ML17317B248

Responds to IE Bulletin 79-06A, Review of Operational Errors & Sys Misalignments Identified During TMI Incident. Forwards Proposed Tech Specs Implementing Design Changes. Class III Amend Fee Encl

ML17317B248
Person / Time
Site:	Crane, Cook
Issue date:	06/06/1979
From:	Dolan J INDIANA MICHIGAN POWER CO.
To:	Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML17317B249	List: ML17317B248 ML19263E331
References
AEP:NRC:00185A, AEP:NRC:185A, NUDOCS 7906080266
Download: ML17317B248 (18)

Text

REGULATJRY

"'"ORt~ATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTt: M (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:7906080266 DOC.DATE: 79/06/06 NOTARIZE NO DOCKET FACIL:50-315 Donald C,

Cook !<uclear Power Plantz Unit ig Indiana 8

0500 50-316 Donald C,

Cook Nuclear Power Plantr Unit 2i Indiana 8,

05 00316 AUTH i~tAt~E AUTHUR Af FILIATION DOLAN'sE ~

Indiana tt Michigan Power Co, HEC IP ~ NAME RECI VIEN l AFFILIATION DE>>TONpH,RE Office of tlucl ear Reactor Regu l at i on

SUBJECT:

Responds to IE Bulletin 79-ObAi "Review of Vperational Errors 8

Sys 'lisalignments Identified During TMI Incident,"

Forwards proposed Tech Specs implementing design changes.

Class III amend fee encl, DISTRIBUTION CODE:

A001S COPIES RECEIVED:LTR /

ENCL g SIZE:

TITLE: GENERAL DISTRIBUTION FOR AFTER ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LIC RECIPIENT IO CODE/NAME 05 BC 046 ACT ION

-'NTERNAL:

REG FILE 12 I

15 CORE PERF BH 17 ENGR BR 19 PLANT SYS Bti 21 EFLT. TRT SYS 1

1 2

2 1

1 1

1 1

1 1

02 NRC PDR 14 TA/EDO 16 AD SVS/PROJ 18 REAC SFTY UR 20 EEB 22 BR INKMAN COPIES RECIPIENT LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME 7

7 COPIES LTTR ENCI 1

1 1

1 1

1 EXTERNAL: 03 LPDR 23 ACRS 1

16 16 04 NSIC TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES

~E~UIREO:

LTTR 38 Et CL 38

INDIANA II MICHIGAN POWER COMPANY P. O. BOX 18 8OWLING GREEN STATION NEW YORK, N. Y. 10004 June 6, 1979 AEP:tLRC:00385A Donald C.

Cook Nuclear Plant Units 1 and 2

Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316 License Nos.

DPR-58 and DPR-74 Mr. Harold R. Denton, Dilector

'Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555

Dear Mr. Denton:

This letter and its attachments respond to Item.13 of IE Bulletin 79-06A, Revision 1, wherein we were requested to "Propose

changes, as required, to those'technical specifications which must be modified as a result of your implementing the above items and identify design changes necessary in order to effect long term resolutions of these items."

We are implementing design changes on both Units 1 and 2 of Cook Plant to delete the low pressurizer water level coincidence logic for Safety Injection actuation and to convert it to a 2 out of 3 channel logic on low pl essurizer pressure only (for safety injection actu'ation).

The proposed changes to the Cook plant Technical Specifications are contained in Attachments 1 and 2 ond have been emphasized by the revision bai s in the'ma1 gin of the affected pages.

A description and justification for the'proposed changes follow.

C S06 D80~

I

Nr. Harold R. Denton, Director AEP:NRC:00185A IE Bulletin 79-06A called for licensees to trip the low pressurizer water level bistables such that, when the pressurizer pressure reaches the low setpoint, safety injection would be initiated regardless of the pressurizer water level.

IE Bulletin 79-06A, Revisi'on 1 allowed the pressurizer level bistables to be returned to their normal (untripped) operating positions during the pressurizer pressure channel functional surveillance tests.

The effect of tripping the pressurizer low water level bistables which are normally coincident with the pressurizer low pressure bis-

tables, has the effect of reducing this safety injection actuation logic to a 1 out of 3 channel logic.

