ML17308A293

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Proposed Tech Specs Re Enhancement of Station Breathing Air Sys by Addition of New Containment Isolation Valve on Air Header to Containment & New Air Aftercoolers
ML17308A293
Person / Time
Site: Saint Lucie NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 03/17/1987
From:
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML17308A292 List:
References
NUDOCS 8703260345
Download: ML17308A293 (14)


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ATTACHMENT l Marked Up Technical Specification Pages 3/4 6-5 3/4 6-20 3/4 6-2I

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Sn SVS Penetration System TABLE 3.6-1 CONTAINENT LEAKAGE PATHS Location Valve Ta Nombe to Containment Service Test e*

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O 10 14 23 24 25 26 28 Makeup Mater Station Air Instriment Air Containment Purge Conta1reent Purge Maste Management

,Component Cool!ng Ceaponent Cooling Fuel Transfer Tube CVCS Sattipling Gate (I+-15-1)t Check (1-V-15-1347)

Gl obe (I<<V<<18-947).<

Globe.(14-1 8<<9471;c~

check (I-v-<eiiis) ewe globe (I-SH-l8797)

Gate (I'4f-l8-1.}

'heck (I-V-18-957}

Butterfly (I-FCY<5-4}

Butterfly (I-FCV<5-5),

Butterfly (I-FCY-25-3).

Butterfly.+-FCV<5-2}

Globe

.(V-6741 }

Check.(V-6779}.

Butterflyt (14CV-14-7).

Butterfly. (14CV-14-1 )

Butterfly (14CV-14-6}

Butterfly (1WCV-14-2)

Double Gasket Flange GloBe (V4515)

Globe.(V-2516)

Globe V-5200).

Globe V-5203)'l obe. I-FCV43-1E).

Globe I-.PCV<3-1F}.

Inside

'nside Outside Outside Outs1de Outside Letdown Line Reactor Coolant Sample SI Tank Sample SI Tank Sample Outside Pr1mary Makeup Mater Inside Outside Station A1r Supply Outstde ggsjde 4 4'4 gnnu/05 +++

Outside instrument Air Supply inside inside Containment Purge Outside Exhaust Inside.

Containment Purge Outside Supply Outside Nitrogen supply to Outside Si Tanks Outside RC Pump CM supply Outside Outside RC Pump CM Return Outside Inside Fuel Transfer Bypass

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Bypass Bypass Type C

Type C

Bypass Bypass.

Bypass Bypass Bypass Bypass Bypass

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TABLE 3.6-2 COHTAIHNEHT ISOLATION VALVES n

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COHTAINthEHT ISOLATIOH 1.

I-FCV-25-4,5 2.

I-FCV-25-2,3 3.

I-HV-15-1 4.

I-HV-18-1 5 ~

V-6741 6.

I-flCV-14-1 5 7 7.

I-HCV-14-6 5 2 8.

V-2515,2516 9.

V-5200,5203 10.

V-5201,5204 11.

V-5202,5205 12.

V-6554,6555 13.

I-LCV-07-11A,118 Penetr ation Number 10 11 7

9 14 23 24 26 28 29 29 31 42 Function Containment purge air exhaust, CIS Containment purge supply, CIS Primary makeup water, CIS Instrument air supply, CIS Nitrogen supply to safety injection

tanks, CIS Reactor coolant pump cooling water
supply, SIAS Reactor coolant pump cooling water
return, SIAS Letdown line, CIS, SIAS Reactor coolant sample, CIS Pressurizer surge line sample, CIS Pressurizer steam space
sample, CIS Containment vent header, CIS Reactor cavity sump pump discharg'e, CIS No Yes No Yes 5

5 19 28 5

No No No Yes 4-Yes Yes Yes Yes 5

5 5

5 5

10 Testable Ouring Isolation

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V-6301,6302 15.

V-2505 16.

I-SE-01-.1 43 44 Reactor drain tank pump suction, CIS Reactor coolant pump controlled

bleedoff, CIS Reactor coolant pump controlled
bleedoff, CIS Yes Ho No l7.

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Valve Ta Number B.

tlANUAL OR REMOTE ttAHUAL 1.

I-V-18-947 +

Penetration Number TABLE 3.6-2 Continued Function Station air supply, Manual Testable During Isolation

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Yes 2.

