ML17286A539
| ML17286A539 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 12/29/1990 |
| From: | Chaney H, Yuhas G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A538 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-29, NUDOCS 9101090041 | |
| Download: ML17286A539 (19) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1990029
Text
APPENDIX B
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No.
50-397/90-29
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
(MPPSS)
P.
0.
Box 968
3000 George Washington
May
Richland,
MA
99352
Facility Name:
MPPSS Nuclear
Project,No.
2 (MNP-2)
Inspection at:
MNP-2 site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
Conducted:
November 13-16,
1990
Inspected
by:
raze./AD
aney,
en>or
a
)
son
pec)a
ss
a
e
sgne
Approved by:
Q. P.
u as,
ie
eac or
a lo ogica
Protec
'
Branch
Summary:
Ins ection
November
13-16
1990
(Re ort No. 50-397/90-29)
a
e
1gne
Areas Ins ected:
Routine
unannounced
inspection of the licensee's
radiation
pro ec ion
program including:
radioactive material transportation
activities, internal
and external
exposure
assessment
and controls,
radioactive material control, surveys
and monitoring, radiological work
preplanning
and maintenance
of occupational
exposures
revi'ew of RP
staff assignments,
follow-up on previous inspection findings and corrective
actions to previous Notice of Violation, and observation of work activities
involving decontamination
of the reactor
equipment pool.
Inspection
procedures
83750,
83722,
83726,
83524,
83728,
92701,
92702 were used.
Results:
One violation involving the verification of package
design
was
~l en~i ied (see
paragraphs
2.).
No deviations
were identif)ed.
The
licensee's
program appears
to be adequately
implemented to ensure
compliance
with most
NRC requirements.
The licensee's
self critical assessment
of Health
Physics
(HP)/Radiation Protection
(RP) program implementation is nearing
completion.
A December
1, 1990,
goal
has
been set for presentation
of the
findings to MNP-2 senior management.
Paragraph
2 discusses
the ability of the "Reactor Building Post
LOCA Grab
Sampler
to quantify radioactive
species
in post accident effluents.
9101090041
901224
ADOCK 05000397
8
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
"J. Baker, Plant Manager
"J.
Harmon,
Maintenance
Manager
- D. Pisarcs k, Plant
HP Supervisor
"L. Pritchard,
HP Operations
Supervisor
~R. Graybeal,
HP/Chemistry
Manager
- L. Harrold, Assistant Plant Manager
"C. Madden,
gA Engineer
"D. Larson,
Radiological
Programs
8 Instrument Calibration Manager
"R. Wardlow, Radiological
Services
Supervisor
~J. Allen, Radwaste
Supervisor
- L. Bradford,
HP Planning Supervisor
D. Werlau, HP/Chemistry Technical Training Supervisor
~H. McGilton, Operational
Assurance
Programs
Manager
"P. Macbeth,
General
Engineer
~L. Morrison, Plant Chemistry Supervisor
- L. Sharpe,
Nuclear
Engineer
Others
"C. Sorensen,
Senior
NRC Resident Inspector
"D. Proulx,
NRC Project Inspector
~W. Milbrot, Nuclear Engineer,
Bonneville Power Authority
T. Essig,
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of
Radiation Protection
and
Emergency
Preparedness,
Radiation
Protection
Branch
F. Witt,
NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, Division of
Engineering Technology, Materials
and Chemical
Engineering
Branch
- Denotes
those attending the exit meeting
on November 16,
1990.
Additional licensee
personnel
were contacted
during the course of the
inspection.
Follow-u
on Previous
Ins ection Findin s (92701,
92702)
Notice of Violation 397/90-22-02
(Closed):
This item involved the
licensee
s
as
ure
o per
orm
mme y an
accurate
assessments
of
radioactive material
uptakes
by workers.
The licensee's
response
to the
Notice of Violation dated
September
21, 1990,
and corrective action
commitments (revising procedures
and correcting exposure
data for the
affected individualsj were reviewed
and implementation verified.
The
licensee's
corrective actions (revision of Radiological
Program
Instructions
(RPIs) 5.6, 5.7, 5.8,
and Plant Procedure
11.2.4. 1) were
implemented
on or before October 31,
1990 and appear to be adequate
to
prevent
a recurrence
of the violation and ensure future compliance with
NRC regulations.
r>
<il
i
2
Unresolved
Item 397-50/90-22-03
(Closed):
This item involved the
icensee
s ina >> y
o provi
e
e
inspector with appropriate
documentation
or certification verifying that the design criteria of 49
CFR Part 178.350
had been satisfied for a Specification
7A type
radioactive material shipping package
used by the licensee
on March 21,
1990.
