ML17309A828
| ML17309A828 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Saint Lucie  |
| Issue date: | 03/13/1996 |
| From: | Castro C NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION II) |
| To: | Plunkett T FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9603250212 | |
| Download: ML17309A828 (25) | |
Text
Mar'ch 13, 1996 Florida Power and Light Company ATTN:
Hr. T. Plunkett President
- Nuclear Division P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420
SUBJECT:
HEETING SUHHARY - PREDECISIONAL ENFORCEHENT CONFERENCE ST LUCIE -
DOCKET NOS 50-335 AND 50-389 Gentlemen:
This refers to the predecisional enforcement conference conducted at our request at the NRC Region II office in Atlanta, Georgia, on Harch 8, 1995.
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss apparent-violations regarding a
January 22,
- 1996, event involving excessive
'boron dilution on Unit l. It is our opinion that this meeting was beneficial.
A list of attendees is provided in Enclosure 1 and the material you presented is provided in Enclosure 2.
In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
Part 2, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosures will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.
Should you have any questions concerning this letter, please contact us.
Sincerely, Original signed by Charles A. Casto Charles A. Casto, Chief Engineering Branch Division of Reactor Safety Docket Nos. 50-335, 50-389 License Nos.
Enclosures:
1.
List of Attendees 2.
FPL Presentation cc w/encls:
See page 2
96032502i2 9603i3 PDR ADQCK 05000335 P
FPL cc w/encls:
W. H. Bohlke Vice President St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 H. N. Paduano, Manager Licensing and Special Programs Florida Power and Light Company P. 0.
Box 14000 Juno
- Beach, FL 33408-0420 I
J. Scarola Plant General Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0128 E. J.
Weinkam Plant Licensing Manager St. Lucie Nuclear Plant P. 0.
Box 128 Ft. Pierce, FL 34954-0218 J.
R.
- Newman, Esq.
- Morgan, Lewis
& Bockius 1800 M Street, NW Washington, D.
C.
20036 John T. Butler, Esq.
- Steel, Hector and Davis 4000 Southeast Financial Center Miami, FL 33131-2398 Bill Passetti Office of Radiation Control Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services 1317 Winewood Boulevard Tallahassee, FL 32399-0700 Jack Shreve Public Counsel Office of the Public Counsel c/o The Florida Legislature 111 West Madison Avenue, Room 812 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1400 cc w/encls cont'd:
See page 3
FPL cc w/encls cont'd:
Joe Hyers, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness Department of Community Affairs 2740 Centerview Drive Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100 Thomas R. L. Kindred County. Administrator St. Lucie County 2300 Virginia Avenue Ft. Pierce, FL 34982 Charles B. Brinkman Washington Nuclear Operations ABB Combustion Engineering, Inc.
12300 Twinbrook Parkway, Suite 3300 Rockville, HD 20852 K. Landis, RII J. Norris, NRR G. A. Hallstrom, -RII PUBLIC NRC Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
7585 South Highway AlA Jensen
- Beach, FL 34957-2010 OFFICE 9 IG NATURE NAME Rll RII RSchIn O
L /Se YE NO O3/(
/Se ES NO DATE 03/
/99 YES NO o3/
/ee YES NO COPY?
OFFICIAL RECORD COPY OCUHENT NAHE:
G:iSLHTGSUH.396 03/
/99 03/
/99 YES NO YES NO
LIST OF ATTENDEES Florida Power and Li ht Com an T. Plunkett, President
- Nuclear Division, FPL W. Bohlke, Vice President, St. Lucie Nuclear Plant J. Scarola, Plant General
- Manager, St. Lucie D. Denver, Engineering
- Manager, St. Lucie E. Weinkam, Licensing Manager, St. Lucie P. Honeysett, Nuclear Plant Supervisor, St. Lucie F.
- Cone, Reactor Controls Operator, St. Lucie H. Holzmacher, Reactor Controls Operator, St.
Lucie Nuclear Re ulator Commission S. Ebneter, Regional Administrator, Region II (RII)
A. Gibson, Director, Division of Reactor Safety (DRS), RII J.
- Johnson, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects (DRP), RII J. Beall, Enforcement Coordinator, Office of Enforcement (OE)
B. Uryc, Director, Enforcement and Investigation Coordination Staff (EICS),
RII C. Casto, Chief, Engineering
- Branch, DRS, RII T. Peebles, Chief, Operations
- Branch, DRS, RII K. Landis, Reactor Projects Branch 3, DRP, RII J. Norris, Project Manager, NRR L. Watson, Senior Enforcement Specialist, EICS, RII C.
