ML17279A975
| ML17279A975 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 03/30/1988 |
| From: | Caldwell C, Johnson P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17279A974 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-88-09, 50-397-88-9, IEB-85-003, IEB-85-3, NUDOCS 8804190120 | |
| Download: ML17279A975 (13) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1988009
Text
U.
S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report
No.
Docket No.
License
No.
50-397/88-09
50-397
Licensee:
Facility Name:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.
0.
Box 968
Richland,
99352
Washington Nuclear Project
No.
2 (WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
conducted:
March 7 - March 11,
1988
Inspector:
C.
W. Caldwell, Proj ct Inspector
Da
e
S gned
Approved By:
P.
H. Johnson,
Chief,
Reactor Proj'ects
Section
3
Date Signed
Ins ection
Summar
Ins ection
on March
7 - March ll
1988
Re ort No. 50-397/88-09
Areas Ins ected:
Routine project inspection in the areas of scram discharge
volume capacity,
respon'se
to
"Motor Operated
Valve Common
Mode Failure"; followup of inspector identified items,
and on-site review of
events.
Inspection procedures
25590,
25573,
92701,
93702,
and 30703 were
covered.
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SIMS
Items:
Item 41, Multiplant Action (MPA)
Item B-58, Licensee's
Scram Discharge
Volume Capacity.
Results:
No violations or deviations
were identified.
One inspector followup
item was identified (paragraph
7) which deals with licensee
evaluation to
determine if environmental qualification requirements
are adequately
maintained
during and following the performance of surveillance
procedures.
SS04190i20
S80330
ADOCK 05000397
O
DETAILS
Persons
Contacted
Licensee
Personnel
- C. M.
J.
W.
D. S.
A. G.
K. D.
N. C.
R. L.
R. J.
- E. R.
- S. L.
- W. H.
J.
D.
Powers,
Plant Manager
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
Feldman,
Plant equality Assurance
Manager
Hosier, Nuclear Safety Assurance
Group Manager
Cowan, Plant Technical
Manager
Bartlett, Plant
gC Supervisor
Koenigs, Plant Technical
Supervisor
Barbee,
Plant Engineering Supervisor
Ray, Instrumentation
and Controls Supervisor
Lead Compliance
Engineer
Sawyer,
Control
Room Supervisor
Arbuckle, Compliance
Engineer
- Denotes
those attending
the final exit meeting
on March 11,
1988.
The inspector also contacted
licensee
operators,
engineers,
technicians,
and other personnel
during the course of the inspection.
Ins ection
To Verif
Licensee's
Scram Dischar
e Volume
Ca abi lit ,
Safet
Issues
Mana ement
S stem
SINS
Item 41
The inspector
reviewed the licensee's
actions to ensure that the scram
discharge
volume
(SDV) capability was in accordance
with long term
commitments.
These
commitments
were in response
to concerns
identified by
the
NRC in Multiplant Action (MPA) Item B-58.
In particular, the licensee
was required to improve the hydraulic coupling between
the
and
the
SDV instrumented
volume, to increase
the reliability of the float
switches
in the instrumented
volume,
and to modify the instrumented
volume
to prevent
damage to the level sensors
by hydrodynamic forces
and water
hammer.
The inspector
reviewed the final safety analysis
report
(FSAR)
and Drawing
N-528, Revision 45, "Flow Diagram, Control
Rod Drive System," to determine
the hydraulic coupling between
the headers
and the instrumented
volume.
The inspector verified that the design basis for the scram discharge
volume was 3.34 gallons
per rod drive unit.
This was identified as
an
acceptable
means of meeting the sufficient volume criterion established
in
General Electric letter
ER 54 dated
March 14,
1972.
Drawing M-528 showed
that the system
was designed with progressively larger piping ((from each
hydraulic control unit (HCU) to the instrumented
volume)) to minimize flow
restriction.
The only location where blockage
needed
to be assumed
in the
design analysis
(piping less
than
2 inches
in diameter)
was the discharge
line form the hydraulic control unit since the piping diameter
was 3/4
inch.
However, blockage
here would only cause, failure of one control rod
to insert.
This was determined to be an acceptable
consequence
for a
single failure and
was evaluated
as part of the design basis..
The
inspector
reviewed drawing N-528 to ensure
that the
SDV vent and drain
valves close
on
a loss of air and toured the control
room to verify that
there
was valve position indication for these valves.
The inspector
noted
that there were two vent and drain valves per
HCU, with each valve powered
from the two trains of the reactor protective
system
(RPS).
