ML17278A353
| ML17278A353 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Columbia  |
| Issue date: | 08/06/1985 |
| From: | Johnson P, Qualls P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17278A351 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-397-85-22, NUDOCS 8508210179 | |
| Download: ML17278A353 (14) | |
See also: IR 05000397/1985022
Text
U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No.
Docket No.
50"397j85
22
50-397
License
No.
Licensee:
Washington Public Power Supply System
P.
O. Box 968
Richland Washington
99352
Facility Name:
Washington Nuclear Project No.
2
(WNP-2)
Inspection at:
WNP-2 Site,
Benton County, Washington
Inspection
conducted:
June
10-28, July 9 and July 31,
1985
Inspector:
P.
M. Quails, Reactor Inspector
Z4
gS
Date Signed
Approved By:
P.
H. Johnson,
Chief
Reactor Projects
Section
3
Date Signed
Summary:
Ins ection on June
10-28
Jul
9
and Jul
31 1985
(Re ort No. 50-397/85-22)
Areas Ins ected:
Unannounced
inspection by a regional inspector of the
implementation of the
WNP-2 Nuclear Power Plant Pire Protection, (}uality
Assurance
and other Special items identified during the outage.
The
inspection involved 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> onsite by one
NRC inspector.
During this
inspection,
Inspection Procedures
30703,
35701,
64704B and 71707 were covered.
Results:
Of the areas
examined
one violation was identified (See
paragraph
4).
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DETAILS
1.
Persons
Contacted
C.
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D.
J.
A.
D.
G.
R.
Powers, Plant Manager
Baker, Assistant Plant Manager
Feldman,
Manager, Site equality Assurance
Bell, Manager, Industrial Safety and Fire Protection
Jones,
Senior Fire Protection Engineer
Eggen,
Senior Fire Protection Engineer
Bastad, Electrical Engineer
Koenigs,
Compliance Engineer
>'Denotes
those attending the exit meeting
on June
28,
1985.
2.
S ecial Ins ection To ics
The inspector
reviewed licensee
documentation,
and interviewed licensee
personnel
concerning
the following licensee
reported findings:
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During the process
of conducting
a review to determine
compliance
with Appendix R to 10 CFR 50, section XII.G, the licensee identified
that under certain fire 'conditions in,the, control room, certain
equipment required to, safely shut~ down'" the',p'lant might not be
from the remot'e
shutdown., panel.,
The licensee
stated that
the permanent solution is th'e installation of transfer
s'witches in
several circuits to isolate
them from the control'oom in an
emergency.
The licensee
also identified several
cables in the plant
which did not meet the Appendix R section III.G separation criteria.
The licensee
stated that
a fire barrier 'was being 'installed to
protect these
cables.-
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II
Until the permanent modifications are completed,
the licensee
changed
Abnormal Condition Procedure
4.12.1.1,
"Control Room
Evacuation".
The licensee
stated that thi.'s change included the
steps
needed
to ensure
that. the equipment necessary
to safely shut
the plant down in the event of a control room fire, can be restored
to operation
and operated
when required.,
The inspector verified
that the procedure
change
was incorporated into the copy of the
control room and remote
shutdown panel procedures.
The inspector
noted that sheet
22 of this procedure
was not readable.
The
licensee
stated that he would replace
the sheet if needed.
The
inspector also questioned
the use of an "Uncontrolled" copy of plant
procedures
at the remote
shutdown panel.
In an emergency,
the
licensee staff would not have time to verify that the most current
procedures
were in place at the panel.
The licensee
stated that
they would assess
the desirability of putting "Controlled"
procedures
at this location (85-22-01).
The control room is continuously manned,
so the probability of an
uncontrolled fire is remote.
The licensee is making hourly fire
watch patrols in all other areas identified as not completely
meeting the Appendix
R separation criteria 'required by plant
technical specifications.
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The above listed interim corrective actions
and the licensee's
report have since been listed in LER 84-031-04,
issued July 11,
1985.
NRR has been requested
to review the technical
adequacy of
the circuit isolation corrective actions.
The issue will be
followed up further at
a scheduled
Appendix R team inspection,
LER 84-031-04 will remain open until evaluated
by the Appendix R
inspection
team.
b.
During the course of the outage,
the licensee identified certain
fuses installed in conductors
which penetrate
the primary
containment that differed from the fuse sizes listed in the
Technical Specifications.
