ML17310A534
| ML17310A534 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/08/1993 |
| From: | Pate R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17310A532 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-528-93-20-EC, 50-529-93-20, 50-530-93-20, NUDOCS 9308160072 | |
| Download: ML17310A534 (52) | |
See also: IR 05000528/1993020
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report Nos.
Docket Nos.
License
Nos.
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Meeting at:
Meeting Date:
50-528/93-20,
50-529/93-20,
and 50-530/93-20
50-528,
50-529,
and 50-530
and NPF-74
Arizona Public Service
(APS)
Company
P.O.
Box 53999, Station
9082
Phoenix,
Arizona 85072-3999
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1,
2 and
3
APS Corporate
Headquarters
Building, Phoenix,
May 10,
1993
Type of Meeting:
Announced,
Enforcement
Conference
Prepared
By:
D. Schaefer,
Physical
Security Inspector
Approved by:
Robert J,
at
,
hief, Safeguards,
Emergency
Preparedness,
and Non-Power Reactor
Branch
at
Signed
Meetin
Summar
Enforcement
Conference:
An enforcement
conference
was held on May 10,
1993, at the
APS Corporate
Headquarters
Building, Phoenix, Arizona, to discuss
the fol'towing:
())
Description of the violations associated
with three investigations
conducted
by the
NRC Office of Investigations
(OI) from July 22,
1991, through February
26,
1993, at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
as
documented
in the
NRC Region
V letter to Arizona Public Service
Company dated April 23,
1993;
(2)
NRC concerns;
and
(3) Licensee corrective action planned
and implemented.
9308<60
2
00528""
cypp7 i2
ADQCK 050
DR
6
REPORT DETAILS
l.
Enforcement
Conference Partici ants
2.
Arizona Public Service
Com an
(APS)
J. Levine, Vice President,
Nuclear Productions
P. Caudill, Director, Services Division
T. Bradish,
Nanager,
Licensing
and Compliance Division
R. Fullmer, Hanager, guality Audits and Nonitoring
E. Lumley, Supervisor,
Performance
Assessment,
Security Department
A. Huttie, Supervisor,
Training and Support, Security Department
T. Ford, Security Shift Supervisor,
Security Department
W. Hendrix, Security Shift Supervisor,
Security Department
K. Simonson,
Security Shift Supervisor,
Security Department
B. Whitney, Technical Specialist,
equality Assurance
P. Coffin, Engineer,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
J. Napier,
Engineer,
Nuclear Regulatory Affairs
W. Lohse, Shift Sergeant,
Nuclear Security Department
N. Benac, Site Representative,
El Palo Electric
R. Henry, Site Representative,
Salt River Project
Nuclear
Re ulator
Commission
(NRC)
R. Scarano,
Director, Division of Radiation Safety
and Safeguards,
Region
V
R. Pate,
Chief, Safeguards,
Emergency
Preparedness
and Non-Power
Reactor
Branch,
Region
V
L. Tran,
F.
Huey, Enforcement Officer, Region
V
K. Logan, OI, Region
V Field Office
D. Schaefer,
Security Inspector,
Region
V
Enforcement
Conference
3.
On Nay 10,
1993,
an enforcement
conference
was held at the Corporate
Headquarters
Building of Arizona Public Service
Company
(APS), Phoenix,
Arizona Qith the individuals listed above participating.
The conference
related to
NRC concerns
and apparent violations identified in a Region
V,
NRC letter to APS, dated April 23,
1993.
This letter documented
findings from three investigations
conducted
by the
NRC Office of
Investigations
(OI) from July 22,
1991, to February 26,
1993
(OI Case
Nos. 5-91-009,
5-92-011,
and 5-92-012), at the Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station.
0 enin
Remarks
Nr. Scarano
opened the enforcement
conference
by stating that the
.
purpose of the meeting
was to allow APS and
NRC an opportunity to
discuss
the results of three
OI Investigation Reports
(Case
Nos. 5-91-
009, 5-92-011,
and 5-92-012),
which identified apparent violations of
NRC requirements.
It was noted that the allegation of harassment
and
intimidation of security officers by security management
discussed
in OI
Investigation
Case
No. 5-92-011,
was not substantiated,
and was not
a
regulatory concern.
Mr. Levine indicated that
APS had completed
a thorough investigation of
all issues
discussed
in the Region
V letter dated April 23,
)993.
