ML17317B515
| ML17317B515 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Cook  |
| Issue date: | 07/26/1979 |
| From: | James Keppler NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
| To: | Dolan J AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO., INC., INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 7909040579 | |
| Download: ML17317B515 (12) | |
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Docket No. 50-315 Docket No. 50-316 UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION III 799 ROOSEVELT ROAD GLEN ELLYN,ILLINOIS60137 JUL Ss 879 American Electric Power Service Corporation Indiana and Michigan Power Company ATTN:
Mr. John E. Dolan Vice Chairman Engineering and,Construction 2 Broadway New York, NY 10004 Gentlemen:
Enclosed is IE Bulletin No. 79-16 which requires action by you with regard to your reactor facilities.
Should you have questions regarding this Bulletin or the actions required of you, please contact this office.
Sincerely, ames G. Kepp er Director
Enclosure:
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 cc w/encl:
Mr. D. V. Shaller, Plant Manager Central Files
- Director, NRR/DPM
- Director, NRR/DOR PDR I,ocal PDR NSIC TIC Ronald Callen, Michigan Public Service Commission Citizens for a Better Environment 9090 $ 0
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY'COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT WASHINGTON, D.C.
20555 July 26, 1979 IE Bulletin No. 79-16 VITAL AREA ACCESS CONTROLS Description of Circumstances:
An attempt to damage new fuel assemblies occurred recently at an operating nuclear reactor facility.
During a routine fuel inspection, the licensee discovered that a chemical liquid had been poured over 62 of 64 new fuel assemblies..
Analysis indicates that the chemical liquid was sodium hydroxide, a chemical stored and used onsite, The licensee stores new fuel assemblies in dry storage wells on the same elevation as the spent fuel pool within the Fuel Building, a vital area.
Access to the building is controlled by use of a coded keycard which elec-,
tronically unlocks the alarmed personnel portals.
The licensee issues coded keycards to both licensee and contractor personnel after the successful com-pletion of a background screening program.
In addition, licensee site manage-ment certifies monthly that each individual has the need for a coded keycard in order to perform required duties.
Further access within this building is not limited by other barriers, or controls.
As a result of this incident,, an initial licensee audit determined that sevezal hundred licensee and contractor personnel had access to this area during the period when the attempt to damage the fuel was made.
The audit also revealed that one coded keycard reader at a vital area portal was inaccurately recording access data at the alarm station.
Also discovered during this audit were indications of frequent "tailgating" on access through the portals.
Tailgating occurs when more than one person passes through a portal on one person' authorized access.
Their passage is therefore not recorded, and unauthorized persons could gain entry in this manner.
Tailgating does not include author-ized access controlled by an escort.
Discussion of Applicable Requirements:
10 CFR 73.55(a) requires the licensees to protect against industrial sabotage committed by an insider in any position.
10 CPR 73.55(d)(7) states that access to Vital Areas shall be positively controlled and limited to individuals who are authorized access to vital equipment and who require such access to perform their duties.
Specific commitments implementing this regulation are described in each licensee's approved Secuzity Plan.
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 Page 2 of 4 NRR, in their meetings with the licensees', in March 1977 to explain& 73.55 and
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what would constitute an acceptable plan, 'explained that positive control of access to a vital area consisted of two elements:
first, that the person requesting entry has the necessary background screening and need to perform
)ob related functions to be authorized access to that Vital Area, and second, that he has a need at that specific time to enter to perform a specific func-tion.
This is comparable to gaining access to a classified document; you need both a clearance and a need to know.
In approving security plans, NRR assumes that the determination of need would be based upon a valid need and not convenience.
Furthermore, access should be authorized to a minimum number of people,.
and licensees should use reason-able alternatives to minimize the number of personnel and frequency of access.
Acceptance Criterion 5.3 of the Security Plan Evaluation Report (SPER) workbook, dated January 1978, states that the licensee must. commit to pro-viding positive access control to Vital Areas by:
1)
Limiting access to authorized personnel.
2)
Requiring positive identification prior to entry.
3)
Requiring an established need for access.
