ML17285A780
| ML17285A780 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 10/03/1989 |
| From: | Knighton G Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17285A781 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8910180221 | |
| Download: ML17285A780 (12) | |
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UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM DOCKET NO. 50-397 NUCLEAR PROJECT NO.
2 AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE Amendment No.
74 License No.
NPF-21 1.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission or the NRC) has found that:
A.
The application for amendment filed by the Washington Public Power Supply System (the licensee),
dated October 24,
- 1988, complies with complies the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; B.
The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the regulations of the Commission; C.
There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I; D.
The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and E.
The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.
891018022i 89>003 PDR ADOCX 05000397 p
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Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-21 is hereby amended to read as follows:
(2)
Technical S ecifications and Environmental Protection Plan The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A, as revised through Amendment No.
74, and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix 8, are hereby incorporated in the license.
The licensee shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.
3.
This amendment is effective as of the date of issuance and must be fully implemented no later than 7 days from the date of issuance.
FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Attachment:
Changes to the Technical Specifications Date of Issuance:
October 3, 1989 George
. Knighton irector Projec Directorate V
Division of Reactor Projects - III, IV, V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
ENCLOSURE TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO.
74 FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO.
NPF-21 DOCKET NO. 50-397 Replace the following pages of the Appendix "A" Technical Specifications with the enclosed pages.
The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the areas of change.
Also to be replaced are the following overleaf pages.
AMENDMENT PAGE 3/4 3-58 3/4 3-59 B 3/4 3-4 OVERLEAF PAGE 3/4 3-57 3/4 3-60 B 3/4 3-3
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. INSTRUMENTATION
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~ 4 3/4. 3. 7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION
- 3. 3.7.1 The radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1 shall be OPERABLE with their alarm setpoints within the specified limits.
APPLICABILITY:
As shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1.
ACTION:
a.
b.
C.
With a radiation monitoring instrumentation channel alarm set-point exceeding the value shown in Table 3.3.7.1-1, adjust the set-point to within the limit within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> or declare the channel inoperable.
With one or more radiation monitoring channels inoperable, take the ACTION required by Table 3.3.7.1-1.
The provisions of Specifications 3.0.3 and 3.0.4 are not applicable.
SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS 4.3.7.1 Each of the above required radiation monitoring instrumentation channels shall be demonstrated OPERABLE by the performance of the CHANNEL
- CHECK, CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST and CHANNEL CALIBRATION operations for the conditions and at the frequencies shown in Table 4.3.7.1-1.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 3/4 3-5B Amendment No. 74
TABLE 4.3.6-1 (Continued)
CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS TABLE NOTATIONS (a}
Neutron detectors may be excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.
(b)
Within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> prior to startup, if not performed within the previous 7 days."
(c}
Includes reactor manual control multiplexing system input.
With THERMAL POWER
> 30K of RATED THERMAL POWER.
With more than one control rod withdrawn.
Not applicable to control rods removed per Specificati'on 3.9. 10. 1 or 3.9. 10.2.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 3/4 3"57
TABLE 3.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMENTATION 1.
Main Control Room Ventilation Radiation Monitor MINIMUM CHANNELS OPERABLE 2/intake APPLICABLE CONDITIONS 1,2,3,5 and
- ALARM SETPOINT
< 5000 cpm ACTION 70 2.
Area Monitors a.
Criticality Monitors 1)
New Fuel Storage Vault 2)
Spent Fuel Storage Pool TABLE NOTATIONS
< 5 R/h(a)
< 20 mR/h 71 71 "When the main condenser air evacuation system is in operation.
¹With fuel in the new fuel storage vault.
¹¹With fuel in the spent fuel storage pool.
(a)Alarm setpoint set IAW 10 CFR 70.24.a. 1.
ACTION STATEMENTS ACTION 70-ACTION 71 aO With one of the required monitors inoperable, manually isolate the associated remote air intake within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />; restore the inoperable channel to OPERABLE status within 7 days, or, within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the pressurization mode of operation.
With both of the required monitors inoperable, initiate and maintain operation of the control room emergency filtration system in the pressurization mode of operation within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.
With the required monitor inoperable, assure a portable continuous monitor with the same alarm setpoint is OPERABLE in the vicinity of the installed monitor during any fuel movement.
If no fuel movement is being made, perform area surveys of the monitored area with portable monitoring instrumentation at least once per 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />.
TABLE 4.3.7.1-1 RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION SURVEILLANCE RE UIREMENTS INSTRUMENTATION 1.
Hain Control Room Ventilation Radiation Honitor 2.
Area Honitors a.
Criticality Monitors 1)
New Fuel Storage Vault 2)
Spent Fuel Storage Pool CHANNEL CHECK CHANNEL FUNCTIONAL TEST CHANNEL CALIBRATION OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR ltHICH SURVEILLANCE RE UIRED 1,2,3,5and*
TABLE NOTATIONS NMith fuel in the new fuel storage vault.
