ML17312A856
| ML17312A856 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 07/10/1996 |
| From: | Vandenburgh C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17312A855 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-96-10, 50-529-96-10, 50-530-96-10, NUDOCS 9607160147 | |
| Download: ML17312A856 (27) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1996010
Text
0
ENCLOSURE
1
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION IV
Inspection Report:
50-528/96-10
50-529/96-,.10
50-530/96-10
Licenses:
NPF-51
Licensee:
Arizona Public Service
Company
P.O.
Box 53999
Phoenix,
Facility Name:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Units 1, 2,
and
3
Inspection At:
Wintersburg.
Inspection
Conducted:
April 29 through
May 30.
and June
13.
1996
Inspector:
Phi llip M. Quails.
Reactor
Inspector.
Engineering
Branch
Division of Reactor
Safety
Approved:
ns
.
an en urg
.
ie
.
ngineenng
rane
Division of Reactor
ety
3- )o-R4
~ae
Ins ection
Summar
Areas
Ins ected
Units
1
2
and
3
Special,
announced
inspection of the
licensee's
action and root-cause
evaluation related to the fires in the
Unit 2 control
room and the Train
B dc equipment
room on April 4.
1996.
NRC Inspection
Procedure
64704 was used.
Results
Units
1
2
and 3
~
An apparent violation concerning the failure to meet
Appendix R. safe shutdown requirements
was identified. The violation
involved the failure to ensure that both trains of equipment
necessary
to achieve
and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition for
a
fire in the Train
B dc equipment
room were adequately
protected
(Section
1.2.6).
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~
An apparent violation concerning the failure to adequately translate
licensee
design
commitments into construction
requirements
was
identified.
The violation involved a failure during plant construction
to ensure that the 480/120 volt Regulating Transformer
2E-QBB-V02 in the
Train
B dc equipment
room in Unit 2 was electrically grounded in
accordance
with the plant design
(Section 1.2.6).
Summar
of Ins
ction Findin s:
~
Violation 9610-01
was opened
(Section 1.2.7).
~
Violation 9610-02 was opened
(Section 1.2.7).
Attachment:
Attachment
- Persons
Contacted
and Exit Meeting
-3-
DETAILS
1
FIRE PROTECTION/PREVENTION
PROGRAM
(64704)
1.1
Palo Verde Nuclear Generatin
Station Fire Protection
Re uirements
Palo Verde Unit
1 Operating License.
NPF-41, Section 2.C.7,
issued
June
1,
1985; Unit 2 Operating License.
NPF-51, Section 2.C.6.
issued April 24,
1986;
and Unit 3 Operating License.
NPF-74, Section 2.F,
issued
November
25,
1987.
requires the licensee to implement and to maintain in effect all provisions
of the
NRC approved fire protection program as described in the Final
Safety Analysis Report for the facility.
Final Safety Analysis Report,
Section 9.5.1.1.1.A, states,
that the fire protection system shall
be designed
to'inimize, consistent with other safety requirements.
the effects of fires
on structures,
systems,
and components
important to safety in accordance with
10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R, Part III; Section
G.
1.2
Followu
of the A ril 4
1996
Fires
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
actions
and root-cause
evaluation
related to the Unit 2 control
room and Train
B dc equipment
room fires'on
April 4,
1996.
1.2. 1
Electrical Distribution Background
Regulating Transformer
2E-QBB-V02 supplied
power to the Train
B Essential
Lighting Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel
Panel
2E-QDN-N02, in
turn, supplied
power to Essential
Lighting Distribution Panel
These panels
provided
power for
some control
room lighting and the auxiliary
building fire detectors.
These
panels
are located
near
the north wall of the
control
room.
1.2.2
Event Description
At approximately
5 p.m.
on April 4.
1996. during
a refueling outage,
a
licensee
firewatch detected
smoke in the back panel
area of the Palo Verde,
Unit 2, control
room.
Licensee's
operators
observed
smoke emanating
from the
'rain
B Essential
Lighting Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel
2E-QDN-N02 and
Essential
Lighting Distribution Panel
2E-QBN-D84 in the control
room.
