ML17319A748
| ML17319A748 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 02/02/1981 |
| From: | Boyd D, Dubry N, Swanson E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17319A745 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-315-80-21, 50-316-80-17, NUDOCS 8103120487 | |
| Download: ML17319A748 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000315/1980021
Text
'
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE
OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION III
Reports
No. 50-315/80-21;
50-316/80-17
Docket Nos. 50-315;
50-316
Licenses
No. DPR-58;
Iicensee:
American Electric Power Service Corporation
and Michigan Power
Company
2 Broadway
New York, NY
10004
Facility Name:
D.
C.
Cook Nuclear Power Plant, Units
1 and
2
Inspection At:
D.
C.
Cook Site,
Bridgman,
MI
Inspection Conducted:
December
1-31,
1980
Inspectors:
E.
R.
Swanson
Approved By:
D.
C. Boyd, Chief,
Projects
Section
4
Ins ection
Summa
Ins ection on December
1-31
1980
(Re orts No. 50-315/80-21.
50-316/80-17)
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite regular
and backshift inspection by the
resident inspector.
Areas inspected
included operational safety verification,
inspection during long term shutdown, surveillance observation,
maintenance
observations,
IE Bulletin and IE Circular followup, licensee
event report reviews,
plant trips,
and independent
inspection efforts.
The inspection involved
a total
of 178 inspector-hours
onsite by two NRC inspectors
including 49 inspector-hours
on the off-shifts.
Results:
Of the nine areas
inspected,
no items of noncompliance
or deviations
were identified in eight areas.
Two items of noncompliance
were identified in
two areas
(violation, level IV - exceeding
an action statement,
paragraph
8;
violation level VI - failure to meet commitment - paragraph
10d).
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
R. Hunter, Vice President,
AEP
+D. Shaller, Plant Manager
- B. Svensson,
Assistant Plant Manager
+E. Townley, Assistant Plant Manager
R. Keith, Operations
Superintendent
~E. Smarella,
Technical Superintendent
>R. Dudding, Maintenance
Superintendent
<J. Stietzel,
QA Supervisor
+D. Duncan,
CRI Supervisor
+D. Palmer, Radiation Protection Supervisor
. Kriesel, Environmental Supervisor
R. Jurgenson,
Assistant Vice President,
AEP
The inspectors
also conducted
a number of interviews with operators,
technicians,
and maintenance
personnel
during the inspection.
+Denotes
those present at the exit interview.
0 erational Safet
Verification
The inspector
observed control room operations,
reviewed selected
logs and
records to identify significant changes
and trends; to assure
required entries
were being made;
to verify operating
memos
and instructions
conform to Tech-
nical Specifications;
to check correctness
of communications
about equipment
operational status;
and to verify conformance to limiting conditions for
operation during the month of December
1980.
The inspector also conducted
discussions
about selected
with the control room operators
and
supervision to assure
they were knowledgeable
of plant conditions
and that
corrective action, if required,
was being taken.
Tours of the Unit 2 reactor
compartment
(lower level), the auxilary building, and turbine buildings were
conducted
to observe plant equipment conditions, including potential fire
hazards, fluid leaks,
and excessive vibrations
and to verify that maintenance
requests
had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenance.
The in-
spector by tours of the montoring stations,
observations,
and direct interview
verified that the physical security plan was being implemented in accordance
with the station security plan.
The inspector
observed plant housekeeping/cleanliness
conditions
and verified
implementation of radiation protection controls.
During the month of December
1980, the inspector walked down the accessible
portions of the Unit 1 high
head
and boron injection portion of the
CVCS which is part of the ESF systems
to verify operability.
These
reviews
and observations
were conducted to
verify that facility operations
were in conformance with the requirements
established
under technical specifications,
10 CFR,
and administrative pro-
cedures.
Ins ection Durin
Lon
Term Shutdown
The inspector
observed
the continued
shutdown control room operations
of
Unit 2, reviewed applicable
logs and conducted
discussions
with operators
and others during early December
1980.
The inspectors
checked
the oper-
ability of selected
emergency
systems
and verified proper return to service
of affected
components.
The inspectors
observed portions of the mutliple
restarts
of Unit 2.
The inspectors
also observed
the shutdown operations
of Unit
1 in late
December
1980.
Monthl
Surveillance Observation
The inspector
observed technical specifications
required surveillance testing
on the Pressurized
Pressure
Protection Set II (2 THP 4030
STP 112)
and
Steam
Generator
Water Level Protection Set III (2 THP 4030
STP 117)
and verified
that testing
was performed in accordance
with adequate
procedures,
that test
instrumentation
was calibrated,
that limiting conditions for operation
were
met, that removal
and restoration of the affected
components
were accomplished,
that test results
conformed with.technical specifications
and procedure re-
quirements
and were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing
the test,
and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were pro-
perly reviewed
and resolved by appropriate
management
personnel.
The inspector also witnessed portions of the following test activities:
Procedure
No.
2 THP 4030
104
Title
Overtemperture
and Overpower Protection
Set I.
2 THP 4030
118
Water Ievel Protection
Set IV.
