ML17266A108

Forwards Testimony of RG Fitzpatrick & Bl Siegel of NRC Responding to ALAB-537 Questions & Testimony of Ej Fowlkes of FERC Responding to ALAB-537 Question B1.Also Forwards Rl Baer to Util.Bl Siegel Affidavit Encl

ML17266A108
Person / Time
Site:	Saint Lucie
Issue date:	09/21/1979
From:	Olmstead W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Mike Farrar, Johnson W, Salzman R NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
Shared Package
ML17266A109	List: ML17266A108 ML19254E087 ML19254E091 ML19254E093
References
NUDOCS 7910310060
Download: ML17266A108 (79)

Text

~C C>~ "e0O C'Ip O~

Q ~~0(',

<<<<**+

UNlTED STATES NUCLEAR R E G ULATORY COMMISS ION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 September 21, T979 Michael C, Farrar, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and L'icensing Appeal.

Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555 Dr.

W.

Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.

C.

20555 Richard S.

Sal zman, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D;

C.

20555 ga In the Matter of 8j FLORIDA POWER 8I LIGHT COMPANY (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2)

Docket No. 50-389 CP Gentlemen:

Sincerely,

-C' William J.

Olmstead Counsel for NRC Staff Enclosed please find the testimony of Robert G. Fitzpatrick and Byron L.

Siegel of the NRC Staff prepared in response to questions posed by this Board-.

in ALAB-537.

Also enclosed is testimony provided to the HRC Staff by Edward J.

Fowl kes of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission which was prepared to respond'o guestion.

Bl as stated in ALAB-537.

For the information of the Board and the parties, a letter to Dr. Robert E. Uhrig from Robert L.

Baer dated September 17, 1979 is included.

That letter identifies the confirmatory testing requirement addressed in Mr. Siegel's testimony.

Enclosures:

As Stated cc (w/encls.):

Michael Glaser, Esq; Dr. David L. Hetrick Martin Harold Hodder, Esq.

Dr. Frank Hooper Dr. Marvin M.

Mann Harold F. Reis, Esq.

Norman AD Coll, Esq.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Docketing and Service Section O'I lo~t~go

SEP I 7 Syg Doch t No. 50-3B9 Or. Robert E.

Uhrig Yica Presi d nt of huclear and General Engi neerin" Florida Power and Light Company P.

0.

Box 5291'33 Hi a-...i, Flori ca 3315"

Dear Dr. Uhri 9:

SUBJ Cl:

ADEQUACY OF REACTOR ".OO'I'T PUHP SEAL DESIGN DURING POSTULATED STATICS'i BLACKOUT COND;

> IONS (St. Lucie Plant, Un-.t No. 2)

One of the open issues related to ALAB-537 pertaining to St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2, involves the stability of the Florida Power and Light Company's electrical grid (Question B" of ALAD-537').

In response to the ALAB order of March 10, 197o, both the staff a~?d the Florida Power and Light Company discussed the consequ nces of offsite power with simul taneous on-si te power failure (s.ation blackout).

Florida Powgr and Light Company suggested that the first significant milestone encountered would b~ excessive core heating due to loss of water from the condensate storage tank about 16 hours1.851852e-4 days <br />0.00444 hours <br />2.645503e-5 weeks <br />6.088e-6 months <br /> after loss of all AC power {Flugger Affidavi t of Ha.rch 31, 1978).

The staff judgment was that a

loss of reactor coolant pump seals at aoout one hour after loss of all AC power - resulting in a loss of coolant accident (Fitzpatrick Affidavit of June 12, 197S) would be mom limiting.

Me have evaluated the potential of reactor coolant pump seal failures for the duration of time the pl a nt would be subjected to a total loss of AC power (see Enclosure).

Based on o~ir evaluation we require that a confirmatory test on one of'he four seal asiemblies that comprises the seal cartridge be perforred under expected blackout.'onditions of tenqerature, pressure and tim, to pro--

videe the addi tional ve'pi fi cation necessary to determine the adequacy of the reactor coolant pump s,'eal design.

The results of this test should be included in the FSAR for St. Lbcie Plant, Unit'io. c, when it is filed.

Sincerely, Original Signed Robert L. Baer, Chief Light Mater Reactors Branch No. 2 niv(Titan nf Prniect Hanaoerent

f

~

UNITED STATES OF Ai<<".PICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO ~ii~'!ISS ION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFFTY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD In the'Mhtter of

)

)

FLOPIDA PO<-'ER 5 LIGHT COMPANY

)

(S'..