The fire in the control
room resulted in loss of some control
room lights. but
the operators
had sufficient lighting to operate the unit from lights on the
unaffected Train A lighting system.
The breaker
supplying power to
Essential
Lighting Uninterruptible Power Supply Panel
2E-QDN-N02 tripped open when
wiring in the conduit supplying the power
supply panel
melted
and caused
a
short circuit.
Opening the breaker
resulted in Panel
2E-QDN-N02 deenergizing.
J'
-4-
N
This action deenergized
the fire detectors
in the auxiliary building.
A check
of the control
room fire alarm monitors by the operators
indicated that
a
large number of fire detector trouble alarms were alarming and that the alarms
were scrolling on the monitor screen
due to the deenergized fire detectors.
The trouble alarms
masked the actual fire alarm in the Train
B dc equipment
room.
E
The control
room dispatched auxiliary operators to walk down their assigned
areas to check for additional
problems.
An auxiliary operator discovered
smoke
and fire in the Train 8 dc equipment
room on the 100 ft level of the
auxiliary building.
The fire was located in the 480/120 volt Regulating
Transformer
1.2.3
Licensee Fire Response
The licensee's
onsite fire department
immediately responded
and extinguished
all fires.
The licensee
took actions to establish
required compensatory
firewatches
in areas with disabled fire detectors.
1.2.4
Root-Cause
Evaluation
The licensee initiated an extensive
root-cause
investigation
under Condition
Report/Disposition
Request
2-6-0070.
The licensee's
root-cause
investigation
indicated that the core of Regulating Transformer
2E-QBB-V02 failed and
contacted the transformer coils causing
a short circuit fault to station
ground through the transformer's
panel
ground.
The investigation also
determined that the neutral
leg of the transformer
was not grounded.,
Since
the transformer's
neutral
leg was not grounded,
the fault current propagated
through the station ground into Panels
2E-QDN-N02 and 2E-QBN-D84 located in
the control
room.
The overcurrent,
resulting from the fault. caused the fires
in the control
room.
The licensee's
root-cause
investigation further indicated that the
system
was designed with ground connections
on the neutral
leg of the
inverter instead of grounding the neutral
leg of the power supply (Regulating
Transformer
2E QBB-V02) in accordance
with industry practice.
The neutral
wiring conductors within the inverter and from the inverter to Essential
Lighting Distribution Panel
2E-QBN-D84 became the return fault path to the
regulating transformer.
These conductors
were of an insufficient size to
handle the high fault currents to which 'they were subjected.
As
a result.
these wires ignited under these high fault currents.
The licensee
also
determined that the fires were related
and caused
by a design error in the
electrical
grounding which dated
back to plant construction.
The licensee
found similar grounding arrangements
in the other
two units.
P
The licensee's
root-cause
investigation
was expanded to include all similar
transformers
in all three units.
The licensee identified similar deficiencies
in Essential
Lighting Regulating Transformers
E-QBB-VOl and
-V02; Control
Room
Emergency Lighting Inverters
E-QDN-N01 and
-N02; Instrument
Power Supply
Regulating Transformers
E-NNN-V15, -V16.
-V17, -V18; Meat Tracing Regulating
t
-5-
Transformers
E-QMB-V30 and
-V31: and,
Control
Room Emergency Lighting Inverter
Battery Supplies
E-QDN-F01 and
-F02 in all three units.
1.2.5
Corrective Actions
To correct the original deficiency. the licensee modified the circuit by
grounding the transformer's
neutral
leg and fusing the output of the
transformer's
secondary to protect the circuits supplied from the transformer
'from fault propagation.
The licensee's
modification also
removed the ground
in Panel
The modification was completed
for Units
1 and
2 on
April 27,
1996.
At the conclusion of the inspection.
the modification was
scheduled for completion
on Unit 3 before mid-July 1996.
The licensee took prompt actions to correct the other deficiencies identified
during the root-cause
investigation.
