ML17286A296
| ML17286A296 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/27/1990 |
| From: | Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17286A294 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-90-16, NUDOCS 9009110195 | |
| Download: ML17286A296 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1990016
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION
V
Report Ho:
Docket No:
50-397/90-16
50-397
- Licensee:
Facility Name:
Inspection at:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P. 0.
Box 968
Richland,
WA 99352
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2
(WNP-2)
WNP-2 Site near Richland,
Inspection
Conducted:
June
18 - July 29,
1990
Inspectors:
C. J.
Bosted,
Senior Resident
Inspector
R.
C. Sorensen,
Resident
Inspector
Approved by:
P.
H.
o nson,
C ref
Reac
Projects
Section
3
Date
S gne
Summary:
Ins ection
on June
18 - Jul
29,
1990
50-397/90-16
Areas
Ins ected;
Routine inspection
by the resident
inspectors of control
room operations,
licensee
action
on previous inspection findings, engineered
safety feature
(ESF) status,
surveillance
program,
maintenance
program,
licensee
event reports,
special
inspection topics, procedural
adherence,
and
review of periodic reports.
During this inspection,
Inspection
Procedures
30703,
61726,
62703,
71707,
71710,
90712,
90713,
92700,
92701
and 92702 were
covered.
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SIMS
Items:
None.
Results:
General
Conclusions
and
S ecific Findin
s
A strength
was observed
in the licensee's
persistence
in resolving their
emergency
diesel
generator
problems
(see
paragraph
8);
A weakness
was
observed
in the maintenance
of the standby service water
system
(see
paragraph
7).
Si nificant Safet
Matters:
Hone.
~ci0~1 1019
9OC>S2:
I DR
AGCiCI'.=0003%7
Q
PGC
Summar
of Yiolations and Deviations:
One violation was identified for
failure to specify lubrication schedules
for certain safety-related
pump
motors.
0 en Items
Summar
Four
LERs were closed;
one
new item was
opened.
h
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
- J. Baker, Plant Manager
C. Edwards, guality Control Manager
R. Graybeal,
Health Physics
and Chemistry Manager
- J. Harmon, Maintenance
Manager
A. Hosier, Licensing Manager
D. Kobus, guality Assurance
Manager
R. Koenigs, Technical
Manager
S. McKay, Operations
Manager
- J. Peters,
Administrative Manager
G. Gelhaus,
Assistant Technical
Manager
W. Shaeffer, Assistant Operations
Manager
- R. Webring, Assistant Maintenance
Manager
The inspectors
also interviewed various control
room operators, shift
supervisors, shift managers,
and maintenance,
engineering, quality
assurance,
and management
personnel.
- Attended the Exit Meeting
on August 9,
1990.
Plant Status
At the start of the inspection period, the plant was in the annual
refueling outage
and remained
shut
down for diesel
generator
repairs
and
for inspecting
samples of environmentally qualified electrical splices.
A major effort was expended
by the licensee
in carrying out
a splice
sampling
program to determine
the extent of deficiencies
discovered
during the maintenance
team inspection.
On July 13, the licensee
commenced
a 72-hour full load run of the division two (DIV II) emergency
diesel
generator
(EDG) to determine whether the shorted windings found
on one rotor pole were degrading.
Pole piece voltage drop readings
were
measured
at the start
and completion of the operating test
and were
determined to be unchanged after the
72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> run.
On July 25, the DIV I
EDG generator
was returned to the site and
was in the process
of being
installed at the end of the inspection period.
0 erational
Safet
Verification
71707
a ~
Plant Tours
The following plant areas
were toured
by the inspectors
during the
course of the inspection:
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Reactor Building
Control
Room
Diesel
Generator
Building
Radwaste
Building
Service Water Buildings
Technical
Support Center
Turbine Generator Building
Yard Area and Perimeter
b.
The
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
following items were observed
during the tours:
0 eratin
Lo s
and Records.
Records
were reviewed against
ec nica
peci ication an
administrative control procedure
requirements.
Monitorin
Instrumentation.
Process
instruments
were observed
for corre ation
etween
c annels
and for conformance with
Technical Specification requirements.
~Ehif
M
i
.
C
1
4
hfdf
i g
b
d
for conformance with 10 CFR 50.54. (k), Technical Specifica-
tions,
and administrative procedures.
