ML17305A870
| ML17305A870 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/12/1990 |
| From: | James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| 192-00671-JML-T, 192-671-JML-T, 2-SR-90-003, 2-SR-90-3, NUDOCS 9006190013 | |
| Download: ML17305A870 (8) | |
Text
REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:9006190013 DOC.DATE: 90/06/12 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET N4 FACIL:STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Arizona Publi 05000529 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M.
Arizona Public Service Co.
(formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Special Rept 2-SR-90-003:on 900503,cathodic protection sys inoperable over 30 days.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event RePort (LER), Incident RPt, etc.
NOTES:Standardized plant.
05000529 RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA PETERSON,S.
INTERNAL: ACNW AEOD/DOA
, AEOD/ROAB/DSP NRR/DET/ECMB 9H NRR/DLPQ/LHFB11 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 NRR/DST/SELB 8D NRR/DST/SPLB8D1 WE-RGN5 FILE 01 EXTERNAL EG&G STUART i V ~ A LPDR NSIC MAYS,G NUDOCS FULL TXT NOTES:
COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
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1 2
2 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
-1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
4 4
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD CHAN,T ACRS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 NRR/DREP/PRPBll NRR/DST/SICB 7E NRR/DST/SRXB 8E RES/DSIR/EIB L ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDS NSIC MURPHY,G.A COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
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1 1
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1 1
1 NOTE TO ALL"RIDS" RECIPIENTS PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WASTE! CONTACT THE DOCUMENT CONTROL DESK, ROOM P 1-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINATEYOUR NAME FROiVI DISTRIBUTION LISTS FOR DOCUMENTS YOU DON'T NEED!
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 38 ENCL 38
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Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034
~
PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 JAMES M, LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION 192-00671-JML/TRB/RKR June 12, 1990 U.
S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 2 Docket No.
STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Special Report 2-SR-90-003 File:
90-020-404 Attached please find Special Report 2-SR-90-003 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.8.1.3 ACTION a and 6.9.2.
This report discusses the Cathodic Protection System for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks being inoperable for over 30 days.
If you have any questions, please contact T.
R. Bradish, Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, JML/TRB/RKR/tlg Attachment cc:
W. F.
J.
B.
D.
H.
T. L.
A. C.
A. H.
Conway Martin Coe Chan Gehr Gutterman (all with attachment)
I
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 2 Cathodic Protection System Inoperable Over 30 Days License No. NPF-51 Docket No
~ 50-529 Special Report 2-SR-90-003 Initial Conditions On May 3, 1990 at approximately 1455 MST, Palo Verde Unit 2 was in a refu outage with the core off-loaded to the spent fuel pool.
Technical Specif*
3.8.1.3 requires the Cathodic Protection System associated with the Diese Fuel Oil Tanks be OPERABLE at all times.
escri tion of Event This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specificatio 3.8.1.3 ACTION a and 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Cathodic Prote System for the Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks was inoperable for than 30 days.
The 30-day limit for inoperability was exceeded at approxi MST on June 2,
1990.
At approximately 1455 MST on May 3,
- 1990, the Cathodic Protection System Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tanks was declared inoperable due to th Protection System not meeting TS surveillance requirements.
The Cathodic System was being tested in accordance with an approved surveillance testi procedure, when it was discovered that a test point on the train "B" Dies Generator fuel lines did not have sufficient voltage shift to meet the ac.
criteria in the surveillance testing procedure.
Cause of Event APS performed an engineering review of the Cathodic Protection System and that the insufficient voltage shift was due to one of the anodes (B53) in Cathodic Protection System not h'aving sufficient current capacity because installation of a grounded steel reinforced concrete pad between the Dies Generato'r Building and the Operations Support Building.
The concrete pad in a single anode in the immediate area being unable to provide adequate against corrosion.
The concrete pad was installed in April 1990 followin construction of the Operations Support Building.
The original design cal installation of an asphalt pad which would not have interfered with the C,
Protection System., However, due to an increase in the expected loads on
~the design was changed to a concrete pad. It was not recognized that the installation of a concrete pad would affect the Cathodic Protection Syste:
t
Special Report 2-SR-90-003 Page 2
Corrective Actions A modification is being developed to correct the'problem with the Cathodic Protection System.
The modification is expected to be implemented and the Cathodic Protection System returned to OPERABLE status by September 15, 1990.
Other than the area affected by the anode discussed in this report, the Cathodic Protection System is performing its required function.
The Cathodic Protection System for the Unit 2 Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Tanks has been adjusted as much as possible to attempt to compensate for the addition of the concrete pad and minimize corrosion in the affected area while the Cathodic Protection System is inoperable.
Based upon this, APS engineering believes the corrosion in the affected area will be negligible during the time the Cathodic Protection System is inoperable.
A review of the Cathodic Protection Systems for Units 1 and 3 determined that the event described in this report is unique to Unit 2.
The configuration of the Cathodic Protection System is different in each of the three units.
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