At the conclusion of the inspection, all
other corrective actions were complete except wiring modifications to install
a fuse to protect Control
Room Emergency Lighting Inverter Battery
Supplies
E-QDN-FOl and -F02.
The fuse installation was scheduled to be
completed
by late June
1996 for Units
1 and 2.
The modification required that
the units be shutdown.
Unit 3 modifications,
requi ring plant shutdown,
were
scheduled to be completed during the next refueling outage.
The licensee
determined that the circuits were already protected
from overcurrent
because
of a shunt that was installed in the circuit path.
Licensee's
testing of the
shunt oyercurrent failure characteristics
demonstrated
that the shunt would
melt prior to cable
damage
and fire propagation.
The licensee
also issued
night orders to the operators
describing the cause of the related fires and
the actions
needed to respond if a similar event occurred before corrective
modifications could be implemented.
In addition, the licensee placed,,
compensatory fire watches in all areas as'equired
by the fire protection
program for degraded fire protection capabilities.
The licensee
was also investigating
a method to ensure that control
room
operators
could rapidly monitor the control
room fire alarm monitor screen
and
separate
valid fire detector
alarms
from detector
loss-of-power
failure
alarms.
1.2.6
Licensee
Event Report 96-01
On Hay 6,
1996, the licensee
issued
Licensee
Event Report 96-01.
In the
licensee
event report, the licensee
described the event
as related
above.
The
licensee
also stated that:
"Contrary to 10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R,
and the requi rements of
the Fire Protection
Program
as described in the
PVNGS Updated
Final 'Safety Analysis Report
(UFSAR).
a design basis Appendix
R
fire in Train A or Train
B DC Equipment
Rooms (Fire Zones
7A and
7B, respectively,
described in the
PVNGS Pre-Fire Strategies
Manual) could adversely affect the ability to achieve
and maintain
safe
shutdown conditions."
f
I
Fr
e
-6-
As
a result
~ the licensee
concluded that the Unit 2 fire was
a condition
outside of the design basis of the plant.
Subsequent
to receiving Licensee
Event Report 96-01. the inspector
reviewed
the licensee's
investigation of the event.
Upon further review, the inspector
agreed with the licensee's
conclusion that
a fire could, ".
.
. adversely
affect the ability to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown conditions."
The
inspector concluded that
a single fire in the Train
B dc equipment
room could
result in a control
room fire and expose
both trains of safe shutdown
equipment to fire damage
and was. thus.
an apparent violation of the
licensee's
requirement to implement
10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R,Section III.G.
The inspector conducted
a telephonic exit meeting with the licensee
on May 30,
1996, to discuss
these
conclusions with the licensee.
Subsequent
to the meeting
on May 30.
1996, the licensee
revised
Licensee
Event
Report 96-01.
On June
11,
1996, the licensee
issued Revision
1 to Licensee
Event Report 96-01 providing additional details
concerning the event
and the
circumstances
in the control
room and the Train
B dc equipment
room.
The
licensee
concluded that the fire in the control
room was "self-limiting" due
to the low combustible loading and the location of the fire inside of an
enclosed
metal cabinet.
Concerning the fire in the Train
B dc equipment
room,
the licensee stated that.
although operator actions
were required to open
a
circuit breaker to terminate the fire, the fire was in the transformer
enclosure;
the amount of combustible material
was limited; there were no
exposed
cables;
and there were limited transient combustible materials in the
area.
Thus, the licensee
concluded that the fire would not have progressed
outside of the transformer
enclosure.
The licensee
also concluded that. "It
has
been determined that there
was no potential to adversely affect the
ability to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown prior to 1992."
The licensee
was continuing to evaluate
a modification made in 1992, which was unrelated to
the transformer grounding problem,
and later informed the inspector that the
subsequent
evaluation identified no potential
impact. on the safe
shutdown
analysis.
The inspector
reviewed additional information provided in Licensee
Event
Report 96-01, Revision
1.
The inspector verified the licensee's
statements
concerning
equipment configuration
and combustible loading.
However, the
inspector did not agree with the licensee's
conclusion that there'as
no
potential to safely shutdown the plant.