The attentiveness
of
the operators
was observed
in the execution of their duties,
and the control
room was observed to be free of distractions
such
as non-work related radios
and reading materials.
E ui ment Lineu s.
Valves
and electrical
breakers
were
verified to be in the posi tion or condition required
by
Technical Specifications
and administrative
procedures
for the
applicable plant mode.
This verification included routine
control board indication reviews
and conduct of partial
system
lineups.
Technical Specification limiting conditions for
operation
were verified by direct observation.
E ui ment Ta
in
.
Selected
equipment,
for which tagging
requests
had
been initiated,
was observed to verify that tags
were in place
and the equipment
was in the condition specified.
General
Plant
E ui ment Conditions.
Plant equipment
was
observed for indications of system
leakage,
improper lubrica-
tion, or other conditions that would prevent the system from
fulfillingits functional requirements.
were
observed to ascertain their status
and operability.
Fire Protection.
Fire fighting equipment
and controls were
observed for conformance with administrative
procedures.
Plant Chemistr
.
Chemical
analyses
and trend results
were
reviewe
or conformance with Technical Specifications
and
administrative control procedures.
Radiation Protection Controls.
The inspectors
periodically
observed
radio ogica
protection practices
to determine
whether the licensee's
program
was being implemented in
conformance with facility policies
and procedures
and in
'ompliance
with regulatory requirements.
The inspectors
also
observed
compliance with Radiation
Exposure Permits,
proper
wearing of protective equipment
and personnel
monitoring
devices,
and personnel
frisking practices.
Radiation
monitoring equipment
was frequently monitored to verify
operability and adherence
to calibration frequency.
(10) Plant Housekee
in
.
Plant conditions
and material/equipment
storage
were observed
to determine
the general
state of
cleanliness
and housekeeping.
Housekeeping
in the radio-
logically controlled area
was evaluated with respect
to
controlling the spread" of surface
and airborne
contamination.'11)
~Securit
.
The inspectors periodically observed
security
practices
to ascertain
that the licensee's
implementation of
the security plan
was in accordance
with site procedures,
that
'the search
equipment at the access
control points
was
operational,
that the vital area portals
were kept locked and
alarmed,
and that personnel
allowed access
to the protected
area
were
badged
and monitored
and the monitoring equipment
was
functional.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
4.
En ineered Safet
Feature
S stem Walkdown
71707
71710
Selected
engineered
safety feature
systems
(and systems
important to
safety)
were walked
down by the inspectors
to confirm that the systems
were aligned in accordance
with plant procedures.
During the walkdown of
the systems,
items
such
as hangers,
supports, electrical
power supplies,
cabinets,
and cables
were inspected
to determine that they were operable
and in
a condition to perform their required functions.
The inspectors
also verified that the system valves were in the required position and
locked as appropriate.
The local
and remote position indication and
controls were also confirmed to be in the required position and operable.
Accessible portions of the following systems
were walked
down on the
indicated dates.
~Sat
em
Diesel
Generator
Systems,
Divisions 1, 2,
and 3.
Hydrogen Recombiners
Low Pressure
(LPCS)
High Pressure
(HPCS)
Residual
Heat
Removal
(RHR), Trains
"A" and "B"
Dates
July
2
July
9
July 10
July
15
June
22
Scram Discharge
Volume System
Standby Service Water System
125Y
DC Electrical Distribution,
Divisions
1 and
2
July 9
June
20, July
11
June
26
250V
DC Electrical Distribution
No violations or deviations
were identified.
June
26
5.
Survei 1 l ance Testin
61726)
a
~
Surveillance tests
required to be performed
by the Technical
Specifications
(TS) were reviewed
on
a sampling basis to verify
that:
( 1) the surveillance tests
were correctly included
on the
facility schedule;
(2)
a technically adequate
procedure existed for
performance of the surveillance tests;
(3) the'urveillance tests
had
been
performed at the frequency specified in the TS;
and
(4) test results satisfied
acceptance
criteria or were properly
dispositioned.
b.
