ML17275B016

Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Fsar.Responses Needed by 810703

ML17275B016
Person / Time
Site:	Columbia
Issue date:	04/27/1981
From:	Tedesco R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Ferguson R WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM
References
IEB-79-27, IEB-80-06, IEIN-79-22, NUDOCS 8105050255
Download: ML17275B016 (7)

Text

Docket No.

50-397 Washington Public Supply System ATTN:

Mr. R. L. Ferguson Managing Director 3000 George Washington Way Richland. Washington 99352

Subject:

WNP-2 FSAR - Request for Additional Informati Cy As a result of our review of your application for operating license.

we find tPat we need additional information regarding the WNP-2 FSAR.

The specific information required is as a result of the Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch's review and is listed in the Enclosure.

To maintain our licensing review schedule for the <~Alp-W FSAR, we will need respons8s to the enclosed request by July 3, 1981. If you cannot meet this date, please inform us within seven days after receipt of this letter of the date you plan to submit your responses so that we may review our schedule for any necessary changes.

Please contact Raj Auluck, Licensing Project Manager, if you desire any discussion or clarification of the enclosed report.

DISTRIBUTION Sincerely, Docket or Central File TMurley TERA LBg2 File DRoss NRC/PDR DEisenhut RHartfield, MPA

~@mQ~ ~

L/PDR BJYoungblood VNoonan n0~~ r ~,

NSI C RAul uck OELD Robert L. Tedesco, AssistarH Director MRushbrook OIE (3) for Licensing RTedesco DThatcher Division of Licensing RVo1 lme r LRib

Enclosure:

As stated cc:

See next page 8105050 X~

OFFICE/

SURNAME)

OATE f>

h u

ck:sp 4/gP/81

..NN ASch encer 4/q+81

~

~ ~

\\ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

T dgspg 4/

/81 NRC FORM 318 IIO/80) NRCM 0240 OfflClAL RECORD COPY o USGPO, 1980-329 024

I e ~ I

) "J ~ ra 4

at

+A I i ~

-i k

~

e

~ I<<l<<jl

~ ~

~ 4

~ ft I'

4 ~ ~

<<a.

v-C >.', I'>>

4 <I' t

Ie

~

a

~ e>>

~

ac I

4 9

~ *

~ I I

~ ~

~I

>>44 e v, 4. )I I

~

A

<<crk.,

g. Er

~I 4

~

Ae 'C

~4 4>

9>>l,e 'e,.

• 9 I

~

ke 4

'>Iv' C

4 Iiv II gr I~

vi 9 I I"

~

e

'S C 4

~

f)"g 4

~

I 44 tv I

4.. 4 '-'-=.

>IE tr '4 '

ecv <<

1 4

a tie 4.

Err a

I 4

~

9

'I

~

9 4

II

~ ~ ~ ~ ~

I'4

~ v'

.A>>

~ ~"

~ t I

e

>> ~

";44,$l 4>e}<<>f) )7 AE~

J, A

. ". 3 "IS

-"~ I>C) <<."."!'~.

e 4>kl I ar>pV.>><

e>

~ v t>>

ic

- I

'j I

~,'; C.

9

~

A c 4',

~

~

~

~

4 e I s>tl'4 g':-

4

~

c

~

~

4 4

~

IE 9

>4 e<<c 4

4 e

E

ENCLOSURE Instrumentation 8, Control Systems Branch Loss oi t'-" ':lays I." Instrumen ~-';."ion an*

Ci~n'.i@i

~nw=-.'y=t;:

t)Us LlUI i nv renal M'rat ion If reactor controls and vital instl Uments derive power, rom cori-.,an elec rical distribution systems, the failure of such electrical distribution systems may result,ini an event requ.ring operator action concurrent with failure of important instrumentation upon which these operator actions should be based.

Tnis concern was addressed in IE Bulletin 79-27.

On November 30, 1979,.IE Bulletin 79-27 was sent to operating license (OL) holders, the near term OL appl'icants (North Anna 2, Diablo Canyon,

HcGuire, Salem 2, Sequoyah, and Zimmer),

and other hc> ders of construe ion perr..'..s (CP),

ncludi ng HNP-2, Of these recipients, the CP holders were not given explicit direction'or making a submittal as part of the licensing review.

However, they were informed that the issue would be addressed. later.