Lucie Nuclear Power Plant

)

U it No. 2)

)

Docket No. 50-389 Affidavit of Byron L. Siegel I, Byron L. Siegel; b ing duly sworn to depose and state:

1.

I am a Nuclear Reactor Engineer in the Office of Nuclear Reac.or Regulation.

2.

I have prepared a statement of professional qualifications which is attached to this affidavit.

3.

I have prepared testimony in the captioned proceeding addressing the Appeal Board's guestion 'numbered B2 as stated in ALAB-537.

This question requested the staff and applicant to analyze even'ts that would occur between the loss of all AC power and the violation of either the fuel design limits or the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and in particular the differing responses of the NRC staff and applicant to guestion B.l(b) of the Appeal Boards March 10, 1978 Order pertaining to the most limiting safety related fai lure.

I hereby certify that the above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge 'and belief.

rg fyr.n L. Si Subscribed and sworn to before;;.~ this -. ;

~ day of September 1979 egel Hotarj Public Hy Corr.":ission expires:

,y~ ~P C'< i>> <~ ~

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ti'UCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOl~iIC SAF'TY kiD'ICENSIHG APPEAL BOARD In the tlatter of FLOR'IDA POWER 5 LIGHT COMPA!'Y (St.

Lucie l)uclqar Power Plant Unit t<o. 2)

Docket No. 50-389 NRC STAFF TESTIMONY OF BYRON L.

S IEGEL IHTRODUCT ID'

~

This testimony addresses Appeal Board question 82 relevant to the analysis of events

.hat would occur between the total loss of all AC power and the violation of either the fuel design limits or the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and in particular the differing responses of the

>>RC staf and the applicant to question B.l(b) of the Appeal Boards March 10, 1978 Order pertaining to the most limiting safety related failure.

1/

uestion BZ 1/

In 1:ne with the above discussion, the testimony is to analyze events that would occur between the "loss of all AC power" and the violation of either the fuel design limits or the design conditions of the reactor coolant pressure boundary (or any portion thereof).

In particular, the parties should, if possible, reconcile their differing responses to question B.l(b) of our March 10, 1978 order, 29/ or, if not, point up precisely where the disagreements lie.

29/

[ References fn 24 reproduced below:

]

Applicant suggests that the first safety i elated ailure encount. red would be e.<cessive core heating due to the loss of water from the

,n~

~,

oil

'nd(

4 r)

~s s

'L 'li( )

46

'4 4I ~ i l 4

~ 4 4444

~

~ 4

'4 I i Il

)

~

(

I the I oss OT AC power (Fj ugger Affidav i t o f !',arch 31, 1 978,

p. ")

.'he staff's judgment is that the first failure would be that of a primary pump seal at about one hour after the loss of AC puwer---

resul ting in a small loss of coolant accident.

(Fitzpatrick Affidavit or June 12,

1978,

p. 11).

I have reviewed the testimony of F> ederick George Fl!,q"er p! ovided in response to question B2 of ALAB-537 contained in the Applicant's June 22, 1979 submit".al.

The Aop]icant's estimony addresses fa lure of a reactor coolant pump seal thus apparently reconciling the difference bet!;ecn its;"l rch 31, 1978 submittal and ihe HiRC Staff's J<<ne 12, 1978 submittal.

The content of tf!is testimony, related to the failure of the reactor coolant pump s:< ls, is consistent with the information pro;ided by F. Fehlau (Technical Admiristrator for Byron Jackson

Pumps, manufacturer of the reactor coolant pumps for the St.

Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 2) at a meeting held on Hay 16, 1979 between the USNRC, staff and the applicant, Florida Power and Light Company.

The testimony of Frederick George Flugger concluded that in the event of a station

blackout, which results in a loss of cooling water flow to the cartridge seal assembly of the reactcr coolant pu..:",p, an appreciable eakage path tnlough tne seal assembly to the reactor cont inment buIlding thai: could result in a significant loss of primary reactor coolant does not xist.

The bases for this conclusion were:

l.

All seal components are captured within the seal cartridge assembly and held together by hydraulic and spring forces thereby minimizing the leakage paths.

2.

Each of 'the four seals that comprise the seal ass mbly is desigred to provide sealing against full system prcssure'.

Al.l the components that comprise the seal cartridge assembly, except for the elastomeric U-cups and O-rings, are made of materials that are unaffected by the elevated temperatures resulting from a loss of coolant to the'eals.

4.

Confined 0-rings made of the elastomeric material used on the U-cups and 0-rings have been used on flanged joints o a reactor coolant pump hot test loop where they have been subjected to temperatures of 550 F

0 for in excess of 100 hours0.00116 days <br />0.0278 hours <br />1.653439e-4 weeks <br />3.805e-5 months <br />.