This
investigation included
a thorough review of requirements
of the Security
Plan, Training and gualification Plan, appropriate
Palo Verde Security
Procedures,
and pertinent training records for members of the
1991
initial (basic) security training classes
A and
B.
As a result of this
investigation,
he and his staff had identified important issues for
discussion.
Licensee Discussion of Issues.
Messrs.
Caudill, Huttie,
and Bradish
presented
the major portion of the licensee's
briefing.
NRC Re ion V Letter
Mr. Caudill
began
by indicating that the issues
(and apparent
violations) addressed
in the
NRC Region
V April 23,
1993, letter
indicated:
(1) there
was
no indication of deliberate
misconduct;
(2) that the issues
were of marginal safety significance;
(3) that
there
was
no indication that the apparent violations were
symptomatic of a current programmatic
problem;
(4). that in some
instances
the issues
were further examples of issues
identified
and corrected
in response
to the February
1992 enforcement
conference
at Region V; and (5) the apparent violations
do not
indicate repeat security program problems..
(See attached
slide PJC-2).
APS Investi ation
Mr. Caudill indicated that during the investigation of these
issues,
APS had completed the following:
(1) reviewed
~ . Appendix B; (2) reviewed
NRC inspection reports;
(3) conducted
licensee
and contract security employee interviews to include
interviews of the remaining
18 security officers that had
-previously been
members of the
1991 initial (basic) security
training classes
A and B; (4) reviewed the course curriculum,
firing range records,
and crucial task forms audit;
(5) reviewed
post assignment
rosters;
(6) reviewed quality assurance
documents;
and (7) reviewed the February
1992 enforcement
conference
corrective actions.
(See attached
APS slide PJC-3).
Results of APS Investi ation
Further,
Mr. Caudill indicated that the results of the
investigation determined that the following situations existed
during the conduct of training for members of the
1991 initial
security classes
A and
B:
(1) there were inconsistencies
between
the requirements
of the
NRC approved Security Plan
and the
security procedures,
and that these
inconsistencies
affected the
content of classroom instruction;
(2)
some of the crucial/critical
task forms were inaccurate;
and (3) that
APS had not followed
portions of the range firing procedure.
Additionally, Mr Caudill
indicated that the June
17,
1991, safeguards
event
had
been
properly reported
and declassified
{determined to be not
reportable)
per standard
practice,
however, the July 20,
1991,
safeguards
event
had not been properly recorded in a log within 24
hours of discovery.
(See attached
APS slides
PJC-4
and PJC-S).
(Note:
As requested,
APS will provide Region
V a copy of the
documents utilized by APS (during their investigation) to
determine that this event
had
been properly declassified.
Additionally, Mr. Caudill indicated that,
as discussed
during the
February
1992 enforcement
conference
at Region V, the
APS training
provided to members of the
1991 initial security training classes
A and
B mistakenly included shortened
classroom instruction,
and
performance testing of students
in groups.
Further,
due to
unforeseen
circumstances,
these
students
were not later afforded
an opportunity for on-the-job
(OJT) training.
For this reason,
in
February
1992,
APS had provided detailed task/post
performance
training to former member of Classes
A and
B.
During this enforcement
conference,
Mr . Caudill
added that many of
the student training records pertaining to tasks
associated
with
hand-held
metal detectors,
hand-held explosive detectors,
and
baton,
were administratively incorrect in that
a portion of these
records
indicated that this training had
been completed,
when in
fact
APS had not provided (nor intended to provide) this training
to members of these
two 1991 classes
(see
APS slides
PJC-S,
PJC-9,
PJC-10,
and PJC-11).
(Note:
On May 12,
1993, the Region
V staff
(Mr. D. Schaefer)
advised the
APS staff
(Mr . A.. Huttie) that there
was no apparent
regulatory basis for APS to have discontinued
providing the training in the two tasks
associated
with the hand-
held metal detector.)
In discussing
the training records,
Mr.
Caudill further indicated that it was the intention of APS that
the signature of the instructor
and the student at the bottom of
the training records,
meant that the specific training
-requirements
{of the critical tasks/subtasks)
of the Training and
gualification Plan had been completed.
Mr. Caudill also indicated that contrary to Security Training
Procedure
20DP-OTROl, that five students
in the
1991 initial
security training classes
A and
B 'had
been (improperly) permitted
more than three
weapons qualification attempts
per weapon.
(See
attached
APS slide PJC-12).