4)
Maintaining records of entry, exit and reason for entry.
5)
A, system for control within the Vital Area.
NRR Review Guideline 821 suggests that blanket access authorizations should not be granted by stating that an acceptable method of indicating the Vital Areas to which access is authorized includes a record of each vital area to which the holder is authorized
- access, and the card is encoded to permit access to only those Vital Areas to which the individual has been granted access.
Review Guideline f23 states that for access to a Type I Vital Area, the person must be authorized entry by the shift supervisor or other designated individual who has been informed of the estimated length of time to be. spent in the Type I Vital Area.
There needs to be some balance attained between operational necessity and the administrative burden of validating the need for access each time entry is to be afforded.
Many licensees grant "permanent access authorization" to all persons requiring access to vital areas, regardless of the frequency or dura-tion of the need.
This is contrary to the regulations and guidelines from NRR cited above.
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 Page 3 of 4 Action to be Taken by Licensee:
l.
Establish criteria for granting unescorted access to each vital area, which shall be based upon the following:
a.
A, screening program meeting ANSI N18.17.
b.
The individual has a valid need for access to the equipment contained in each vital area to vhich access is authorized.
Valid need is based upon assigned duties-requiring the performance of specific tasks upon or associated with specific equipment located ia each vital area to which access is granted.
Valid need to enter one vital area shall not necessarily indicate that the persoa has a aced to enter any other vital area.
2.
An access H.st will be established for each area not to exceed 31 days.
An individual vill be on the access liat only for the duration of the task to be performed. If an individual has a valid need for unescorted access for a single entry or for intermittent occasions during this
- period, a separate daily access list shall be prepared.
All access lists shall be approved by the station manager (or equivalent) or his desigaated representative.
3.
Individuals will be removed from the access list immediately upon termination of aced..
If. an. individual has not entered the vital area duriag the effective period of the access list (not to exceed 31 days) the need for access should be reassured prior to extending the authoriza-tion.
To ensure that these actions are taken, the access list shall be revieved and reapproved at least every 31 days.
4.
Void access authorizations for all personnel not satisfying the criteria ia la&b and vhere appropriate, reprogram the key card system aad reissue key cards that are coded to implement the above vital area access authori-zation program.
5.
Develop reasonable alternatives so that the number and frequency of access to vital areas can be minimized coasistent with safe operations.
6.
Establish emergency procedures where, during an emergency, additional authorized personnel, meeting criteria in la&b, can move freely throughout the vital areas vith their entry and exit being recorded.
Upon securing from the emergency, the entry/exit record vill be revieved, and normal access control will be reestablished.
7.
Prevent tailgating by one or more of the followiag:
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 Page 4 of 4 a.
Establish procedures that require'uthorized personnel to prevent other personnel, including those authorized unescorted
- access, from tailgating.
Ensure all authorized personnel are trained in the proce-
- dure, and establish a management program that ensures that the proce-dure is properly performed.
b.
Acquire equipment, such as turnstiles, to prevent tailgating.
Ensure that such equipment vill not deny access or egress under emergency conditions.
c.
Station a guard, watchperson or escort at the vital area access portal.
This alternative would be most useful when there is a large number and frequency of access, such as occurs with containment during refueling.
d.
By any other means that achieve this ob5ective.
8.,
Assign corporate responsibility for management oversight of VA access control and require personal involvement to ensure that all intermediate levels of management are properly discharging their responsibilities in this regard.
9.
Conduct routine functional tests of the electronic access control system, including each key card reader, to verify (i) its operability and proper performance, and (ii) the accuracy of the data recorded.
This test should be incorporated into the seven-day test required by 10 CFR 73.55(g).
- 10. Report in writing within 45 days (for facilities with an operating license) the actions you have taken and plan to take (including a schedule) with regard to Items I through 9.
Reports should'e submitted to the'Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office and a copy should be forward'ed to the KtC Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Division of Safeguards Inspection, Washington, D.C.
20555.
Approved by GEO, B180225 (R0072); clearance expires 7-31-80.