This item is closed.
The licensee
could not produce the certification required
by 49
CFR Part
173.415(a).
This matter was previously documented
in Inspection
Report
Nos.
50-397/90-22.
Failure to demonstrate
compliance with the criteria
of 49
CFR 173.415 represents
an apparent violation of 10
CFR 71.5
(50-397/90-29-01).
Unresolved
Item 50-397/85-20-04
(U date
This item has
been previously
iscusse
in
nspec
ion
epor
s
os.
50-397/85-20,
87-05, 87-29,
88-33, 89-20, 89-29, 89-32,
and 90-07,
and involved the licensee's
item II. F ~ 1, Attachment
2 required ability to sam le and
uantif
the effluent release
rate for gaseous/particulate
ra ioiodine
un er reactor accident conditions.
During the licensee's
evaluations for
implementation of this requirement the licensee
determined that the
plants as-built post-accident
radioiodine effluent
~sam lin
system
(REA-SR-27
8 27A) would not be accessible
for use during reactor
accidents
in accordance
with the access criteria stipulated in Item
II.B.2 of NUREG-0737 (a design review of plant shielding for spaces
which
personnel
may need
access
during postaccident
operations).
The licensee
subsequently
installed
a pump driven, shielded,
isokinetic sampling
system
(REA-SR-48) to satisfy postaccident
iodine sampling requirements.
This postaccident
sampling system is described
in the licensee's
Final
Safety Analysis Report
(FSAR), Section 11.5.2.2. 1.5,
Amendment
No. 36,
and Appendix
BE 2,
Amendment
No. 35.'he
NRC questioned
the ability of
the system to representatively
sample effluent releases
under accident
conditions involving steam with attendant
high and low temperatures
along
the sample line.
These conditions would likely cause
severe
plate-out in the. sample lines
due to the reactivity of iodine and
generation of excessive
water (condensate)
in the sample line under these
circumstances.
In 1988 the licensee initiated independent offsite
laboratory testing of the sample
system via a representative
mockup.
The
independent testing laboratory submitted to the licensee their results of
the testing
on October ll, 1990,
and the results
indicated that the
sampling system
as designed
and operating at .isokinetic sample flows is
approximately
.002 percent efficient when operated
under simulated
reactor accident conditions.
Therefore,
a correction factor of
approximately
500 must be applied to sample results.
This large of a
correction factor is. considered
unacceptable
by the licensee,
the testing
laboratory',
and the
NRC.
The licensee
has requested
further testing of
the system
under greater than isokinetic flows to see if better
performance
can
be obtained.
MNP-2 Technical Specification
(TS) 3. 3. 7. 5, require, in part, that the
Reactor Building Post
LOCA Grab Sampler
be operable in operational
modes
1, 2,
and 3, or if not (a) Initiate the preplanned alternate
method of
monitoring the appropriate
parameter(s),
and (b) In lieu of any other
report required
by Specification 6.9. 1, prepare
and submit a Special
Report to the Commission pursuant to Specification 6.9.2 within 14 days
following the event outlining the action taken,
the cause of the
C
I
operational
problems
and the plans
and schedule for restoring the 'system
to OPERABLE status.
Currently the licensee is evaluating industry available on-line analyzers
and possible alternate
methodologies for quantifying iodine release
rates
in effluents during a reactor accident if the current sampling system is
declared
The licensee currently can not accurately quantify
the release
rate of radioiodine
except for limited reactor
accident
scenarios
during which the
RAE-5R-27
8
27A sample
racks would be
accessible,
and at larger accidents
must revert to default/credible
reactor accident release
scenarios
contained in Section
15 of the
and/or field monitoring team
sample results.
However, these
methodologies
do not meet the intent of NUREG 0737,
Item II.F.1-2, to
establish
the ability to quantitatively determine
the rate at which
radioiodines
are being released
from the plant in gaseous
effluents
under
accident conditions.
Or anization
and
Mana ement Controls
(83722)
The
NRC inspector
reviewed the licensee's
offsite WPPSS Support
Services-Radiological
Programs
and Instrument Calibration l3epartment
(Corporate
HP group) staffing and management
controls.