Mr. Caudill indicated that the range
instructors
had confused the weapons qualification program of the
initial training officers {classes
A and B) with the weapons
qualification program for other
(annual requalification) security
officers.
Mr. Caudill also noted that the
1991 initial training classes
A
and
B were assigned
to shift duty on July 10 and July 15,
1991,
respectively.
,I
4
Trainin
and
uglification Pro ram - 1992 Initiatives
Nr Caudill then discussed
the
1992 initiatives of the Palo Verde
Training and gualification Program,
and indicated that these
initiatives, discussed
during the February
1992 enforcement
conference
at Region V, have
improved the overall effectiveness
of
the current training provided to members of the Palo Verde
security force.
(See attached
APS slide PJC-6).
Trainin
and
uglification Conclusions
In conclusion,
Nr. Caudill indicated that even though
some
inaccuracies
were identified in the crucial task training records,
that the
APS investigation
had not identified any members of the
security force that had
been
assigned on-shift security duties
without receiving necessary training to perform assigned
tasks.
Nr. Caudill also noted that the
APS investigation
had resulted in
a composite review of the Security Plan, Training and
gualification Plan,
and Security Procedures.
As a result,
APS had
identified additional
areas
and specific items that will be
corrected.
For example, APS-identified inconsistencies
between
the above documents that will be corrected.
(See attached
slide PJC-14).
~ER
Nr. Caudill then discussed
the manner in which Palo Verde
maintained their safeguards
event log in 1991,
as well as the
manner in which this log is maintained in 1992
and
1993.
(See
attached
APS slide PJC-15).
Nr. Caudill noted that due to poor communication
between security
shift supervisors,
and improper handling of the initial event
'eport, that the July 20,
1991, event at Door 16-103
had not been
logged until three
days latet
.
However, this event
was properly
gubmitted in the subsequent
quarterly event report to the
NRC (see
attached
APS slide PJC-)6).
Hr. Caudill
and staff also concluded
that the second
event involving the security officer leaving his
safeguards
post orders unattended for two and one-half minutes,
was not
a separate
event
and therefore did not need to be
reported.
(Note:
On Nay ll, 1993, the Region
V staff (Nr . D.
Schaefer)
advised the
APS staff (Nr .
E. Lumley) that after
verifying with NRR, it was determined that the two events at door
1G-103 were caused
by separate
types of failures.
Therefore,
each
of these
two events
should
have
been separately
reported.)
Nr. Caudill also noted that the safeguards
event
on June
17,
1991,
had
been properly evaluated,
and had
been determined to be not
reportable.
For this reason, this event
was not included in the
. Palo Verde quarterly safeguards
event report to the
NRC.
(See
attached
APS slide PJC-18).
I
Safet
Si nificance
Nr Bradish indicated that there is minimal safety significance
with the administrative discrepancies
in the student training
records for the
1991 initial security training classes
A and
B.
Further the safety significance involving the problems with the
logging and reporting of the June
17 and July 20,
1991 events is
also minimal.
(See attached
APS slide TRB-l).
'Current Securit
Trainin
Pro ram
Mr . Huttie then discussed
Palo Verde's current security training
program to include the basic training requirement in Section 3.4
of the Training and gualification Plan, the required crucial
tasks,
the initial on-the-job
(OJT) training program,
the on-shift
enhancement
training program, the random selection crucial testing
program,
the security training (monthly) advisory board,
and the
customer (security officer) training feedback questionnaire.
These
ongoing
programs
have resulted in improved security officer
performance,
a continued reduction in security officer human error
events,
overall
improved communications
and teamwork,
and
an
overall better understanding
of security requirements
by members
of the security force.
(See attached
APS slides
ADH 1-4).
NRC Discussion of A
arent Violations.
During the enforcement
conference,
NRC discussed
the following regulatory concerns
and issues.
Trainin
Re uirements
Section 3.2.3 of the licensee's
approved Training and
gualification (Th)),Plan requires that security personnel
successfully
perform before assignment,
all crucial (critical)
security tasks identified for that assignment,
under the
conditions
and to the standards
specified in the TSg Plan.
During interviews
by OI, licensee security management
stated that
upon completion of training, all of the students
in the
1991
initial security classes
A and
B had
been trained
and qualified
for all of the security critical tasks,
and that the primary
purpose of the students
was to assume all security duties in the
event of a strike or a labor action by the bargaining unit.