The 0-rings maintained their sealing capability although hardening and permanent set of the O-rings, as

expected, occurred.

Ba ed Qn my rev iew of the i n format i on p: ovided, I agree that the above reasons provide strong basis for acc,.ptanc o,

th conclusion that a significant loss of reactor coolant through the seal ca.

ridge will not occur.

!<owever, since no test data on

~he seal'es'gn under exp cted reactor temperatures and pressures following a station blackout and specifically on the elastomeric seals in the geom try utilized in the seal assembly design is available, we have required that the Applicant perform a confirmatory test on at least one of the four seal assemblies that compromise the seal cartrige under expected blackout con-itions of temperature,

pressure, and time to pi ovide tho additional verifi-cation necessary to determine the adequacy of the reactor coolan pump seal design.

It is my position that the information provided by the applicant in combination with results from the conf',rmatory test, which show that the loss of coolant through the reactor coolant pump seals during the duration of station blackout is not sufficient to adversely affect natural circulation, provide adeq ate assurance that the ability to cool the reac.or core will be maintained and that fuel and reactor coolant pressure boundary limits will not be exceeded.

STATEMLNT OF PPOFESSIGNAL QUiLIFICATiO;!S OF PrYRO" L S!EGEL I

="m a f<uclear Rea~tor Eng neer in the Off-'ce of ili.clear Reactor Regulation.

I have reco" iy b'=en assign "d to the Bul 1 etins and Or".'ers Task Force fol i ow I ng the Thre,~iile Island accident.

I am responsibie for conducting safety revIews and evaluations for light watt r reactor emergency cor~ cooling, reactor coo!ant, and various auxiliary systems assigned to me during the review of nuclear reactor license applications.

I received a Mechanical Engineering Degree in 1955 from City College of.New York.

In 195G I was a pet, oleum heater cesign engineer at Foster

~'heeler Corporation in Hew York CIty~

New York.

From 195o to 1973 I was a Nuclear Engineer in the Nuclear Systems Division at the National A:ronautics and Space Administration

( ormerly National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics),

Lewis Research

Center, Cleveland, Ohio.

My assignments included:

'3 years ai the Plumbrook Reactor Faci'iity during construction phase.

Experimental and'evelopmental heat transfer research related to nuclear propulsion and space power applicat'ions.

'Project Manager on contracts to fabricate capsules to test fuel element design for space power applications.

'Design of experiments to be tested at the Plumbrook Reactor Facility.

'Responsibility for analysis of test, data and evaluation of post-irradiation examinations.

During this time I authored or coauthored approximately 12 reports.

In May 1973 I accepted employment with the Atomic Energy Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) in the Reactor Fuels Section, v here I 'reviewed reactor fuel elenen" and assembly

designs, thermaj performance analyses

and, operating experience.

From May, 1977 to May 1979 I was a member of the Reactor Systems Branch where I was responsible for reviewing safety systems on light I,

I Task Force where I have been perro> ming reviews of licensee and vendor supp'iied information to support decisions regarding plant operations.

uiirTED STAT'S OF A";:RICA HUCL:AR RFGULATORY CZ: ~ISSIOH

'r>k

'a ra'sTp

<o,k.

a/

"ak k

/ Tha k,'s"'n kkrkQ kak kkrat" ark Oa l Oa ak k

.a

>'k I va'kk C vt'k. a>>

(kk.u a>t >.a*a

~ a'l >

~

> >I a>0>'

a'>U In the ilatter oF Fl ORIDA PONER 5 LIGHT COYiPAaiY (Si..Lucie 4'uclear Power Plant, Unit 2)

)

)),

)

Docket Ho. 50-389 AFFIDAVIT OF POBF."T 6.

FITZPATRICK Robert G ~

FltZpata> \\cks becca>kg du.a>'a>'soma ko depOse and state>

l.

I am an electr-ical eng;n er and a senior member of the Power Systems Bra~"

.a'>

of the nuclear Regulatory Commission.

2.

I have prepared a statement of professional qualifications.kvhidxis.Mtaoh&::--:

to thisaffiidavit.'S a

a 3.

I have prepared the testimony attached to.this affidavit which.'addresses questions Al, A2, Bl, B2, B3, B4, C and 0 as stated in ALAB-537.

'LS>a W~ Q a- ~~a.