The Radiological
Programs office is located in the Plant Support/Emergency
Operations
Facility (PSF) which is located approximately 0.5 miles from WNP-2.
This
group was initially developed
and organized to support all five WPPSS
nuclear facilities.
The Radiological
Programs
and Instrument Calibration Department
(RP8IC)
is a functional part of the
WPPSS corporate staff and is comprised of
'pproximately
33 personnel.
Approximately 16 skilled craftspersons
occupy positions in the laundry (3) and the measurement
and test
equipment/material
calibration facility (13).
The Radiological
Programs
group is comprised, of approximately
9 professional
Health Physicist
and
9
Health Physics
Technicians
(HPTs).
This staff provides professional
level
technical
support to the plant
HP group involving external
personnel
dosimetry supply, processing
and official dosimetry records
administration/maintenance,
internal dosimetry, including whole body
counting and respiratory protection equipment
(RPE)
use qualification,
and
RPE maintenance
and testing,
RP portable instrument calibration,
contaminated protective clothing laundry, plant design
change
,
reviews,
environmental
dosimetry supply and processing,
Offsite Dose
Calculation Manual administration, offsite dose calculations,
and
semiannual
effluent release
report preparation.
The offsite radiation protection, program is implemented
by an extensive
and comprehensive
set of
RP procedures.
- These procedures
establish
assignment
of responsibilities
and division of authorities within the
Radiological
Programs'epartment.
Detailed implementing procedures
are
available for procedure
development
and control, internal
and external
dosimetry programs, offsite dose
assessment,
radiochemistry activities to
support plant operations,
radiation protect>on instruments calibration
and operation,
posting of radiological areas,
use of protective clothing,
transfer of radioactive materials
between facilities, radiation
and
contamination
surveys,
airborne radioactivity measurements,
preparation,
decontamination
of work areas
and personnel,
etc.
The
offsite group does not have
any operational
responsibilities
in-plant
f
il
other than providing technical
advise/support
to the in plant
HP group.
Members of the Radiological
Programs
Department provide technical
assistance
to the corporate
gA group during audits of plant
RP programs.
Radiological
Program implementing procedures
are reviewed
and approved at
the corporate level in accordance
with the conditions contained in TS 6.8.2.
I
/
The corporate
HP organization
appears
to be adequately staffed
and
functionally competent to support the WNP-2
RP mission
and carry out
safely the offsite radiological work activities involving the
contaminated 'laundry and instrument calibration facility.
The licensee's
program appears
adequate
in this area.
4.
Occu ational Radiation
Ex osure
(83750)
The licensee's
RP program was examined to determined
compliance with the
requirements
of Technical Specifications (TS) 6.2, 6.4,
6. 10, 6.11,
and
6.12
10
CFR Parts
19.11,
19.12,
19.13,
20.101,
20.103,
20.201,
20.202,
20.253,
20.401,
20.403,
20.405,
20.408,
and 20.409;
and agreement with
the commitments
contained in Sections
12.5, 13.1, 13.2, 13.4,
and 13.5 of
the
WNP-2 FSAR; and agreement with the guidance
contained in NRC
Regulatory Guides 1.8, 1.33, 1.97, 8.7, 8.8, 8.10, 8.14, 8.15,
and 8.27,
Industry Standards
N13.11-1983,
and
NRC Inspection
and
Enforcement Information Notice (IEIN) 81-26.
a.
Audits and
A
raisals
The
NRC inspector
examined the licensee's
onsite (plant) Operational
Assurance
Division (quality assurance
surveillance
group) staffing,
staff qualification, schedule of surveillance,
and selected
surveillance reports.
The inspector
reviewed the following
survei llances:
2-90-98,
Spent
Resin Processing,
July 1990
2-90-100,
Sodium 24 Injection, August 1990
b.
The
NRC inspector
noted that
a surveillance, critical of the
Radiation Protection
Program implementation,
e. g.,
HP radiological
work control practices,
procedures,
supervisor oversight, etc., of
spent fuel inspections that took place during late July through
early August 1990,
had not been issued
as of this inspection.
However,
gA and
HP have
been reviewing the issues
associated
with
the surveillance
so that final documentation of the surveillance
findings is factual
and accurately
assesses
the safety significance
of each findings.
