ML17285A682

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Insp Rept 50-397/89-20 on 890710-14.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Liquids & Liquid Waste,Radwaste Mgt,Alara & Followup of Open & Unresolved Items
ML17285A682
Person / Time
Site: Columbia 
Issue date: 08/01/1989
From: Cicotte G, Garcia E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML17285A680 List:
References
50-397-89-20, NUDOCS 8908180346
Download: ML17285A682 (21)


See also: IR 05000397/1989020

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION

V

Report,No.

License

No.

Licensee:

Facility Name:

Inspection at:

50-397/89-20

NPF-21

Washington Public Power Supply System

P. 0.

Box 968

Richland,

Washington

99352

Washington Nuclear Project

No.

2

WNP-2 Site,

Benton County, Washington

Inspection

Conducted;

July 10-14

198

Inspected

by:

G.

R. Cicotte,

Ra iation Sp cia ist

Approved by:

. N. Garcia,

cting Chi

'acilities

Radiological Protection Section

~Suamar:

s-i-8'L

Date Signe

P r

ate

igne

Ins ection durin

the

eriod of Jul

10-14,

1989

(Re ort No. 50-397/89-20

Areas Ins ected:

Routine unannounced

inspection

by

a regionally based

inspector

o

iquids and liquid wastes,

radioactive waste

management,

ALARA,

and follow-up of open

and unresolved

items.

Inspection

procedures

30703,

84723,

84850,

83728,

90712,

90713,

92701,

and 92702 were addressed.

Results:

Of the four areas

addressed,

no violations were identified in two

areas.

In one area,

a violation of Technical Specification 6.5.2

was

identified, regarding audit of personnel

performance, training,

and

qualifications

(paragraph

2.A).

In another area,

one violation of Department

of Transportation

requirements

pursuant to 49

CFR 173, regarding

packaging

was

identified (paragraph

4.C).

A non-cited violation was also identified in

paragraph

4.C, related to

a shipment manifest error.

Overall, the licensee's

programs

appeared

capable of meeting their safety objectives.

DETAILS

I.

Persons

Contacted

  • J.

W. Baker, Assistant Plant Manager

  • J. D. Arbuckle, Compliance

Engineer

  • T. N. Brun, Plant guality Assurance

(gA) Engineer

A. I. Davis, Senior Radiochemist

  • R. -G. Graybeal,'Health

Physics/Chemistry

(HP/C) Manager

  • D. A. Kerlee, Principal

gA Engineer

  • D. E. Larson, Radiological

Programs

and Instrument Calibrations

(RPIC)

Manager

P. J. NacBettt; Engineering-Supervisor

L. L. Nayne,

Chemistry CrrR~jervisor

D. B..0&fey, Radiological

Assessments

Supervisor

  • R. F.

PatcCc;

ALA'RA Coordinator

  • D. J. Pisarcik,

HP Support Supervisor

  • L. A. Pritchard,

HP Craft Supervisor

E.

R. Ray, Instrumentation

and Controls

(ISC) Supervisor

K. A. Smith,

Radwaste

Program Leader

D. N. Werlau, Manager of HP/C 5 General

Employee Training (GET)

\\

  • Denotes

those present at the exit interview held

on July 14,

1989.

In addition to the individuals identified above,

the inspector

met and

held discussions

with other members of the licensee's

and

contractors'taff.

2.

Li uids and Li uid Wastes

84723)

A,

Audits

The following audits

were examined for applicability and content

related to .this program area:

88-453, Trainin

, Oualification and Performance of Plant

2 Staff

date

cto er

0,

19 8

89-490,

Radiolo ical Effluents, Environmental Monitorin

and

Offsite Dose Calcu ation Nanua

, dated

June

19,

1989

Audit 889-490 contained

no significant findings in the area of

liquid wastes.

At the time of the inspection,

responses

to the

findings were not yet due.

Audit 88-453 contained

a number of

findings related to records of training, mostly in departments

other

than

HP, Chemistry,

and radioactive waste handling.