. I hereby certify that the above statements are true and correct to-the best of

=

my knowledge and belief.

r)P ~~,~

Ro".ert G.~Fi.zI;.atri'cf; gg Subscribed and s<<orn to before m

this

. :." day of September, 1979 Ny Co;:;kiss ion E>pi:os:

I i3ota".y. P;;UTi c k

~

a a

U "BAITED STATES OF.~iI-"RICA NUCLEAR REGULA l'CRY CGYil'SSIOil 8

FORE Tl'lE

<TC>'IIC SRF TY Ai~!'ICFiiSI'6 AP. EAL BOARD In the Hatter of FLORIDA POlJER 5 LIGHT COiiPAHY (St.

Lucie lfuclear Power Plant, Unit 2)

Docket Ho. 50-389 HRC STAFF TESTIViOilY GF ROBERT G.

FITZPATRICi<

I.

If lTiiODv'CTIC ii Th',s testimony responds to auestions Al, A2, Bl, 32, B3, G4, C and D as set forth in ALAB-5"-? d ted Apriil 5 1979.

Part two of my testimony se' forth some background material to provide the Appeal Board a description of the Staff's view of the FPM grid in gene. al and the onsite and oi"fsite power systems at St.

Lucie in particular.

Part three addresses the specific ALAB-537 questions and includes Staff ccmments on the Applica'nt's responses.

Part four is a summary of th',s testimony.

II.

BACKGROUND Two documents have been previously submitted to the Appeal Board which summarize the FPGL grid system and the St. Lucie power systems:

jo-,nt testimony prepared by N.

S. inivasan and D. !IcDonald entitled "A Further Evaluation of the Florida Power and Light Company Electric Pcwer System",

October 25, 1977 and my testimony of June 12, 1978.

The first document provides bact;ground material on power systems in general, HAC requirements concerning electrical powel syste!;s, a

su;.:-::;iary oi the Il:ajor FPFtL grid sys ce!'il di s Ut'bances from I 973 to 1977, and tIle action th staff has taken in response to these ma,ior disturbanc

"=.

yv testimony prepared in response to

>:he App::a', Board's i'I, ch 10,

(~7."-. Order updates the

~

'ormer document with respect to the Vay 1<<,

197;I event and subsequent sta f actions, It also prov.Ides a discussion o;"'RC rI.ql..i. ements concerning electrical power systems and documentation oi additional staff positions imposed upon FPSL as a result or the ollgoing staff re-view ;n th= el c+r',cai power systems area.

These two docu!rients; when taken together, provide the background material upon which mj response to l'iLAB-537 has bean constructed, A~ILA -53 33 A.

General Desi n Criterion (GDC} 17 21/

Al.

This criter'.Oli, ent;tied "Elec ric Po:, r Systems,"

requir. s in its third paragraph

('phasis added):

Electric pcwer from the transmission network.to the onsit electric distribution system shall be supplied by t:;o physically inidependent circuits (not necessarily on separate rights of way) designed and located so as to minimize to the extent practical the 'lil:eTihood of their si!ilul'taneous failure under operating and postulated accident and environmental conditions.

'A switchyard common to both circuits is acceptable.

All three transmission lines connecting the St. Lucie station applicant s g'I'id originate at the Viidway Substation.

The hay incident. in which all power at that substation was lost desp incoming soUlc s, d!e!llonstlates that these circuits are indeed to

'mu ta i ous faillire.

!."c test imo:Iv shou': d address

'!:- "-;he St.

LUc'Ie s ta i.1oI'I noi'le'th5el oss Ii:eats

"s GOC-17 l

oulremot"t.

to the 14, 1978 ite redunda suscep I J

>5'5

~ iii

~ I'( s,n& i AA 3

5

~ I.,;,I ll I jli"yi AIi!

i,'

~ 5-.,

I gA for Nuclear Power Plants" ).

Sl'P..".F Af'l!S':i"iR TO BO!)PD (lL.":STICK!l !<I The <t. Lucie station is in full conformance wioh the require"i!ants of QDC-17 including the speci fic s!,"n.-.ection addressed i:i.his q!!est

~ on.

F10Al 'he staff's r!.,i

'oin7, of 4i

".j rlone 01'ile three Si.

Luci-, to:ii'.,/

1 n"'

~ !ee our igj

>!ay l~,

1970 Incident.

The Hay 1(, 1978 'inc 4."::~t i as a lc s cf ofrsi e

power to the St.

Lucie sta.ion as was the fiay 10, 1977 incident.

". make a distinction between grid unavailability avd circuit fa'!lure becauseit is fundamental to the staff's intevpretation of GD'.-l7.

Grid unavailability

(>,e., loss Gf of site powe". ) is veco.-:r ized

. s a ! <,nticipated operat ona!

occurr erce.