APS Trainin
Failed To Neet
Re uirements
The OI investigations
determined that
APS provided incomplete
training to members of the
1991 initial security training classes
A and
B.
During interviews by OI, four members of licensee
security management
and instructor staff described
the following
training for these
classes
as being completed without having met
the tasks,
conditions
and standards
specified in the Twg Plan.
,I
t
1
I
f
I
a ~
b.
C.
d.
0 crate
Communication
E ui ment.
During the licensee's
conduct of training of this critical task,
due to a shortage
of radios,
some of the students
admittedly were unable to
perform the sub task of Operate
A Hand-Held Radio.
These
students
were required to simulate turning on the radio,
setting the squelch,
and selecting the radio channel.
As
such, the required training standard of being able to
"communicate clearly" was not met.
Conduct X-ra
Packa
e Search.
During the licensee's
conduct
of training of this critical sub task,
students
admittedly
were trained to only operate
the equipment,
and were not
trained or tested to meet the training standards
of being
able to "recognize objects
by image
on the X-ray screen,"
or
"recognize explosives
or incendiary devices."
Conductin
Vehicle Searches.
During the licensee's
conduct
of training of this critical sub task,
group training and
testing admittedly did not allow all students
to
individually conduct
a vehicle search.
Res
ond To and Assess
Alarms.
During the licensee's
conduct
of training of this critical task
an alarm situation
was
admittedly simulated,
and students
were thus not trained or
tested to perform the sub task of Hove To Point of Alarm as
Directed by the
CAS/SAS Operator,
under the conditions of
"utilizing techniques
of deployment, tactical
movement,
and
withdrawal."
Additionally, the required training conditions
of "being
a team member,
operate
a vehicle, running,
carrying
a portable radio and weapon,
and wearing
a bullet-
proof vest
and riot helmet" were not met.
Additionally, the OI investigation determined that the training of
,classes
A and
B did not include the critical tasks/subtasks
of:
Adjust and Test Hand-Held Hetal Detectors,
and Conduct Hand-Held
Metal Detector Search.
Further, during the OI investigation,
nine of the eleven students
interviewed stated that they completed their training without
having performed two or more of the critical tasks/subtasks.
During this enforcement
conference,
messrs
R. Scarano
and
P.
- Caudill agreed that the APS training provided to these
two classes
(A and B), was not up to standards.
The licensee
did not identify
that portions of their training provided to classes
A and
B, had
not met all of the training conditions
and standards
specified in
their approved
Tbg Plan.
This represents
an apparent
(licensee
and
NRC identified)
violation.
Region
V noted that during the February ll, 1992,
enforcement
conference
(as well as during this conference),
the licensee
discussed their 'previous intentions of providing students
in
classes
A and
B with on-the-job Training (OJT).
Additionally, it
was noted that the licensee
had previously acknowledged that
weaknesses
in their OJT for these
students
had partially
'contributed to the decline in security officer performance,
and
that approximately seven
months later, they completed
a task/post
performance training program to supplement
the OJT program.
Following the
May 10,
1993,
enforcement
conference,
a review of
the licensee's
Security Post Assignment Rosters
noted that during
these
seven
months
(from Mid July 1991 to mid February 1992), the
licensee
had assigned
some of these security officers (former
"graduates" of classes
A and
B) to security shift assignments
that
required their performance of critical tasks/subtasks
for which
they had received
incomplete training.
In particular, the
officers had
been
assigned
to security posts that required
them in
part, to have knowledge of,
and
be able to perform the following
tasks/subtasks:
Operate
a Hand-Held Radio,
Conduct X-ray Package
Search,
Conduct Vehicle Searches,
and
Respond
To and Assess
(security) Alarms..
APS Securit
Trainin
Procedure
The OI investigations
determined that two members of classes
A and
B were allowed to attempt to qualify up to six times per range-
firing day with their assigned
weapons,
rather than the maximum
three qualifying attempts
per day provided by Security Procedure
This represents
an apparent
(NRC identified)
violation.
,Additionally, the licensee's
Security Training Procedure
(20DP-
OTR01) incorrectly interpreted the requirements
of the Th) Plan,
in.,that the procedure did not insure that instructors
adequately
trained student to perform all of the required critical security
tasks
under the conditions
and to the standards
specified in the
T8g Plan.
For example,
the proce'dure incorrectly allowed students
to successfully
demonstrate their knowledge of many critical tasks
through practical tests
(verbal scenario-testing)
and written
tests,
and
made incomplete reference to the specific tasks,
conditions
and standards
specified in the TLg Plan.