The inspector

examined audit 888-453 to determine if licensee

personnel

having responsibilities

in the area of liquid waste

processing

had

been audited.

It was determined that the audit did

not list Equipment Operators

(EO), who operate

the liquid waste

processing

and effluent svstems.

II

Technical Specification (TS) 6.5.2.8 states

in part:

"Audits of unit activities shall

be performed

under the

cognizance

of the

CNSRB

t Corporate

Nuclear Safety Review

Board].

These audits shall

encompass:

"b.

The performance,

training and qualifications of the

entire unit staff at least

once per

12 months;"

When the matter was discussed

with the licensee's

audit personnel,

they stated that the

EOs

had been purposely excluded from the audit.

They further stated that this was

done in order to allow more time

to examine the other areas

more thoroughly,

as

numerous findings had

already

been

made in those areas.

The inspector

asked the audit

personnel if they had

a system'atic

method for assuring that

representative

populations

are audited,

such

as minimum sample size

and composition,

or if they had any guidance

on the matter.

They

stated that they relied

on their experience

to determine

proper

audit scope.

They further stated that they had not recognized

the

exclusion

as being contrary to TS 6.5.2.8.

The

CNSRB meeting

minutes of January 5, 1989, did not address

the change

in the scope

of audit 888-453.

The licensee

acknowledged that

TS 6.5.2.8.b

does

not allow exclusion

of a major group of personnel

on the unit staff, such

as

EOs.

The

last performance of an audit in this area

was conducted

in audit

b87-416,

dated October 9, 1987.

At the time of the inspection,

the

next scheduled

audit was to be performed in August/September,

1989.

The licensee

stated that an audit of training was conducted in May,

1989,

and that

some elements of EO training had

been

addressed.

The

inspector

asked if that portion of the audit had been

performed to

address

the lack of audit in 88-453.

The licensee

stated that it

had not,

and that there

had been

no findings specifically related to

EOs.

The inspector

concluded that

no audit of

EO performance,

training,

or qualifications

had

been

performed for the purpose of satisfying

TS 6.5.2.8.b,

from October 9, 1987,

when audit 887-416

was issued,

until the time of the inspection,

a period of 21 months.

This

appears

to be

a violation of TS 6.5.2.8.b(50-397/89-20-01).

Chan<hes

No major changes

to the licensee's

processing

and monitoring systems

had

been

made since the last inspection of this program area.

Revision

6 to the Offsite Dose Calculation

Manual

(ODCM) was

submitted with the July-December

1988 Semi-Annual Effluent Release

Report.

Most of the changes

were to correct previously identified

deficiencies.

The licensee

responded

by separate

correspondence

to

NRC concerns

regarding

the .licensee's

rationale for

some of the

changes.

N

C.

Effluents

D.

Radioactive liquid effluent release

records for the first half of

1989 were reviewed.

No major concerns

were identified.

However,

several

omissions

were noted in release

permits,

PPM 7.4.11.1. 1.1,

Radioactive Li uia Waste Dischar

e to the River.

The omissions

were

a ministrative in nature,

an

i

not signi scantly affect the

release itself.

However, the number,

about

one third of those

permits reviewed, did indicate

a certain lack of attention to detail

by technicians

and in the review process

by Chemistry supervision,

the Shift Support Supervisor,

and the Shift Supervisor.

Similar

concerns

were identified in review of radiation surveys

performed

for radioactive waste shipping (see

paragraph

4.C).

Liquid

effluents were within Technical Specification 3.11;

10 CFR 20;

Appendix B; and

10 CFR 50, Appendix I, limits.

Instrumentation

Representative

maintenance

records for liquid process

e'F,.luent

monitors were reviewed."

The effluent monitoring instrumentation

appeared

to be maintained in a manner consistent with the licensee's

program,

although several

discharges

were performed without the

monitor

due to unavailability.

Licensee

procedures

provided for

increased

sampling

and analysis

in accordance

with TS 3.3.7.11

action statements.

