ML17305B132
| ML17305B132 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 10/16/1990 |
| From: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17305B131 | List: |
| References | |
| EA-90-121, NUDOCS 9010250073 | |
| Download: ML17305B132 (10) | |
Text
-e NOTICE OF VIOLATION AND PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY Arizona Public Service Company Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Docket Nos.
50-528, 50-529 and 50-530 License Nos.
NPF-41, NPF-51, and NPF-74 EA 90-121
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During inspections conducted from January 8 through March 23, and May 16 through August 31, 1990, two violations of NRC requirements were identified.
In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (Act), 42 U.S.C.
2282 and 10 CFR 2.205.
The particular violations and civil penalty are listed below.
A.
Failure to Im lement Fire Protection ualit Assurance Pro ram License No. NPF-41, Condition 2.C(7) for Palo Verde Unit 1, License No.
NPF-51, Condition 2.C(6) for Palo Verde Unit 2, and License No. NPF-74, Condition 2.F for Palo Verde Unit 3, provide in part:
APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the facility, as supplemented and amended and as approved in the NRC Safety Evaluation Report (SER) through Supplement 8 for Units 1 and 2 and through Supplement 11 for Unit 3.
FSAR Table 9B.3-1(C) requires the development and implementation of a guality Assurance Program to satisfy the guidance of Branch Technical Position (BTP) 9.5-1 for design, procurement, installation, testing, and administrative controls for the fire protection program for safety-related areas.
The Table sets forth ten criteria, including those requiring adequate corrective actions and test controls.
BTP 9.5-1 defines the term "Fire Protection Program" as "the integrated effort involving all components, procedures, and personnel utilized in carrying out all activities of fire protection. It includes system and facility design, fire prevention,.fire detection, annunciation, confinement, suppression, administrative controls, fire brigade organization, inspection and maintenance, training, quality assurahce, and testing."
(Emphasis added).
FSAR Section 17. 2.2. 2 provides:
"the Operations gA program, as described in the Operations guality Assurance Criteria Manual, shall be applied to fire protection program activities associated with those fire protection systems and equipment used or installed in areas housing-safety related equipment, and other areas where an unsuppressed fire could potentially damage safety-related structures, systems or components."
The original Palo Verde Safety Evaluation Report (SER) dated November 1981, Section 9. 5. 1.7, approved the implementation by the licensee of a fire protection program consistent with the provisions of the NRC staff's
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guidance in "Nuclear Plant Fire Protection Functional Responsibilities, Administrative. Controls and equality Assurance,"
dated August 19, 1977
("FRA(UA"), including those provisions concerning quality assurance.
Attachment 6 to the FRAgUA guidance recommends a quality assurance program that applies, among other things, to emergency lighting.
Contrary to the above, at the time of the inspections and since initial startup of each unit, emergency lighting system components required as part of the Fire Protection Program were classified as Non-guality Related (N(R), and thus were not subject to the guality Assurance provisions of the Operations guality Assurance Criteria Manual and related administrative procedures and did not meet the FRA(UA provisions concerning quality assurance.
Consequently, emergency lighting was not adequately tested, and deficiencies were not properly corrected.
In addition, the licensee's letter of July 20, 1990 identifies additional items, of the Fire Protection Program improperly classified as NgR to which the appropriate provisions of the Operations guality Assurance Manual or the FRA(UA had not been applied.
Emer enc Li htin S stem Failures License No. NPF-4l, Condition 2.C(7) for Palo Verde Unit 1, License No.
NPF-51, Condition 2.C(6) for Palo Verde Unit 2 and License No.
NPF-74, Condition 2.F for Palo Verde Unit 3, provide in part:
APS shall implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the facility, as supplemented and amended, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 8 for Units 1 and 2 and through Supplement ll for Unit 3.'SAR Section 9.5.1.1.1 (R), Safety Design Basis Eighteen, states in part:
"Emergency lighting systems shall be provided in accordance with the guidance provided in NRC Branch Technical Position (BTP) APCSB 9.5-1...
Batteries for emergency lighting shall be rated for a minimum of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />...."
NRC BTP APCSB 9.5-1, Appendix A, recommends suitable fixed emergency lighting with 8-hour minimum battery power supplies for safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
FSAR Table 9B.3-1, D.5(a), requires emergency lighting units with at least 8-hour battery power supplies in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.
Contrary to the above, on numerous occasions while Units 1, 2 and 3 were operating in Mode 1 between initial startup and the time of the inspections, the licensee did not have available emergency lighting units required for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress areas thereto that would have been able to operate for at least 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />.
Specifically, from 1987 to 1990, a significant number of the lighting units failed to operate or would not have been able to operate for the full eight hours if required during an emergency as evidenced by the following examples (for each lighting unit lis'ted below, its respective
reactor was in Mode 1 for a significant part of the time that the lighting unit was unavailable):
Unit 1:
Control Room emergency lighting unit lEgDNNOl was not available for approximately 12 weeks in that the specific gravity of its electrolyte was low, i.e., outside licensee acceptance
- criteria, following a discharge test on February 3, 1987.