~Chan
es
There were
no changes
in facility design or operations,
other than
the
HP group reorganization,
that affected the
RP program.
The plant
HP staff assignments
have under
gone
a reorganization
as
of September
3; 1990.'wo
new supervisory positions
(Radwaste
and
HP Planning-ALARA) were created.
Nearly all
HP supervisory
positions
have
had
a change
in staffing and responsibilities.
Senior
HPTs were used to fill additionally created
ALARA technician
~
~
~
ositions in the
HP Planning group
and foreman (lead
HPT) positions.
his staffing has
reduced the number of senior
HPTs available for
day to day operational
support.
The licensee still depends
on the
routine use of overtime to satisfy operational
support requirements.
The licensee currently utilizes five contracted
senior
HPTs to-
support the
HP staff so continuing training needs
can
be met.
The
HP group
has
been granted authority to hire nine senior
HPTs (three
as replacements
for HPTs that were lost through in-house
transfers/promotions
and an additional six senior
HPTs in fiscal
year 1991).
This will bring the
HP group senior
HPT manning to
approximately
34 persons.
Even though the reorganization
has
been
in effect approximately three
months several
functional positions
had only been filled within the last few weeks preceding this
inspection.
The radiological/HP work planning group
(ALARA) is not
fully functional at this time and the licensee's
desire to
consolidate
radiological work permit
(RWP) development
and issuance
within this group has not fully materialized.
The consolidation of
RWP development
and issuance
should provide needed continuity
between work activities and standardization
of
RP controls.
The
current HP/Chemistry
Group organization
does not agree with the
descriptions
and organization chart (Figure 13. 1-11) in Section
13. 1
of the
FSAR.
The plant
HP group appears
to be marginally staffed
due to the
continue
use of contract personnel
and the routine
use of overtime
to accomplish
day to day operational
support of plant activities.
The reorqanization of the
HP group
has taken longer than expected
and
may impact on the efficient preparation for the R-6 refueling
outage,
especially in the area of ALARA reviews
and special
development.
Trainin
and
uglification of New Personnel
The
NRC inspector
examined the training and qualification program
for the offsite Radiological
Programs
Department staff.
This
training program is setforth in Radiological
Programs Instruction
(RPI) Manual
No. 0.8 and Technical Training Manual 5.1.2,
"HP and
Chemistry Training Program Description."
The licensee's
commitment
to training is contained
the in the
WPPSS Health Physics
Program
Description
(HPD)
contained in the Corporate Policy and Procedures
Manual
Volume 3, Management
Statement.
qualification and experience
requirements
for plant and offsite
RP staffs is setforth in HPD
3. 1.21.
Radiological
Programs staff personnel
must qualify, based
on performance,
in each of their assigned
functional areas, i.e.,
external
dosimetry, internal dosimetry, respiratory protection
equipment maintenance,
dosimetry records,
etc.
Discussions with
staff members
indicated that all members of the Radiological
Programs
Department
possessed
adequate
technical
knowledge in their
functional areas of assignment.
Discussions
with the laundry
facility staff (HP and laborers)
indicated that craft knowledge
and
RP/ALARA concepts
are well understood.
The training and qualification program for the plant
HP group is
currently undergoing task based analysis for the purpose of
4
0
0
upgrading the program and improving HPT performance.
This area will
be reviewed in subsequent
inspections.
d.
External
Radiation Control
and Oosimetr
(83750/83524)
The licensee's
external radiation dosimetry
and exposure control
was
reviewed for agreement
with the commitments
contained in Section
12
of the
and compliance with the requirements
of 10
CFR Part
19.12,
19.15,
and 20.202(c).
The licensee currently has in place
an older automated
personnel
dosimetry processing
system consisting of a teflon card
(thermoluminscent
dosimeter-TLD) impregnated with thermoluminescing
materials.
The licensee
had elected to have this TLD accredited
by
NVLAP (National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program-
conducted
by the National. Institute of Standards
and Technology) for
radiation exposure
measurements
in five of the eight categories
referenced
in ANSI N13.11-1983.
The three categories
that the
licensee's
system is not accredited
are:
Category - I, Accident,
low-energy photons.
Category - III, Low-energy photons.,
Category - VI, Photon Mixtures (low and high)
The licensee's
TLO system
was last accredited
in July 1990.