Portions of the following surveillance tests
were observed
by the
inspectors
on the dates
shown:
Procedure
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
7.4.3.6.6
Source
Range Monitor
Channel
A quarterly
Channel Calibration
July 8
7.4.8.1.1.2.11
7.4.3.2.1.22B
DIV II DG Monthly
Operability Test
MS Line High Flow
Channel
B Channel
Functional
Test
(CFT)
July
13
July
15
July 26
Ko violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Plant Maintenance
62703
During the inspection period, the inspectors
observed
and reviewed
documentation
associated
with maintenance
and problem investigation
activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements
and with
administrative
and maintenance
procedures,
required
gA/gC involvement,
proper
use of safety tags,
proper equipment alignment and use of
jumpers,
personnel
qualifications,
and proper
r etesting.
The inspectors
verified that reportability for these activities
was correct.
The inspectors
witnessed
portions of the following maintenance
activities:
Descri tion
Dates
Performed
Rotor Pole
AC Voltage Drop Test
and Bearing Oil Sightglass
Modification
for DIV II DG per
AS 6205.
Rotor Pole
AC Voltage Drop Test for
DIV II DG per
AS 6484.
June
29
July
17
Reconnect Electrical Terminati ons
for DIV I
DG per
AS 5869
No violations or deviations
were identified.
July 29
7.
Review of Standb
Service
Water
S stem Maintenance
Practices
62703
The inspectors
reviewed the maintenance
practices
associated
with the
standby service water
(SSW) system.
The
SSW system is
a safety-related,
Class
1E powered, seismically qualified system with a high degree of
importance
from a probabilistic risk assessment
(PRA) standpoint.
Vendor
manuals for major system
components
were reviewed to determine
manufacturers'orrective
and preventive maintenance
requirements.
Plant records
were then reviewed to determine
what maintenance
practices
were used for corrective
and preventive maintenance
on these
components.
The intent of this inspection
was to determine
the scope
and effective-
ness of maintenance
being performed
on the
SSW system.
The
inspectors'indings
are suomarized
as follows:
The vendor's instructions for the residual
heat
removal
(RHR) heat
exchangers,
as
documented
in GEK-90332, states,
"The insides of all
tubes
and the tube
ends
should
be visually inspected for cleanli-
ness at the end of the first reactor refueling cycle.
Subsequent
inspections
should
be at each refueling cycle, unless
user
experience justifies
a less frequent interval.
The interval
between
inspections
should not be excessive
however since
difficulty of cleaning
increases
rapidly as scale thickness
or
deposit increases."
A review of plant equipment history records for the
RHR heat
exchangers
indicated that the first time the "A" heat exchanger
was
inspected
in this manner
was in June
1989.
The "B" heat exchanger
was initially inspected
in May 1990.
These inspections
did not
indicate significant fouling of the heat exchangers.
However,
no
user experience
had
been
noted which justified a less frequent
inspection interval.
GEK-90332 further recommends for the
RHR heat exchangers
that bolts
in the shell-to-tube
sheet
and channel
cover flanged joints be
checked for tightness
at plant startup, just prior to the first
refueling cycle,
and prior to subsequent
refueling cycles until no
change in bolt stress
is noted.
The inspector
was not able to identify any maintenance
task which
currently exists to accomplish this check.
The Byron-Jackson
Technical
Manual for the standby service water
(SSW)
pumps states,
under the chapter for Preventive Maintenance,
"Make a periodic check for the security of all accessible
bolting",
and,
"Check packing lubrication and leakage...".
The inspector
could not identify any periodic maintenance
tasks
which perform these
checks.
From the equipment history records,
the
inspector
determined that packing
was adjusted
on the "A" pump in
6
July 1989, but no record could be found for adjustments
on the "8"
pump.
The inspector
was not able to determine
where or how the
packing
was checked for proper lubrication.
The General Electric Instructions for the
pump motors states,
"Change oil at regular intervals.
The time between oil changes
depends
upon the severity of operating conditions
and
hence
must be
determined
by the motor user.
One or two changes
a year is
average...".
The inspector
found that preventive maintenance
"SMS task Ol".for
the
pump motors specifies
completing plant procedure
10.25. 12, "Inspection of AC Motors, Controls,
and Generators",
at
two year intervals.
PPM 10.25.12 states,
"Lubricate when required
and scheduled
per WNP-2 Lubrication Guide ".
The WNP-2 Lubrication
Guide does
not state
a frequency for oil changeout,
and is denoted
with a double
hyphen ("--") mark under change
frequency.
After a search of equipment history for both
pumps
and the
Service
Water
pump, the inspectors
and the licensee
concluded that
the oil had not been
changed
since plant startup.