The inspector
conducted
a second exit meeting with the licensee
during
a
teleconference
on June
18.
1996.
The inspector discussed
the observations
concerning the plant configuration,
and reiterated that, after additional
inspections
that the inspector did not agree with the licensee's
conclusion
concerning the potential to adversely affect the ability to safely shutdown
the plant and that
an apparent violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R.
T
-7-
Section III.G, had occurred.
The licensee did not agree that
a violation had
occurred.
The licensee stated that the fires, which occurred,
could not have
spread to adjacent
equipment.
The licensee
also stated that
Appendix R, requirements
for electrical separation,
were met and that the
proper
associated
circuits analysis
had been accomplished
and implemented.
1.2.7
Inspection Activities and Conclusions
The inspector
reviewed
IEEE Standard
142-1982,.the
recommended
practice for
grounding of industrial
and commercial
power systems
provides guidance for
grounding electrical
systems.
l
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
Final Safety Analysis Report to
determine the licensee's
design
requirements for establishing
grounding
for electrical
systems.
Section 8.3.1.1.9.G of the Final Safety Analysis
Report
documented that grounding
was accomplished in accordance
with IEEE
Standard
142-1982.
Licensee
personnel
informed the inspector that the
transformer
and equipment supplied
by the transformer
was designed
as
a
grounded
system.
IEEE 142-1982 defined
a grounded
system
as
a system of
conductors in which at least
one conductor or point (usually the middle wire
or neutral point of transformer or generator windings) is intentionally
grounded.
The licensee stated that the grounding design for Palo Verde was in accordance
with Bechtel
Drawing 13-E-ZVG-007,
"Grounding Notes,
Symbols,
and Details,"
Revision 20.
The
NRC inspector
reviewed the document to determine if
transformer grounding was accomplished
in accordance
with the original design
specifications.
The document did not require grounding of the transformer 's
neutral leg.
The
NRC inspector
reviewed licensee's fire response activities and concluded
that the licensee's
response to the fire was excellent.
The onsite fire
department arrived on the scene within minutes of smoke identification.
The
proper extinguishing agents
were used.
The damaged
equipment
was promptly
deenergized.
The control
room took prompt actions
when the large
number of
detector
alarms were received in the control
room.
Auxiliary operators
were
instructed to inspect the unit for additional fires and.
as
a result.
promptly
located the fire in the Train
B dc equipment
room.
The inspector
observed the areas
around the location of the two fires and
verified that the statements
in Licensee
Event Report 96-01.
Revision 1, were
correct concerning
low combustible loading and that there were no exposed
electrical
cables in the vicinity of the fires.
The inspector
concluded that
.
the licensee's fire protection program was effective in limiting the potential
for propagation of the fires which occurred.
However, the inspector did not
agree with the licensee's
conclusion that for all plant conditions
(such
as
maintenance activities with the cabinets
open or "approved" transient
combustible materials in the area)
the fires could not propagate to other
plant equipment.
-8-
Palo Verde Unit 1, Operating License
NPF-41, Section 2.C.7,
issued
June
1,
1985; Unit 2, Operating License
~ Section 2.C.6,
issued April 24.
1986;.
and Unit 3, Operating License
NPF-74, Section 2.F,
issued
November 25,
1987;
required that the licensee
implement
and maintain in effect all provisions of
the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis
Report for the facility.
Final Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.5. 1. 1. 1.A,
states that the fire protection system shall
be designed to minimize,
consistent with other safety requirements,
the effects of fires on structures,
systems,
and components
important to safety in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.
Appendix R.Section III.G.
Section III.G requires that fire protection features
are provided for
structures,
systems,
and components
important to safe shutdown.
This section
also requires that the fire protection features limit fire damage
so that one
train of systems
necessary
to achieve
and maintain hot shutdown
from either
the control
room or emergency control station is free of fire damage.
