ML17296A961
| ML17296A961 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 09/04/1980 |
| From: | Van Brunt E ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Harold Denton Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| ANPP-16286-JMA, NUDOCS 8009090523 | |
| Download: ML17296A961 (10) | |
Text
REGULATOR INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION TEM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR ~ 8009090523 DOC ~ DATE 80/09/04 NOTARIZED YES FACIL:STN 50-528 Palo Verde Nuclear Statjonr Unit 1i Arjzona Publi STN-50 529 Palo Verde Nuclear Statjoni Unjt 2i Ar'jzona Publj STN 50 530 Palo Verde Nuclear Stations Unit. 3i Arizona Publi AUTH BYNAME AUTHOR AFFIL'I ATION VAN BRUNTrE.E.
Ar izona Public Service Co.
REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT" AFF ILIATI ON DENTONrH ~ RE Of.fice of Nuclear Reactor Regulatfoni Director DOC~p~Q 9
05000530
SUBJECT:
Forwards comments Class IE dc power.
reaui'pe addi clari DISTRIBUTION CODE:
B001S C
TITLE! PSAR/FSA NOTES:Standardized Plant.
of util review board re open items from sys review.Six items identified which fication.
OP IES RECEI VED: LTR J
- ENCL, SIZE!
R AMDTS and Related Correspondence 05000528 05000529 05000530 RECIP IENT ID CODE/NAME ACTION:
A/D LICENSNG LEEgJ ~
INTERNAL: ACCID EVALr BR26 CHEM ENG BR 08 CORE PERF BR 10 EMERG PREP 22 GEOSC IENCES 14 I8C SYS BR 16 MATL ENG BR 17 MPA OEI D PROC/TST REV 20 RAD~SESS BR22 FI 01 NG BR25 COPIES LA'TR ENCI 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 0
1 1
1 1
1, 1
0 1
0 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 RECIPIENT ID CODE'/NAME SCHWENCERpA ~
KERRIGANrJ ~.
04 AUX SYS BR 07 CONT SYS BR 09 EFF TR SYS BR12 EQUIP QUAL" BR13 HYD/GEO BR 15 ILE 06 MECH ENG BR 18 NRC PDR 02 POWER SYS BR 19 QA BR 21 REAC SYS BR 23 SIT ANAL BR 24 COPIES LTTR ENCL' 0
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
3 3
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 EXTERNAL: ACRS NSIC 27 05 16 16 1
1 LPDR 03 TOTAL NUMBER OF COPIES REQUIRED:
LTTR 49 ENCL 43
~.- ~ ~
IP I
N
~
~
1 4
4 a
~
n d
4g m
4
~
l
0 o
mvxu ae IKEEIPMlla CKOIKVIMlll'.
O. BOX 2I666
'HOENIX'RIZONA85036 September 4,
1980 ANPP-16286 - JMA/JPS Dr.
H.
R. Denton, Director Nuclear Reactor Regulation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Units 1, 2 and 3
Docket Nos. STN-50-528/529/530 File:
80-001-419.06
Reference:
Letter dated June 30, 1980 from E.
E.
Van Brunt, Jr.
to Dr. H. R. Denton
Dear Dr. Denton:
The responses of Bechtel Power Corporation and Arizona Public Service Company to the open items of the Class IE DC Power System Review have been reviewed by the PVNGS Power Systems Review Board.
The Board was to assure the responses to these open items adequately addressed the initial concerns raised in the DC System Review of May 8, 1980.
As a result of their review, the Review Board has identified six open items which require additional clarification.
The comments of the Review Board on these items are attached for your information.
These comments will be resolved to the satisfaction of the Review Board by Bechtel.
Final resolution of these items by the Review Board will be submitted to you when completed.
Respectfully submitted, ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE COMP EEVBJr/ JPS/av Attachment cc:
J. Kerrigan F.
Rosa By:
C Edwin n an runt, Jr.
APS Vice President, Nuclear Projects ANPP Project Director goo/
5 On its own behalf and as agent for all other joint applicants.
g~ $e ~, 1980.
STATE OF ARIZONA
)
) ss.
County of Maricopa Subscribed nd sworn to before me this" day of sloiI Expires Jan. 23, 3,988
,,'My Cbmmission expires:
s" >>oo
~g.g
1 C
E r
t p
fy 4
n t D
I
COMMENTS OF THE PVNGS POWER SYSTEMS REVIEW BOARD ON RESPONSES TO OPEN ITEMS FROM THE CLASS IE DC POWER SYSTEM REVIEW Action 84 Bechtel has misinterpreted the original question.
Please respond to the question as expanded upon below.
The necessity of thermal or magnetic trips on the battery to bus disconnect device should be determined.
Since the battery must be most reliable and the chance of a fault occurring on the main DC bus is considered very remote, the necessity of tripping devices on this breaker is questioned when reliability and security of control is of extreme importance.
Consideration should be given to the use of a permanently connected, mechanically interlocked disconnect device at each DC main switch-gear.
As the switchgear terminals, for termination of the power cables to the testing load bank, are not readily accessible, it is suggested that a permanent connection between this section of cables and the switchgear be consi dered.
In this arrangement, the other end of these power cables would be brought out to another location, suitably located for performing the testing operations, and be terminated in a junction
P
Page 2
box.
This junction box would serve as the connection point for the loadbank and thus provide a means for battery testing without disturbing the permanent battery connections.
Action ¹5 Bechtel stated that Power Conversion Products (PCP) has had no experience with failed battery chargers of the current design.
What
, mechanism does PCP have to obtain, feedback from prev'ious customers?
Action ¹6 Bechtel has examined the DC Power Systems 'apability to withstand multiple failures.
Please expand the response to this item to incorporate the results of a recent Class IE DC System Reliability Analysis.
Action ¹7 Bechtel has examined the potential for adverse, interaction between acid spills in the battery room and the floor coatings.
The response states the floors and embeds are coated with an epoxy, paint which resists acid attack.
Please quantify this response to indicate to what degree it is resistant, i.e., what does the specification state.
Also, the battery support frames and attachments to the embeds should also be analyzed.
c
/
Page 3
Action '¹8 Bechtel has investigated how the battery rooms are protected from flooding by fire protection water sprays in the lower cable spreading room and discussed how water is prevented from entering the battery rooms because of external drains.
Please discuss the possibility of flooding from any indirect routes (i.e.,
pipe chases) and also discuss how battery room flooding is prevented should the external drains become plugged.
Action ¹13 In the response to this item, Bechtel indicated that an undervoltage relay alarm occurs when the bus voltage drops approximately 5 volts below the float voltage level.
Please verify that this small allowance in voltage drop will not result in excessive nuisance alarms and whether an increase in allowable voltage fluctuation is warranted.
I I