HMith fuel in the spent fuel storage pool.
"i/hen the main condenser air evacuation system is in operation.
INSTRUMENTATION i ~
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BASES 3/4.3.5 REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The reactor core isolation cooling system actuation instrumentation is provided to initiate actions to assure adequate core cooling in the event of reactor isolation from its primary heat sink and the loss of feedwater flow to the reactor vessel without providing actuation of any of the emergency core cooling equipment.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4.3.6 CONTROL ROD BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION The control rod block functions are provided consistent with the require-,
ments of Specifications 3/4.1.4, Control. Rod Program Controls, 3/4.2, 'Power Distribution Limits and 3/4.3. 1 Reactor Protection System Instrumentation.
The trip logic is arranged so that a trip in any one of the inputs will result in a control rod block.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the difference between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
3/4. 3. 7 MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION 3/4. 3. 7. I RADIATION MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION
, The OPERABILITY of the radiation monitoring instrumentation ensures that; (1) the radiation levels are continually measured in the areas served by the individual channels; (2) the alarm is initiated when the radiation level trip setpoint is exceeded; and (3) sufficient information is available on selected plant parameters to monitor and assess these variables following an accident.
This capability is consistent with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 19, 41, 60, 61, 63, and 64.
The criticality monitor alarm setpoints were calculated using the criteria from 10 CFR 70.24.a. 1 that requires detecting a dose rate of 20 Rads per minute of combined neutron and gamma radiation at 2 meters.
The alarm setpoint was determined by calculational methods using the gamma to gamma plus neutron ratios from ANSI/ANS 8.3-1979, Criticality Accident Alarm System, Appendix B and assuming a critical mass was formed from a seismic event, with a volume of 6' 6' 6't a distance of 27.7 feet from the two detectors.
The calculated dose rate using the methodology is 5.05 R/hr.
The allowable value for the alarm setpoint was, therefore, established at 5R/hr.
3.4.3.7.2 SEISMIC MONITORING INSTRUMENTATION The OPERABILITY of the seismic monitoring instrumentation ensures that sufficient capability is available to promptly determine the magnitude of a seismic event and evaluate the response of those features important to safety.
This capability is required to permit comparison of the measured response to that used in the design basis for the unit.
This instrumentation is consistent with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.12, "Instrumentation for Earthquakes,"
April 1974.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR " UNIT 2 B 3/4 3-4 Amendment No.
74
INSTRUMENTATION BASES 3/4.3.4 RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP ACTUATION INSTRUMENTATION The anticipated transient without scram (ATWS) recirculation pump trip system provides a means of limiting the consequences of the unlikely occur-rence of a failure to scram during an anticipated transient.
The response of the plant to this postulated event falls within the envelope of study events in General Electric Company Topical Report NED0-10349, dated March 1971, and NED0-24222, dated December 1979.
The end-of-cycle recirculation pump trip (EOC-RPT) system is a part of the reactor protection system and is an essential safety supplement to the reactor trip.
The purpose of the EOC-RPT is to recover the loss of.thermal margin which occurs at the end-of-cycle.
The physical phenomenon involved is that the void reactivity feedback due to a pressurization transient can add positive reactivity to the reactor system at a faster rate than the control rods add negative scram reactivity.
Each EOC-RPT system trips both recircula-.
tion pumps, reducing coolant flow in order to reduce the void collapse in the core during two of the most limiting pressurization events.
The two events for which the EOC-RPT protective feature will function are closure of the turbine throttle valves and fast closure of the turbine governor valves.
A fast closure sensor from each of two turbine governor valves provides input to the EOC-RPT system; a fast closure sensor from each of the other two turbine governor valves provides input to the second EOC-RPT system.
Similarly, a position switch for each of two turbine throttle valves provides input to one EOC-RPT system; a position switch from each of the other two throttle valves provides input to the other EOC-RPT system.
For each EOC-RPT system, the sensor relay contacts are arranged to form a 2-out-of-2 logic for the fast closure of turbine governor valves and a 2-out-of-2 logic for the turbine throttle valves.
The operation of either logic will actuate the EOC-RPT system and trip both recirculation pumps.
Each EOC-RPT system may be manually bypassed by use of a keyswitch which is administratively controlled.
The manual bypasses and the automatic Operating Bypass at less than 30K of RATED THERMAL POWER are annunciated in the control room.
The EOC-RPT system response time is the time assumed in the analysis between initiation of valve motion and complete suppression of the electric arc, i.e.,
190ms, less the time allotted for sensor response, i.e., 10ms, and less the time allotted for breaker arc suppression determined by test, as correlated to manufacturer's test results, i.l., 83ms, and plant preoperational test results.
Operation with a trip set less conservative than its Trip Setpoint but within its specified Allowable Value is acceptable on the basis that the differ ence between each Trip Setpoint and the Allowable Value is equal to or less than the drift allowance assumed for each trip in the safety analyses.
WASHINGTON NUCLEAR - UNIT 2 B 3l4 3-3