Overall, the licensee's

program appeared

capable of meeting its safety

objectives.

Other than that noted in paragraph

2.A above,

no violations

or deviations

were identified.

3.

Radioactive

Waste

Mana ement

(84850)

A.

Mana ement Controls

The following licensee

documents

and Plant Procedure

Manuals

(PPfl)

were reviewed to determine if they addressed

the regulatory

requirements

contained in 10 CFR 20 and

10

CFR 61:

PPM 1.12.1,

Radioactive

Waste

Mana ement

Pro ram,

$g/14/87

PPM 1.12.2,

Radioactive

Waste

Process

Contro

Pro Am, 12/14/87

PPM 1. 12.3, Contract

Yen or

Waste

rocessin

,

12

1 /88

PPM l. 12.4,

Process

F uids - Water

Ba ance

and

Consum tive Use,

10/27/87

NOS-40, Radioactive

Waste

Manaqement

NOS-41,

ua itv

ssurance

ro ram

or Radioactive Materials

Shi

in

Pac

a es

Responsibilities

and authority of licensee

personnel

were clearly

assigned

by the above referenced

procedures.

The licensee

was

conducting waste operations

and shipping in a manner consistent with

their established

implementing procedures,

with some exceptions

as

noted below.

One problem,

discussed

in paragraph

C, below,

was the

manner in which the licensee

had been assigning

HP personnel

to

perform shipping functions.

No major concerns

were identified.

The licensee

maintains

a

QC program consistent with 10 CFR 61.

Results of the most recent audits

and corrective actions

were

addressed

in Inspection

Report 50-397/88-41,

paragraph

2.A.

Due to

the

number of findings in audit ¹87-420,

the licensee

had conducted

an additional audit, ¹87-420-A.

No additional

concerns

were

identified by the audits in the area of shipping.

C.

Waste Hanifests

'Representative

radioact'ive waste

shipment records

were reviewed to

determine if the manifests

contained all the information required

by

regulations

and the burial facility's license.

Except for minor

typographical errors,

and one shipment discussed

below,

no concerns

were identified.

On June

13,

1989, the licensee

sent shipment ¹89-32-02 to the U.S.

Ecology licensed burial site located at Richland, Washington,

about

18 miles from the licensee's facility.

On June

14',

1989, the

licensee

was informed by the State of Washington

Department of

Health and Social Services that the manifest

was incorrect, in that

the

number

on one of the packages,

an

LSA box,

was not listed on the

manifest,

and that one

number

on the manifest

was not represented

by

an accompanying

LSA box.

It should

be noted that the regulatory

requirements

regarding manifests/shipping

papers

are prescribed

in

49

CFR Parts

172.200-204,

10 CFR Part 20.311(b)

and (c) and in the

applicable burial sites'icense.

Each regulatory requirement

requires

the waste, generator to certify on the manifests that the

transported

materials

are properly classified,

described,

packaged,

marked

and labeled.

The inspector

noted that the

numbers differed

by one digit, that is, the manifest indicated the inclusion of box

¹94196,

which was not shipped.

Box ¹94186,

which was shipped,

was

not on the manifest.

The licensee

was further informed that the drain plugs

on

LSA boxes

94184,

94195,

94853,

95077,

95078,

95079,

95082,

105094,

and 105095,

were loose, constituting

a failure to maintain strong tight packages

in accordance

with 49

CFR 173.425(b)(1),

and that

a radiation dose

rate reading in the 'sleeper'ortion

of the truck cab

was in excess

of 2 mi llirem per hour (mr/hr), contrary to 49

CFR 173.441(b)(4).

49

CFR 173.411 states

that radiation levels must not exceed

2

millirem per

hour in any normally occupied

spaces.

The information provided to the licensee

on June

14, 1989,

was

followed by a written citation dated

June

21, 1989, identifying the

above three violations.

The inspector

reviewed the records for shipment ¹89-32-02 and,

discussed

the matter with licensee

personnel.