Securit
Trainin
Records
The OI investigations
determined that security training records
for the
1991 initial security training classes
A and
B were not
complete
and accurate
in all material respects.
Specifically,
signatures
of students
and instructors
on training records
documented
completion of "qualifying performance
demonstration,"
in that they incorrectly indicated that the students:
had
)I
ltl
f
communicated clearly with a hand-held radio;
had operated
an X-ray
machine
and were able to recognize objects,
explosives
or
incendiary devices
on an X-ray screen;
had (individually)
conducted vehicle searches;
had responded'o
an alarm by moving to
.
the point of alarm as directed
by the alarm station operator,
utilizing techniques
of deployment, tactical
movement,
and
withdrawal,
and while being
a team member, operating
a vehicle,
running, carrying
a portable radio and weapon,
and wearing
a
bullet-proof vest
and riot helmet;
and
had adjusted,
tested
and
conducted
a search with a hand-held
metal detector.
This
represents
an apparent
(licensee
and
NRC identified) violation.
Safe uards
Events
and
Re ulator
Issues
June
17
1991.
The OI investigations
determined that
on June
17,
1991, the licensee
had identified that
a compensatory
security
officer was improperly posted at the perimeter
fence in such
a
manner that during the hours of darkness,
the officer could not
provide
a full field of vision for the two adjacent
inoperative
perimeter
alarm zones.
A security sergeant
and
a security shift
supervisor
prepared
an initial 73.71 report,
however, this event
was not included in the quarterly event log submitted to the
NRC.
The regulatory issues
involved in this event include:
(1)
The improper posting of a compensatory security measure.
(2)
The licensee's
failure to include this event in the
quarterly safeguards
event log submitted to the
NRC.
(Note:
Upon review of the material
used
by the licensee to
evaluate this event,
Region
V agreed that this event
was not
reportable to the
NRC.
The licensee's
documents
confirmed that
multiple (cascading)
alarms
had
been received
from two perimeter
alarm zones,
and that
a compensatory
security officer had
been
posted in the vicinity of these
alarm
zones.
These
documents
also confirmed that during this period of time, the two perimeter
. alarm zones
had remained operational
(in the security mode),
and
that the security officer had
been prepositioned
in the vicinity
to simply assess
the cause of any security alarms
from this
vicinity.
2
l.
Th Ii
tlg
i
h
d
i dtht
ai1
20,
1991, the licensee
had identified that
a security officer,
posted
as
a compensatory
measure for an unlocked vital Door 1G-
103, leading to the Unit-1 Diesel
Generator Building, left his
post for approximately two and one-half minutes to make
a call
from a telephone
located
on the other side of the building.
The
officer also left his safeguards
post orders
unattended.
From
this event,
the following apparent violations were identified:
(1)
The failure of a compensatory security measure.
(licensee
identified)
(2)
Failure to record the officer departing his assigned
compensatory
post in the safeguards
event log within 24
.hours.
Instead this event was recorded three
days later.
(NRC identified)
(3)
Failure to properly protect safeguards
information.
(licensee identified)
(4)
Failure to record the officer's failure to properly protect
safeguards
information in the event 'log,
and subsequent
failure to include this event in the quarterly safeguards
event log submitted to the
NRC.
(NRC identified)
6.
Closin
Remarks
In closing Nr. Levine indicated that
APS has worked hard investigating
the issues
involved in the Region
V letter dated April 23,
1993,
and
that as
a result of the
APS ongoing corrective actions in security
training, that the present training program far surpasses
the security
training program that was presented
to the
1991 initial security,
training classes
A and
B.
Nr. Levine confirmed that all identified
inconsistencies
between the approved Security Plan
and
APS security
procedures
would be corrected.
Nr. Scarano
indicated that
APS seems to be headed
in the right direction
in their approach to continue resolving the security training problems
and issues
presented
in the Region
V letter dated April 23,
1993.
Attachment:
A Licensee slides for enforcement
conference
1'
ENFORCEMENT
CONFERENCE
MAY 10,
1993
AttachmeIlt A
)I
ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE
SECURITY
MAY 10,
1993
AGENDA
~
OPENING
REMARKS
R. A.
SCARANO
3.
M.
