ML17305A482

Special Rept 3-SR-89-009:on 891215,containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor Unit RU-149 Inoperable for Greater than 72 H.Caused by Malfunctioning Logic Card Due to Inadequate Connection of Eprom to Socket.Card Replaced

ML17305A482
Person / Time
Site:	Palo Verde
Issue date:	01/15/1990
From:	James M. Levine ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
192-00618-JML-T, 192-618-JML-T, 3-SR-89-009, 3-SR-89-9, NUDOCS 9001250167
Download: ML17305A482 (10)

Text

ACCELERATED ISI'.RIBUTION DEMON~MWTION SYSTj2vi REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)

ACCESSION NBR:9001250167 DOC.DATE: 90/01/15 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 3, Arizona Publi 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION LEVINE,J.M. Arizona Public Service Co. (formerly Arizona Nuclear Power RECIP.NAME -

RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)

SUBJECT:

Special Rept 3-SR-89-009:on 891215,radiation monitor unit, inoperable greater than 72 h.

DISTRIBUTION CODE: IE22D COPIES RECEIVED LTR ENCL SIZE-TITLE: 50.73/50.9 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.

NOTES:Standardized plant. 05000530 RECIPIENT COPIES RECIPIENT COPIES ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL ID CODE/NAME LTTR ENCL PD5 LA 1 1 PD5 PD 1 1 PETERSON,S. 1 1 INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON 1 1 ACRS MOELLER 2 2 ACRS WYLIE 1 1 AEOD/DOA 1 1 AEOD/DS P/TPAB 1 1 AEOD/ROAB/DSP 2 2 DEDRO 1 1 NRR/DET/ECMB 9H 1 1 NRR/DET/EMEB9H3 1 1 NRR/DET/ESGB 8D .1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LHFBll 1 1 NRR/DLPQ/LPEB10 '1 1 NRR/DOEA/OEAB11 1 1 NRR/DREP/PRPB11 2 2 NRR/DST/SELB 8D '1 1 NRR/DST/SICB 7E 1 1 NRR/DST/SPLB8Dl 1 1 R/A+DfB 8E 1 1 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES/DSZR/EIB 1 1 REG FILE~ 02 1 1 1 1 GN FILE 01 1 1 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S 4 4 L ST LOBBY WARD 1 1 LPDR 1 1 NRC PDR 1 1 NSIC MAYS,G 1 1' NSIC MURPHY,G.A 1 1 NUDOCS FULL TXT 1 NOTES: 1 1 NCYIZ TO ALL "RIDS" RECIPIENTS:

PLEASE HELP US TO REDUCE WAS'! CONTACT THE DOCUMENI'ONTROL DESK,

.ROOM Pl-37 (EXT. 20079) TO ELIMINA'IEYOUR NAME FROM DISTRIBVHON TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED: LTTR 39 ENCL 39

I, Arizona Public Service Company PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION P.O. BOX 52034 ~ PHO'ENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 JAMES M. LEVINE VICE PRESIDENT 192-00618-JML/TRB/DAJ NUCLEAR PRODUCTION January 15, 1990 S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sirs:

Subj ect: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Unit, 3 Docket No. STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-74)

Special Report 3-SR-89-009 le'0-020-404 Attached please find Special Report 3-SR-89-009 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specifications 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and 6,9.2. This report discusses a radiation monitor inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

If you. have any questions, please contact T. R. Bradish, (Acting) Compliance Manager at (602) 393-2521.

Very truly yours, JML/TRB/DAJ/kj Attachment CC: W. F. Conway (all with attachment)

J. B. Martin E. E. Van Brunt D. Coe M. J. Davis A. C, Gehr 9001250167 900115 PDR ADOCK 05000530 PDC

PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Radiation Monitoring Unit Inoperable Greater Than 72 Hours License No. NPF-74 .

Docket No ~ STN 50-530 Special Report No. 3-SR-89;009 DESCRIPTION OF WHAT OCCURRED'.