Nore
specifically, Appendix R,Section III.G.2, requi res that cables or equipment,
including -associated
nonsafety ci rcuits that could prevent operation
or cause
maloperation
due to hot shorts.
open ci rcuits,
or shorts to ground of
redundant trains of systems
necessary
to achieve
and maintain hot shutdown
conditions that are located within the same fire area outside of primary
containment,
include separation
to ensure that one of the redundant trains
remains free of fire damage.
For areas
where separation
cannot
be obtained,
Appendix R,Section III.G.3, requires that alternative
or dedicated
shutdown
capability and its associated
circuits,
independent of cable,
systems,
or
components
in the area,
room,
or
zone under consideration,
shall
be provided.
The licensee did not meet the electrical separation
requi rements of
Section III.G.2 for the control
room, in that both Trains A and
B of the safe
shutdown capability are located inside of the control
room.
For
a postulated
control
room fire. the licensee
used
an alternative safe shutdown method,
which required actions
and equipment installed, in the Train
B dc equipment
room.
The fire in the Train
B dc equipment
room resulted in a control
room
fire.
Therefore,
both trains of equipment relied upon to shut
down the
reactor during
a postulated fire were exposed to the potential of receiving
fire damage.
Fire damage to both shutdown trains would have resulted in the
inability of the operators to safely shutdown the plant.
The failure to
provide adequate
grounding for the transformer,
and the resulting related
fires as described
above.
demonstrated
that both trains of safe
shutdown
equipment were exposed to the potential of receiving fire damage.
This is an
apparent violation of License Condition 2.C.6
~ which required the licensee to
implement the
10 CFR Part 50. Appendix R,Section III.G.1 requirement that one
train remain "free of fire damage"
(529/9610-01).
l
-9-
The'failure to provide adequate
transformer grounding is also
an apparent
violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B. Criterion III. which states that
measures
shall
be established
to assure that applicable regulatory
requirements
and the design
bases
are correctly translated into drawings,
procedures.
and instructions.
The failure to incorporate
IEEE 142 guidance
into the drawings is a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III,
(529/9610-02).
2
REVIEW OF UPDATED FINAL SAFETY ANALYSIS REPORT
(UFSAR)
COMMITMENTS
A recent discovery of a licensee operating their facility in'a manner contrary
to the
UFSAR description highlighted the need for a special
focused review
that compares
plant practices.
procedures,
and/or parameters
to the
descriptions.
While performing the inspections
discussed
in this report, the
inspector
reviewed the applicable portions of the
UFSAR that related to the
inspection.
The inspector determined that the plant design
documented in the
UFSAR was inconsistent with the as-built conditions of a portion of the
electrical distribution system.
Specifically, the
UFSAR documented
in
Section 8.3. 1. 1.9.G that grounding was accomplished
in accordance
with
The transformer
and panels
discussed
in this report were purchased
as
a grounded
system.
IEEE 142-1982 defined
a grounded
system
as
a system of
conductors
in which at least
one conductor or point (usually the middle wire
or neutral point of transformer
or generator windings) is intentionally
grounded.
The actual as-built configuration did not have the transformer
neutral point grounded.
E
I
'I
1
!
ATTACHMENT
PERSONS
CONTACTED AND EXIT MEETING
1
PERSONS
CONTACTED
1. 1
Licensee
Personnel
+
J. Bailey, Vice President,
Engineering
¹ S.
Bauer.
Section Leader,
Licensing
+
S. Burns,
Department
Leader,
Nuclear Electrical
and Instrumentation
8
Control Design
¹*B. Eklund, Compliance Consultant
-+¹*F. Garrett.
Department
Leader, Fire Protection
+¹ B. Grabo, Section
Leader
. Compliance
-+¹ R. Guron. Fire Protection
Engineer
+
M. Hodge, Section Leader,
Mechanical
and Auxiliary Systems
+¹"J.
Holmes, Section Leader, Electrical
Design
~¹ A. Krainik. Department
Leader,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
+
J. Levine, Vice President.
Production
- E. O'eill, Primary Plant Event Investigator
-+ *N. Turley. Licensing Engineer
1.2
NRC Personnel
+¹ W. Ang. Senior Reactor
Inspector,
Engineering
Branch. Division of Reactor
Safety
+
D. Garcia,
Resident
Inspector
T. Gwynn, Director, Division of Reactor Safety
- J. Kramer, Resident
Inspector
P. Quails,
Reactor Inspector,
Engineering,
Division of Reactor
Safety
G. Sanborn.
Office of Enforcement
+¹ T. Stetka.