I-V-25-11,12 3.

I-V-25-13,14, 15,16 4.

V-3463 5.

I-V-03-1307 6.

V-07206, V-07189 56 57 8 58 41 41 Hydrogen purge outside air make-up, Manual (NC)

Hydrogen purge exhaust, Manual (NC)

Safety injection tank test line, Manual (AC)

Safety injection tank test line, Manual (NC)

Refueling cavity purification flow inlet, tea>>ual (NC)

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes NA NA NA+

NA*

NA 7.

V-07170, V-07188 Refueling cavity purification flow Yes

outlet, manual (NC) 8.

I-FSE-27-1,2;3, 4,8,10 9.

I-FSE-27-5,6,7, 9,11 48 51 1~

Hydrogen sampling line, Remote

'manual llydrogen sampling line, Remote manual Yes Yes

ATTACHMENT2 SAFETY EVALUATION I.

Descri tion of Chan e

Florida Power 5

Light Company has planned a

plant improvement modification for St. Lucie Unit I, which will enhance the station breathing air system by adding new containment isolation valves on the station air header to containment, and by adding a breathing air aftercooler.

(Note:

The breathing air aftercooler is classified non-nuclear safety-related and its addition will not affeet any safety related structures, systems or components.)

Figure I shows the existing configuration for penetration 778.

Figure 2 shows the configuration of penetration

$38 after the modification is implemented.

These new containment isolation valves will have valve tag numbers different than the valve tag numbers of the presently installed containment isolation valves.

Therefore, Technical Specification Table 3.6-I, "Containment Leakage Paths" and Table 3.6-2, "Containment Isolation Valves" must be revised to reflect the new valve tag numbers.

ll.

Discussion The above described changes require revisions to Technical Specification Table 3.6-l "Containment Leakage Paths" and Table 3.6-2 "Containment Isolation Valves" to reflect the new valve tag numbers.

These changes to the Technical Specifications are adminstrative in

nature, and the modification to the plant does not involve an unreviewed safety question in
that, A. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis is not increased.

The new containment isolation valves will be installed in accordance with the containment isolation criteria specified in the St. Lucie Unit I FSAR, and the new valves are of similar design or better than the valves presently installed; B. The possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated in the safety analysis report is not created because the new containment isolation valves will meet the criteria specified in the St. Lucie Unit,l FSAR for containment isolation; C. The ma'rgin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification will not be reduced because the new containment isolation valves will meet the criteria specified in the St. Lucie Unit I FSAR for containment isolation.

III.

Conclusion The new valves will meet the contain'ment isolation criteria specified in the St. Lucie Unit I FSAR, and they will be of similar design or better than the valves presently installed.. Therefore, the modification to the plant does not involve an unreviewed safety question, and the resulting revisions to the Technical Specification are administrative in nature.

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ATTACHMENT3 DETERMINATION OF NO SIGNIFICANT HAZARDS CONSIDERATION The standards used to arrive at a determination that a request for amendment involves no significant hazards consideration are included in the Commission's regulations, IO CFR 50.92, which states that no significant hazards considerations are involved if the operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (I) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previoiusly evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Each standard is discussed as follows:

(I)

Operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment to revise valve tag numbers identified in the Technical Specifications is purely administrative in nature.

The addition of the new containment isolation valves will not increase accident probability or consequences because the new valves will be installed in accordance with the containment isolation criteria specified in the St. Lucie Unit I FSAR, and the new valves are of similar design or better than the valves presently installed.

Also, the station air system is not considered in any accident analysis nor does it affect any other safety-related equipment.

(2)

Use of the modified specification would not create the possiblity of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

The proposed amendment is purely administrative in nature, and the plant modification does not decrease the design margins of the service air system, change operating conditons or functions or affect any other safety-related equipment.

(3)

Use of the modified specification would not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

The proposed amendment is purely administrative in nature.

The new valves will be installed in accordance with the containment isolation critieria specified in the St. Lucie Unit I FSAR, and the new valves are of similar design or better than the valves presently installed.

The service air system is not considered in any accident analysis.

Based on the above, we have determined that the amendment request does not (I) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated, (2) create the probability of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated, or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety; and therefore does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

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