- Evans, Regional
- Counsel, RII M. Hiller, Senior Resident Inspector, St. Lucie, DRP, RII R. Schin, Reactor Inspector, Engineering
PRE-DECISIONAL ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE ST.LUCIE PLANT NRC INSPECTION REPORT NOS. 50-335/96-03 AND 50-389/96-03 MARCH 8, 1996 ATLANTA,GA Enclosure 2
UNIT 1 FLOOR PLANRAB CONTROL ROOM ELEVATION62.00 I
0 OOOO SAB MA MC MO MB N.W.E.
OFFICE SA ESSES SB A 8 OQO RAD. MNTR.
PANELS REACTOR PROTECTION SYSTEM BOWN STHRS TO AB'L
~ R ~
MD MB MA TEAMINATlONCABINETS NA N8 SA
'-~:RTGB',""..i';":
"';,;;:;jrGB';;";
-;,, "('03".,-.
- ~s",RTGB
~m~>4'OB
'""RTGB'-~
~
TABLE 8
5's CRAG PANEL RESTROOM KITCHEN TECH. SUPPORT CENTER PHONE EQUIP.
BATHROOM 4 STORAGE ROOM COMPUTER ROOM OPS ADMIN.
OFFICE ERDADS COMPUTER OFFICE glEPTiIJC%015S.F 1.R 1)
UNIT 1 DILUTIONEVENT JANUARY22, 1996 BRCO RETURNS FROM KITCHEN 0200 BRCO LEAVES FOR KITCHEN DILUTION EVENT TERMINATED 0300 0314 NPS ASSUMES SENIOR RO RESPONSIBILITY DRCO LEAVES FOR KITCHEN BRCO BEGINS'ILUTION (0225)
BRCO RESPONDS TO ALARM E-9 DRCO RETURNS FROM KITCHEN ANPS SUMMONEDTO CONTROL ROOM; ENTER LCO T-COLDAND POWER STABILIZED; EXITLCO (0314) glVGWOfd1&t.RfJ
UNIT 1 DILUTIONEVENT PROMPT ACTION JANUARY22 JANUARY23 0400 NOON MIDNIGHT DS-7 COMPLETED BYANPS HPES COORDINATOR ON SITE (0515)
NPS RELATES EVENTTO OPS SUPERVISOR DURING ROUTINE CALLFROM OFFSITE (0545)
NPS FURTHER DISCUSSES EVENTWITHOPS SUPERVISOR IN OFFICE; DELIVERS DRAFT IHE (0600)
OPS TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR BEGINS EVENT REVIEW MANAGEMENT PHONE CALL DISCUSSING EVENT (0740)
DRAFT IHE
'ISTRIBUTED TO MANAGEMENT (0630)
ANPS NOTIFIES OPS TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR ORALLY OPS TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR RECOMMENDS BRCO SUSPENSION OPS TECHNICAL SUPERVISOR HOLDS FACT FINDING MEETING WITHCREW AND BARGAININGUNIT OPS SUPERVISOR APPROVES OPS TECHNICALSUPERVISOR RECOMMENDATION TO SUSPEND BRCO
Root Cause. Evaluation PROBLEM 1:.
A reactivity evolution was initiated without adequate controls.
Root Cause:
Routine boron dilutions to maintain 1QO percent power are not treated with the same importance as other reactivity management evolutions.
PROBLEM 2:
The plant staffs recognition ofthis event s significance was slow.
Root Cause:
The root cause ofthis problem is lack ofa well defined threshold for recognizing safety significance.
PROBLEM 1 A reactivity evolution was initiated without adequate controls.
Corrective Actions
- Personnel
- Procedures/Documents/Policies
- Equipment Performance
- Training and Quality Assurance
- Supervision and Management
PROBLEM 2 The plant staffs recognition ofthis event's significance was slow.