The
licensee
elected to not have their personnel
dosimetry system
accredited
in the above
noted categories
since they believed that
low-energy photon measurement
was unnecessary
at WNP-2.
Even though
there is a degraded
photon component in plant areas
due to inherent
system
shielding/gamma
photon attenuation/bremsstrahlung
the
licensee
considered that it was effectively masked
by the larger
high-energy
component
and would show up, if significant, during the
calculation of potential
beta exposure
in the systems
algorithms.
The inspector
agreed that the
need for low-energy photon
accreditation
was not warranted for WNP-2.
The vendor of this type
TLD has successfully
had it accredited
in all eight categories.
The
NRC inspector toured the dosimetry processing facilities, examined
equipment,
interviewed personnel,
and reviewed selected
personnel
exposure
records.
The licensee's
personnel
exposure
records
system
applicable equivalents of NRC Forms 4 and 5, extension
authorizations,
whole body countinq data, respiratory protection
physical qualifications
and mask fit testing results,
and copies of
termination letters were reviewed.
The files are maintained in fire
rated cabinets.
These
records
showed
a high level of maintenance.
The licensee
had recently purchased, 'installed,
and is
preoperational
testing
a state-of-the-art
computer driven TLD system
that employs hot gas heating of a multiple TL chip TLD.
This TLD
system will be placed in service following preoperational
testing
and full spectrum accreditation.
The
NRC inspector toured in-plant areas
and observed
the wearing and
use of personnel
dosimetry. 'he licensee
tracks personnel
exposures
between routine
TLD processing
(monthly and quarterly)
by the use of
1
>1
'
0,
self reading pocket dosimeters
(SRDs) that are issued
by the plant
HP group.
Personnel
are required to maintain their own accounting
of SRD exposure
each work shift.
The computerized
dose tracking
system
(RER-Radiation
Exposure Reporting) is normally update
each
night based
on
SRD tallies.
The licensee
maintains administrative
control over personnel
exposures
via personnel
exposure
guides
found
in Plant Procedures
Manual
Volume ll, HP Procedure
11.2.5.1.
The
licensee is committed to maintaining personnel
exposures
at less
than five Rem per calendar year.
This commitment is achieved
by
limiting personnel
exposures
to less
than .300
Rem per day and
1
per quarter.
For a person to exceed
these administrative
exposure
guides authorization
(HP Procedure
11.2.5. 1) must be obtained from
the HP/Chemistry
Manager
for quarterly extensions
and from the Plant
manager for yearly extensions.
Control of Radioactive Materials
and Contamination
Surve
s
and
one or)n
The
NRC inspector
examined offsite and in-plant controls over
radioactive material
(RAM) and contamination,
and conduct of
radiological
surveys for identification and evaluation of
radiological conditions.
The licensee
conducts radiological work
activities at the
PSF.
Activities include
RP instrument
calibration,
laundering of contaminated protective clothing,
and
limited radiochemical
analyses.
These activities involve, handling
seal
sources,
the generation of'adioactive wastes,
and working with
loose surface contamination,
including hot particles.
The
WPPSS Radiological
Programs
Department provides for its
own
radiological controls separate
from the WNP-2 plant
HP group.
The
NRC inspector
observed
contamination controls in place for the
contaminated
laundry operations,
reviewed transfer
and control of
contaminated
clothing to and from the WNP-2, segregation
of clothing
based
on radiation levels or hot particle threat,
the use of hand
held personnel
friskers
and automated"whole
body friskers.
The work
practices
and survey program for work activities at the
PST is
adequate
to control
RAM and contamination.
The content of RWPs
appeared
to be adequate
for the level of radiological
hazards
present at the
PSF.
The
NRC inspector
observed
ongoing preparation for decontamination
of the reactor building 606 foot elevation dryer/reactor
equipment
pit.
All workers appeared
to be knowledgeable of the
RP controls
for the work.
Work operations
did not start while the
NRC inspector
was present
due to electrical
grounding certification problems with
the equipment.
This was brought to the attention of the lead
HPT by
the. plant Operational
Assurance
engineer.
Semi-portable
exhaust
ventilation systems
equipped with HEPA filtration units were
extensively
used to control airborne radioactivity in the immediate
area of the dryer pit during high pressure
water wash
downs.
Respiratory protection is required during initial operations until
airborne radioactivity is evaluated.
