ML17306A784
| ML17306A784 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde |
| Issue date: | 06/05/1992 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | Conway W ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17306A786 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 9206230124 | |
| Download: ML17306A784 (26) | |
See also: IR 05000530/1992019
Text
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Docket No. 50-530
License
No.
UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORYCOMMISSION
REGION V
1450 MARIALANE
WALNUTCREEK, CAUFORNIA94596-5368
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Arizona Public Service
Comoany
P.O.
Box 53999, Station 9012
Phoenix, Arizona
85072-3999
Attention:
SUBJECT:
Nr.
W.
F.
Conway
Executive Vice President,
Nuclear
NRC INSPECTION REPORT 50-530/92-19
On Hay 8 - 14, 1992,
an
NRC Region
V Augmented Inspection
Team (AIT) conducted
an inspection at the Palo Verde Nucleat
Generating Station, Unit 3.
The AIT
examined activities authorized
by
NRC License
At the conclusion of
the inspection,
on Hay .I4, the inspI.c.'rs
held
e discuss"'on of their findings
with you and members of your staff.ji identified in the en-:.;sod report.
Areas examin
d Outing the inspection
are identified in the report.
Within
these
areas,
the inspection consisted
of selective
examinations of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with personnel,
and observations
by the
inspectors.
The AIT found that the event, the loss of plant annunciator
and alarm
systems
at Unit 3, could have been avoided.
Three points in the
work process
were identified as missed opportunities to prevent the
event:
1.
The work planner failed to review archived documents
as required
prior to issuing the work order.
As a result, the planner failed to
notice that the circuit breaker continuity check that initiated the
event
had been previously performed,
and that a repeat of the check
was not necessary.
2.
The work planner modified Engineering Department instructions,
which
originally asked for continuity checks
on spare breakers
only, to
require performing continuity checks
on active breakers,
without
obtaining Engineering review and concurrence for the instruction
modification.
3.
The electricians
implementing the work order disconnected
a lead,
an
action not specifically required by the work order.
The team observed that the programs
and procedures
governing non-safety
related maintenance
work apply equally to safety-related
maintenance.
The
team, therefore,
concluded that the findings noted
above could also
be
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applicable to safety-related
maintenance.
The team further concluded that
a
lack of intrusive supervisory
involvement in the initiation and performance of
routine, balance-of-plant electrical
work was
an underlying root cause of the
event,
common to each missed opportunity.
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In addition, the AIT found that the electricians failed to implement necessary
safety precautions for preventing accidental
equipment
damage.
Inadvertent
contact of the electrical
lead w>th. other. circuits would have been avoided
by
either (1) installing rubber or canvas
blankets
over the nearby 480 vac
electrical
bus work, or (2) exerting. positive controls to capture
and restrain.
the electrical
upon di'sconnectson
from the terminal board.
The AIT found this failure to take adequate
safety precautions
to be of
particular note,
because
the resultant short circuit and ensuing
event. (1)
significantly degraded
-the Control
Room operators'bility to monitor plant
parameters
(2) impacted plant computer capabi,lity for automatic calculation
of plant safety limits, invoking license, requirements for reducing plant
power,
and (3) called. 1nto question the operability of the optical isolation
system,
which segregates
safety-related
and non-safety-related
devices.
Recent events at your faci.l.ity have occurred which,, at least partially, were
the result of poor practices in controlling work at Palo Verde.
These
include reactor trip breaker
maintenance
problems,
the lack of Senior Reactor
Operator coverage
during core alteratio>>:- at Uni.t 2,, and ",.'e Unit 3,
switchyard crane incj4~-than~-';,"erat'ed in a partial loss of offs.'.
p".'ver.
these events,
combined with the findings of this,AIT, raise serious
questions
regarding
the. effectiveness
of your programs for defining, performing,
and
controlling work with the potential for impact on plant safety.
Any enforcement action resulting from this inspection will be the topic of
separate
correspondence.
In accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the HRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy
of this letter and the enclosures will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room..
Should you have any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
Sincerely,
l
p~
a
Regional
Adminis
Encl osure:
Inspecti on Report 50-530/92-19
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II
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cc w/enclosure:
0. Hark DeMichele,
J.
H. Levine,
R. Stevens,
.
S. Guthrie,
E.
C.
Simpson,
R.
W.
Page,
T.
R. Bradish,
J.
A. Boeletto,
Esq., Assistant Council, Southern California Edison
Company,
Rosemead,
CA
C.
B. Brinkman,
Combustion Engineering,
Inc.
C.
L. Hoskins,
El Paso Electric Company,
Phoenix,
AZ.
R.
P.
Lessey, Jr., Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer,
and Feld
S. Olea, Chief Engineer,
Arizona Corporation
Commission
Al Gutterman,
Newman & Holtzinqer
S.
H. Olea, Chief Engineer,
ARszona Corporation
Commission
B.
M. Jones,
Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Haver,, and Feld
N.
C. Loftin Esq.,
Corporate Secretary
& Corporate
Counsel,
J.
R.
Newman, Esq.,
Newman & Holtzinger P. C., Washington,
M. A. Wright, Interim Acting Director
Arizona Radiation
Regulatory Agency (ARRA), Phoenix,
AZ.
Chairman,
Haricopa County Boar
fgupervisors,
Phoenix,
AZ
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Docket No.
50-530
License
No.
Arizona Public Service
Company
P.O.
Box 53999, Station
9012
Phoenix,
85072-3999
Attention:
Mr. 'M.
F.
Conway
Executive Yice President,
'Nuclear
SUBJECT:
NRC INSPECTION
REPORT 50-530/92-19
On May 8 - 14',
1992,
an
NRC Region
Y Augmented Inspection
Team (AIT) conducted
an inspection at the Palo Yerde Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 3.
The AIT
examined activities authorized
by NRC 'License
At the conclusion of
the inspection,
on May 14, the inspectors
held
a discussion
of our findings
with you and members of your staff identified in the enclosed
report.
Areas
examined during the inspection
are identified in the report.
Within
these
areas,
the inspection consisted of selective
examinations
of procedures
and representative
records,
interviews with personnel,
and observations
by the
inspectors.
The AIT found that the event,
the loss of plant annunciator
and alarm
systems at Unit 3, could have
been avoided.
Three points in the
work process
were identified as missed opportunities to have avoided the
event:
1.
The work planner failed to review archived
documents
as required
prior to issuing the work order.
As a result,
the .planner failed to
notice that the circuit breaker continuity check that initiated the
event
had been previously performed,
and that
a repeat
of. the check
was not necessary.
2.
The work planner modified Engineering
Department instructions,
which
originally asked for continu>ty checks
on spare
breakers .only, to
require performing continuity checks
on active breakers,
without
obtaining Engineering
review and concurrence for the instruction
modification.
3.
The electricians
implementing the work order disconnected
a lead,
an
action not specifically requ>red
by the work order.
The team concluded that
a lack of intrusive supervisory
involvement in the
initiation and performance of routine, balance-of-plant electrical
work was
an
underlying root cause of the event,
common to each missed opportunity.
In addition, the AIT found that the electricians failed to implement necessary
safety precautions
for preventinq accidental
equipment
damage.
Inadvertent
contact of the electrical
lead w>th other circuits would have
been avoided
by
II
ia.
0'
either
(1) installing rubber or canvas
blankets
over the nearby
480 vac
electrical
bus work, or (2) exertinq positive controls to capture
and restrain
the electrical
upon disconnection
from the terminal board.