Under these conditions, any.

spuri'ous signal in the low pressure channels will create a safe-guards actuation with the consequent transient to the plant.

To avoid this situation, a "two out of three low pressurizer pressure" signal logic i's being implemented at the Cook Plant.

Westinghouse has performed a safety review of safety injection actuation logic modifications to the Cook Plant.

The existing logic will be modified as indicated above.

After the modification is per-formed, three of the four existing pressurizer pressure channels for safety injection actuation and two of the four channels for control system functions will be utilized.

Control and protection require-ments set forth in IEEE-279, are addressed by interlocking two separate pressure control channels such that a single pressure trans-mitter failure will not cause power operated relief valve actuation.

This is accomplished by raising all the pressure bistables for the power operated relief valve interlocks to 2350 psia.

All current ECCS analyses are valid and appropriate for safety injection initiation as a function of pressurizer pressure signals only.

As mentioned before, safety injection was previously initiated on coincident pressurizer pressure and level signals; the effect of changing to a pressure-only signal will result in either an earlier initiation of safety injection, or no change in the time of safety injection initiation for all break locations.

For small breaks in the pressurizer the pressure-only signal will assure SI actuation.

Therefore, current small break analysis assumptions con-cerning safety injection initiation time are appropriate.

Additionally, the effect of safety injection initiation time on peak clad temperature is negli'gible when initiation times being considered correspond to RCS pressures above 1400 psia.

The switch to a pressure-only safety injection signal results in a negligible impact on large break analyses.

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director AEP:NRC:000185A I'n addi'tion, as mentioned in our response to Item 3 of IE Bulletin 79-06A, we are also proposing, for Unit 2 only, a change to the P-11 permissive setpoint.

Our current Technical Specifications on Unit 2 require that the low pressurizer pressure setpoint for safety injection be set at ~ 1900 psig and the P-ll permissive be set at 0 1915 psig.

With a 1% lockup on the P-ll bistables, the reset point for this bis-table during unit cooldown is 1907 psig. This allows only a 7 psig i'ncrement, with no allowance for bistable drift, for manually blocking safety injection actuation during cooldown.

As shown in the revised page 3/4 3-22 of Attachment 2, the P-11 setpoint has been changed to read, "with 2 of 3 pressurizer pressure channels ) 2010 psig".

The changes in the P-11 setpoint for Unit 2 will provide a greater margin between the safety injection actuation setposnt on low pressurizer pressure and the P-ll permissive.

Mesti'nghouse has re-evaluated the P-ll permissive in light of the safety analysts requirements and has determined that a permissive setpoint of 2010 psig i's acceptable.

The proposed design changes discussed above and the proposed Technical Speci'fication changes of Attachments 1 and 2 have been re-vi'ewed by the PNSRC and the required membership of the NSDRC in accor-dance tIritl> the requirements of our Technical Specifications.

The re-sult of these revi'ews indicates that in no instance will the proposed changes to the Technical Specifications adversely affect the health and safety of the public.

Pursuant to 10 CFR 170, AEPSC has determined that the proposed Technical Specification change request is a Class III license amendment.

As required by Part 170.22 a combined check for both Units 1 and 2

for $4,400.00 accompanies this submittal.

Very truly yours, JED:em Sworn and subscribed to before me this 4'~day of June, 1979 in New York County, New York John E. Dolan Vice President Notary Public KATHLEWlBARRY NOTARY t'USLtC, Stcte of New York No. 41<606r92 Quclilied in 4uccns County.

Certihccto fited in New York County Conurnssion sr.ires ntcrch 30, 19titil cc:

(Attached)

Nr. Harold R. Denton, Director AEP:NRC:00185A CC:

R.

C. Callen G. Charnoff D. V. Shaller-Bridgman R.

M'. Jurgensen J,

G.

Keppler-Regi'on III', NRC N.

C. Noseley

-NRC

ATTACHMENT 1 DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

1 APPENDIX

'"A" TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

'<<som7.;.

TABLE 3.3-3 EHGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATIOH SYSTEM INSTRUYIEHTATIOH FUNCTIONAL UHIT l.

SAFETY INECTION AHO FEEnllATER ISOLATION TOTAL NO.

CllAHNELS OF CllhNNELS TO TRIP lhIH INUbl CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE IlODCS ACTION a.

manual Initiation b.