Corrective Actions
- Personnel
- Procedures/Documents/Policies
- Equipment Performance
- Training and Quality Assurance
- Supervision and Management
Management Lessons Learned Management's Operational Guidance to Maintain T, at 549F:
Adjustment ofHigh Tc Alarm Reinforcement ofExpectations to the Operating Crews Concerning Personal Accountability Operating Crew Communication with Plant Management
Personnel Lessons Learned Operating Staff Has the Highest Levels ofHonesty, Integrity, and Accountability Confirmation of Crew Members'itness to Perform Licensed Duties
Procedures and Policies Lessons Learned Senior Reactor Operator Direct Oversight ofReactivity Manipulations Periodic Dilutionofthe Reactor Coolant System Is Not an Activity to Be Turned Over to Another Operator Clarification of Short Term Turnover ofControl Station Responsibility Implementation ofEvent Response Teams
Equipment Lessons Learned Continued Focus on "Dark Board" Use of"Manual" Mode versus "Automatic" Mode ofControl for Boration and Dilution
Training and Quality Assurance Lessons Learned Lessons Learned Need to be Included in Continuing Training Effectiveness ofCorrective Actions
Safety Significance Reactor Power Peak at 101.13%
Observed Cold Leg Temperature (Tc) Maximum of 549.75F Technical Specification LimitingCondition for Operation ACTIONLimitwith Tc > 549F is 2 Hours; Tc Exceeded 549F for About 50 Minutes UFSAR Boron DilutionEvent Licensing Basis Assumptions Bounds Subject Boron Over-Dilution Event Probabilistic Safety Assessment Evaluation Concluded That the Plant's Core Damage Frequency Was Unaffected by the Event
Apparent Violations B and C
. Apparent Violation B - Inadequate Design Control
- Review Ec Conclusions
- Corrective Actions Apparent Violation C - Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation Review Ec Conclusions
- Corrective Actions 13
Apparent Violation B Pro osed Violation:
"Design control was inadequate,
... procedures for adding... demineralized water and boric acid to the... [RCS] (in manual and directly to the suction ofthe charging pumps) did not implement the method in... Chapter 15 (in automatic and to the volume control tank),...since January 1976..."
Assessment:
FPL Concurs with the Apparent Violation
~
UFSAR Describes Automatic Mode as Normal in Contrast to Plant Practice:
15.2.4:
"During normal plant operation, concentrated boric acid solution is mixed with demineralized makeup water...and is automatically introduced into the
[VCT]..."
Apparent Violation 8 (Cont'd)
Conclusions
~
Design as Described in the UFSAR Is not Consistently Translated into Procedures
~
UFSAR Inconsistencies with Plant Practices Need to Be Eliminated Safety Analysis Has Concluded No Unreviewed Safety Question Corrective Actions
~
Review and Enhance UFSAR Assessment by Multi-DisciplineTeam (Covered - I/3 UFSAR Content)
Complete Identification and Elimination ofInconsistencies Unit 1 by mid-December 1996 Unit 2 by September 30, 1996
~
Improve the Procedure Review Process to Include Feedback for UFSAR Update
Apparent Violation C Pro osed Violation:.
"A... 50.59 evaluation was inadequate,
... the licensee made a change to the Unit I boron dilution procedure on January 23, 1996 (after the event), to allow adding demineralized water in "Manual" and directly to the suction ofthe charging pumps, that was different from the method stated in the UFSAR, Chapter 15 (in "Dilute"and to the volume control tank) and without preparing a... 50.59 safety evaluation."
Assessment:
FPL Concurs with the Apparent Violation
~
UFSAR Description Is Not Consistent with Plant Practices
Apparent Violation C (Cont'd)
==
Conclusions:==
~
TC 1-96-017 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Conclusions Are Not Supported by UFSAR Description
~
UFSAR and 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Process Need Improving
~
~
Apparent Violation C (Cont'd)
Corrective Actions
~
Improve 10 CFR 50.59 Screening Process Improve Process by Documenting the UFSAR and Technical Specifications Sections Reviewed During Screening Conduct 10 CFR 50.59 Training for Departments Responsible for Procedure Changes with New Emphasis on the Definition of"...procedures as described in the safety analysis report" Clarify Screening Criteria Reference Applicable UFSAR Sections within Procedures
~
Improve UFSAR Eliminate Procedure / UFSAR Inconsistencies 18
Impact offhe Boron DilutionEvent on St. Lucie Plant Management Expectations Programs and Procedures Training Personnel Performance Management Performance
0 CI V
II P',
1 q
V