12 THP 6030
IMP 142
Cardox System Surveillance.
Monthl
Maintenance
Observation
Station maintenance activities of safety related
systems
and
components
listed below were observed/reviewed
to ascertain that they were conducted
in accordance
with approved procedures,
regulatory guides
and industry codes
or standards
and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered
during this review:
the limiting condi-
tions for operation were met while components
or systems
were removed from
service;
approvals
were obtained prior to initiating the work; activities
were accomplished
using approved procedures
and were inspected
as applicable;
functional testing and/or calibrations
were performed prior to returning
com-
" 3-
'
ponents or systems
to service; quality control records
were maintained;
act-
ivities were accomplished
by qualified personnel;
parts
and materials
used
were properly certified; radiological controls were implemented;
and, fire
prevention controls were implemented.
Work requests
were reviewed to determine status of outstanding jobs
and to
assure that priority is assigned
to safety related
equipment maintenance
which
may.affect
system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed/reviewed:
Procedure
No.
Title
2 THP 6030
IMP 229
12
MHP 4050 FDF 001
Source
Range NI Calibration on N-32.
Receipt,
Storage,
and Preliminary
Inspection of New Fuel Assembly
Shipping Container.
6.
IE Bulletin Followu
For the IE Bulletins listed below the inspector verified that the written
response
was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written
response
included the information required to be reported, that the written
response
included adequate
corrective action commitments
based
on information
presentation
in the bulletin and the licensee's
response,
that licensee
manage-
ment forwarded copies of the written response
to the appropriate onsite
manage-
ment representatives,
that information discussed
in the licensee's
written
response
was accurate,
and that corrective action taken by the licensee
was
as described in the written response.
IEB No.
Title
80-21
Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm
Foundry Company, Inc.
80"23
Failures of Solenoid Valves Manu-
factured by Valcor Engineering
Corp.
The inspectors
are still following the licensee's
re-evaluation of IEB 79-21
"Temperature Effects on Level Measurements".
7.
IE Circular Followu
For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified that the Circular
was received by the licensee
management,
that
a review for applicability was
performed,
and that if the circular were applicable to the facility, appropri-
ate corrective actions
were taken or were scheduled
to be taken.
IEC No.
Title
79-17
Contact Problem in SB-12 Switches
on G.E. Metalclad Ckt B.
80-23
Potential Defects in Beloit Emergency
Diesels.
Also, IE Circular 79-05, "Moisture Leakage in Stranded
Wire Conductors,"
has been closed out. It was noted that there
have been similar occurrences
when water leaked through
a conduit and contaminated
the turbine building
sub-basement
in July 1980.
8.
Licensee Event Re orts Followu
Through direct observations,
discussions
with licensee personnel,
and review
of records,
the following event reports
were reviewed to determine that
reportability requirements
were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was
accomplished,
and corrective action to prevent recurrence
had been
accomp-
lished in accordance
with technical specifications.
Unit
1
Unit 2
80-20/03L-0
79-26(Sup)/03x-1
80-25/03L-0
80-27/03L-0
LER 80"033/01-T-0
(Unit 2)
During preparations
for changing operational
modes
on December
4,
1980
Surveillance Test ~02-OHP 4030 STP.007
was performed
on the containment
spray
(CTS) system.
This required valve aligments including closure of
CTS-124E
and
CTS-128E
on the discharge
of the East
CTS Heat Exchanger.
These valves were found to be closed during a tour of the Auxiliary
Equipment Operator
on December
14,
1980.
The two valves
were opened re-
storing operability by 0700 on the 14th.
Investigation revealed
these valves
had been shut on December 4,
1980 at
about
1000 hours0.0116 days <br />0.278 hours <br />0.00165 weeks <br />3.805e-4 months <br /> to perform the surveillance test
on East
CTS Pump.
The
valves are shut to prevent inadvertent
spray to the containment while test-
ing the pump.
After pump testing
was complete,
an Auxiliary Equipment
Operator
was assigned
to restore
the flow path to normal.
CTS-124E
and
CTS-128E are required to be locked and sealed
open in the flow path.
The
Auxiliary Equipment Operator locked and sealed
CTS-124E
and
CTS-128E in
the shut position, but initialled the Checkoff Sheet
as having locked and
sealed
the two valves in the open position.
Numerous
mode
changes
(9) were made during the period of December
4-14 each
of which constitutes
a violation of Technical Specification (T.S.)
3 '
'
which requires
the system to be operable prior to entering the next higher
mode.
Also, exceeded
was the T.S. 3.6.2.1 which allows one of the two CTS
to be inoperable for 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> before taking specified actions.
This
is an item of noncompliance violation category IV as specified in Appendix A.
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
corrective actions
and determined
them
to be adequate
to prevent further recurrence.
Additionally, Plant Manager Instruction,
PMI-2110, had been revised
by tem-
porary sheet
on December 9,
1980 to require independent verification of
restoration of valve lineups
on all ECCS equipment prior to declaring oper-
able after maintenance
or surveillance testing.
Had this been in effect
1/
on December 4,
1980, this event would have been
much less likely to occur.