Aut.o)))atic Actuation Logic c.

Co)) ta inmen t Pres s ure-l I ig I) d.

Pl'Qssul iver P) Qssure -

l ow 2

1, 2, 3, 4

1,2,3,4 1,2,3 1, 2, 3g lB 13 14 e.

Differential l') Qssure Between Steam Lines - lligh Four Loops Operating Tl)r Qe Loops Ol)era ting

~ 3/steam line 3/operating steam line 2/steam line 2/steam line any steam line l

/steal)1 2/opelating If!I' line, any steanI line OPQI ating s teat)I 1 lne 1, 2, 3ltII I4

~

15 1

TABLE 3.3-3 Ccr. inu

b. Above P-11 or P-12, d...cnstra.

that the l<inimum Cha..nels OPER BLE requirement is met uithin 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; opera icn.".ay continue w',th the inoperable ch nr; l byassed and cne additional channel may be byoassed fcr up to 2 hcurs fcr surveillance t s.-ng per Sp cific"ion=4.3.2. 1.(

~

ACTION 17 - With less than the t<inimum Channels OP R'BLE, cpera icn.-.:ay con inue provided the containment pur" and exhaust v iv s are maintaired closed.

ACTIOti 18 - With the number of OPERABLE Charnels cne less than the Total Humber of Channels, res.cr the i..ccerab'.e charm 1

status within 48 hcurs or be in at least

.'-'07 ST.4)D""Y w'.-.,".in the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD Si-.'UT-i:( uithin the foii=w'..".".

30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

EliGIliEERED Sr';FE7'(

FcATURES DES IGii~7IGl(

CGi'(DITIGl< A.'>0 S" 7.""0 I47 FL C

Gi

'-11 Mith 2 of 3 pressuri=.er pressure channels 1="15 pslg

~

P-ll prevents or de=ca s

marual bl ck of safe=y injection actuaticn or.

pressuri"er press re P-12 Mith 3 of 4 T hannels

> 544'F.

P-12 preven s cr defea:s manual block of saf

-.y inject',on ac.uation h.:",".

steam line flow and ic~

steam lire pressur Mith 2 of 4 T channels

< 540'F.

Allcus manual block of safety in> ction ac=

tion on hich steam 1

ne flow and low steam lir.

pressure.

Causes s:e=;.,

line isol".ion cn h.'-,h steam View.

Af72czs steam dump blocks.

D. C.

COOK-U"(IT 1

3/4 3-23

TABLE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURF. ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUllENTATION TRIP SETPQINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT SAFETY IN,>ECTION AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION a.

tlanual Initiation b.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

Con ta inmen t Pressure--lligh d.

Pressurizer Pressure--Low TRIP SETf'OINT

. Not App1 ica bl e Not Applicable

< 1.1 psig

> 1815 psig ALLOlNBLE VALUES Hot Applicable Hot Applicable

< 1.2 psig

> 1005 psig e.

Differential Pressure Between Stean Lines--lligh f.

Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines.

lligh Coincident with Tay Low Low or Steam Line Pressure--low

< 100 ps i

< 1.42 x 10 lbs/hr Vrom OX load to 20$

load.

Li~ear from 1.42 x 10 lbs/hr at6205 load to 3.00 x 10 lbs/hr at 100'" load T,

> 541'F

>'~IIO psig steam line pi essure

< 112 psi

< 1.56 x 10 lbs/hr from 0Ã load to 20K load.

Linear from 1.56 x 10 Ibs/hr at620$

load to 3.93 x 10 lbs/hr at 100$ load.

T

> 539'F

>'IIO psig steam line pressure

TASLE 3.3-5 fContinued ENGINEER 0 S'=7'(

FEATLRES RES"GHSE TIl!"S IHITIATIl'G SIGiQL AHO F'JHCTIC:l RESPOHS=

Ti.'!E H

SECONDS 3.

Pressurizer Pro.ssul "-'-

a.

Safety Inject:cn

("=CCS) b.

Reactor Trip (f. cm SI.)

c.

Feedriater Isolation d.

Containm nt IsoIation-Phase "A"

e.

Con Binzen Pure-are Exhaus isolation f.