LEVINE
NRC REVIEW OF APPARENT
VIOLATIONS
~
NRC REVIEW OF SAFETY
SIGNIFICANCE
. ~
INTRODUCTION
~
RESPONSE
TO
NRC ISSUES
~
REVIEW OF SAFETY
SIGNIFICANCE
~
CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAM
~
REVIEW OF
NRC
ENFORCEMENT
POLICY
~
CLOSING REMARKS.
NRC
NRC
P. 3.
CAUDILL
P. 3.
CAUDILL
T.
R.
BRADISH
A. D.
HUTTIE
F.
R.
HUEY
J.
M.
LEVINE
R. A.
SCARANO
PJC
1
05/10/93
REVIEW OF APRIL 23
1993
NRC
LETTER
~
NO INDICATION OF DELIBERATE MISCONDUCT
~
MARGINAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
NO INDICATION APPARENT VIOLATIONS ARE
SYMPTOMATIC OF A CURRENT PROGRAMMATIC
PROBLEM
~
FURTHER
EXAMPLES OF ISSUES
IDENTIFIED
AND CORRECTED IN RESPONSE
TO
FEBRUARY
1992
ENFORCEMENT
CONFERENCE
~
APPARENT VIOLATIONS DO NOT INDICATE
REPEAT SECURITY PROGRAM PROBLEMS
PJC
2
05/10/93
- I
)l
l
i
EVALUATION
~
REVIEW OF lOCFR73
APPENDIX B,
SECURITY
PLAN,
TRAINING. AND QUALIFICATION PLAN,
AND iMPLEMENTING PROCEDURES
~
REVIEW OF
NRC INSPECTION
REPORTS
~
AND CONTRACT EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS
~
COURSE
CURRICULUM, FIRING RANGE
RECORDS,
AND CRUCiAL TASK FORMS AUDIT
~
REVIEW OF
POST
ASSIGNMENT ROSTERS
~
REVIEW OF
PVNGS QUALITY ASSURANCE
DOCUMENTS
~
REVIEW OF
FEBRUARY 1992
ENFORCEMENT
CONFERENCE
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
PJC
3
05/10/93
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EVALUATION RESULTS
TRAINING AND QUALIFICAT10N
~
PLAN/PROCEDURE
INCONSISTENCIES
~
CRUCIAL/CRITICAL TASK FORM INACCURACIES
~
RANGE FIRING PROCEDURE
EVENT REPORTING
~
JUNE 17,
1991 -
REPORTED
AND
DECLASSIFIED PER
STANDARD PRACTICE
~
JULY 20,
1991 - FAILURE TO
LOG WITHIN
24-HOURS
REQUIRED
PJC
4
05/10/93
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NRC COMMENTS ON TRAINING
(JUNE/JULY 1991 - PTI TEMPOMZUES)
~
LENGTH OF CLASSES
~
PERFORlVlANCE TESTING FOR CRITICALTASKS
~
OPPORTUNITIES FOR OJT
~
INSTRUCTOR PRESENCE IN CLASS
~
ACCURACY OF TRAININGRECORDS
PJC
5
05/10/93
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TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PROGRAM
1992 INITIATIVES
~
INTERIM POST
AND TASK-SPECIFIC CRUCIAL
TASK TESTING
FOR PTl A L B CLASSES
USING SHIFT SUPERVISION
~
CRUCIAL TASK PERFORMANCE
INTO
REQUALIFICATION
~
INSTRUCTORS
ON SHIFT
e
SECURITY TRAINING ADVISORY BOARD
~
SPECIFIC
CRUCIAL TASK PERFORMANCE
CRITERIA
~
FORMAL ON-THE-JOB TRAINING PROGRAM
PJC
6
05/10/93
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NRC APRIL 23
1993
LETTER
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION ISSUES
~
MEMBER
AI
AI
NI
NE
S
OF 1991 INITIALSECURITY
NG CLASSES
A AND
B MERE
NOT
D
TO
PERFORM ALL CRUCIAL SECURITY
ASKS
PRIOR
TO ASSIGNMENT
~
CRUCIAL TASK TRAINING FORMS
MERE NOT
ACCURATE IN ALL MATERIAL RESPECTS
REFLECTING A FALSE LEVEL OF SKILL
.PJC
7
05/10/93
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
EVALUATION RESULTS
~
PLAN/PROCEDURE
INCONSISTENCIES
~
CRUCIAL/CRITICAL TASK FORM INACCURACIES
HAND-HELD EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR
HAND-HELD METAL DETECTOR
BATON DEPLOYMENT
~
RANGE FIRING PROCEDURE
PJC
8
05/10/93
II
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h
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HAND-HELD EXPLOSIVES DETECTORS
o
HAND-HELD EXPLOSIVES
DETECTOR SEARCH
AND FUNCTIONAL TEST
SUBTASKS
NOT
PERFORMED
IN 1985
HAND-HELD EXPLOSIVES
DETECTORS
TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE
HANDS-ON SEARCHES
CONDUCTED IN LIEU
OF HAND-HELD EXPLOS1VES
DETECTOR
SEARCHES
HAND-HELD EXPLOSIVES
DETECTORS
DELETED
FROM 1985
SECURITY PLAN,
TRAINING PROCEDURE,
AND CRUCIAL
TASK FORM
SUBTASKS
REMAINED IN TRAINING &
QUALIFICATION PLAN
PJC
9
05/10/93
- HAND-HELD METAL DETECTORS
~
HAND-HEI D METAL DETECTOR SEARCH
AND
FUNCTIONAL TEST
SUBTASKS
NOT
PERFORMED
IN 1989
HAND-HELD METAL DETECTORS
TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE
HANDS-0
OF
HAND
SEARCHE
N SEARCHES
CONDUCTED IN LIEU
-HELD METAL DETECTOR
S
HAND-HELD METAL DETECTORS
REMAINED
IN SECURITY DOCUMENTS
SUBTASKS
REMAINE
QUALIFICATION PL
CRUCIAL TASK FOR
D IN TRAINING 5
AN;
AND REMAINED ON
M
PJC
10
05/10/93
BATON DEPLOYMENT
~
DEPLOYMENT OF
BATON SUBTASK NOT
PERFORMED
CONSISTENTLY
IN 1990
BATON USE
DELETED
FROM
PRACTICE
CHEMICAL AGENT (MACE) INSTITUTED IN
LIEU OF
BATON DEPLOYMENT
SUBTASK REMAINED IN TRAINING AND
QUALIFICATION PLAN AND ON CRUCIAL
TASK FORM
PJC
11
05/10/93
'I
RANGE FIRING PROCEDURE
~
FIVE CONTRACT EMPLOYEES P
THAN THREE WEAPONS QUALIF
ATTEMPTS IN ONE
DAY CONTR
PROCEDURE
ERMITTED
ICATION
ARY TO
MORE
PJC
12
05/10/93
RELATED TRAINING ISSUES
~
TERRORISM TRAINING
~
HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION
~
EXAMINER/EXAMINEE SIGNATURES
PJC
13
05/10/93
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION CONCLUSIONS
~
ME
PR
NE
S INVESTIGATION REVE
MBERS
OF
TH
IOR TO
COMP
CESSARY
FOR
E SECURIT
LETION OF
ASSIGNED
ALED NO EVIDENCE
Y FORCE
POSTED
TRAINING
DUTIES
~
INACCURACIES IN SOME CRUCIAL TASK FORMS
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
~
IN DEPTH
REVIEM OF PLANS,
PROCEDURES,
AND FORMS
TO
ENSURE
CONSISTENCY
~
REVISION OF
DOCUMENTS
TO
CORRECT
INCONSISTENCIES
~
IMPLEMENTATION OF
MORE
FORMAL
CHANGE,
CONTROL,
PROCESS,
AND
ACCOUNTABILITIES
~
LESSONS
LEARNED MEETINGS MITH SECURITY
PERSONNEL
PJC
14
05/10/93
EVENT REPORTING
lOCFR73.71
EVENT REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS
~
MAINTAIN A CURRENT
LOG AND RECORD
THE
SAFEGUARDS
EVENT WITHIN 24
HOURS
OF
DISCOVERY
~
SUBMIT. QUARTERLY REPORT
TO INCLUDE ALL
EVENTS
NOT PREVIOUSLY SUBMITTED
~
IMPLEMENTATION GOVERNED
BY PVNGS
EVENT
REPORTING
MANUAL
STANDARD PVNGS
PRACTICE (1991)
o
COMPLETED WITHIN 24
HOURS
CONDUCTED
FACT FINDING,
GATHERED
STATEMENTS,
AND DOCUMENTED IN EVENT
REPORT
--SIGNED/APPROVED
BY SHIFT CAPTAIN
FILED (CURRENT
LOG) IN CAPTAINS
OFFICE
SUBMITTED QUARTERLY REPORT
TO
NRC
PJC
15
05/10/93
DIESEL GENERATOR
DOOR
POST
G103
0 /20/91
~
EVENT NOT
LOGGED WITHIN 24-HOURS
OF
DISCOVERY
~
SECURITY MANAGER AND OPERATIONS
SUPERVISOR
CONDUCTED