Senior Reactor Inspector,
Engineering
Branch, Division of
Reactor Safety
-+¹ C.
VanDenburgh,
Chief, Engineering
Branch. Division of Reactor
Safety
In addition to the personnel
listed above,
the inspector contacted
other
personnel
during this inspection period.
- Denotes personnel
that attended
the exit meeting
on May 3.
1996.
¹Denotes
personnel
that attended the telephonic exit meeting
on June
18.
1996.
+Denotes
personnel
that attended
the telephonic exit meeting
on May 30,
1996.
-Denotes
personnel
that attended
the telephonic exit metting on July 10.
1996.
2
EXIT MEETING
An exit meeting
was conducted
on May 3,
1996.
During this meetings
the
inspector
reviewed the scope
and findings of the report.
The licensee did
not express
a position on the inspection findings documented in this report.
The licensee identified that Bechtel
Drawing 13-E-ZVG-007 was labelled
proprietary.
The licensee did not identify as proprietary any other
information provided to, or reviewed by, the inspector.
A second exit was
telephonically conducted
on May 30.
1996, with Ms. A. Krainik and others of
e
the licensee's staff.
The apparent violation identified,
as
a result of
the review of Licensee
Event Report 96-01.
was discussed
at that time.
The
licensee stated that
a revision to Licensee
Event Report 96-01 was being
evaluated to more accurately quantify and to better understand
the potential
safety significance of the event.
A third exit meeting
was conducted with Hr .
J. Levine and others of the licensee's staff on June
18,
1996.
The final
inspection findings were also discussed
in a fourth exit meeting
on July 10,
1996.
I
&
Enforcement Policy Statement
V. PREOECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCES
Whenever the
NRC has learned of the existence of a potential violation for
which
escalated
enforcement
action
appears
to
be
warranted,
or recurring
nonconformance
on the part of a vendor, the
NRC may provide
an opportunity for
a predecisional
enforcement conference with the licensee,
vendor, or other person
before taking enforcement
action.
The purpose of the conference
is to obtain
information that will assist
the
NRC in determining the appropriate
enforcement
action,
such
as: (I)
a
common understanding
of facts,
root causes
and missed
opportunities associated with tPe apparent violations, (2) a common understanding
of corrective action taken or planned,
and
(3)
a
common understanding
of the
significance of issues
and the need for lasting comprehensive
corrective action.
If the
NRC concludes that it has sufficient information to make an informed
enforcement decision,
a conference will not normally be held unless the licensee
requests it.
However,
an opportunity for a conference will normally be provided
before issUing an order based
on a violation of the rule on Deliberate Misconduct
or
a civil penalty to an unlicensed
person.
If a conference
is not held,
the
licensee
will normally
be
requested
to
provide
a written
response
to
an
inspection
report, if issued,
as
to
the
licensee's
views
on
the
apparent
violations
and their root causes
and
a description of planned
or implemented
corrective action.
During the predecisional
enforcement
conference,
the licensee,
vendor, or
other persons will'e given an opportunity to provide information consistent with
the
purpose
of the
conference,
including
an
explanation, to the
NRC of the
immediate corrective actions (if any) that were taken following identification
of the potential violation or nonconformance
and the long-term comprehensive
actions that were taken
or will be taken to prevent
recurrence.
Licensees,
vendors,
or other
persons
will
be told
when
a
meeting
is
a predecisional
enforcement
conference.
A predecisional
enforcement conference is a meeting between the NRC and the
licensee.
Conferences
are normally held in "the regional offices
and
are not
normally open to public observation.
However,
a trial program is being conducted
to . open
approximately
25
percent
of all eligible
conferences
for public
observation,
i.e.,
every fourth eligible conference
involving one of three
categories
of licensees
(reactor, hospital,
and other materials licensees). will
be open to the public.
