ML17319A937
| ML17319A937 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 06/04/1981 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17319A938 | List: |
| References | |
| IEB-79-06A, IEB-79-6A, NUDOCS 8107080591 | |
| Download: ML17319A937 (2) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
'SAFETY 'EVAL'UATION'BY'THE'OFFICE 'OF 'NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
'OR
'NDIANA'AND 'MICHIGAN'ELECTRIC COMPANY DONALD C.
COOK NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NOS.
1 AND'2
"'DOCKET 'NOS; '50-'315 'AND'50-316 INTRODUCTION On March 28, 1979 the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2 (TMI-2) experienced core damage which resulted from a series of events which were initiated.by a loss of feedwater transient.
Several aspects of the acci-dent have generic applicability at operating Westinghouse reactors.
On April 11, 1979, IE Bulletin 79-06 was sent to all Westinghouse operatiIIg plant licensees.
The purpose of the Bulletin was to provide information concerning the accident at TMI-2 and to request certain actions be taken by licensees to preclude a similar occurence at their facilities.
This bulletin was superseded and expanded by IE Bulletin 79-06A dated April 14, 1979 and by IE Bulletin 79-06A Revision 1 dated April 18, 1979.
By letters dated May 1, 1979, June 6, 1979, June 25, 1979 July"25, 1979, September 17, 1979 and October ll, 1979, the licensee provided responses in conformance with the requirements of the Bulletins.
EVAL'UATION In the two year period since the Bulletins have been implemented we have
- observed, in addition to our review of the responses enumerated
- above, that the licensee has complied with all the following provisions of the Bulletins:
- Understanding of the TMI-2 sequence of events.
- Review Plant Procedures for coping with accidents and transients.
- By review of procedures and training instructions:
(1} to avoid overriding automatic action of ESF, (2} to keep high pressure injection (HPI) system in operation for Iat least 20 minutes and to maintain 50'F subcooling margin, (3} to correlate HPI initiation with reactor coolant pump (RCP) opera-tion, and (4) to train operators not to rely on pressurizer level only, to deter-mine primary coolant inventory.
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- Verification of emergency feedwater (EFW) valve positions and all safety-related valve positions to ensure proper operation of EFW and ESF.
- By review of containment isolation initiation and design for avoidance of isolating lines that are needed to avoid degraded core cooling capability.
- By preparing and implementing procedures for all valves which could defeat or compromise:flow of EFW.
- By reviewing operating modes and procedures to prevent inadvertent pumping of radioactive gasses and liquids out of the primary containment.
- By reviewing procedures related to maintenance and test of safety-related systems to:
0 ) verify operability of redundant system prior to removal of any system from service, (2) verify operability of all systems following maintenance or testing, and (3) verification to operating personnel whenever a system is removed from or returned to service.
- By developing procedures and training operators to establish and maintain natural circulation.
- By training operators to take into account reactor vessel integrity con-siderations during any accident or transient.
- By performing analyses and design modifications to reduce the likelihood of automatic PORV actuation during anticipated transients.
- By providing procedures and training operators for a prompt manual reactor trip for transients that result in a pressure increas.e in the reactor coolant system.
- By providing for prompt reporting within one hour of the time the reactor is not in a controlled or expected condition of operation.
- By proposing any needed Technical Specification changes to implement any of the above parts of the Bulletins.
CONCLUSIONS Based on our review of the information provided by the licensee in response to IE Bulletins 79-06A and 79-06A Revision 1, we conclude that the licensee has acceptably responded to these Bulletins.
The actions taken by the licensee demonstrate its understanding fo the concerns.and implications of, the THI-2 accident as they relate to the Donald C.
Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit Nos.
1 and 2;
These actions have resulted in added assurance for the continued protection of theopublic health and safety during plant operation.
Dated: