ML17290A512
| ML17290A512 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 06/24/1993 |
| From: | Ang W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17290A510 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-93-19, NUDOCS 9307140113 | |
| Download: ML17290A512 (11) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1993019
Text
Report
No.
Docket No.
License
No.
Licensee:
Faci 1 ity Name:
Inspection at:
Inspection
Conducted:
Inspectors:
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
50-397/93-19
50-397
Washington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS)
P.O.
Box 968
3000 George
Way
Richland,
99352
Nuclear Project No.
2
(WNP-2)
WNP-2 site near Richland,
May 24-28,
1993
C. Clark, Reactor Inspector,
Region
V
M. Payne,
Reactor Inspector,
Region
V
M. Tschi ltz, Project Inspector,
Region
V
Approved by:
m~8,
W. P. Ang, Chic
Engineering Section
Date Signed
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection durin
the
eriod of Ha
24-28
1993
Re ort No. 50-397 93-19
Areas
Ins ected:
1
This routine announced
inspection
reviewed the Inservice Inspection (ISI)
activities conducted
during the eighth refueling outage
(R8).
Inspection
Procedures
73753,
"Inservice Inspection,"
and 92701,
"Followup," were used
as
- guidance
during the inspection.
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SIMS
Item:
None
9307140113
930625
ADQCK 05000397
6
Results:
General
Conc1usions
and
S ecific Findin s:
~
ISI examinations
observed
were performed in accordance
with licensee
procedures.
Personnel
performing ISI examinations
and data evaluations
were
knowle'dgeable
and proficient in their activities.
~
A weakness
in controlling the introduction of foreign material
around the
open reactor vessel
and the refueling cavity area during refueling
operations
was identified.
Si nificant Safet
Hatters:
None
Summar
of Violation or Deviations:
One violation (with two examples)
was identified (paragraph
3 of the report):
~
Disassembly of a underwater
camera 'inside the refueling floor Foreign
Haterial Control
Boundary.
The camera parts were observed to be
uncontrolled
and unattended
on the floor.
Disassembly
outside
the
Foreign Haterial Control
Boundary was possible.
Failure to follow procedure
requirements
for logging of tools serial
numbers for accountability of tools brought into a Foreign Haterial
Control
Boundary.
0 en Items
Summar
No new open items were identified.
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Mashin ton Public Power
Su
1
S stem
- C
- L
- R.
- T
- R.
- J
- D
- G
- R.
- D
Baker, Plant Nanager
Fies,
Licensing Engineer
Gearhart,guali ty Assurance Director
Grumme,
Nuclear Safety Assurance
Nanager
Kyle, Chemistry Engineer
Nessersmith,
Haintenance
Support Nanager
Noen, Naterials
and Inspection
Nanager
Parrish,
Operations Assistant
Nanaging Director
Ramey,
Inservice Inspection
Engineer
Sorensen,Regulatory
Programs
Nanager
Webring, Technical Division Nanager
Welch, Nondestructive
Examinations
Supervisor
'Denotes
th'ose attending
the exit meeting
on Nay 28,
1993.
The inspectors
also held discussions
with other licensee
personnel
during
the inspection.
Inservice
Ins ection
Observation of Work Activities
73753
a.
~Pur ose
The purpose of this inspection
was to review a sample of completed
Inservice Inspectio'n (ISI) work and to observe
work activities in
progress
to determine if the inspection,
repair and replacement of Class
1,
2 and
3 pressure
retaining
components
were being performed in
accordance
with applicable requirements.
b.
~Back round
During this inspection
the licensee
was conducting the eighth refueling
outage
{R8) for WNP-2.
Section 4.0.5 of the Mashington Public Power Supply System
(WPPSS)
Project
Number
2 Technical Specifications
requires that Inservice
Inspection (ISI) be performed in accordance
with Section
XI of the
American Society of Nechanical
Engineers
(ASNE) Boiler and Pressure
Vessel
Code
(Code)
and applicable
Addenda.
