ML17303A392

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Documents 870323 Discussion Re Making Both Control Element Assembly Calculators (Ceacs) Inoperable While Performing Certain Surveillance Tests,Per Tech Spec 3.3.1,Action 6. Inoperabilaity of Ceacs & Entry Into Action 6 Desirable
ML17303A392
Person / Time
Site: Palo Verde  Arizona Public Service icon.png
Issue date: 03/30/1987
From: Haynes J
ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR
To:
NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
161-00118-JGH-R, 161-118-JGH-R, NUDOCS 8704130191
Download: ML17303A392 (6)


Text

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ACCESSION NBR: 8704130191 DOC. DATE: 87/03/30 NOTARIZED:

NO DOCKET 0 FAC IL:STN-50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit 1> Arizona Pub 1 i 05000528 STN-50-529 Palo Verde Nuclear Stati one Unit 2i Arizona Pub li 05000529 STN-50-530 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit 3i Arizona Pub li 05000530 AUTH. NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION HAYNES> J. Q.

Arizona Nuclear Power Prospect (formerly Arizona Public Serv REC IP. NAME REC IPIENT AFFIL'I ATION Document Control Branch (Document Control Desk )

SUBJECT:

Documents 870323 discussion re making both control element assembly calculators (CEACs) inoperable while performing certain surveillance tests'er Tech Spec

3. 3. i. Action 6.

Inoperabilaitg of CEACs 5 entry into Action 6 desirable.

DISTRIBUTION CODE:

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SIZE:

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General Distribution NOTES: Standardized plant. M. Davis'RR: 1Cg.

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Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. BOX 52034 4

PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 March 30, 1987 161-00118-JGH/RAB U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Washington, D. C.

20555

Subject:

Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)

Units 1, 2 and 3 Docket No:

STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)

STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)

STN 50-530 (License No. NPF-65)

Compliance With Technical Specification 3.3.1, Table 3.3-1, I.C.1 (CEACs), Action 6 for PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 File:

87-001-211 This is to document discussions on March 23, 1987 between.Mr. G.

W. Knighton, members of the NRC staff and PVNGS staff members in which the subject of making inoperable both CEAC's while performing certain surveillance tests was discussed.

When performing procedures 77ST-9SB11 and 77ST-9SB12-,- CEAC 1 and 2 Functional Checks, it is necessary to inop that CEAC for which the ST is being performed.

During this time, if the other CEAC should auto-restart, or get a

calculational error as has been the case in the past, the plant will trip (the same case exists if one CEAC must be taken out for maintenance).

This test usually takes approximately 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> per CEAC to perform and is performed on a monthly basis.

Beginning with the second fuel cycle for each unit, a software modification is planned which will eliminate this trip.

This change has already been reviewed and approved by the NRC for other CPC plants.

If we experience a rod mis-alignment, slip or drop a rod as has happened in the past when performing Procedures 41ST-1SF01, 42ST-2SF01, 43ST-3SF01, CEA Operability Checks, a plant trip can occur.

This test typically takes about 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> to perform and is performed on a monthly basis.

As we indicated, ACTION 6 provides the plant with an equivalent if not more conservative degree of protection, including reducing power and changing addressable constants (RSPT/CEAC INOP and BERR1).

Operation per ACTION 6 has been fully analyzed by Combustion Engineering.

There is no limit on the amount of time that the plant may be operated in ACTION 6.b or 6.c (both CEACs inop).

Operation under ACTION 6 is effectively the normal operational mode of CE's plants with an analog protection system.

8704130191 870330 PDR ADQCK 05000528 P

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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:

Document Control Desk Page 2

Because of this, it is desirable and prudent to inop both CEAC's'hile performing the above evolutions and enter ACTION 6.

This has the overall effect of reducing challenges to the Plant Protection

System, and at the same time provide an equivalent or more conservative degree of protection for the plant.

I 1

After consultation with members of the NRC staff, Mr. Knighton concurred with our action to proceed with these tests scheduled on Unit 1 and requested we document our discussion via a letter to you.

Please contact R. Bernier of my staff immediately with any concerns.

Very truly yours, J.

G. Haynes Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/RAB/dim cc:

0.

M. De Michele E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.

E. A. Licitra G.

W. Knighton J.

B. Martin R. P.

Zimmerman A. C. Gehr

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