Following the plant trips on December
14,
1980 due to a malfunction in the
Unit 2 main generator pilot exciter the inspector ascertained
the status of
the reactor
and safety systems
by observation of control room indicators
and
discussions
with licensee
personnel
concerning plant parameters,
emergency
system status
and reactor coolant chemistry.
The inspector verified the
establishment
of proper communications
and reviewed the corrective actions
taken by the licensee.
All systems
responded
as expected,
and the plant was returned to operation
on December
16,
1980.
10.
Inde endent Ins ection
(a)
Bomb Threat:
A bomb threat
was received by the licensee via
a telephone.
The inspector
observed
the licensee's
implementation of their security
plan which included notification of local law enforcement
agencies,
coordination of plant wide search,
communications
during the event,
and
decision making.
The threat
was determined to be
a hoax, no bomb was
found.
t)
1980 of the Unit, 2 Residual Heat Removal System
RH-133,
RH-134, SI-170 L2, SI-170 L3.
The procedure
used
(12-THP-SP.003)
was
reviewed with it's temporary
changes
The inspector
verified that calibrated
equipment
was used in performing the test.
An effort was not made to quantify isolation valve leakage
since the
initial test met the acceptance
criterion of~ 5
GPM total leakage.
The test
was performed at
a primary system pressure
of 400 psig.
The
results
were
as follows:
1/
A managment
enforcement
meeting
was held in the Region III offices on
January
13,
1981 to discuss this event.
Details of this meeting will be
discussed
in a seperate
report.
Valve
Desired
Actual
Rh-122 6 RH 134
SI-170 L2
SI"170 L3
All 4
2
GPM
1
GPM
1
GPM
5
GPM
.10 observable
2.02
gpm
1.12
gpm
3.24
gpm
Tube Wear:
On November 4, 1980, the Resident Inspector
was notified of visible damage to several
inner-row tubes in a Unit 2
was in progress
to detect
a minor
tube leak on this steam generator,
and when the secondary
side hand
holes were opened
the tube lane blocking device
was found loose.
Four
tubes
were found to have 50$ wastage
and 'one tube with 20'j wastage.
These
were adjacent to the tube lane blocking devices
which had
apparently
been moving due to the flow.
Subsequent
checks of the
Unit 1 steam generators
in late December revealed similar wear in two
The blocking devices
were found properly secured
indicating they had been loose during a previous operating period.
All tubes with significant wear were plugged
and the procedure
revised
to pervent further recurrence.
Salem Unit 1 has experienced
similar wear in three of four steam
generators
and
as
a result plugged all of the tubes adjacent to the
tube lane blocking devices.
A draft IE Circular was submitted
on
this subject.
Auxiliar
S stems:
As tasked by the Safety Evaluation Report
related to Amendment
42 to Iicense
No. DPR-58 and Amendment
24 to
License
No. DPR-74, the inspector
reviewed various procedures
and modi-
fications affecting the Auxiliary Feedwater
System
as discussed
below:
Recommendation
GS-4:
Procedure
OHP-4022.055.003
is the abnormal
operating procedure titled "Loss of Condensate
Pumps".
The inspector
'determined that it adequately
delineates
the
coordination
and actions required to align Essential
to supply the three Auxiliary Feedwater
Pumps.
Recommendation
GS-5:
OAP-4023.001.007
including Temporary Sheet
No.
1
was found to specify actions
necessary
for manual initiation of the
Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater
Pump
(TDAFP).
The inspector also
found that emergency lighting was installed in the
TDAFP rooms
and
that emergency
radios are available in the Shift Operating Engineer's
office for use during AC power loss.
Recommendation
GS-6:
Verification of valve alignment after testing
and
maintenance
is required by Temporary Sheet
No.
8 to OHP-4030.
STP.017
dated August 4, 1980.
OHP-4021.001.002
"Plant Startup from Hot Standby
to Minimum Load" was reviewed
and it was found that the procedure
did
not call for operating all auxiliary feedwater
pumps.
During the
-
7 "
Unit 2 startup
on December
7,
1980 the
TSAFP was not used to provide
water to any steam genertors,
though it was otherwise
demonstrated
by the surveillance test.
When the disparity between the
licensee's
December ll, 1979 letter and current operating procedures
was pointed out to the licensee
a Temporary Sheet
was added to the
procedure requiring the flow verification described in recommendation
GS-6.
Recommendation
GL-4:
The licensee's
December
11,
1979 letter
(AEP:NRC:
trip on low suction pressure
which will alarm in the control room. It
states
that "This modification will be made by January
1, 1981."
The
associated
design
change
RFC-12-2460
has not been completed
as scheduled.
As a result of these
discussions
the licensee
issued
a letter,
dated
January
27,
1981, to H. Denton, indicating their intention to complete
this modification by April 30,
1981.
This is
a deviation from a commitment and is
vidation as stated in Appendix A.
16.
Exit Interview
The inspector
met with licensee
representatives
(denoted in Paragraph
1)
throughout the month of December
1980 and summarized
the scope
and findings
of the inspection activities.