The licensee

was

taking the following corrective action:

Licensee

procedures

were being revised to assure

that

HP

personnel

would specifically match manifests to packages

immediately prior to shipment,

and that labor personnel

would

be warned to inform HP personnel

of changes'

The licensee's

sign-off function for gC personnel

was being

revised

such that in future they will sign for tightness of

drain plugs,

as contrasted

with signing for presence

thereof,

as

had

been previously done.

The Radwaste

Pro'gram Leader

(RWPL) had been instructed to

personally verify manifest information, and provide more

specific guidance to

HP technicians

on how surveys

are to be

performed.

The procedures

addressing

surveys of the truck cab were being

clarified to prevent recurrence

of the greater

than

2 mr/hr

reading cited by the state of Washington.

The licensee

stated

that the

HP technician

had non-conservatively

assumed

that

"normally occupied positions

on the vehicle" as delineated

in

PPM 11.2.23.4,

LSA Radioactive Materials Shi ments

and other

related

procedures

did not apply to the sleeper portion of the

cab

on an

18 mile trip.

The matter of the qualifications of the

HP technician

was discussed

with the licensee.

The

HP technician

was

a contractor

who had

been

terminated at the end of the most recent refueling outage.

The

licensee

stated that

an in-depth review had revealed that although

the technician

met the qualifications for ANSI N18.1-1971,

he had

no

prior experience specifically in shipping,

and

had not attended

the

special

radioactive waste shipping training provided to virtually

all of the licensee

HP technicians.

The licensee further stated

that future shipments

would be conducted

using only those

personnel

who had attended

the training.

The inspector

asked

the

HP/C Manager

how that would be assured.

The

HP/C Manager

responded

by stating

that

a memorandum to personnel

responsible for assignment

of

technicians

would be promulgated stating that commitment.

The

inspector verified that the technician

had met the qualifications

for ANSI N18. 1-1971,

and that the above noted

memorandum

had

been

developed for distribution.

The following observations

regarding this matter

were made:

The manifest errors

appeared

to have

been administrative in

nature,

as the result of a single digit transposition.

The citation by the state of Washington

had stated that

a

radiation reading of 2.8 mr/hr was obtained at the back wall of

the 'sleeper'ompartment

of the transport vehicle.

It did not

indicate that this was

a whole body penetrati'ng

dose rate.

The

driver's position

had measured

a dose rate of about

1 mr/hr.

The 'sleeper'ompartment

was not occupied during the transport

of shipment f89-32-02 to the burial site.

The licensee

had

made only one shipment of radioactive waste

since

shipment 889-30-02,

regarding which no significant

problems

were identified.

The licensee

had just developed

a

new lesson

plan for the

special

radioactive

waste handling training, to address

issues

identified by licensee

audits

and evaluations.

The state of Washington did not withhold authorization to use

the burial facility, but did request

a 30-day response,

which

would be due July 21, 1989.

A'eview of records did not reveal

any recent

examples of the

same violation, although the State of Washington report of the

violation noted that previous transposition errors

on manifests

had occurred in 1988.

The changes

to the licensee's

procedures

appeared

adequate

to

prevent recurrence of the violation.

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, section

V.A, Notice of Violation, states

in part that for isolated Severity Level

vio atsons,

a notice of

violation normally will not be issued

regardless

of who identifies

the violation provided that the licensee

has initiated appropriate

corrective action before the inspection

ends.

The inspector

determined that the manifest error met the criteria necessary

to not

cite the violation (NCV-50-397/89-20-02).

10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, section V.G.1, allows

NRC to exercise

discretion to not cite

a Severity Level

IY violation, provided in

part that the violation is identified by the licensee.

The failure to make the

LSA boxes of shipment II89-30-02 strong tight

packages

in accordance

with Department of Transportation

requirements

appears

to be

a violation of 49

CFR 173.425(b)(1)

(50-397/89-20-03).

D.

Waste Classification

The licensee's

waste classification

procedures

and program provide

reasonable

assurance

that low-level wastes

are classified in

accordance

10 CFR 61.55.

No examples of improperly classified

wastes

were observed.