Selected
workers were observed
inspecting,
donning
and testing full face
HEPA filtered air
purifying respirators,
The
NRC inspector
reviewed the qualification
records of three workers that donned
RPE for the work operations.
'I'j
0
h
8
The
NRC inspector brought to the attention of the licensee
an
industrial safety concern involving the high pressure
spray
equipment.
The spray unit,
an electrically driven positive
displacement
pump was rated to deliver liquid spray
under pressure
of approximately 10,000
pounds per square
inch.
Even though
approximately
75 feet or more of delivery hose
and attachments
comprised the downstream portion of the system,
including several
mechanical joints, the
NRC inspector did not observe
any
verification of testing of the hoses/fittings, or was the system
equipped with whip restraints
to protect workers if a hose or joints
'ailed.
During the setup of the high pressure
sprayer
wand it was
noted that several joints would be exposed to bending motions during
pit washdown activities.
Plant management
agreed to evaluate
the
inspectors'oncerns.
The
NRC inspector
observed portable
RP survey instrument calibration
,
facilities, response
check methods,
and technician preoperation
quality control check of instruments.
The licensee's
calibration
and instrument response
check program appear to satisfy industry
standards
and 'guidance.
Survey instruments
are proper]y segregated
or clearly tagged to indicate
an instrument's
functional status.
Maintainin
Occu ational
Ex osures
ALARA (83750
and 83728)
The
NRC inspector
examined the preparations
and planning associated
with the decontamination
of the reactor vessel
equipment pit/dryer
pit.
This operation involved measured
dose rates of 500-1,000
millirem per hour above the residual
water surface in the bottom of
the pit.
Mater depth
was about six inches.
The
RWP 2-90-00468
was
developed
by a senior
HPT and the
HP Planning Supervisor.
The
NRC
inspector
observed worksite preparations
for the high pressure
wash
down of the pit,
Documentation
was available at the work site
denoting that prework briefings (tailgate meeting)
had been held
prior to start of equipment setup,
The lead
HPT required everyone
that would enter the
606 elevation to be familiar and briefed on
requirements.
An Operational
Assurance
engineer
was in the area for
surveillance
of the ongoing work.
During discussions
with the lead
HPT about the content of the
RMP it became evident that not all of
the activities associated
with the work were detailed in the
RMP and
were maintained
as written notes in the
RMP package.
The
NRC
.
inspector
determined that all workers
had been briefed on the
and supplementary
information in the notes prior to start of work.
The
NRC inspector discussed
with HP supervision
and plant management
his concern that
a significant portion of the controls to be
implemented
by the
HP group were not written into the
RMP.
Licensee
representatives
indicated that normally
RMPs do not contain
information that is specific only to
HP operations.
It was noted to
the licensee that if workers did not know when
HPTs were to perform a
specific act/requirement
(which was
based
on the .worker's
activities) and the
HPT was distracted
then there would be
a good
chance that the act would be missed.
The licensee
provided the
NRC inspector with an
ALARA report of the
R-5 refueling outage that appeared
to be distributed only to WNP-2
managers
and then to no one manager in particular.
The report is
from the
HP staff.
This report
ss compilation of man-rem
l
performance for 220
RWPs,
concluding prejob man-rem estimates
and
hours of work associated
with the
gob/RWP.
Also included are
statistics
on skin and clothing contamination incidents
and other
radiological occurrences.
The report includes
a section
on
areas/work operations that are perceived
by the report originators
to need
more attention during future outages.
The report also
highlighted one area
(CRD rebuild room modifications) that showed
a
significant man-rem savings
over previous outages.
The licensee's
program appears
adequate
in this area.
5.
~E*it M ti
(30703)
The inspector
met with licensee
representatives
identified in
paragraph
1 of the report on November 16,
1990.
The inspector
discussed
the scope
and findings of the inspection.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspectors
findings regarding the appar ent
violation and initiated action to evaluate
apparent corrective
actions that
may be necessary.
The inspector
informed the licensee
that the Regiona] office would be examining the history and current
test data involving the operability of the Post Accident
Monitor (an unresolved
item, referenced
in paragraph
2 of this
report)
and determining what further actions to resolve the issue
are available to the
NRC.
The licensee
acknowledged
the inspectors
statements
with their concern that further testing of the sampler is
ongoing to determine if better
sampling efficiencies
can
be
obtained.
0,