You are requested to aadress these issu s by taking IE Bulletin 79-27 Actions 1 thru 3 under "Actions to be Taken by Licensees".

Within the response time called for in the attached transmittal

letter, complete the review and evaluation required by Actions 1 thru 3 and provi de a written response descri bi,ng your reviews and actions.

This report should be fn the form of an amendment to your FSAR and submitted to the NRC Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulations as a licensing submittal.

En ineered Safety Features (ESF)

Reset Controls

( IE Bulletin 80-06)

If safety equipment.does not remai.n.in.its. emergency.

mode upon reset of an engineered safeguards* actuation signal, system modification, design change or other corrective action should be planned to assure

'hat protective action of the affected equipment is not compromised once the associated actuatfon signal fs reset.

This issue was addressed in IE Bulletin 80-06 (enclosed).

For facilities with operating licenses as of March 13, 1980, IE bulletin 80-06 required that reviews be conducted by the licensees to determine whfch, if any, safety functions might be unavailabe after reset, and what changes could be implemented to correct the problem.

For facilities with a construction permit including OL applfcanfsBulletin 80-06 was issued for information only.

The NRC staff has determined that all CP holders, as a part of.

the OL review process are to be requested to address this issue.

Accordingly, you are requested to take the actions called for fn Bulletin 80-06 Actions 1 thru 4 under "Actions to be Taken by Licensees".

Within the response time called for fn the attached transmittal letter, complete the review verifications and description

0

,0 h

0 Page 2 of IQ of corrective actions taken or planned as stated in Action 1 thru 3

and sub...it the report called for in Action Item 4.

The report snoula oe suomiited to the NRC Office of Nuclear Regulation a~

a licensing submittal in the form of an FSAR amendment.

Oualification "'of 'Control Systems

( IE Information Notice 79-22)

Operating reactor licensees were informed by IE Information Notice 79-22, issued September 19, 1979, that certain non-safety grade or control equipment, if subjected to the adverse environment of a

high energy line break, could impact the safety analyses and the adequacy of the protection functions performed by the safety grade equipment.

Enclosed is a copy of IE Information Notice 79-22, and reprinted copies of an August 30, 1979 Westinghouse letter and a September 10, 1979 Public Service Electric and Gas Compa~

letter which address this matter.

Operating Reactor licensees conducted reviews to determine 'whether such problems could exist

~

at operating facilities.

Me are concerned that a similar potential may exist at light water facilities now under. construction.

You are, therefore, requested to perform a review to determine what, if any, design changes or operator actions would be necessary to assure that high energy line breaks will not cause control system failutres to complicate the event beyond your FSAR analysis.

Provide the results of your review including all identified problems and the manner in which you have resolved them to NRR-

~

~

The specific "scenarios" discussed in the above referenced Westinghouse letter are to be considered as examples of the kinds of interactions which-might -occur-.

Your-review-should,exclude those scenarios, where applicable, but should not necessarily be limited to them.

Applicants with other LMR designs should consider analogous interactions as. relevant to their'esigns-I 4

P' Control System Failures The analyses reported fn Chapter 15 of the FSAR are intended to demonstrate the adequacy of safety systems in mitigating anticipated operational occurrences and accidents.

Based'n the conservative assumptions made in defining these design-basis events and the detailed review of the analyses by the staff, it fs likely that they adequately bound the consequences of single control system failures.

To provide assurance that the design basis event analyses adequately bound other more fundamental credible failures you are requested to provide the following information:

~ P 0

,Q~<":Alpwg C~

l Paae3Ã>o

.a m

+, ~

~, stems whose as

,xrgou+I v i,a t g

ontrol sy>><>>-

~'aunt

~ ~~ +~

which, ";,"f any, o~ the c

The power so 'rc.s red should include a

o;.

r malfuction of more

~function could lea ld tend to the effects one con.rol system f 'lure of hiaher leve shou ex 1

ower losses due

+o the as 1

d load centers.

ibution pane s

an 1

s stems identified

'f an of the contro sy sugr al s, rom common sensors.

T ho ld t

1 b

,-i ere 1

1' d'ulic headers or gamp

-sure, or other signals to two or

.-sure, temperature, level or o er a control systems.

t an

~ simultaneous malfunctions of (2) d (3) lt f th 1

bl om ai b

th 1

Ch t are bounded y

wer b odth re uire action or res pability of operators or sa e

C l

C t

1

/

'4