This is an
apparent violation of the Technical Specifications, Section 6.8. 1,
and Regulatory Guide 1.33, which require that lubricating schedules
be specified for safety-related
equipment
(Enforcement
Item
-397/90-16-01).
Following the inspector's
identification of this condition, the
licensee
sampled
the oil and
had it analyzed.
The analysis of the
upper bearing (thrust) indicated that different lubricating oils
may have
been
mixed over the years
and that incorrect oil may have
been
added
on one or more occasions.
The General Electric Instructions for the
pump motor also
indicated that the
maximum temperature
and maximum pressure
allowable for bearing oil cooling water are
shown
on the nameplate
instructions.
The manual
stated that exceeding
these
values
may
cause
accelerated
deterioration of the cooling coil.
Cooling water
flow is also important, per the nameplate,
to ensure
adequate
cooling of the bearing oil.
No means
were identified by the inspector for indicating pressure
or flow in'he bearing oil cooling water.
The inspector
recognized that the vendor manual instructions
dis'cussed
above are not
NRC requirements;
however,
they represent
good practices.
Good engineering
judgement would expect
them to be included in a
preventive maintenance
program or suitable technical justification
provided for not following them.
No such justification could be
identified for these findings.
The inspectors
concluded that
insufficient attention
was being given to preventive maintenance for
major components
of the
SSW system.
One violation was identified,
as discussed
above.
'mer
enc
Diesel
Generator
Re airs
93702
On May 27,
1990 the DIV I
EDG suffered
severe
damage to the generator
bearings
during
a post-maintenance
24-hour full load run.
At the
end of
the previous reporting period, the shaft
had been
machined
and the
bearings
had been replaced.
During shop, testing after reassembly
of the
generator, it was discovered that two of the rotor field windings were
partially shorted.
The generator rotor was subsequently
disassembled
for replacement
of all rotor field windings.
Following the rewind of the eight pole pieces
and reassembly of the
rotor,
one pole was found to have
a partial short and 'was
rewound
a
second time.
This was apparently
due to failure of the epoxy resin to
adequately
adhere
to the windings during the first rewind.
Another
rotor pole
was also
rewound
a second
time.
This was due to a failure of
the temperature
controller on the oven used during the baking process.
The pole was overheated,
causing
some deformation
and rendering
the pole
unusable,
even
though the .voltage drop across
the windings was
determined to be acceptable.
The
DIV I generator arrived back
on site
on July 25 and
was being
reinstalled
as this inspection period ended.
The licensee
conducted
an inspection of the division two (DIV II) EDG on
June
29 to determine
whether shorted windings existed in that
generator's
rotor poles.
One rotor pole in a set of poles
was found to
have
a voltage drop of approximately
36
VAC when
120
VAC was applied to
the two poles in series.
This indicated shorted windings in that pole.
The short
was turn-to-turn within the winding.
A short to ground did
not exist.
The licensee
consulted with industry experts
and reviewed the data
obtained
from the limited testing.
Industry experts
concluded that
partially shorted
poles were not uncommon.
They recommended
that
additional testing
be performed to evaluate
whether this condition was
chronic or acute.
In order to determine
whether this defect
was
degrading,
the licensee
performed
a 72-hour run of the DIV II EDG
commencing
on July 13.
The shorted winding condition was determined
not
to be degrading
and did not result in the inoperability of the EDG.. The
licensee's
assessment
was transmitted to and discussed
with the NRC's
Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation before plant restart.
During the 72-hour
EDG run, problems still persisted
in the accuracy of
the bearing oil level indication.
The licensee
also learned what to
expect for generator
bearing
temperatures
and what was acceptable
to the
bearing manufacturer.
Bearing temperature
annunciation for both
generators
was modified accordingly.
The generator
bearing sight glasses
were modified for improved readability, but some confusion
remained
due
to the very tight tolerance
allowed for variations in.oil level
(approximately one-eighth
inch).
At the exit meeting the inspectors
strongly encouraged
the licensee
to
take positive corrective action for the weaknesses
manifested
in the,
bearing oil level anomalies.
The inspector expressed
a concern that
the tight tolerance of the oil levels could cause
operators
to read the
sight glasses differently.
This could then result in a change
due to
oil being
added or removed which would affect the bearing.
