ML17304A225
| ML17304A225 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 06/22/1988 |
| From: | Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION & RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (ARM) |
| References | |
| 1-SR-88-003, 1-SR-88-3, NUDOCS 8806290116 | |
| Download: ML17304A225 (8) | |
Text
F AC CELERATED lRIBUTION DEMONS+PION SYSTEM REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR:8806290116 DOC.DATE: 88/06/22 NOTARIZED: NO DOCKET FACIL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Arizona Publi 05000528 AUTH.NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HAYNES,J.G.
Arizona Nuclear Power Project (formerly Arizona Public Serv RECIP.NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk)
SUBJECT:
Suppl 1 to Special REpt 1-SR-88-003:on 880304,valid diesel generator failure.
DISTRIBUTION CODE:
IE22D COPIES RECEIVED:LTR ENCL SIZE:
TITLE: 50.73 Licensee Event Report (LER), Incident Rpt, etc.
NOTES:Standardized plant.
05000528 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 LA LICITRA,E INTERNAL: ACRS MICHELSON AEOD/DOA AEOD/DSP/ROAB ARM/DCTS/DAB NRR/DEST/ADS 7E NRR/DEST/ESB 8D NRR/DEST/MEB 9H NRR/DEST/PSB 8D NRR/DEST/SGB 8D NRR/DLPQ/QAB 10 NRR/DREP/RAB
~ 10 IB 9A REG FILE,02 EIB RGN5 FILE 01 EXTERNAL: EG&G WILLIAMS,S H ST LOBBY WARD NRC PDR NSIC MAYS,G NOTES COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 4
4 1
1 1
1
~ 1 1
1 1
RECIPIENT ID CODE/NAME PD5 PD DAVIS,M ACRS MOELLER AEOD/DSP/NAS AEOD/DSP/TPAB DEDRO NRR/DEST/CEB 8H NRR/DEST/ICSB 7 NRR/DEST/MTB 9H NRR/DEST/RSB 8E NRR/DLPQ/HFB 10 NRR/DOEA/EAB 11 NRR/DREP/RPB 10 NUDOCS-ABSTRACT RES TELFORD,J RES/DRPS DEPY FORD BLDG HOY,A LPDR NSIC HARRIS,J COPIES LTTR ENCL 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 2
2 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 D
S A
TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 47 ENCL 46
I
Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034
~
PHOENIX. ARIZONA85072-2034 192-00386-JGH/TDS/DAJ June 22, 1988 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NRC Document Control Desk Washington, D.C.
20555
Dear Sirs:
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1
Docket No.
STN 50-528 (License NPF-41)
Supplement to Special Report 1-SR-88-003 File:
88-020-404 Attached please find Supplement 1 to Special Report 1-SR-88-003 prepared and submitted pursuant to Technical Specification 4.8. 1. 1.3 and 6.9.2.
This report is submitted to provide updated information from the previous submittal.
If you have any questions, please contact T.
D. Shriver, Compliance Hanager at (602) 393-2521.
Very truly yours, J.
G.
Ha es Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/TDS/DAJ/kj Attachment cc:
0.
H. DeHichele E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
R.
C. Sorenson J.
R. Ball E. A. Licitra A. C.
Gehr INPO Records Center (all w/a)
SS06290116 SS0622 PDR ADOCK 0500052S S
PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION UNIT 1
Valid Diesel Generator Failure on Harch 4, 1988 Docket No. 50-528 License No.
NPF-41 Special Report 1-SR-88-003 Supplement No.
1 This Special Report describes an event involving a valid failure of an Emergency Diesel Generator.
The report is provided pursuant to Technical Specifications 4.8. 1. 1.3 and 6.9.2 and contains the information recommended in Regulatory Position C.3.b of Regulatory Guide
- 1. 108, Revision 1, August 1977.
At approximately 0120 HST on Harch 4, 1988 Palo Verde Unit 1 was in Hode 3
(HOT STANDBY) when an output breaker on the Unit 1 "B". Diesel Generator did not close properly during surveillance testing.
Subsequent attempts were unsuccessful in closing the breaker and the diesel generator was declared inoperable at approximately 0135 HST.
As a result of the "B" Diesel Generator inoperability, the appropriate activities were initiated to comply with Technical Specification ACTION requirement 3.8. 1. 1(b).
On Harch 4, 1988, surveillance testing was being conducted in accordance with approved procedures pursuant to Technical Specification 4.8. 1. 1.2 for demonstrating "B" Diesel Generator operability.
The diesel generator was being tested on a monthly (i.e.
once per 31 days) basis.
At approximately 0120 HST, the "B" Emergency Diesel Generator was started in accordance with approved surveillance testing procedures.
No problems were noted during the diesel generator start.
While initially attempting to parallel the generator with the normal, off-site power supply, the output breaker would not close.
Subsequent attempts were unsuccessful in closing the breaker.
As immediate corrective action, an approved work document to troubleshoot the cause of the breaker malfunction was initiated.
During the troubleshooting, the breaker was placed in the "Test" mode.
On the first attempt to close the breaker while in the "Test" mode, the breaker operated properly.
The breaker was then placed in the "normal" position and the breaker operated properly.
After. the breaker was observed to operate properly, the emergency diesel was loaded and the remaining portions of the surveillance test completed successfully.
Emergency Diesel Generator "B" was then declared operable at approximately 0622 HST.
The diesel generator was unavailable for approximately five (5) hours.
After the diesel generator was returned to operability, an approved work document was initiated to perform a routine maintenance activity on the breaker.
During the performance of the breaker maintenance, no discrepancies were identified and only minor (i.e.
no affect on breaker operability) adjustments were necessary.
A functional test of the breaker was then performed and no deficiencies were noted.
ll
Special Report 1-SR-88-003 Supplement No.
1 Page 2
A root cause of failure engineering evaluation was initiated to determine the cause of the improper breaker operation and the corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
Possible causes for the breaker malfunction were developed and additional troubleshooting corrective actions were developed.
The additional troubleshooting investigation was conducted in accordance with an approved authorization document.
The investigation revealed that there was an intermittently faulty contact in the breaker closing circuitry.
The contact monitors the breaker close charging springs and provides a permissive in the breaker closing circuitry when the breaker closing springs are charged.
The faulty contact was replaced and the breaker operated properly.
A root cause of failure evaluation has been initiated for the malfunctioning contact.
The emergency diesel failure described herein is the second (2) failure in the last 100 tests and the first (1) failure in the last twenty (20) tests on the "8" Diesel generator.
Additionally, the number of failures in the last 100 diesel generator tests for Unit 1 is less than seven.
Pursuant to Technical Specification 4.8. 1. 1.2, the current surveillance test interval (once per 31 days) will be continued.
I t'