ML17298B810
| ML17298B810 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1984 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Kirsch D NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-31528-TDS, NUDOCS 8501160014 | |
| Download: ML17298B810 (16) | |
Text
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December 20, 1984 ANPP-31528-TDS/TRB Arizona Nuclear Power Project P.O. SOX 52034 O
PHOENIX, ARIZONA85072-2034 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368 Attention:
Mr. D. F. Kirsch, Acting Director Division of Resident Reactor Projects and Engineering Program
Subject:
Deficiency Evaluation Report Revisions File:
84-019-026; D.4.33.2
Dear Sir:
ANPP has conducted a review of revised final reports, submitted by our A/E, after transmittal of our Final Reports to your office.
Attached is a summary description and evaluation of the impact of changes to Final Reports which the ANPP has evaluated as substantive changes.
Those revisions which have been evaluated as not substantive have been so noted in our files.
Very truly yours, cu~
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
APS Vice President Nuclear Productions ANPP Project Director EEVB/TRB/plk Attachment cc:
See Page Two 850ilh0014 841220
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Mr. D. F. Kirsch Page Two CC ~
Richard DeYoung, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.
20555 T. G. Woods, Jr.
D. B. Karner W. E. Ide D. B. Pasnacht A. C. Rogers A. Souza D. E. Powler T. D. Shriver C. N. Russo B. S. Kaplan J. R. Bynum J.
M. Allen A. C. Gehr W. J. Stubblefield W. G. Bingham R. L. Patterson R.
W. Welcher H. D. Poster D. R. Hawkinson R. P.
Zimmerman L. Clyde M. Matt T. J.
Bloom D. N. Stover J.
D. Houchen J.
E. Kirby D. Canady Records Center Institute of Nuclear Power Operations 1100 Circle 75 Parkway, Suite 1500
- Atlanta, GA 30339
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ATTACHMENT
SUMMARY
OF DER REVISIONS
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE IMPACT OF CHANGE 80-29 Originally, Unit 3 modifications to the hydrogen monitor were to be performed under a DCP.
This was changed to allow the supplier to make modifications to the hy-drogen monitor pump and to speci-fy future modifications of equip-ment delivered in the future.
The change only clarifies the corrective action responsibilities and has no impact on the resolution of the deficiency.
80-46 The original response stated that the pre-service examination (PSE) program would be revised.
Further investigation revealed the PSE program did not need revision and the applicable NCR's were disposi-tioned USE-AS-IS.
The change reflects the findings of more extensive investigation only.
There is no impact on the corrective action.
81-6 The corrective action was expanded to address Unit 2 and 3 ceiling support system.
The original re-port only addressed Unit l.
There is no impact resulting from this change.
The Corrective Action was ex-panded to include inspections for Unit 2 and 3.
82-41 The criteria for visual inspec-tion of crimp-type lugs in GE switchgear was expanded from, "The conductor shall be flush or pro-trude through the connector barrel up to approximately 1/16 inch" to the terminal lug is ac-ceptable if the conductor is vi-sible and underneath the crimp indentation (i.e., approximately 1/16" from the face of the bar-rel).
In addition, the conductor extending beyond the barrel of the connector does not pose a problem unless it interferes with the termination screw, in which case it should be cut back.
This change was made to clarify, for field use, the allowable and acceptable criteria for crimp type lugs.
This cri-teria meets or exceeds GE specifica-tions and has no impact on the disposi-tion of the DER.
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Attachment (Continued)
Page 2
DER NO.
82-42
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE The original Corrective Action stated that all stainless steel portions of tap nozzles would be replaced with a double socket piece of inconel.
Revised Cor-rective Action states that RCP 2B in Unit 1 was replaced with a double socket piece of stain-less steel.
IMPACT OF CHANGE There is no impact as a result of this change.
CE letter V-CE-16760 states that the stainless portion of the nozzle will be replaced either by a double socket piece of either stainless steel or inconel.
82-58
'he original Corrective Action stated that cubicles in Units 1, 2, and 3 would be anchored on four sides.
Revised Corrective Action states that proper an-chorage for the cubicles will be provided.
This change has no impact.
This allows latitude in determining the most effic-ient method of mounting the cubicles for seismic qualification.
In each case the seismic qualification requirements have been or will be met.
82-73 The revised Corrective Action clarifies actual steps taken as follows:
- 1) The five defective pipe clamps were rejected and returned to ITT Grinnell; 2) To preclude recur-
- rence, Bechtel quality personnel at ITT Grinnel will conduct a com-plete dimensional and fit examina-tion on all clamps of this type prior to shipment;
- 3) WPP/gCI No.
201.1, Nuclear Pipe Hanger and Support Installation, has been amended to include instructions for proper installation of this type of clamp.
This change details actual action taken to resolve this deficiency. Addition-ally, the project clarified by proced-ural change actual instructions for this type of'ipe clamp.
This action is con-sidered prudent to preclude recurrence and has no impact on this DER.
82-81 Subsequent revisions to this re-port detailed the results of in-spections performed by Honeywell.
During these inspections, Honey-well reported numerous installa-tions which had been modified after final inspection had been The Corrective Actions originally speci-fied in this DER were not completed in a timely manner.
Therefore, the Project initiated DER 84-27 to thoroughly inspect and evaluate the conditions stemming from this DER.
This action resulted in a com-prehensive evaluation and corrective ac-
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Page 3
DER NO.
SUMMARY
OP CHANGE IMPACT OP CHANGE performed.
These unauthorized modifications occurred along with other documented cases of improper original installations performed by Honeywell.
As a result, the original intent of the Corrective Action, to verify compliance with engineering acceptance criteria, could not be met.
The documenta-tion, safety implications and im-plementation of corrective action for the conditions identified were transferred to DER 84-27.
tion plan to resolve the deficiencies noted.
83-8 The function of the timer in the Hydrogen Recombiner is to bypass the low flow alarm and trip func-tion during initial startup of the units for 60 seconds.
Sub-sequent to the decision to in-stall sealed timers in the unit, Rockwell conducted further testing of the Recombiners and determined that this bypass feature was un-necessary due to the fact the blower motors rapidly reach op-erating speeds negating the need of a bypass timer.
Therefore, the timers have been removed from the circuitry altogether.
This change was made to make the component more reliable and less likely to fail during operation.
83-22 This change was necessary to meet Project schedule.
The Westing-house breakers would have re-qui.red a lead time for procure-ment which was unacceptable to to the Project.
The ITE Gould circuit breakers are fully environmentally qualified for this application in accordance with IREE 323 therefore this change has no impact on this DER.
83-28 The original Corrective Action was to disposition the NCR's USE-AS-IS.
Revised response states that NCR 5-260-ZM will be "REworked and NCR 5-262-1M will be "Repair/USE-AS-IS".
This< change,has no impact. 't clarifies the actual corrective action taken to correct one shock suppressors minimum re'serve requirement.
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Page 4
DER NO ~
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE IMPACT OF CHANGE 83-43 The original report stated that all cabinets supplied by Harlo would be inspected.
The revised report clarifies that all Class 1E cabinets will be in-spected.
There is no impact resulting from this action.
Non-lE cabinets are not a safety concern.
83-44 Originally, the cause of the de-ficiency was thought to be due to an error in the wiring during implementation of a CE Field Action Request.
Further inves-tigation revealed that, in act-uality, there was an error in the field modification procedure which caused the error.
As a result of this condition, CE con-ducted a review of their QA program to preclude recurrence of this or similar deficiencies.
Additionally, reviews of design interfaces have been conducted and found acceptable.
83-45 The original report did not address APS CAR C-83-94N which identified additional equipment in violation of the FSAR.
The additional equipment is as follows:
1J-RMA-B01, B02, B06, 1J-RMD-B02E, 1J-RMB-B04, 1J-RMC-B04, B07, 1J-RMD-B04,
- B05, B07, 1J-RMN-B05.
