ML17310B193
| ML17310B193 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 04/01/1994 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17310B194 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-94-011, EA-94-11, NUDOCS 9404150112 | |
| Download: ML17310B193 (4) | |
Text
NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Maricopa County, Arizona Docket Nos. 50-528, 50-529, 50-530 License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 EA 94-011 During an NRC inspection conducted on December 15-17, 1993, violations of NRC requirements were identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C. 2282, and 10 CFR 2.205. The particular violations and associated civil penalty are set forth below:
A.
10 CFR 73.56(b) requires in part that the licensee establish and maintain an access authorization program with the objective of providing high assurance that individuals granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable. This program must include a background investigation designed to identify past actions which are indicative of an individual's future reliability within a protected or vital area of a nuclear power reactor, including development of information concerning an individual's employment and criminal history. The licensee shall base its decision to grant unescorted access authorization on review and evaluation of all pertinent information developed.
10 CFR 73.56(a)(4) requires in part that if a licensee accepts an access authorization program used by its contractor, the licensee is responsible for granting, denying, or revoking unescorted site access authorization to employees of that contractor.
Contrary to the above, in relying on the background investigations of BKW Nuclear Technology (BWNT), a licensee contractor whose access authorization program had been accepted by the licensee, the licensee did not evaluate all pertinent information developed before granting unescorted site access at Palo Verde:
1 On October 19,
- 1993, the licensee granted Employee M interim unescorted site access authorization to Palo Verde. On October 18, 1993, BWNT requested interim site access and certified to the licensee that Employee M's background investigation met the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56. However, as of October 15, 1993, a BWNT contractor had'cquired derogatory information about Employee M (involving a felony conviction and prison sentence that the employee had not previously disclosed on his security questionnaire), but this derogatory information
I I
l l
was not provided by the subcontractor to BWNT until October 29, 1993 and was not provided to the licensee until.November 1, 1993.
(2)
On October 15,
- 1993, the licensee granted Employee R
interim unescorted site access authorization to Palo Verde.
On October 14, 1993 BWNT requested interim site access and certified to the licensee that Employee R's background investigation met the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56. However, as of March 2, 1993, a BWNT contractor had acquired derogatory employment information about Employee R
(involving a previous employment termination. for cause),
but this derogatory information was not provided by the sub-contractor to BWNT until October 15, 1993, and was not provided by BWNT to the licensee until October 28, 1993.
(3)
On April 14, 1993, the licensee granted Employee L interim unescorted site access authorization to Palo Verde. On March 29, 1993, BWNT requested interim site access and certified to the licensee that Employee L's background investigation met the requirements of 10 CFR 73.56. On August 12, 1993, BWNT notified the licensee that a satisfactory full 5-year background investigation had been completed.
However, as of September 5, 1991, BWNT had acquired derogatory information about Employee L (involving seven convictions for worthless checks that the employee had not previously disclosed on his security questionnaire), but this derogatory information was not provided to the licensee until October 8, 1993 when the licensee performed an audit of BWNT records.
B.
Paragraph 6,8.1 of the Facility Technical Specifications states in part that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering security plan implementation.
Sections 3.13.7 and 3.13.5 of licensee Security Procedure 20AC-OSK07 (Revisions 6 and 8, dated August 10, 1992, and August 24, 1993, respectively),
required in part that APS contractors using private investigative agencies to performbackground investigations, conduct annual audits of these agencies, and make the audit information available to the licensee.
Contrary to the above, from August 1992 to October 1993, a period exceeding one year, the licensee failed to ensure that BRW Nuclear Technology (BWNT), a contractor using private investigative agencies to perform background investigations, conducted annual audits of all of these agencies.
This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement III).
Civil Penalty - $ 100,000
,