The AIT found this fai lure to take adequate
safety precautions
to be of
particular
note,
because
the resultant short circuit and ensuing event (1)
significantly degraded
the Control
Room operators'bility to monitor plant
parameters,
(2) impacted plant computer capability for automatic calculation
of plant safety limits, invoking license
requirements
for reducing plant
power,
and (3) called into question the operability of the optical isolation
system,
which segregates
safety-related
and non-safety-related
devices.
Recent events at your facility have occurred which, at least partially, were
the result of poor practices
in controlling work at Palo Verde.
These
include reactor trip breaker maintenance
problems,
the lack of Senior Reactor
Operator
coverage
during core alterations
at Unit 2,
and the Unit 3
switchyard crane incident that resulted in a partial loss of offsite power.
These events,
combined with the findings of this AIT, raise serious
questions
regarding the effectiveness
of your programs for defining, performing,
and
controlling work with the potential for impact on plant safety.
Any enforcement action resulting from this inspection will be the topic of
separate
correspondence.
In accordance
with 10 CFR Part 2.790 of the
NRC's "Rules of Practice,"
a copy
of this letter
and the enclosures will be placed in the
NRC Public Document
Room.
Should you have
any questions
concerning this inspection,
we will be glad to
discuss
them with you.
Sincerely,
J.
B. Martin
Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
Inspection
Report 50-530/92-19
bcc w/o enclosure:
LFMB (Licensee
Fee
Management
Branch)
bcc w/enclosure:
Region
V
J.
B. Martin, Regional Administrator
B. Faulkenberry,
Deputy Regional Administrator
M. Smith, Secretary,
Regional Administrator
G.
Cook, Regional
Public Affairs Officer
R.
Zimmerman, Director, Div. Radiation Safety
8 Projects
R. Scarano,
Director, Div. Radiation Safety
and Safeguards
S.
Richards,
Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
L. Miller, Chief, Reactor Projects
Branch
0
~
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cc w/enclosure:
0.
Mark DeMichele,
J.
M. Levine,
R. Stevens,
S. Guthrie,
E.
C. 'Simpson,
R.
W.
Page,
T.
R. Bradish,
J.
A. Boeletto,
Esq., Assistant Council, Southern Cal.ifornia Edison
Company,
Rosemead,
CA
C.
B. Brinkman,
Combustion Engineering,
Inc.
C.
L. Hoskins,
El Paso Electric Company,
Phoenix,
AZ.
R.
P.
Lessey, Jr.,
Esq., Akin, Gump, .Strauss,
Hauer,
and Feld
S.
Olea, Chief Engineer,
Arizona Corporation
Commission
Al Gutterman,
Newman
8 Holtzinqer
S.
M. Olea, Chief Engineer,
ARizona Corporation
Commission
B.
W. Jones,
Esq., Akin, Gump, Strauss,
Hauer,
and
Feld'.
C. Loftin Esq.,
Corporate Secretary
8 Corporate
Counsel,
J.
R.
Newman,
Esq.,
Newman
8 Holtzinger P. C., Washington,
W; A. Wright, Interim Acting Director
Arizona Radiation
Regulatory
Agency (ARRA),. Phoenix,
AZ.
Chairman,
Maricopa County Board of Supervisors,
Phoenix,
AZ
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H. Mong, Chief, Projects
Section II, Div. Reactor Projects
B. Olson,
Palo Verde Project Inspector
Docket file
Resident
Inspector (4)
bcc w/enclosure:
James Taylor, Executive Director of Operations,
James
H. Sniezek,
Deputy Executive Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Regional
Operations
8 Research,
OEDO
C. Calvo,
Region
V Contact,
OEDO
David A. Ward, Chairman,
Advisory Committee
on Reactor
Safeguards
(ACRS)
The Commissioners:
Ivan Selin,
Chairman
James
R. Curtiss
E. Gail
de Planque
Forrest J.
Remick
Kenneth
C.
Rogers
Charles Trammell,'II, Project Manager,
Alfred E. Chaffee,
Chief, Events
Assessment
Branch,
Div. Operational
Events
Assessment,
Document Control
Desk (Office of Information Resources
Management),
Thomas
E. Murley, Director,
F. J. Miraglia, Deputy Director,
J.
