ML17289A271

Proposed Tech Specs,Revising Actions for TS Re Source Range Monitor Operability

ML17289A271
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	01/21/1992
From:	WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
To:
Shared Package
ML17289A270	List: ML17289A269 ML17289A271
References
NUDOCS 9201270205
Download: ML17289A271 (6)

Text

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REFUELIHG OPERATIONS 3/4. 9. 2 INSTRUMENTATION LIHITIHG CONDITION FOR OPERATION 3.9.2 At least 2 source range monitor" (SRH) channels shall be OPERABLE and inserted to the normal operating level with:

a. Continuous visual indication in the control room,

b. At least one with a'}arm in the contro'1 room,

c. One of the required SRH detectors located in the quadrant where CORE ALTERATIOHS are being performed and the other required SRH detector located in an adjacent quadrant, and

d. The "shorting links" removed from the RPS circuitry prior to and during the time any control rod is withdrawn and shutdown margin demonstrations are in progress.

APPLICA8 ILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5.

ACTION:

Mith the requirements of the above speciri tion not satisfied, immediately J ~ ,.a suspend all operations involving CORE AL IOHS+" and insert all insertable contr ol rods.

Z~LC> -".i SURVEILLANCE REOUIREHEHTS 4.9.2 Each of the above requi SRM channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by:

a. At least once per 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />s:

1. Performance of a CHANNEL CHECK,

2. Verifying the detectors are inserted to the normal operating level, and

3. During CORE ALTERATIOHS, verifying that the detector or an OPERABLE SRM channel is located in the core quadrant where CORE ALTERATIOHS are being performed and another is located in an adjacent quadrant.

"The use or special movable detectors during CORE ALTERATIOHS in p'lace of the normal SRH nuclear detectors is permissible as long as these special detec ors are connected to the normal SRM circuits.

"~Except movement of IRH, SRH or special movable detectors.

Not required for control rods removed per Specification 3.9. 10. 1 and 3.9. 1O.Z.

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REFUELIHQ OPERATIOHS SURVEILLAHCE REOUIREHEHTS Continued)

b. Performance of a CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST:

1. Mithin 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to the start of CORE ALTERATIOHS, and

2. At leas once per 7 days.

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c. Verifying that the channel count rate is at least

1. Prior to control rod withdrawal,

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2. Prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during CORE ALTERATICHS, and

3. At leas e per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.

d. Verifying, with hours prior to and at least once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> during, that the circuitry "shorting links" have been removed during:

1. The time any con rod is withdrawn,Ã or g>i>,,

2. Shutdown margin dern ations.

.-":Provided signal-to"noise ratio > g. 0 herwise)3 cps>P ~'~

".~Hot required for control rods r moved per Scecificat>on 3.9. 10. 1 or 3.9. 19.2.

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3/4. 9 REFUELING OPERATIONS BASES 3/4.9. 1 REACTOR MOOE SWITCH Locking the OPERABLE reactor mode switch in the Shutdown or Refuel posi-tion, as specified, ensures that the restrictions on control rod withdrawal and refueling platform movement during the refueling operations are properly activated. These conditions reinforce the refueling procedures and reduce the probability of inadvertent criticality, damage to reactor internals or fuel assemblies, and exposure of personnel to excessive radioactivity.

.3/4. 9. 2 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensures that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core.

3/4.9.3 CONTROL ROO POSITION The requirement that all control rods be inserted during, other CORE ALTERATIONS ensures that fuel will not be loaded into a cell without a control rod.

3/4. 9. 4 OECAY TIME The minimum requirement for reactor subcriticality prior to fuel movement ensures that sufficient time has elapsed to allow the radioactive decay of the short-lived fission products. This decay time is consistent with the assump-tions used in the safety analyses.

3/4. 9. 5 COMMUNICATIONS The requirement for communications capability ensures that refueling station personnel can be promptly informed of significant changes in the facility status or core reactivity condition during movement of fuel within the reactor pressure vessel.

3/4. 9. 6 REFUELING PLATFORM The OPERABILITY requirements ensure that (1) the refueling platform will be used for handling control rods and fuel assemblies within the reactor pressure vessel, (2) each crane and hoist has sufficient load capacity for handling fuel assemblies and control rods, and (3) the core internals and pressure vessel are protected from excessive lifting force in the event they are inadvertently engaged during lifting operations.

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3 4.9.1 INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of at least two source range monitors ensure that redundant monitoring capability is available to detect changes in the reactivity condition of the core. SRMs are not required to be OPERABLE when less than or equal to 4

. bundles are inserted around the SRM and no other fuel assemblies are in the associated core quadrant since this configuration will not be critical even with all control rods withdrawn. Additionally, this configuration (four bundles inserted around each SRM) provides significantly more SHUTDOWN MARGIN than is required by LCO 3. 1. 1 (SHUTDOWN MARGIN).

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