The licensee

was evaluating whether

classification would be affected

by the analysis errors

discussed

in

paragraph

E, below.

E.

Waste

Form and Characterization

The licensee's

methodology of waste

form and characterization

were

consistent with 10 CFR 61.56.

The licensee

uses

a contractor to

perform analyses

for the purpose of developing input to their

computerized

waste characterization

program.

Computer output is

routinely verified by independent calculation,

and documented with

the codes.

At the time of the inspection,

the licensee

had just received

a

letter from their contractor for waste

stream characterization,

which stated that calculations for some radioactive isotopes

were

incorrect.

The error was the responsibility of the contractor,

and

the letter indicated that the contractor

had already contacted

NRC.

The change

in activity shipped

was quickly determined

by the

licensee

to affect approximately

130 packages.

The recalculation

F.

factors were relatively low, for isotopes

which do not-predominate

in the licensee's

waste

stream. 'he licensee-determined

that no

notifications were necessary

at the time of the inspection,

but had

concluded that three

semi-annual

effluent release

reports

would

likely be affected.

Waste

Shi ment Labelin

No examples of improperly labeled radioactive material

were

observed.

The licensee's

procedures

contain

a sign-off function for

verification of the presence

of the -proper

Class

-A, B, or

C label.

One shipment of radioanalytical

samples,

which was shipped offsite,

was observed

to have

been

shipped

by using licensee

procedure

PPM

11.2.~,

Shi

in

Other<han

LSA Radioactive Materials, Revision

6, dated 10/24/88.

Th~pment

was categorized

as

Radioactive

Matexial., N.O.S.,

UN2982." . PPM 11.2.23.6 states,

in part:

"C.

This procedure

address

the following shipping categories:

1.

RAN, Limited guantity, N.O.S.,

UN2910

2.

RAN, Instruments

and Articles,

UN2911

3.

RAM, Special

Form, N.O.S.,

UN 2974

4.

RAM, N.O.S.,

UN2912"

H.

However, the checklist includes

a portion for category

UN 2982.

While the material

was not shipped

as waste, it was handled

by

radwaste

personnel.

The inspector

noted to the licensee that

although the material

was properly categorized,

the procedure

did

not authorize its use for that category,

and this procedural

logic

error was not recognized

by their personnel.

The licensee

acknowledged

the observation.

Trackin

of Waste

Shi ments

The licensee's

procedures

contain provisions for investigation if

re'ceipt acknowledgement

from the consignee

is not received within

one week, -in accordance

with 10 CFR 20.311.,

The licensee

stated

that no instances

of late receipt acknowledgement

had

been

experienced.

Dis osal Site License Conditions

The licensee

had

a current version of the disposal site's license,

WN-I019-2.

No examples of failure to meet disposal site license

conditions were observed.

Overall, the licensee's

program appeared

capable of meeting its safety

objectives.

Other than that noted in paragraph

C above,

no violations or

deviations

were identified.

4.

Maintainin

Occu ational

Ex osures

ALARA (83728)

A.

Audits and

A

raisals

B.

No audit of this program area

was

due or conducted

since the last

inspection.

ALARA Pro ram Chan

es

C.

The licensee

had

made personnel

changes

in ALARA. Responsibilities

for various tasks

had

been divided among area coordinators,

to allow

the

ALARA Coordinator to focus attention

on overall function of the

program.

In an effort to improve access

controls, the licensee

had

modified their pre-job briefing procedure

such that two levels of

briefing would be done,

depending

on the level of hazard present.

Worker Awareness

and Involvement

D,

Worker involvement in the

ALARA process,

via the licensee's

ALARA

Im rovement

Su

estion

Pro

ram AIS

, had increased.

Although some

workers were not fu

y aware of t eir role in the program,

knowledge

of ALARA goals

had improved.

ALARA Goals

and Ob'ectives

E.

The licensee

had revised estimates

of collective exposure,

usually

in reaction to unscheduled

outage activities.