G. Partlow, Associate Director for Projects,
B.
A. Boger, Director, Div. Reactor
Projects--Regions III, IV, and V,
M. T. Russell,
Associate Director for Inspection
8 Technical
Assessment,
C.
E. Rossi, Director, Div. of Operational
Events
Assessment,
B.
K. Grimes,
Div. of Reactor Inspection
8 Safeguards,
J.
M.
Roe, Div. of Licensee
Performance
8 Quality Evaluation,
A.
C. Thadani,
Div. of Systems
Technology,
M. J. Virgilio, Assistant Director, Regions
IV 8
V Reactors,
J.
E. Richardson,
Director, Div. of Engineering Technology,
T.
R.
Quay, Director, Project Directorate
V,
Edward
L. Jordan,
Director,
Denwood
F.
Ross,
Deputy Director,
Director,
DRP, RI, II, III, IV
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bcc w/enclosure:
James
M. Taylor, Executive Director or Operations,
James
H. Sniezek,
Deputy Executive Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Regional
Operations
8t Research,
OEDO
C. Calvo,
Region
V Contact,
OEDO
David A. Ward,
Chairman,
Advisory Committee
on Reactor
Safeguards
(ACRS)
The Commissioners:
Ivan Selin,
Chairman
James
R. Curtiss
E. Gail
de Planque
Forrest J.
Remick
Kenneth
C. Rogers
bcc w/enclosure:
Charles
Trammell, III, Project Hanager,
Alfred E. Chaffee,
Chief,
Events
Assessment
Branch, Div. Operational
Events Assessment,
Document Control
Desk (Office of Information Resources
Hanagement),
Thomas
E. Hurley, Director,
F. J. Hiraglia,
Deputy Director,
J..G.
Partlow, Associate Director for Projects,
B. A. Boger, Director, Div. Reactor Projects Regions III, IV, and V,
W. T. Russell,
Associate Director for Inspection
8 Technical
Assessment,
C.
E. Rossi, Director, Div. of Operational
Events
Assessment,
B. K. Grimes,
Div. of Reactor Inspection
8 Safeguards,
J.
W.
Roe, Div. of Licensee
Performance
8 guality Evaluation,
A. C. Thadani,
Div. of Systems
Technology,
H. J. Virgillo, Assistant Director,
Regions
IV 8
V Reactors,
J.
E. Richardson,
Director, Div. of Engineering Technology,
T.
R. quay, Director, Project Directorate
V,
Edward L. Jordan,
Director,
Denwood
F.
Ross,
Dep t
Director,
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bcc w/enclosure:
James
H. Taylor, Executive Director or Operations,
James
H. Sniezek,
Deputy Executive Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Regional
Operations
& Research,
OEDO
C. Calvo,
Region
V Contact,
OEDO
David A. Ward,
Chairman,
Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards
(ACRS)
The Commissioners:
Ivan Selin,
Chairman
James
R. Curtiss
E. Gail de Planque
Forrest J.
Remick
Kenneth
C. Rogers
bcc w/enclosure:
Charles
Trammell, III, Project Hanager,
Alfred E. Chaffee,
Chief,
Events
Assessment
.Branch,
Div. Operational
Events
Assessment,
Document Control
Desk (Office of Information Resources
Hanagement),
Thomas
E. Hurley, Director,
F. J. Hiraglia, Deputy Director,
J.
G. Partlow, Associate Director for Projects,
B. A. Boger, Director, Div. Reactor Projects Regions III, IV, and V,
W. T. Russell,
Associate Director for Inspection
8 Technical
Assessment,
C.
E. Rossi, Director, Div. of Operational
Events Assessment,
B. K. Grimes, Div. of Reactor Inspection
8 Safeguards,
J.
W.