As
a result,
if the
RPS should lose
power the valves would fail closed
and were
protected
from a single active failure.
The inspector
reviewed the
FSAR and drawing N-528,
and walked
down the
accessible
portions of the system.
The inspector
found that the
safety-related
instrument level taps
were
on the instrumented
volume,
as
required,
and not connected
to the attached
piping.
The inspector
noted
that there were
6 level instruments
per
SDV.
These consisted of 2
Rosemount
level transmitters
and
4 Magnetrol float switches.
These level
instruments
were set at three different levels.
At the lowest level,
one
of the float switches
would actuate
to indicate that the volume was not
completely
empty during post-scram draining or to indicate that the
was starting to fill through leakage
accumulation at other times during
reactor operation.
At the second level,
a second float switch would
actuate
a rod withdrawal block when leakage
accumulated
to half the
capacity of the instrumented
volume.
The remaining
two float switches
and
the
two level transmitters
were interconnected
with the reactor protection
system to give
a scram
when
a high water level existed in the instrumented
volume.
The high level
was set to allow for sufficient volume for a full
reactor
The inspector
noted that there
was
one instrument tap for
every
two level instruments.
In addition,
each instrument
had its own
manually operated
isolation valves.
The header
piping arrangement
was
such that there would be
a relatively slow filling of the instrumented
volume to preclude
a water
hammer effect on the piping and
instrumentation.
The inspector considered
that using this instrument
arrangement
allowed for adequate
redundancy
and diversity.
The inspector
reviewed the following surv'eillance
procedures:
7.4. 1.3.1.4. 1, Revision 1, "Scram Discharge
Volume Operability Test"
7.4.3. 1. 1.17, Revision 1,
"RPS
SDV Level Channels
B and
D Channel
Calibration and Channel
Functional Test"
7.4.3.1.1. 16, Revision 1,
"RPS
SDV Level Channels
B and
D Channel
Calibration and Channel
Functional Test"
7.4. 1.3. 1.1, Revision 6,
"Scram Discharge
Volume Vent and Drain
Valves Operability"
7.4.3.1.1.61,
Revision 7,
"RPS-SDV Level Transmitter
(Channels
A 8
C)
Channel
Functional Test"
7.4.3.1.1.68,
Revision 4,
"RPS-SDV Level Transmitter
(Channels
B
& D)
Channel
Functional
Test"
7.4.3.1. 1.59,,Revision ll, "RPS-SDV Level Transmitter
(Channels
B 8
0) Calibration"
7.4.3. 1.1.60,
Revision ll, "RPS-SDV Level Transmitter
(Channels
A 5
C) Calibration"
The inspector verified that procedures
existed to perform surveillances
periodically in accordance
with the Technical Specification
(TS)
requirements.
The surveillance
procedures
appeared
to be of sufficient
detail to adequately test the level alarm and trip instrumentation.
They
demonstrated
that the scram instrument
response
and valve function tests
were performed at pressure
and temperature
and at approximately
505
control
rod density.
The procedures
also provided for proper restoration
of the system configuration
upon completion of testing.
As
a result of the inspector's
review of the system configuration,
the
inspector considered
that the system
was not susceptible
to
a single
failure; that it was designed
with adequate
volume; that it should
be
subject to minimal hydrodynamic forces
and water
hammer;
and, that the
instrument arrangement
allowed for adequate
redundancy
and diversity.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Licensee's
Res
onse
To
"MOV Corwon
Mode Failures
Durin
P ant Transients
Due
o
Im ro er Sw>tc
Settln
s
The inspector
continued
a review of the licensee's
program for testing of
motor operated
valves
(MOVs) in response
to
In
particular,
the inspector
reviewed
the Supply System's
training program
for personnel
performing testing using motor operated
valve analysis
and
testing
(MOVATS) equipment.
In the past,
the licensee
sent their
personnel
to MOVATS Inc. for training on the use of the testing equipment.
Since the original inspection in this area,
the licensee
has instituted
their own training program.
The inspector
reviewed lesson
plan 82-ELE-1100-LP,
"MOVATS 2100/2150 Field
Data Acquisition and Analysis".
This training plan was designed
to expand
upon the
MOV actuator training course that was required for all personnel
performing
MOVATS testing.
The lesson
plan was constructed
to teach
personnel
how to perform signature acquisition according to the
manufacturers'pecification
and the plant procedure.
The inspector
found
that it provided
a review of motor operated
valve actuator operation
and
a
detailed description of the theory of operation
and the use (including
hands-on
experience)
of MOVATS equipment.