The Code inspection
requirements
are the basis for inservice examinations
and tests
conducted
during the initial 120-month of commercial operation inspection interval,
which began
on December
13,
1984.
The Washington Public Power Supply
System Project
Number
2
(WNP-2) inservice inspection
program is in its
first ten year interval; ending December
13,
1994.
The licensee's
program is based
on the
1980 Edition of the
ASHE Code,
Section XI, with
Addenda through Minter 1980
{80M80), except that paragraph
IWA-2300 (a)
(1) and code category
C-F welds have
been
updated to the
1983 Edition,
Minter 1983 Addenda
(83W83).
In addition Paragraph
IFW-3400 has
been
2
updated
to the
1980 Edition, Minter 1981 Addenda
{BOM81).
c.
Scheduli n
of Work
The inspectors
reviewed licensee
ISI plans
and schedules
for the'urrent,
ISI interval to determine if changes
to the inspection
plan had
been
properly documented
and approved.
The inspectors
found that all changes
to the ISI plan had
been properly
documented
and approved.
d.
Review of Personnel
ualifications
and Certifications
The inspectors
reviewed the qualifications
and certifications of the
personnel
who were observed
conducting ISI examinations
during this
inspection.
These
personnel
were certified for LevelI and II
examination activities under American Society for Nondestructive
Testing
Standard
SNT-TC-lA.
The inspectors
also reviewed
a sample of the
qualifications
and certifications of licensee
and contractor
Level III
examiners.
The inspectors verified that the records
contained
the
required information,
such as:
employer's
name,
person certified and the
activity that they were qualified to perform.
e.
Observation of Work
The inspectors
observed
portions of the following examinations:
~
Volumetric examination of main steam piping welds
[numbers
26MS(l)D-
8, D-BLDI, D-8LDO, D-9, D-9LUI, and
D-9LUO] by ultrasonic testing
(UT) using procedure
No. gCI 6-13,
Rev.
5, "Ultrasonic Examination
of Ferritic Steel
Piping Welds."
~
Surface
examination of main steam piping welds
[numbers
26NS(1)D-8,
D-8LDI, D-BLDO, D-9, D-9LUI, D-9LUO], attachment
welds for eight
welded lugs installed
on reactor core isolation cooling
(RCIC)
system piping [weld No. RCIC-IC-2{M)] and reactor pressure
vessel
(RPV) head studs
[numbers
35-1-7A and 35-1-14A] by magnetic particle
testing
(NT) using procedure
No.
QCI 4-3,
Rev.
5, "Magnetic Particle
Examination
WNP-2."
~
Surface
examination of process
instrument line welds
[numbers XI-3
and XI-5] by liquid penetrant testing
(PT) using procedure
No. (CI
3-1,
Rev.
7, "Liquid Penetrant
Examination Instructions."
Visual examination of flange and valve bolting for reactor water
cleanup
(RWCU) system [item part numbers
4RMCU(3)-10BD, RWCU-V-100-
BLT and
RWCU-101-2]
and
RCIC system [item part No. 6RCIC{l)-28BD]
using procedure,
No.
QCI 7-1, Rev.5,
"Visual
Examination."'or
each of the examination
methods
observed,
the inspectors verified the
following:
~
Approved procedures
were available
and followed.
Nondestructive
examination
(NDE) equipment specified in the procedures
was used.
~
Personnel
were knowledgeable of the examination
methods
and proper
operation of the test equipment.
~
Personnel
were qualified and certified for the examination
activities which they performed.
These activities included
designation of examination
method, calibration of equipment,
examination,
and evaluation
and acceptance
of test results.
~
Required
documentation
was complete.
Examination results,
evaluations,
and any corrective actions,
repairs or replacements
were recorded
as specified in the ISI program
and
NDE procedures.
f.
Conclusions
The inspectors
concluded that the licensee
was adequately
implementing their approved
ISI program.
Licensee
personnel
were
knowledgeable
and proficient in their examination activities.
No violations or deviations
from NRC requirements
were identified in the
areas
reviewed.
Identification of Uncontrolled Material Inside
a Forei
n Material Control
Area
On May 26,
1993
a tour of the refueling floor was conducted.
