letter to H. Denton dated October I, l986.
EVALUATION 1.
Licensee requests the extension of the battery service tests identified in TS 4.8.2.3.2.d.
This surveillance effort requires verification, every 18 months (during shutdown) that battery capacity (with its charger discon-nected) is adequate to supply associated emergency loads.
The TS specifi-cally requires that this test be performed during operating modes 5 or 6 (shutdown),
If this test were to be performed according to the cuirrent schedule (based on the date of the previous refuelino outaqe),
the unit would be required to shut down before April 20, 1987.
{This date in-
eludes the grace period allowed by TS 4.0.2).
The Unit's current rate of fuel burn is projected to allow operation at least until Hay 23, 1987, the currently scheduled date of the next refueling outage.
The staff's view is that licensee's request for this one-time extension is acceptable.
The weekly surveillance checks of electrolyte levels, spe-cific grivities and cell voltages should likely detect any battery deter-ioration which may occur during the allowed extension.
These requirements, coupled with the fact that the batteries were replaced during the last re-fueling outage and the reouested extension is for a short period, satisfies the staff that the extension will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant nor pose a significant risk to public health and safety.
Licensee requests permission to extend the surveillance intervals established for response time testing of equipment systems which actuate on ESF siqnals.
These systems along with appropriate actuation signals, are identified in the background information presented earlier in this SER.
The licensee indicates that these tests are currently scheduled to commence April 30, 1987 with all systems undergoing testing by Hay 7, 1987.
In order to perform these surveillances during unit shutdown, the current schedule would require slippage, of less than one month to May 23, 1987 with all identified systems undergoing testing by May 30, 1987.
Since the length of this extension is short and since the affected equipment systems and ESF actuation logic channels undergo periodic surveillance
- checks, there is not likely to be any adverse impact on reactor safety and the licensee's extension request is granted.
Therefo~e the staf. finds the one-time ex-tension request acceptable.
3.
Licensee reouests an extension of surveillance interval for performing the reserve power transfer test reouired by TS 4;8.1.1.1.b and TS 4.8.1.2.
These TS call for the testing of the unit's ability to automatically transfer from the normal auxiliary source to the preferred reserve source.
The licensee indicates that the automatic transfer function has been demon-strated functional nn three separate occasions during 1986 as a result of unit trips from power.
Given that the automatic transfer has performed satisfactorily and only a two -onth extension has been requested, the staff's view is that the granting of this extension is not likely to result in a significant risk to the public health and safety.
The staff therefore reconxnends that licensee's reouest for a two month extension be granted.
4.
Licensee requests permission to extend surveillance requirements for TS Table 4.3-4, item la; TS Table 4.3-7, item 13; TS Table 4.3-7, item 14; and TS 4.4.4.2.
(The specific items of surveillance as identified in the background information presented earlier in this SER.)
Staff re-commends that these requests be approved.
Each of these surveillances is currently scheduled to be initiated after the Hay 23, 1987 date of the next refueling outage.
However these instruments'rimary safety functions are most needed during operating modes 1-4.
While the plant is shutdown for refueling, these safety functions are of less importance.
The staff therefore feels that sufficient justification exists to grant a one-time extension for these surveillances until'he end of-the re-fueling outage.
5.
Licensee requests permission to extend surveillance requirement f'r TS 4.6.5.3 and 4.6.5.4 for testing the lower inlet doors and the door position monitoring system.
Currently, the TS require surveillance testing of the lower inlet doors at least once per 9 months and testing of the lower inlet door monitoring system at the same time.
Furthermore, the current technical specifications reouire a channel functional test of the lower inlet door moritoring system at 18 months.
The licensee has proposed extending the surveillance intervals until the end of the Cycle 9-10 refueling outage (currently scheduled to begin on or about Hay 23, 1987) in order to avoid a surveillance outage before the next refueling outage.
A surveillance outage to satisfy the current technical specifications test schedule would be necessary since the testing in question cannot be performed at power due to ALARA considerations.
In the last surveillance o< the lower inlet doors (June 1986) all doors were demonstrated by testing to be operable.
Surveillance performed in December 1985 revealed the failure of 7 (out of 48) lower inlet doors.
The licensee concludes that those failures were the result of an earlier ice condenser defrost operation performed after September 1985 which caused accumulation of ice on the doors.
Therefore, the licensee modified the ice condenser defrost procedure to require the testing of door opening torques and visual inspection of the doors following a defrost operation.
Surveillance testing in April and September of 1985 showed no failure of doors, lending credence to the hypothesis that defrost operations created conditions leading to inoperable door conditions.
Since the lower inlet doors and the door position monitoring svstem were scheduled to be tested by Hay 21, 1987 and the refueling outage is scheduled to begin about Hay 23, 1987, the proposed request for an extension of the surveillance interval until the end of the upcoming refueling outage involves only a short time period of operation in modes 1-4.
Furthermore, recent history of door performance suggests the licensee has investigated this matter and taken actions to prevent potential problems.
Consequently, the staff concludes that this extension of the surveillance interval will have no significant isa'pact on safety and is, therefore, acceptable.
6.
Licensee requests permission to extend surveillance requirements for TS 4.6.5.5 for testing containment penetration seals.
With regard to the seals on the personnel access doors and equipment
- hatches, the 'licensee has similarly requested an extension of the surveillance interval until the end of the Cycle 9-10 refueling outage.
Current requirements dictate testing of the seals by July 2, 1987.
While this is later than the scheduled beginning of the outage, the licensee has requested an extension so that testing of the seals may be performed at the end of the outage, which is prudent since use of access doors may result in seal damage.
To support the extension the licensee notes that testing of the seals cannot be performed at power due to ALARA considerations and that the T/S require the access doors and hatches to be closed in modes 1-4.
Furthermore, the licensee has stated that visual inspection of the personnel access doors and equipment hatches performed under TS 4.6.5.5.2.a has revealed no apparent deterioration of the seals.
The staff finds the above considerations sufficient to warrant
. this extension of the surveillance interval called for in T.S. 4.6.5.5.2.b.
Environmental Consideration This amendment involves a change in the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20.
The staff has determined that the amendment involves no significant increase
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in the amounts, and no significant change ia the types, of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is ao significant increase in individual or cumul ative occupational radiation exposure.
The Coomission has previously issued a proposed finding that this amendment involves no C
significant hazards consideration and there has been no public comment on such finding.
Accordi~gly, this amendment meets the eligibility criteria t
for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR Sec 51.22(c)(9).
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 22(b) ao environmental impact statemeat or environmental as-sessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.
Conclusion We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that:
(1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed
- manner, and (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.
Principal Contributors:
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psB E-N- Fieldsj EICSB D-Wigginton PNRN4 Dated: April 17, 1987
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