FACT FINDING
,~
EVENT LOGGED
ON JULY 23,- 1991
~
EVENT SUBMITTED IN QUARTERLY REPORT
~
CAUSE
OF
LATE ENTRY
POOR
COMMUNICATION BETWEEN UNIT 1
POWER
BLOCK SERGEANT AND SHIFT
CAPTAIN
IMPROPER
HANDLING OF INITIAL EVENT
REPORT
AND BACKUP DOCUMENTATION
~
CORRECTIVE ACTION
CAPTAIN AND
REGARDING
P
DOCUMENT CL
OSU
GEANT WERE
COACHED
R COMMUNICATIONS AND
E
PJC
16
05/10/93
ISOLATION ZONE
6/17/91
~
NO EVIDENCE TO
CONCLUDE CHANGE OF
POST
LOCATION CONSTITUTES
IMPROPER
POSTING
~
POSTING
CONCERN IDENTIFIED
~
73.71
EVENT REPORT
GENERATED
e
REPORT MAINTAINED IN LOG DURING
INVESTIGATION
PJC
17
05/10/93
ISOLATION ZONE
6/17/91
(CONTINUED)
~
EVENT DETERMINED NOT REPORTABLE
BASED
UPON THE
FOLLOWING
FACTS OBTAINED FROM POSTED
OFFICER
. AND INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED
VISUAL INSPECTION
OF INITIAL
POSITION
BY SECURITY MANAGEMENT
SECURITY MANAGER DETERMINED SWING
SHIFT POSTING
WAS APPROPRIATE
THE EVENT WAS NOT REPORTABLE AND
DECLASSIFIED
PJC
18
05/10/93
SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION PLAN
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCREPANCIES
NO
PERFORMANCE ISSUES
TRAINING ON EQUIVALENT MEASURES
NOT INTENTIONAL
NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
EVENT LOGGING/REPORTING
LICENSEE IDENTIFIED
NOT INTENTIONAL
,NO SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
~
MANAGEMENT AWARENESS
OF POTENTIAL
VIOLATIONS
.TRB 1
05/10/93
CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAM
~
SECTION 3. 4
OF TRAINING AND
QUALIFICATION PLAN
~
CRUCIAL TASKS
'
INITIAL/REQUALIFICATIONARE THE SAME
TASKS
BROKEN
DOWN INTO SPECIFIC
SUBTASKS
GUIDELINE FOR
PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
PERFORMANCE
BASED/WRITTEN EXAM
INCREASED TEST
SCORE
REQUIREMENTS
ADDRESSES
INDIVIDUALNEEDS
OFFICERS'LUE
HANDBOOK
ADH 1
05/10/93
CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAM
(CONTINUED)
~
INITIALON-THE-JOB TRAINING (OJT)
PROGRAM
INSTRUCTORS
GUIDE
SPECIFIC
TASK COMPLETION
REQUIREMENTS
CONSISTENCY
~
ON SHIFT
ENHANCEMENT TRAINING
CONDUCTED
BY INSTRUCTORS
ON SHIFT
SUPERVISORY
INPUT
FOCUSES
ON INDIVIDUAL/SHIFTNEEDS
CONTINGENCY DRILLS
E-PLAN EVENTS
EQUIPMENT TESTING
SEARCHES
-
WEAPONS FAMILIARIZATION
RANDOM SELECTION CRUCIAL TASK
TESTING
ADH 2
05/10/93
i(
CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAM
(CONTINUED)
~
COMMUNICATIONS
TRAINING ADVISORY BOARD
(MONTHLY)
CUSTOMER
FEEDBACK QUESTIONNAIRE
FRONTLINE INVOLVEMENT IN ALL AREAS
OF TRAINING PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
AOH 3
05/10/93
CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAM
(CONTINUED)
~
RESULTS
IMPROVED TEST
SCORES
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE
-
NO 73.71
HUMAN ERROR
EVENTS
(NEW
OUTAGE OFFICERS)
OVERALL IMPROVED COMMUNICATIONS AND
TEAMWORK
THOROUGH UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE
OF JOB
AND PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
ADH 4
05/10/93
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