During the
tour, while inside the foreign material control boundary area in the
northeast
section adjacent
to the reactor cavity, dryer separator pit,
and open reactor vessel,
the inspectors
noted loose hardware
which did
not appear
to be properly controlled.
The hardware consisted
of several
small
cap screws
and
a cover plate which were later identified as parts
of the underwater "fire fly" submarine
camera unit that was being
temporary stored within the area
by contractor personnel.
The submarine
unit was being used for inspections
inside the reactor vessel.
Repairs
to the submarine unit were ongoing but had temporarily been
suspended.
The inspectors
did not see
anyone working on the repair of the fire-fly.
Review of the foreign material accountabi,lity log sheets
for that day did
not reveal entries for each of the loose hardware.
The situation
was
brought to the attention of nearby personnel
and the cover plate
and cap
screws
were removed
from the foreign material control boundary area.
The
NRC inspectors notified the refueling floor supervisor for the
foreign material control boundary area that they had found uncontrolled
foreign material
(loose hardware) within the area,
which had
been
removed,
and requested
that
he identify the source of this foreign
material.
The licensee
investigation identified that the loose hardware
had
been
generated
by contractor personnel
performing repair work on the
fire fly camera.
This camera
had been properly logged into the foreign
material control
boundary
area
as
one piece of equipment.
The licensee
acknowledged that any foreign material/loose
hardware
generated
during
4
disassembly
of the submarine
camera within the foreign material control
boundary
area
should
have
been captured
or controlled, or the material
logged out of the area.
The licensee identified that contractor
disassembly
personnel
had requested
bags for capture of the loose parts,
but left the uncontrolled
loose parts in the area while they left to
obtain repair parts.
Plant Procedures
Manual
(PPM) Administrative Procedure
number 1.3. 18,
revision 8, "Foreign Haterial Control around the Spent
Fuel Pool, 'the
Reactor Cavity and the Dryer Separator Pit" provided the requirements
for
control of foreign material
in the Foreign Material Control
Boundary.
PPH 1.3. 18 Section 6.2. l.d required that,
"When possible,
move
an item
out of the Foreign Material Control
Boundary prior to any required
disassembly."
The inspectors
concluded that disassembly
of the "Fire Fly" submarine
camera
outside
the foreign material
control
boundary
was possible
because
the camera
was
a relatively small unit that could have
been readily
transported
outside
the boundary for disassembly.
Disassembly of the
"Fire Fly" submarine
camera inside the foreign material
control boundary,
is
a violation of PPH 1.3. 18 and Section 6.8. 1 of the
WNP-2 Technical
Specifications
(Violation 50-397/93-19-01).
The inspectors
noted that the licensee
had experienced
similar past
problems
with control of material accountability
around the reactor
vessel
cavi ty during the last refueling outage in 1992.
A similar
violation (50-397/92-14-03)
was issued
June
30,
1992, in NRC inspection
report 50-397/92-14.
Similarly, Problem Evaluation
Request
(PER)
numbers
293-487,
293-497
and 293-679,
issued during this refueling outage,
identified problems with foreign material control.
PPH 1.3. 18, Sections
3.8, 6.2 and Attachment-8.2
provided the following
requirements
for logging tools into
a foreign material control boundary:
~
Section 3.8, states
in part that,
" ...
The tools will also
be
marked,
using vibro etching or other suitable
permanent
markings,
with a number.
This number will be used to maintain the inventory
of the tools
and to aid in providing positive identification in
logging the tools into the Foreign Material Control Accountability
Log. ...
NOTE: The use of these tools does
NOT prevent other tools
that meet the ... logging requirements
from being brought into the
Foreign Material Control
Boundary.
Section 6.2. 1 c. states
in part that,
"The Foreign Material Control
Watch will log each
separate
item into the Foreign Material Control
Accountability Log...