Initial Conditions:

At approximately 1400 MST on December 15, 1989, Palo Verde Unit 3 was in Mode 3 (HOT SHUTDOWN).

B ~ Reportable Event Description (Including Dates and Approximate Times of Major Occurrences):

Event Classification: Special Report submitted in accordance with Technical Specification 3 '.3.1 ACTION 27.

This Special Report is being submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27 and Technical Specification 6.9.2 to report an event in which the Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor (RU-149) was inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. The 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> limit for returning the monitor to an operable status was exceeded at approximately 1400 MST on December 15, 1989. Pursuant to Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27-1 the preplanned alternate program was initiated to monitor the appropriate parameters.

The Containment High Range Area Radiation Monitor (RU-149) is provided to monitor general area radiation levels on the 140 foot elevation of the Containment Building during postulated Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions. RU-149 is required by Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.3.3.1 to be operable in Mode 1 (POWER OPERATION), 2 (STARTUP), 3 (HOT STANDBY) and 4 (HOT SHUTDOWN).

At approximately 1400 MST on December 12, 1989, RU-149 was declared inoperable when the monitor malfunctioned during monthly functional testing. A work request was initiated to troubleshoot and rework components as necessary to resolve the monitor malfunction.

Troubleshooting performed in accordance with an approved work authorization document determined that a microprocessor logic card was not operating properly. The logic card was replaced, appropriate surveillance testing was completed, and RU-149 was declared operable at approximately 2224 MST on December 26, 1989. RU-149 was inoperable for approximately fourteen days, eight hours, and twenty-four minutes.

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Special Report 3-SR-89-009 Page 2 C. Status of structures, systems, or components that were inoperable at the start of the event that contributed to the event:

As described in Section I.B, RU-149 was declared inoperable at approximately 1400 MST on December 12, 1989.

D. Cause of each component or system failure, if known:

The cause of the improper operation of RU-149 was a malfunctioning logic card as described in Section I.B. The cause of the logic card malfunction has been determined to be an inadequate connection between an Eprom and its socket, E. Failure known:

mode, mechanism, and effect of each failed component, if The effect of the RU-149 not operating properly is its inability to monitor postulated radiation levels following a LOCA. The mode and mechanism of RU-149 not operating properly are described in Sections I' and I.D.

F ~ For failures of components with multiple functions, or secondary functions that were also affected:

list of systems Not applicable - RU-149 does not have multiple functions.

G. For failures that rendered a train of a safety system inoperable, estimated time elapsed from the discovery of the failure until the trains were returned to service:

Not applicable - RU-149 did not render a train of a safety system inoperable. However, RU-149 was inoperable approximately fourteen days, eight hours, and twenty-four minutes.

H. Method of discovery of each component or system failure or procedural error:

The malfunction of RU-149 was discovered during monthly functional surveillance testing. The logic card malfunction was discovered during troubleshooting conducted'in accordance with an approved work authorization document.

Cause of Event:

The cause of the event is RU-149 being inoperable for greater than 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> as described in Sections I.B. and I.D.

Special Report 3-SR-89-009 Page 3 Safety System Response:

Not applicable - no safety system responses occurred and none were necessary.

K. Failed Component Information:

The Containment High Range Area Radiation Area Monitor (RU-149) was manufactured by Kaman Sciences Corporation. The model number is KMA-HR.

II. ASSESSMENT OF THE SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EVENT:

There were no safety consequences or implications resulting from this event. RU-149 is a high range monitor provided for postulated post LOCA conditions. The normal range containment operating level area monitor (RU-

16) was operating during the period that RU-149 was inoperable and no abnormal area radiation levels were detected.

III'ORRECTIVE ACTIONS:

As corrective action for the RU-149 malfunction, the logic card was replaced as described in Section I.B. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.3.1 ACTION 27, the preplanned alternate program was initiated to monitor the appropriate parameter.

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