The inspector
found that the
licensee's
program for training personnel
closely followed the technical
content of the Limitorque operator
manual
and the
MOVATS Inc. training
manual.
Discussions
with the licensee
indicated that personnel
performing
MOVATS testing will be trained
and tested prior to the next refueling
outage at which time additional testing will take place.
The inspector
considered
that the licensee's
training program
was adequate
to train
personnel
performing
MOV testing.
Additional inspections will take place
during the upcoming refueling outage to ensure that the Supply System's
overall
program for performing
MOV testing is adequate.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
Licensee Actions
On Previous
NRC Ins ection Findin
s
a.
Closed)
Fol lowu
Item
87-11-01),
"Determination of Need for
us ment to
e
n er
ro ram
This item identified that the equipment
used for the
MOV testing
program
was not controlled under the Measuring
and Test Equipment
(MKTE) program.
The inspector
recommended
that the licensee
evaluate
the need for this equipment to be included
as
MSTE.
Discussions
with the licensee
revealed that the
NOVATS equipment
has
been incorporated
in the
MSTE program.
The equipment
was sent to
NOVATS Inc. for calibration prior to use during the upcoming
refueling outage
since the Supply System did not have the facilities
to perform the calibrations.
In addition, this equipment will be
recalibrated
on
a periodic basis.
The inspector considered
that the
licensee's
actions
were appropriate
to control the use of this
equipment.
Therefore, this item is closed.
Closed)
Followu
Item
87-21-01
"Review Of Work Performed
Under
Vita
NWR Pro
ram
This concern dealt with the level of detail specified for work on
vital maintenance
work request
(NWR)-1378 and the apparent
lack of
strict controls for work performed
on vital
MWRs in general.
NWR-1378
was
issued to repair the clutch mechanism for the valve operator
on
leakage control
(MSLC) valve 1A.
Due to various
problems
encountered
and the lack of strict controls established
in the
NWR,
the motor operator failed on July 20,
1987.
The inspector
observed
the licensee's
repair of the operator
on NSLC valve lA several
days
later.
However,
long term corrective actions
had not been
implemented until recently.
During this inspection,
the inspector
reviewed the licensee's
long
term corrective action which was to issue
Revision
8 to
PPN 1.3.7,
"Maintenance
Work Request".
This revision defined additional
controls (e.g., additional
reviews
and more definitive instructions
to personnel) for work to be performed
on vital NWRs.
The inspector
considered
that the procedure revisions
should lessen
the potential
for error when performing work specified in vital NWRs.
Therefore,
this item is closed.
Closed
Followu
Item
87-21-02
, "Review Of Licensee's
Con
s urat>on
ontro
ro ram
This item identified the inspector's
concern
over the licensee's
configuration control program.
In particular,
jumpers
were found
missing
by the licensee
in July,
1987 from 12 of 16 valves
in the
MSLC system for no apparent
reason.
These
jumpers
were specified to
be in place
by the applicable
upper tier drawings for the valves.
The inspector
noted that similar concerns
over the configuration
control
program were identified in the safety
system functional
inspection
(SSFI) that was conducted
in August,
1987.
For immediate
corrective actions,
the licensee
performed
a walkdown of motor
operated
valves of which the status
of the installed jumpers
was
indeterminate.
Long term corrective actions
were not implemented
until recently.
For long term corrective action,
the licensee
issued
a revision to
PPM 1.4. 1, "Plant Modifications".
This procedure revision was
designed
to better integrate
the activities of all groups
involved in
the modification process.
In addition,
the
new procedure
required
that the plant system engineer
perform
a post modification review
and/or walkdown of the system modification.
This walkdown will be
performed with support
form the Design Engineering,
Maintenance,
Operations,
and gA/gC as appropriate
to assure
completion of all
required work prior to returning the system to service.
The
licensee's
corrective actions
should minimize the potential for
future configuration control errors.
Therefore, this item is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
5.
Licensee
Event
Re ort
LER
Followu
The inspector
reviewed the following LER packages
to determine
the extent
of the licensee's
corrective actions.
These
packages
included the
proposed modifications which the Supply System intends to implement during
the upcoming refueling outage.
Based
upon the inspector's
review of the
proposed corrective actions,
these
LERs are considered
closed.
(Closed)
LER 87-17 Revision 0,
"RWCU System Isolation
Due To
Demineralizer Influent Valve Leakage"
(Closed)
LER 88-02 Revision 0, "Part 21 Report Dealing With Potential
For An Unmonitored Release
Path Through Reactor
Core Isolation
Cooling System Piping"
No violations or deviations
were identified.