ALARA committee

meeting minutes indicated that the licensee is regularly reviewing

their goals

and objectives to assure

ALARA principles are met.

The

licensee's

goal of 400 person-rem for the July 1989-July

1990

(fiscal year 1990) period is less

than the previous actual

accumulated

dose,

noted in paragraph

4.E, below.

The licensee

had conducted

several

dose-reduction activities during

the

1989 refueling outage.

The ALARA Coordinator stated that these

activities are expected

to result in improved estimates

and lower

doses

during

some tasks.

ALARA Results

The licensee

had revised estimated

outage collective dose from 170

person-rem prior to the outage,

to

a dose estimate

during the outage

of 270 person-rem.

The final dose

had

been approximately

397

person-rem.

Much of this dose,

however,

had

been

accumulated

during

extensive

maintenance

which had not been decided

upon prior to the

outage.

The licensee's

total

dose for calendar

1988 was

353

person-rem,

which was less than for 1987.

The total accumulated

dose for 1989

was approximately

457 person-rem at the time of the

inspection.

The inspector

noted that the licensee

had performed

some tasks with

less

dose

expended

than is experienced

in many plants of the

same

design.

Overall, the licensee's

program appeared fully capable of meetina its

safety objectives.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

5.

~Fol low-u

A.

Inoffice Re;i=;; -, Periodic

and

S ecial

Re orts

90713

1988 Radiolo ical Environmental Nonitorin

Pro ram Annual

Re ort:

e'eview in icate

t at t e

icensee.provi

e

ata

an

ana ysis

results for radiological environmental

samples

and measurements

for

the period, in accordance

with the program

as described

in Technical

Specification 3/4.12.

Comparison with pre-operational

data

and

previous environmental

surveillance reports indicates that their

conclusion that airborne radioactivity, direct radiation, water,

milk and food crops,

among other dose

pathways

from the environment

to man, did not affect plant environs.

All sample results

were

~ below regulatory reporting levels.

The report included. maps,

deviations

from the monitoring program that were corrected

so that

no long-term effect will result,

achievement of all LLDs at or below

the levels required- by the Technical Specifications,

aud results of

EPA Intercomparison

which help to assure

continued guality Control.

The Land Use

Census

did not change significantly from the previous

year.

Annual Environmental

0 eratin

Re ort 1988:

A report

on plant effects in soil and vegetation,

which is prepared

for the State of l'ashington,

has

been s'tudied annually since

1980

(preoperational

to 1984).

The

MNP2 Environmental

Protection

Plan

(EPP) requires

a year monitoring program to assure

the effects of

the cooling tower draft.

Results for 1988 soil chemistry

and

vegetation

analysis

shows

no trends or abnormalities

in relevant

chemistry parameters.

No violations or deviations

were identified.

B.

Follow-u

92701

,

92702)

(90712

50-397/88-41-01

Closed:

This matter refers to adequacy of airborne

monitoring in the breathing

zone,

and

use of extremity dosimetry,

during spent resin handling

(see Inspection

Report (IR)

50-397/88-41).

The licensee

had concluded that the ratio of

extremity dose to whole body dose

when standing

on top of resin

liners was not sufficient to warrant the additional monitoring.

They had decided to continue

an increased

level of airborne

radioactivity sampling for the evolution.

The inspector determined

that both actions

were adequate

to achieve

the safety objective.

This matter is considered

closed.

50-397/88-41-03(Closed):

This matter refers to an unauthorized

entry of personne

into a posted

High Radiation Area

(HRA) (see

IRs

50-397/88-41,

89-02,

and 89-09).

The licensee

had conducted

additional training,

and

had

made

changes

as noted in paragraph

4.B,

above,

as committed to in their timely response

to the Notice of

10

Violation.

The inspector

noted that there did not appear to have

been

a recurrence.

This matter is considered

closed.

50-397/89-09-Ol(Closed

This matter refers to the licensee's

e

orts to construct

an enclosure of an area

on the Turbine Building

501'levation of greater

than

1000 mrem/hr (see

IR 50-397/89-02).