Conferences will not normally be open to the public if
the enforcement
action being contemplated:
I
(I) Would
be taken against
an individual, or if the action,
though not
taken
against
an
individual,
turns
on
whether
an
individual
has
committed
wrongdoing;
Enforcement Policy Statement
(2)
Involves significant personnel
failures
where
the
NRC has
requested
that the individual(s) involved'be present
at the conference;
(3) Is based
on the findings of an
NRC Office, of Investigations
report; or
(4)
Involves
safeguards
information,
Privacy
Act
information,
or
information which could be considered
proprietary;
In addition,
conferences will not normally be open to the public if:
(5) The conference involves medical misadministrations or overexposures
and
the conference
cannot
be conducted without disclosing the exposed individual's
name;
or
(6) The conference will be conducted
by telephone
or the conference will
be conducted
at
a relatively small licensee's facility.
Notwithstanding meeting
any of these criteria,
a conference
may still be
open if the
conference
involves
issues
related
to
an
ongoing
adjudicatory
proceeding with one or more intervenors
or where the evidentiary basis for the
conference
is
a matter of public record,
such
as
an adjudicatory decision by the
Department of Labor.
In addition, with the approval of the Executive Director
for Operations,
conferences will not be open to the public. where good cause
has
been
shown after balancing
the benefit of the public observation
against
the
potential
impact
on the agency's
enforcement
action in a particular case.
As
soon
as it is determined
that
a conference will be
open
to public
observation,
the
NRC will notify the licensee that the conference will be open
to public observation
as part of the agency's trial program.
Consistent with the
agency's
policy on
open meetings,
"Staff Heetings
Open to Public," published
September
20,
1994
(59 FR 48340),
the
NRC intends to announce
open confet ences
normally at least
10 working days in advance of conferences
through (I) notices
posted in the Public Document
Room,
(2)
a toll-free telephone
recording at 800-
952-9674,
and
(3)
a toll-free electronic bulletin board at 800-952-9676.
In
addition,
the
NRC will also issue
a press
release
and notify appropriate
State
liaison officers that
a predecisional
enforcement
conference
has
been scheduled
and that it is open to public observation.
The public attending
open conferences
under the trial program may observe
but
not participate
in
the
conference.
It is
noted
that
the
purpose
of
conducting
open conferences
under the trial program is not to maximize public
attendance,
but
rather
to
determine
whether
providing
the
public
with
opportunities
to
be
informed of
NRC activities is compatible with the
NRC's
ability to exercise
its regulatory
and safety responsibilities.
Therefore,
members
of the public will be
allowed
access
to the
NRC regional
offices to
attend
open enforcement
conferences
in accordance
with the "Standard
Operating
Procedures
For
Providing
Security
Support
For
NRC
Hearings
And Heetings,"
published November
1, 1991 (56 FR 56251).
These procedures
provide that visitors
may be subject to personnel
screening,
that signs,
banners,
posters,
etc.,
not
larger than
18" be permitted,
and that disruptive persons
may be removed.
NUM%i/BR@195
i
t
I
(
I
I
l
I
N
Enforcement Policy Statement
<embers of the public attending
open conferences will be reminded that (I)
the apparent violations discussed
at predecisional
enforcement
conferences
are
subject
to further review and
may
be subject to change prior to any resulting
enforcement action and (2) the statements of views or expressions
of opinion made
by NRC employees
at predecisional
enforcement
conferences,
or the lack thereof,
are not intended to represent final determinations or beliefs., Persons attending
open
conferences
will be provided
an opportunity to submit written comments
concerning the trial program anonymously to the regional office.
These comments
will be subsequently
forwarded to the Director of the Office of Enforcement for
review and consideration.
When needed to protect the public health
and safety or common defense
and
security,
escalated
enforcement
action,
such
as the issuance
of an immediately
effective
order, will
be
taken
before
the
conference.
In these
cases,
a
conference
may be held after the escalated
enforcement
action is taken.
NUREG/BR%195
4