6.
Plant Tour
The inspector
conducted
a tour of the reactor building on March 8,
1988 to
assess
the licensee's
housekeeping
activities.
In general,
the building
cleanliness
was adequate.
However, the inspector identified
a discrepancy
as identified below.
The inspector
found that the bolts
had
been
loosened
and the cover
was
open for terminal
box TB-IR-68-2 Division 2 on the 548 foot elevation of
the reactor building.
The inspector
noted that
a sticker
had been
attached
to the front cover of the box identifying that it was under
PPN
10. 1.21,
"Maintenance of Environmentally gualified Equipment," control.
The inspector questioned
the licensee
as to why this box cover had
been
left open
and reviewed procedure
PPM 10. 1.21 to determine
environmental
qualification (Eg) requirements for terminal
boxes.
The inspector discussed
this item with the licensee
who identified that
the operators
entered
TB-IR-68-2 and other terminal
boxes
the previous
day
to perform Surveillance
Procedure
7.0.0, "Shift and Daily Instrument
Checks
(Nodes
1, 2, 3)."
In the case of TB-IR-68-2, the operators
were
required to check the
cam position for the containment inerting system
timer.
The inspector
reviewed
PPM 10.1.21
and found that step 10.1.21.7.B.6
specified that
Eg equipment that
was covered
by the Technical
Specifications
(TS) surveillance
program shall
have the special
requirements
for the equipment specified in the surveillance
procedure.
However, the inspector
found
no
Eg requirements
specified in surveillance
procedure
7.0.0.
Discussions
with cognizant licensee
personnel
indicated
that terminal
box TB-IR-68-2 was
a spray tight enclosure
only.
The
Eg
requirements
were intended for the seals
used
on conduit that penetrate
the bottom of this box.
These
seals
must
be reinstalled after completion
of work to ensure that water does
not flow through the conduit to the
electrical
component at the end of the conduit run.
For immediate corrective action,
the Instrumentation
and Control
technicians
closed the cover and tightened
the bolts for TB-IR-68-2.
In
addition, technicians
inspected
other boxes to ensure that they were
properly closed.
Although the case of TB-IR-68-2 did not appear to be of
any safety significance,
the inspector
expressed
concern to the Supply
System
management
that there
may be surveillance
procedures
that should
have
Eg requirements
specified in them but do not.
The licensee
management
stated that they would take steps
to ensure that
Eg
requirements
were met when performing surveillance
procedures.
The
licensee's
actions
on this matter will be reviewed in the future and is
identified as inspector
followup item (397/88-09-01).
No violations or deviations
were identified.
On-Site Review of Events
On March 9, 1988, the Supply System identified to the
NRC the possible
desire for a temporary waiver to TS 3.8.2.1 since they could not meet the
surveillance
requirement limits specified in Table 4.8.2.1-1.
In
particular,
24VDC battery
BO-1B had
a pilot cell specific gravity below
the 1.200 Category
"A" limit and
an overall battery average specific
gravity of 1. 190 which was below the 1.205 Category
"B" limit.
However,
at no time was the
TS allowable value exceeded.
The reason for the low
specific gravity on this battery
was determined
to be stratification as
a
result of the discharge that took place the, previous
week while performing
breaker testing.
At that time, the power supply for the battery charger
was
removed
from service
and battery
BO-1B had to act as the power supply
for various
DC equipment.
The licensee
contacted
the vendor to determine
if any corrective actions
could be taken for the low gravities experienced
in each of the jars for battery B0-1B.
The result of the discussion with the vendor
led the licensee
to take
specific gravities at various heights in each of the battery jars
and then
average
the values (in each jar) to determine its actual specific gravity.
The results of the measurements
indicated that the specific gravity for
the pilot cell
and the average specific gravity for the battery
was
significantly higher than the Category
"A" and "B" limits.
As
a result,
the Supply System contacted
the
NRC to specify that the
need for a
temporary
TS waiver was not necessary.
The major concern with the electrolyte stratification was idehtified to be
an accelerated
degradation
of the battery jars thereby reducing their
expected lifetime.
As
a result of this concern,
the Supply System
began
an evaluation to determine
the best method for reducing stratification.
The inspector will monitor the licensee's
progress
in this during future
inspection efforts.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
On March ll, 1987,
an exit meeting
was held with the licensee
representatives
identified in paragraph
1.
The inspector
summarized
the
inspection
scope
and findings as described
in this report.