Auxiliary FeeCi~a-.er

."-;:.ps g.

Essential Service 'r,'. r Syst=m

< 27.0*/'.3.0.=

< 3.0

< 8.0

< 18.0.=

Hot Appli cable Hot Applicable

< 48.0*/13.0;-:

e.

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Auxiliary Feed;vater Pumps g.

Essential Service 'r'ater System 4.

Oifferen ial Pressure

~:=:; een S"earn Lines-Hich a.

Safety Injection'(;CCS) b.

Reactor Trip (from SI) c.

Feedriater Isol.aticn d.

Containment Isol at-ion-Phase "A"i

< 13.0;"./23.0;-.=:

< 3.0

< 8.0

< 18.0.=/28.0.=.'-:

Hot Applicable Hot Applicable

< 13.0.=;/-'.8.0-.-..=

5.

Steam Flo':i in Two S

e=m Lines - Hich Coincident with T

Lolc-Low av a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) b.

Reactor Trip (frcm SI) c.

Feedwater Isolation d.

Contairiment Isolation-Phase "A"

e.

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation f.

Auxiliary Feeduat r Pumips g.

Essential Service Ma er System h.

Steam Line Isolation

< I5.0.<<"./25. 0;-.'.=

< 5.0

< 10.0

< 20. 08/30.0.=.-".

Hot Applicable Not Applicable

< 15.08/50.0;-:-.-:

< 10.0 0.

C.

COOK-UNIT I 3/4 3-28

CD TABLE 4.3-2 ENGINEEREO SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATIOtl SYSTEM INSTRUHENTATIOH SURVEILLANCE RE~tt IRL'hEtlTS CD CD I

C I

FUttCTIOHAL UttIT SAFETY IttaECTIOt< AHn F EEOIIATER ISOLATION a.

tlanual Irritiation b.

Au torrratic hctua tion Logic c.

Containment Pressure-lligh d.

Pres suri zer Pressure--Low CI!ht<ttEL CIII:CI'.A.

N.h.

CINHHEL CINtltIEL FUHCTIOtNL CALI0!thT IOH TEST H.h.

H.h.

ti(2) tl(3) t<ODES IH WIIICII SURVE ILLA!ICE

~RE UIBED

,1, 2, 3, 4

1,2,3,4 1,2.3 1, 2, 3

e.

Dlfferential Pressure De tween S team Lines--Iligh f.

Stearrr Flow in Two Steam Lines--Iligl> Coincident with T

--Low or Steam Line I'I N sure--Low 2.

COHThl t!tIEHT Sl'RAY a.

Hanual Initiation b.

Autorrratic Actuation Logic c.

Contairrrrrent Pressure lligh-lliglr H.A.

H.h.

H.A.

N.A.

ti(2)

II(3) 1,2,3 1.2,3 1, 2, 3, 4

1,2,3,4 1, 2, 3

~

~

ATTACHMENT 2 DONALD C.

COOK NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT NO.

2 APPENDIX "A" TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION CHANGES

TABLE 3.'.-3 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION ~SSJgM INSTRljMFHTATION FUNCTIONAL UNIT TOTAL NO.

OF CNANflELS CHANNcLS TO Tl(IP MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE APPLICABLE NOOES ACTEOil SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP, FEEDWATER ISOLATIOH AND MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS a.

Manual Initiation b.

Automatic Actuation Logi c c.

Containment Pressure-Xigh d.

Pressurizer Pressure

- LoH 2

2 1, 2, 3, 4

1, 2, 3, 4

1,2,3 1,2, 3tI 18 13 14 14 e.

Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines - High Four Loops Operating Three Loops Operating 3/steam line 3/operating steam line 2/steam line 2/steam line any steam line I'4't 1 " 'steam 2/operating line any steam line operating steam line 1, 2, 3IlIt 14 15

TABLE 3.3-3 Continued)

I 'CTION 17 - With less than the Minimum Channels OPERABLE, operat.'on may continue provided the containment purge and exhaust valves are maintained closed.

ACTION 18 - Witn the nu,ber of OPERABr E Chianne 5 one,ess than the otal Number of. Channels, resto're the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> or be in at least HOT STA",0"-Y within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in COLD SHUTDiYiN within the following 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br />.