Following the discharge test,'he unit did not receive an equalizing charge and was not,demonstrated to be satisfactorily recharged until April 5, 1987.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Control Room emergency lighting unit 1EgDNN02 was not available for approximately 21 weeks, due to low specific gravity following a discharge test on February 5, 1987.
The unit required several equalizing charges and was not demonstrated to be satisfactorily recharged until July 6, 1987.
Control Building emergency lighting unit lE(BN001 was not available for approximately ll weeks, following failure of a discharge test on January 28, 1988.
During the test, the inverter smoked and the unit breakers remained open until the unit was restored on April 13, 1988.
Control Room emergency lighting unit 1E(DNNOl was not available for, approximately 29 weeks, due to low specific gravity problems following a discharge test on January 29, 1988.
The unit required several equalizing charges and was not demonstrated to be satisfactorily recharged until August 19, 1988.
Control Room emergency lighting unit lE(DNN02 was not available for approximately 34 weeks, due to low specific gravity problems following a discharge test on January 29, 1988.
Although the battery received several recharges during periodic preventive maintenance activities, low specific gravity problems continued until the battery bank was replaced on September 29, 1988.
The unit did not satisfy test requirements until February 27, 1990.
Unit 2:
6.
7.
8.
Control Building emergency lighting unit 2E(BN002 was not available for approximately 61 weeks, following identification of a defective inverter transfer relay on March 8, 1987.
The unit failed two consecutive discharge tests (September 9, 1987 and May 5, 1988) due to the defective relay.
No discharge time was achieved during the first test and only 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> of discharge were achieved during the
'econd test.
The unit was not repaired until May 12, 1988.
The unit did not satisfy test requirements until July 3, 1989.
't, Control Room emergency lighting unit 2E(DNN02 was not available for approximately 7 weeks, due to low specific gravity..following a discharge test on December 4, 1989.
Battery bank recharging did not satisfy test requirements until January 27, 1990...
Control Room emergency lighting unit 2E(DNN01 was not available for approximately 15 weeks, following failure of a discharge test on
January 3, 1990.
The unit failed two consecutive discharge tests (January 3, 1990 and April 5, 1990), operating only about 7-1/2 hours during each of these tests.
The unit was not restored to operable condition until April 20, 1990.
Unit 3:
9.
Auxiliary Building emergency lighting unit 3E(BN003 was not available for approximately 52 weeks, following failure of the lights to operate during a discharge test on April 17, 1987.
This unit also failed two successive preventive maintenance tests on February 8, 1988 (six of eight cells were missing from the battery bank) and on March 4, 1988 (all eight cells were missing from the battery bank).
The batteries were not replaced and did not satisfy test requirements
'ntil April 19, 1988.
10.
Control Building emergency lightinq unit 3E(BN002 was not available for approximately 31 weeks, follow>ng the discovery of low battery bank voltage and,damaged battery cells on September 12, 1987.
This unit also failed two successive preventive maintenance tests on February 5, 1988 and March 7, 1988, due to continuing low battery bank voltages.
Furthermore, during the March 1988 maintenance activity, two of the eight cells in the battery bank were found to be missing.
The batteries were not replaced and did not satisfy test requirements until April.18, 1988.
11.
Auxiliary Building emergency lighting unit 3E(BN003 was not available for approximately 6 weeks, following failure of a discharge test on May 3, 1990, during which the lights operated only 6-1/2 hours.
The battery and inverter unit were not replaced and did not satisfy test requirements until June 18, 1990.
This is a Severity Level III problem (Supplement I).
Cumulative Civil Penalty
- $125,000 (assessed equally between the violations).
Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Arizona Public Service Company (Licensee) is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, within 30 days of the date of this Notice.
This reply should be clearly marked as a
"Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation:
(1) admission or denial of the violation, (2) the reasons for the violation, (3) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (4) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations, and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
If an adequate reply is not, received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the license should not be modified, suspended, or revoked or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.
Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.
Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown.
Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR
- 2. 201, the Licensee may pay the civil penalty by letter addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with a check, draft, money order or electronic transfer payable to the Treasurer, of
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the United States in the amount of the civil penalty proposed
- above, or the cumulative amount of the'ivil penalties if more than one civil penalty is
- proposed, or may protest imposition of the civil penalty in'whole or in part by a written answer addressed to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.
S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Should the Licensee fail to answer within the time specified, an order imposing the civil penalty will be issued.
Should the Licensee elect to file an answer in accordance with -10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty, in whole or in part, such answer should be clearly marked as an "Answer to a Notice of Violation" and may:
(1) deny the violations listed in this Notice in whole or in part, (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances, (3) show error in this Notice, or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed.
In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty.
In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the factors addressed in Section V.B of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C (1990), should be addressed.
Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate parts of the 10 CFR 2.201 reply by specific reference (e.g., citing page and'paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition.
The attention of the Licensee is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedure for imposing a civil penalty.
Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due, which subsequently has been determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compro-mised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C.
2282c.
The response noted above (Reply to a Notice of Violation, letter with payment of civil penalty, and Answer to a Notice of Violation) should be addressed to:
Director, Office of Enforcement, U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Document Control Desk, Mashington; D.C. 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region V, 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210, Walnut Creek, CA 94596, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of
.this notice.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Dated at Malnut Creek, California this /g day of October 1990.
John B. Martin Regional Administrator
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