Roe, Div. of Licensee
Performance
8 Quality Evaluation,
A. C. Thadani,
Div. of Systems
Technology,
H. J. Virgillo, Assistant Director, Regions
IV 8
V Reactors,
J.
E. Richardson,
Director, Div. of Engineering Technology,
T.
R.
Quay, Director, Project Directorate
V,
Edward L. Jordan,
Director,
Denwood
F.
Ross,
Deputy Director,
DKirsch
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bcc w/enclosure:
James
M. Taylor, Executive Director or Operations,
James
H. Sniezek,
Deputy Executive Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Regional
Operations
5 Research,
OEDO
C. Calvo,
Region
Y Contact,
OEDO
David A. ward,
Chairman,
Advisory Committee
on Reactor
Safeguadds
(ACRS)
The Comm1ssioners:
Ivan Selin,
Chairman
James
R. Curtiss
E. Gail de Planque
Forrest J.
Remick
Kenneth
C. Rogers
bcc v/enclosure
Charles
Trammell, III, Progect
Manager,
Alfred E. Chaffee,
Chief, Events
Assessment
Branch, Div. Operational
Events Assessment,
Document Control Desk (Office of Information Resources
Management),
Thomas
E. Murley, Director,
F. J. Miraglia, Deputy Director,
J.
G. Partlow, Associate Director for Prospects,
B. A. Boger, Director, Div. Reactor .Pro]ects-Regions III, IV, and V,
M. T. Russell,
Associate Director for Inspection
8 Technical
Assessment,
HRR
C.
E, Rossi, Director, Div. of Operat1onal
Events .Assessment,
B. K. Grimes, Oiv. of Reactor -Inspection
8 Safeguards,
J ~
M. Roe
Div. of Licensee
Performance
5, Qual,ity Evaluation,
A. C, Thadani,
Div, of Systems
Technology,
M. J. Yirgillo, Assistant Director,
Regions
IY 5
'Y -Reactors,
J.
E, Richardson,
Director, Div. of Engineering Technology,
T.
R. Quay, D1rector, Project Directorate
Y,
.
Edward L. Jordan,
Director,
Denwood
F. Ross,
Deputy Director,
DKirsch
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bcc w/enclosure:
James
H. Taylor, Executive Director or Operations,
I
James
H, Sniezek,
Deputy Executive Director Nuclear Reactor Regulat1on,.
Regional
Operations
K Research,
OEDO
C. Calvo, Region
V Contact,
OEOO
David A. Mard, Chairman, Advisory Committee
on Reactor
Safeguards
(ACRS)
The Comoissioners:
Ivan Selin,
Chairman
James
R. Curtiss
E. Gail de Planque
Forrest J,
Remick
Kenneth
C, Rogers
bcc w/enclosure:
Charles
Trammell, III, Project Hanager,
Alfred E. Chaffee, Chief, Events Assessment
Branch, Div. Operational
Events Assessment,
Document Control Desk (Office of Information Resources
Hanagement),
Thomas
E, Hurley, Director,
F. J. Hiraglia, Deputy Director,
J.
G. Partlow, Associate Director for Projects,
B. A. Boger, Director, Div. Reactor Projects Regions Ill, IV, and
V,
M. T. Russell,
Associate Director for Inspection
5 Technical
Assessment,
C.
E. Rossi, Director, Div. of Operational
Events Assessment,
B. K. Grimes, Div. of Reactor Inspection
5 Safeguards,
J.
M. Roe, Div. of Licensee
Performance
In guality Evaluation,
A. C. Thadani,
Div. of Systems
Technology,
H, J. Virgillo, Ass1stant Director, Regions
IV 8
V Reactors,
J.
E. Richardson,
Director, Div. of Eng1neer1ng
Technology,
T. R. quay, Director, Project Directorate
V, NRR
Edward L. Jordan, Director,
Denwood
F. Ross,
Deputy Director,
DKirsch
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