The item shall
be logged in sufficient detai l
so that
someone
else bringing it back out can positively identify
II
tO
~
~ ~
~
~
Guideline
3 of Attachment 8.2,
"Foreign Material Control
Accountability Log Sheet
Maintenance
Instructions", stated in part
under tool or equipment description that,
"a good description of the
item is required
so that it can
be uniquely identified by someone
else at
a later time.
Clearly
a six inch screwdriver is not
- sufficient.
You would have
no way of knowing that the six inch
screwdriver being brought out is the
same
one taken in."
The Refueling Floor Foreign Material Control Accountability
Log sheets
'or Hay 25 through 27,
1993 were reviewed to determine
compliance with
the tool control, requirements
noted above.
Several
tool or equipment
descriptions
entered
in the logs were "utilityknife", "knife", "need'le
nose pliers", "safety wire plier", etc.
These descriptions
did not
contain
a unique
number to provide positive identification in logging
these tools in and out of a foreign material control boundary.
Examples
of tools logged into the foreign material control boundary were, as
follows:
(1)
A utility knife at 2355 hours0.0273 days <br />0.654 hours <br />0.00389 weeks <br />8.960775e-4 months <br />
on Hay 25,
1993.
{2)
A knife at 0945 hours0.0109 days <br />0.263 hours <br />0.00156 weeks <br />3.595725e-4 months <br />
on Hay 26, 1993.
(3)
A'nife at
1130 hours0.0131 days <br />0.314 hours <br />0.00187 weeks <br />4.29965e-4 months <br />
on May 26,
1993.
(4)
Needle
nose pliers at
1305 hours0.0151 days <br />0.363 hours <br />0.00216 weeks <br />4.965525e-4 months <br />
on
May 26,
1993.
(5)
A utility knife at 0137 hours0.00159 days <br />0.0381 hours <br />2.265212e-4 weeks <br />5.21285e-5 months <br />
on Hay 27,
1993.
(6)
Safety wire pliers at 0950 hours0.011 days <br />0.264 hours <br />0.00157 weeks <br />3.61475e-4 months <br />
on Hay 27,1993.
The above identified tools were not logged in with a unique serial
number
{and a sufficient description)
as required
by
PPH 1.3.18 Sections
3.8 and
6.2.1.c.
Further review of the accountability log and applicable
requirements,
subsequent
to the on-site inspection identified the failure
to record tool serial
numbers in the accountability log as another
example of a failure to follow procedure,
and the second
example for
Violation (50-397/93-19-01).
This is
a repeat of a Violation 50-397/93-
14-03 issued
on June
30,
1992.
The inspectors
discussed
the above identified violation examples with the
licensee,
and the licensee
acknowledged
the inspectors
concerns.
The
licensee identified that as
a result of violation 92-14-03 they had
revised
PPH 1.3. 18 and provided training to their personnel,
to provide
additional
guidance
on foreign material control
around the reactor vessel
cavity prior to this refueling outage.
The licensee
noted that as
a
result of the
PERs issued in this area during this refueling outage,
they
were already reviewing what additional actions
they could implement to
strengthen
the controls against
the introduction of foreign material
over
or around the
open reactor vessel
and refueling cavity area during
refueling operations.
The licensee
stated
they would factor these latest
NRC inspection results into their corrective actions to strengthen
the
controls against
the introduction of foreign material
over or around the
open reactor vessel
and refueling cavity area during refueling
operations.
0
An exit meeting
was conducted
on Hay 28,
1993, with the licensee
representatives
identified in paragraph
1 of this report.
'The inspectors
summarized
the scope
and findings of the inspection at that time.
The
licensee
representatives
acknowledged
the inspectors
findings.
The
licensee
did not identify 'as proprietary
any of the materials
reviewed
by
or discussed
with the inspector during this inspection.
Further review of information obtained during the inspection resulted in
the identification, subsequent
to the on-site inspection, of an
additional
example of procedural
compliance violation.
The additional
example involved fai,lure to log tool serial
numbers in the Foreign
Haterial Control accountability
log.
The licensee
was notified of this
additional
procedural
compliance violation example during
a followup
telephone
call
on June
18,
1993.
The licensee
acknowledged
the
additional violation example.