ENGINEERED SAFcTv FEATLrRES INTERLOCKS DESIGNATION P-11 CONDITION A.'i0 SETPOri"T With 2 of 3 pressurizer pressure channels

> 2010 ps19.

FUNCTION P-ll prevents or defeats manual block or safety injectior. actuation on 'ow pressurizer pressure P-12 With 3 of 4 Tav channels

> 544'F.

P-12 prevents or, defeats manual block o= safety injection actu"ion high steam line i low and low steam line pressure.

With 2 of 4 T channels

< 540'F.

Allows manual block of safety injection actua-tion on high steami line flow and low steam line pressure.

Caus s

steam line isolation on high steam flow.

Affects steam dump blocks.

D. C.

COOK - UNIT2 3/4 3-22

~

~.

't

TA8LE 3.3-4 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION TRIP SETPOINTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.

SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP, FEEOMATER ISOLATION AND MOTOR DRIVEN AUXILIARYFEED'INTER PUMPS a.

Manual Initiation b.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

Containment Pressure--High d,

Pressurizer Pressure--Low TRIP SETPOINT Not Applicable Not Applicable

< 1.1 psig

> 1900 psig ALLO~a'ABLE VALUES Not Applicable Not Applicabl'e

< 1.2 psig

> 1890 psig e.

Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines--High f.

Steam Line Pressure--Low

< 100 psi

> 600 psig steam line pressure

< 112 psi

> 580 psig steam line pressu.

e

~l I

TABLE 3. 3-5 Continued ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESPO tSE TIMES IHITIATIttG S IG>tAL AND FUNCTION RESPOtlSE TIME It( SECONDS 3.

Pressurizer Pressure-Low a.

Safety Injection

{ECCS) b.

Reactor Trip (from SI) c.

Feedwater Isolation d.

Con ainment Isolation-Phase "A"

e.

g ~

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps Essential Service Mater System 4.

Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines-High a.

Safety Injection (ECCS) b.

Reactor Trip (from SI) c.

Feedwater Isolation d.

Containment Isol ation-Phase "A"

e.

.Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation f.

=-

Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps g.

Essential Service Mater System

< 24.0*/12.0.-".

< 2.0

< 8.0

< 18.0.=

t/ot Applicable

< 60.0

< 48.0"/13.0;":

l

<.13. OP/23.0.="..=

.< 3.0

< 8.0

< 18.0.=/28.0.=.=.

Not Applicable

< 60.0

< 13.0.=/48.0=".

with a.

b.

C ~

T

--Low-Low Safety Injection (ECCS)

Reactor Trip (from SI)

Feedwater Isolation d.

Containment Isolation-Phase "A"

e.

9 ~

h.

Containment Purge and Exhaust Isolation I

Auxiliary Feedwa ter Pumps I

Essential Service Water System Steam L'ine Isol ation t

5.

Steam Flow in Two Steam Lines - High Coincident Hot Applicable Not Applicable Hot Applicable Not Applicable Hot Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Hot Applicable D.

C.

COOK - UNIT' 3/4 3-27

CI o

nI O

TABLE 4;3-2 ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURE ACTUATION SYSTEM INSTRUMENTATION URVEILLILNCE REOUI E

ENTS FUNCTIONAL UNIT 1.

SAFETY INJECTION, TURBINE TRIP AND FEEDWATER ISOLATION a.

Manual Initiation b.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

Containment Pressure-High d.

Pressurizer Pressure--Low CHANNEL CliECK N.A.

N.A.

CHANNFL CALIBRATION N.A.

N.A.

CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST M(1)

M(2)

M(3)

MODES IN WHICH SURVEILLANCE REQUIRED 1, 2, 3; 4

1, 2, 3, 4

1, 2.

3 1,2,3,

~

m 2

ID Cl.

CO D

e.

Differential Pressure Between Steam Lines--High f.

"Steam Line Pressure--Low 2,

CONTAINMENT SPRAY~.

a.

Manual Initiation b.

Automatic Actuation Logic c.

Containment Pressure--High-.

High N.A.

N.A.

R N.A.

N.A.

M(1)

M(2)

M(3) 1, 2, 3

1, 2, 3

1, 2, 3, 4

1, 2, 3, 4

1, 2, 3

3