Better
records of oil addition or removal, which would allow trending of oil
consumption,
were also discussed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Im ro er
S lice In Containment
Tem er ature Monitor
62703
At the conclusion of the recent maintenance
team inspection
(MTI),
conducted
during the annual
refueling outage
(NRC IR 397/90-05),
an MTI
inspector
determined that an unauthorized
splice had been installed in a
containment monitoring temperature
detector.
This condition was
referred to the resident
inspectors
for followup.
During a tour of the drywell on June 7, one of the team's
inspectors
identified
a
damaged flexible conduit for one of the
26 containment
temperature
detectors.
A maintenance
work instruction was generated
to
correct this deficiency before the
team left the site.
On June
13, just
prior to leaving the site, the inspector
was informed that the conduit
was repaired.
The inspector discovered that another year-old work request
was
outstanding
against
the
same deficiency.
When
he examined
the delayed
work request,
he determined that the work was waiting for parts.
Upon
closer examination, it was determined that the work could not be
performed correctly without installing
a splice in the temperature
detector
cable.
The completed
work request neither specified nor
contained
any information about
a splice.
When questioned
about
how he had accomplished
the work request,
the
technician stated that he had installed
a splice.
Examination of the
splice inside
an enclosed
condolet indicated that it was not of the
correct type
and that it had not been installed properly.
The licensee
undertook
an extensive investigation which was directed
by
a member of offsite management.
A team of licensee
investigators inter-
viewed plant staff personnel,
including members of the maintenance,
operations,
and quality control
and assurance
departments.
Through the interviews
and research
on the other work performed
by the
involved individuals, the investigation
team conducted
a thorough review
of the splices in the drywell and steam tunnel.
The work previously
performed
by the two technicians directly involved was reviewed
and
found to have
been acceptable.
No other splices
inspected
by the
licensee
were found to have
been deficient.
The licensee's
investigation
team determined that this was
an isolated
event
caused
by an individual's zeal to "get the job done".
The
investigation identified
a number of programmatic
problems which defeated
the normal
checks that would prevent this kind of problem.
8
Engineering
determined that this component
was not safety related,
but
that at the time of occurrence it was considered
to be safety related.
The licensee
subsequently
conducted
a number of meetings
between
management
and craft personnel
in all of the shops to insure that all
the staff understands
what occurred
and what management
expects.
The
licensee
also directed that all future splices
be performed
by
electrical
maintenance
personnel,
who perform more splices
and are more
familiar with splicing procedures.
From conversations
with a number of
craft personnel,
the inspector
concluded that the workers
he talked with
understood
the correct manner to perform work and what to do if the work
instruction was not adequate.
Enforcement action, if appropriate, will be addressed
in connection with
Inspection
Report
No. 397/90-05.
10.
Licensee
Event
Re ort
LER) Followu
90712
92700
The following LERs associated
with operating
events
were reviewed
by the
inspectors.
Based
on the information provided in the reports, it was
concluded that reporting requirements
had
been met, root causes
had
been
identified,
and corrective actions
were appropriate.
The below LERs are
considered
closed.
LER NUMBER
DESCRIPTION
LER 90-04
LER 90-05
Inoperability of High Pressure
System
due to equipment failure
Engineered
Safety Feature Actuation,
Containment
Instrument Air
LER 90-08
Inadequate
Seismic Monitoring Surveillance
LER 90-09
Loss of reactor protection
bus while in
Condition
5 due to
EPA breaker failure
No violations or deviations
were Identified.
11.
Review of Periodic
and
S ecial
Re orts
90713
Periodic
and special
reports
submitted
by the licensee
pursuant to
Technical Specifications 6.9.1
and 6.9.2 were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report contained
the information required to be reported
by NRC requirements;
test
results
and/or supporting information were consistent with design
predictions
and performance specifications;
and the reported information
was valid. Within the scope of the above,
the following reports
were
reviewed
by the inspectors:
o
Monthly Operating Reports for May and June
1990.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
10
12.
Exit Neetin
30703
The ins ectors
met
P
with licensee
management
representatives
periodically
during the report period to discuss
inspection status,
and
an exit meet-
ing was conducted with the indicated
personnel
(refer to paragraph
1) on
August 9, 1990.
The scope of the inspection
and the
inspectors'indings,
as noted in this report,
were discussed
and acknowledged
by
the licensee
representatives.
The licensee
did not identify as proprietary any of the information
reviewed
by or discussed
with the inspectors
during the inspection.