Approval was given under a blanket clearance specifically for identified generic problems.
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Enclosure Page 1 of 4 Bulletin Sub)ect No.
Date Issued Issued To 79-15 79-14 79-13 79-02 (Rev.
1) 79-12 Deep Draft Pump Deficiencies Seismic Analyses for As-Built Safety-Related
'Piping System Cracking In Feedwater System Piping Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts Short Period Scrams at BWR Facilities 7/11/79 6/2/79 6/25/79 6/21/79 5/31/79 All Power Reactor Licensees with a CP and/or OL All Power Reactor facilities with an OL or a CP All PWRs with an OL for action. All BWRs with a CP for information.
All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP All GE BWR Pacilities with an OL 79-11 Faulty Overcurrent Trip Device in Circuit Breakers for Engineered Safety Systems 5/22/79 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or a CP 79-10 79-09 Requalification Training 5/ll/79 Program Statistics Failures of GE Type AK-2 4/17/79 Circuit Breaker in Safety Related Systems All Power Reactor Pacilities with an OL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 79-08 7~7 Events Relevant to BWR Reactors Identified During Three Mile Island Incident Seismic Stress Analysis of Safety-Related Piping 4/14/79 4/14/79 All BWR Power Reactor Pacilities with an OL All Power Reactor Pacilities with an OL or CP
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 Enclosure Page 2 of 4 LISTING OF IE bULLETXNS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Bulletia 'ub) ect No.
Date Issued Issued To 79-06B 79-06A (Rev 1)
Review of Operational Errors aad System Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile
,Island Incident Review of Operational Errors and Syst'm Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident 4/14/79 4/18/79 All Combustion Engineer-iag Designed Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities of Westiaghouse Design with an OL 79-06A Review of Operational Errors and System Mis-alignmeats Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident 4/14/79 All Pressurized Water Power Reactor Facilities of Westinghouse Design with an OL 79-06 Review of OperationaL Errors and System Mis-alignments Identified During the Three Mile Island Incident 4/11/?9 All Pressurized Water Power Reactors with an OL except B&W facilities79-05A 79-05 Nuclear Incideat at Three Mile Island Nuclear Incident at Three Mile Island 4/5/79 4/2/79 All B&W Power Reactor Facilities with an OL All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL and CP
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IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 LISTING OF IE BULLETINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Enclosure Page 3 of 4 Bulletin Sub5 ect No.
Date Issued Issued To 79-04 78-12B Incorrect Weights for Swing Check Valves Manufactured by Velan Engineering Corporation Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds 3/30/79 3/19/79 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 79-03 79-02 Longitudinal Welds Defects In ASME SA-312 Type 304 Stainless Steel Pipe Spools Manufactured by Youngstown Welding and Engineering Co.
Pipe Support Base Plate Designs Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts 3/12/79 3/2/70 All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 79-OIA 79>>01 Environmental ~lification 6/6/79 of Class IE Equipment (Deficiencies in the Envi-ronmental Qualification of ASCO Solenoid Valves)
Environmental Qualification 2/8/79 of Class IE Equipment All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP 78-14 Deterioration of Buna-N Component In ASCO Solenoids 12/19/78 All GE BWR facilities with an OL or CP
IE Bulletin No. 79-16 July 26, 1979 LISTING OF IE.BULLPgINS ISSUED IN LAST TWELVE MONTHS Enclosure Page 4 of 4 Bulletin Subject No.
Date Issued Issued To 78<<13 78-12A 78-12 78-11 Failures in Source Heads of Ray-Ray, Inc., Gauges Models 7050,
- 7050B, 7051,
- 7051B, 7060,
- 7060B, 7061 and 7061B Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds Atypical Weld Material in Reactor Pressure Vessel Welds Examination of Mark I Containment Torus Welds 10/27/78 11/24/78 9/29/78'/21/78 All general and=
specific licensees with the subject Ray-Ray, Inc.
All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP BWR Power Reactor Facilities for action:
Peach Bottom 2 and 3,
~d Cities 1 and 2, Hatch. 1, Monticello and Vermont Yankee
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