The fuse sizes
had been
changed
during
plant testing
and the Technical Specifications
had not been updated.
NRR determined that the change
represented
no safety concern
and
~
issued
an amendment
to the,licensee's
Technical Specifications
to
reflect the correct fuse size.
The licensee
subsequently
issued
LER 85-039 to report this occurrence.
LER 85-039 is closed.
No violations or deviations
were identified.
3.
gualit
Assurance
The inspector
reviewed selected
changes
to the equality Assurance
(gA)
program implementing procedures
for compliance with the approved quality
assurance
program.
Of the areas
examined
no discrepancies
were noted.
The inspector interviewed several personnel in the gA organization
concerning implementation of (}A program
changes
of the areas
examined;
no
discrepancies
were noted.
No violations or deviationswere identified.
4.
Pire Protection
During his time in the facility, the inspector
reviewed
a number of
housekeeping
and fire protection items.
The following findings resulted:
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b.
Smoking was permitted inside the electronics
counting
room on the
522'levation of the reactor building. It was
a posted
"Smoking
Area".
,The room is part of fire area
RC-1, which includes the bulk
of the reactor building and
a large'quantity of vital, equipment.
The counting room is not separated
fr'om the vital equipment by a
rated fire barrier.
The inspector
observed a,file cabinet
and loose
paper inside the room. 'he inspector noted that,'smoking is
a
potential ignition sour'ce.
When 'discussed
with the 'licensee
management
by telephone
on July 9, 1985, the'icensee
stated that
the area
was identified and was being evaluated..
The inspector will
review this further during', a future inspection
(85-.22-02).
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The WNP-2 operating license'nd
Technical Specifications
require
that the licensee
implement the fire protection program.
The
licensee's
administrative'rocedure
AP 1.3.10
was in effect, to
control the use of combustible materials in the plane, "until
June 26,'1985.
On June
26,
1985, the licensee
promulgated
a new
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procedure
AP 1.3.35 for this purpose.
AP 1.3.10 required that
flammable liquids be in approved safety containers,
the packing
materials
and shipping containers
be removed from vital areas
immediately following unpacking,
and required that no wood ladders
longer than nine feet be used inside the plant.
AP 1.3.35 required
that aerosol
containers with flammable contents
be
removed at the
end of the job or shift, and required removal of combustibles
that
enter the vital area at the end of a job or shift.
When removal is
not possible,
combustible permit is required.
The
procedure
required the "hard copy" of this permit to be posted with
the materials in the area.
During his plant tours,
the inspector noted that these
procedures
were not being fully implemented.
Specific examples
were noted as
follows:
Two cardboard
boxes containing air filters were located
on the
525'levation of the Radwaste Building on June
12,
13 and 26,
1985.
These
items were also identified, by the licensee
during
an inspection
on May 10,
1985.
Small plastic bottles
(not an "Approved Safety Container" )
containing acetone,
a flammable liquid, were observed in the
"B" Diesel Generator
Room and on the 525'levation of the
Radwaste Building on June
13 and 26,'"1985.
The bottle in the
Diesel Generator
Room had been iden'tified by the, licensee
during an inspection
on June 5, 1985.,
A wood extension
la'dder about'15'long, (unextended)
was located
and apparently stored'inside',the
Radwaste Building. 'his
ladder
was identified t6 the, licensee
on June
14, ~1985.
The
ladder
was observed
again 'by the inspector.(in the
same
location)
on June 26,
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On June 27,
1985, after the reactor,had
been restarted,
the
following conditions existed:'
Aerosol cans of a'leaning
agent
"Conq-R-Dust" labeled
as
"Flammable"
had 'been left unattended in the Reactor'Building
on
the 606'2
cans)
the 517'1
can)
and the 548'2
cans)
elevations.
On the 501'levation of the Reactor Building, several
plywood
(apparently untreated)
and cardboard
boxes,
about
two gallons
of oil in a polyethylene jug and
a pile of yellow plastic were
located near the containment entry on June
26 and 27,
1985.
Although identified to licensee
personnel
on June
27,
1985,
the
plywood boxes
were subsequently
observed
by the
NRC resident
inspector
on July ll, 1985.
No Transient Combustible Permit
was located in the area.
Sixteen large plastic
drums were located
on the 501'levation
of the reactor building to be used for collecting liquid from
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the Standby Liquid Control System.
No Transient Combustible
, Permit was located in the area.