The change addressed the additional equipment and included the requirements of the FSAR into the applicable project specification.
83-62 The two (2) missing staking pins will be replaced and inspected to assure no excessive gap exists between the staking pin O.D. and hole I.D.
The length of the new pins will be determined by the applicable CE drawing and will not necessarily be longer as stated prior.
Additional staking of the cap screw head will be re-quired if contact with the top of the pin is not achieved.
The changes detail the actual correc-
'ive action as defined by CE. All staking pins will be inspected for ex-cessive gap.
All pins will be checked for depth below the shim surface.
Re-work staking of pins to ensure contact with the top of the pin will be performed.
These changes will preclude recurrence of loose or missing pins.
83-71 The original report stated there were 366 snubbers total at PVNGS.
The updated report provides the exact location of all 366 snubbers including those in the warehouse.
The change details the results of the review conducted to locate the affected snubbers and to update the list of NCR's initiated to properly disposition this deficiency.
The,, corrective action was not impacted.
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Page 5
DER NO.
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE IMPACT OF CHANGE Additional NCR's were initiated to document the replacement and return of the identified snubbers to Pacific Scientific and ITT Grinnell.
83-80 Subsequent revisions to this re-port updated on a continuing basis the steps taken to solve the problem of valve closure time for the PWIV's.
During this time period, the MSIV's (same valve design, same valve manu-facturer) also failed to close in the specified time period.
The corrective action which had been implemented proved inadequate.
Due to the similarity of the pro-blems encountered, the description and documentation of corrective actions was transferred to DER 84-50 for final resolution.
The corrective actions outlined in the Final Report proved to be inadequate.
DER 84-50 represents the final satis-factory solution to both the FWIV's and MSIV's.
83"81 The original report provided in-formation on how the suspect pipe would be utilized after ultra-sonic testing.
The following items as noted in the original report have the following dis-positions:
1)
Items 1 through 5, 8 and 12 were 100X ultrasonically tested for thickness and found acceptable; 2)
Items 6, 7 and 9 were scrapped.
New pieces from item 12 were cut and in-stalled in their place; 3)
Items 10 and 11 were scrapped; and 4)
Item 13 was rejected and sent back to the manu-facturer.
The impact on the final report is not significant.
The pipe has now been tested and dispositioned accordingly.
The project will inspect only ASME Class I pipe prior to shipment to the jobsite rather than all pipe as stated due to the fact that only ASME Class 1
pipe had deficiencies identified.
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Attachment (Continued)
'age 6
DNR NO.
SUMMARY
OF CHANGE IMPACT OF CHANGE 83-83 The original report stated that SCN No. 3573 would be used to conduct training to preclude re-currence.
Rather than complete the training, the Project de-cided that the more correct action to preclude recurrence was to revise WPP 201.0 and WPP/QCI 201.1, via Procedure Change Notices, to include the design size requirement.
The revised report actually had the appli-cable WPP and WPP/QCI revised to include the design size requirement.
This is.con-sidered a more prudent action to preclude recurrence.
84-02 The original report stated that the check valves would be veri-fied as operating correctly during system testing.
Due to the loca-tion of the check valves in the system (between the containment sump and the SI pump suction) this testing could not be per-formed without filling the con-tainment sump.
The Prospect de-cided not to do this during testing.
Additionally, the slight corrosion of the valve body had no effect on the seal-ing surface of the check valve.
As a result of the above, this action was deleted from the DER.
Since the seating surfaces of the valves were not affected and since the system has successfully been tested this change has no impact on the resolution of this DER.
84-24 The original report cited action to be taken on the valves to veri-fy torque requirements.
The re-vision included the requirement to de-pressurize the system.
The change has no impact on the DER.
Ex-panded instructions will ensure proper disposition of the problem.
84-96 Revision to report specifies that SARCN 1288 and 1272 have been in-itiated to implement necessary changes to the FSAR.
Change only provides additional signi.
ficant information.
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