The inspector

observed that the enclosure

had

been constructed.

This matter is considered

closed.

50-397/89-09-02

Closed

This matter refers to a failure to

maintain

a ra iation area posting

(see

IR 50-397/89-02).

The

licensee,

in their timely response,

had committed to evaluate

the

effectiveness

of HP management

tours,

upgrade postings,

and train

supervisors

in recognition of radiation safety issues.

The

corrective actions

were verified to have

been performed.

This

matter is considered

closed.

50-397/89-OI-XO Closed

This matter refers to an inoperability of

the Post-Accident

Samp ing System

(PASS) containment

atmospheric

radiation monitor.

The inspector verified that the licensee

had

addressed

concerns

expressed

by

NRC at the time the inoperability

occurred

on March 6,

1989.

The licensee

had submitted

a timely

.

Special

Report,

dated

March 22,

1989, detailing additional

maintenance

which was performed or which was expected

to be

performed.

No concerns

were identified.

This matter is considered

closed.

50-397/IN-88-10 Closed

This is Information Notice 888-101,

S i ments of Contaminate'd

E ui ment Between Nuclear

Power Plants,

which t e licensee

a

received

an

distribute

.

T e inspector

verified that the licensee

had considered

and incorporated

the

information in their program.

This matter is considered

closed.

50-397/85-20-04

Unresolved):

This refers to plateout of iodine on

samp ing

ines

un er accident conditions.

The licensee

had

conducted

some of the in-plant testing which was discussed

in IR

50-397/88-33.

The licensee's

staff stated that the laboratory

testing

was in the approval

process prior to award of the contract.

The data from the in-plant testing

was preliminary at the time of

the inspection.

This matter will remain

open pending further

testing

and evaluation

by the licensee.

An unresolved

item is one about which more information is required

in order to determine if it is an acceptable

item,

a violation, or a

deviation.

6.

Tours of the Facilit

Tours of the Radwaste

Building (RWB), Reactor

Building (RB), and Turbine

Building (TB), were conducted.

Independent

radiation surveys

were

performed with NRC ion chamber

survey instrument

model

836100, serial

b009162, that was

due for calibration

on September

2, 1989.

11

Radiological postings,

contamination control stepoff pads,

and other

access

controls which were observed

were consistent with the licensee's

procedures

and

TS requirements.

Radiological

work practices

appeared

to

have

improved over those

observed

during previous inspections.

The licensee

was expending significant effort to restore cleanliness

after the outage.

Little clutter was observed.

In one room, bR316,

which was

an electrical

panel

room,

a large volume of combustible

cleaning materials

had been stocked.

The room was marked with a large

sign which read:

"Combustible materials

not allowed in this room."

The

licensee

removed the material

when it was brought to their attention.

On July 13, 1989,

one portable contamination frisker, model

RN-20, and

a

portal contamination monitor, model

IPN-8, had not had their daily source

response

checks

recorded

on the attached daily instrument source

check

tag.

The RN-20 had

been

marked

as satisfactory

on the licensee's

inventory sheet for the day.

Licensee staff personnel

stated that the

attached

tag is the only record of the check for the IPN-8.

However, the

individual who performs the checks stated that the IPN-8 had

been

checked

that day.

Both monitors were checked satisfactorily the next day.

7.

Exit Interview

The inspector

met with those individuals, denoted

in paragraph

1, at the

conclusion of the inspection

on July 14,

1989.

The scope

and findings

of the inspection

were summarized.

The licensee

committed to perform an

audit of eouipment operators

as corrective action for the apparent

violation (paragraph

2.A).

The licensee

was informed that

a

determination

as to enforcement

action regarding

the three identified

49

CFR 173 violations would be made

subsequent

to the inspection.

The

licensee

was informed by the Senior Resident

Inspector

that an issue of

. non-HP personnel

adherence

to good radiological work practices

would be

examined in later inspections.