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A Notice of Violation was issued;,by
the
NRC to'he Washington Public
Power Supply System
on March,19,
1985,
as
a result of an inspection
in February
1985:
One paragraph of the violation identified
improper storage of Class
A combustibles in the form of four large
open cabinets
each filled wi.'th Class
A combustibles
on each level of
the Reactor Building.
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The licensee
responded
in,a letter dated April 17,
1985
and stated
that:
"The Class
A combustibles
have been reviewed by the Fire Protection
Engineer,and
Health Physics personnel.
This evaluation determined
the minimal amount of clothing needed for each elevation."
Appendix
R to 10 CFR 50 Section XII.K.2 allows the licensee
to
designate
storage
areas with appropriate fire protection.
The
licensee's
evaluation determined
the amount of combustible material
that could safely be allowed on the different levels of the reactor
building at the designated
storage location based
on the building
design.
On June
27,
1985, after the reactor
had been restarted
from the
outage,
the inspector
observed that the amount of combustible
materials
had not been reduced to the levels that the evaluation
had
determined
was safe
and that no transient
combustible permit was
located in the areas.
On the'471'levation
of the Reactor Building, there were four,
large
open cabinets full of clean anti-C clothing and two
cardboard
boxes of anti-C clothing.
The licensee's
analysis
had determined that two cabinets
was the allowable amount.
On the 501'levation of the Reactor Building, there were four
open full lockers,
eleven rolls of polyethylene plastic,
and
seven
cardboard
boxes containing anti-C clothing.
The
licensee's
analysis
allowed two rolls of plastic
and two closed
cabinets of clothing.
The analysis
stated that the cabinets
were to be closed
due to the proximity of safety-related
equipment
on that level.
On the 522'levation of the Reactor Building, there
were four
large open cabinets full of anti-C clothing.
The licensee's
evaluation
had determined that two cabinets
should be allowed.
On the 548'levation of the Reactor Building, there were four
large open cabinets of anti-C clothing and stacked neatly on
top of these
were eleven large full polyethylene bags full of
clothing.
The evaluation determined that only two cabinets
could be safely stored in this area.
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On the 571'levation of the Reactor Building, there were three
full cabinets
of clean anti-C clothing.
The evaluation
had
allowed two cabinets to be stored safely.
The items listed in paragraph
4.b are similar to items included in a
March 1985 Notice of Violation.
In addition, the item discussed
in
paragraph
4.c was identified in the March 1985 Notice of Violation,
and had not been corrected.
(85-22-03)
On a tour of the facility conducted
on July 31,
1985, the inspector
observed that the items listed in the violation had been corrected,
with one exception.
The analysis performed,
to determine
the amount
of combustible material that could safely be kept on the different
elevations of the reactor building, had specified that the clothing
stored
on the 501'levation
be kept in closed metal cabinets.
The
cabinets
were required to be closed
due to the close proximity of
safety related
cables
and equipment.
On July 31,
1985, the amount
of combustible material
on that elevation had been reduced to the
two full cabinets,
specified in the fire loading evaluation;
however,
the storage
had not been
changed
to comply with the
evaluation.
The clothing was still being stored in open cabinets.
On August 1,
1985,
a meeting
was held with the plant manager to
discuss
the storage of the clothing.
The plant manager stated that
prompt action would be taken to correct the issue.
That evening the
inspector
observed that the clothing was being transferred
to
cabinets with closing metal doors
as required by the evaluation.
This is
a Severity Level IV Violation (Supplement
1).
d.
Due to the numerous
small amounts of combustible materials left at
different job sites it appeared
that
some plant workers were not
removing their waste
and work materials at the end of shift as
required by procedure.
The inspector
observed
several high pressure
gas bottles left in the Reactor Building, supported
by a rope,
and
on two occasions
observed
oxy-acteylene
welding rigs left in the
Reactor Building, apparently overnight.
e.
The licensee
was using
a white plastic absorbent
pad to catch oil
,leaks in many areas
of the plant.
When questioned
by the inspector,
the licensee
stated that an evaluation would be conducted
to
determine if more flame resistant
absorbent is available.
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The inspector
reviewed the revised licensee
procedures
concerning
No discrepancies
were noted.
One violation (see paragraphs
b and
c of this section)
and no deviations
were identified.
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An exit meeting with the Plant Manager
and Assistant Plant Manager
was
held on June
28,
1985.
The inspection findings of paragraphs
2 through
4
were discussed
at that time.
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