That is, it is an event that is expected to occuv on or more times during the life of the nuclear po:!er s.ation, In this light. the regulations do not require a desi gn which precludes the event but rather the capability of the integrated nucleav power station design to cope with the ever.t if ahd when i'hould occur.

The St. Lucie to tlidway 'lin"s were not tripped as part of the sequence of events that lead to the isolation of the Midway Substation and weve intact and available to supply St.

Lucie with offsite powev had it been available.

By the staff's interpr etation of GDC-17, there have been no simultaneous circuit failures on the St.

Lucie to Midway transmission lines.

General Design Criterion 17 is specific in the requirements placed upon the physical configuration of the offsite power system in the close proximity o the nucleav generating unit.

TI!e jippeal Board is correct that

'common s'

tc!!ya!d'eferred to is the one el ec".riic" I! ly connected

n'~tl <g

~ o vi)'~ <<);.it ro<)orator and Q/ls 1 te d,s i'!I><<."<oil svs

< em.

ln pi'o t cas;6 tc""ard

!." loc.","..d on t))<. site, however.

<.nis is not an:ihC I'equi\\ e-II)en <..

A IA i fliimu") Gf t':.'o i.r:.I:s".); Ss i0".

! i!)='s I"Jst co )lee <. thi s sw itchy:rd to

'I the offsite power SJ<s):

'<0 and a

II)'fni)i!<II))o i

<).'0

! i, es I'u"t cUl)!<"'< t;.i)is switch-yard to the onsite distribution system.

This 'is the exteni. of..he physical comple)I>> nt of equipment requi) ed by GCC-l7 -"or t!)e o <fsite po'"r system.

Figure ill (It!FPA) depicts, in block diagram form, th';s mini))um physical complement of electrical po)'er system equipment req<l'.!-ed to meet the require-ments of COC-17.

Ti!e additional ohysical reauireI!<e<".placed upon this complement cf elect) ical powei'ystem equ p eI!t 1s c"at thie circuiis Oe "located so as to min'imize to the extent practical the likelihood of thei)'imultaneous failure."

Staff reyiew 0<'his latter aspect of.he design (i.e. location) is described in Standard Review Plan 8,2 and those specific subsections wi<ich address this subject

a. e attached as Enclosu< e 2

There is no NRC )'equirement concerning how many switci!yards out in the grid must be directly connected to the station switchyard.

The allowance of a co)<eon right-o -way for the offsite power circuits implies ti)e acceptability of terminating at a

common distant switchyard subject to the ability of that switchyard to" meet the same design criteria as required of the unit switch-yard.

The ability of the common grid switchyard (in this case NidwaJ< ) to me t the same criteria as the corri.,on plant switchyard (St.

Luc'.e}.is necessarJ to assure the minimization of simultaneous failure of tl)e grid transm"'.ssion

~.. dl luilizldbecause o; the independence cf ".II assoc ated power suopi ies ad. th" phys1c<1 I

s0pc',vc-'tlon OT the buses l'PoII wil'}ch the ccrc"1 ts tevmin:! e.

"0 1 I c." bl >

capite"'1 cl and Gul dane~

col ilie l evlew of a commoll sw1tc l"avd avo 'inciu<id in Enc',osu!ce 2 sect'an III.c The hidway Substation design meets all of thos<. requirements.

The most important consideration for the required minimum of t Io offsite-power civcuits is that they not be the:."=.ak reliab'ility link in the offsite power supply system.

hs long as these o".;Site power circuits have a

reliability equal to or greater than the of,s'ite power system to

'chich they

connect, where they connect to this system is of secondary concern..

The availability of offsite power to the nuclear unit can be no move than the lessev of the availabilities o> the offsite power syst m or the connecting offsite power civcuits, In otiler 'l"ovds, no matter i:ow many civcuits, connect' nuclear power generating station to tne grid, and no matter how well they are des'igned and protected from postulated failures, a grid blackout renders them all useless, The above availability considerations are exactly why GOC-17 includes the words. "to the extent practical" as it is in recognition of this situation.

Based upon the above, it has been and continues to be the staff's conclusion that the St. Lucie design meets the physical configuration requirements of GDC-17.

S

) '-S'0 -

>~0 I)'ll') tl Sl Gll C

f0 'aa, L u)', i!

4 j, 'Deal 2

! 0 V r liV i l Il )~4 to i.hu lay 1~, 1978 The loss Gf of i si to i iyw~i at 1/

"')"4

"('>C')'he Qppl ican states that three separate events led first event cited was "he planned removal of tile 2 K~,'i')

ha,'hach to prate

'I!hitney transmission liine'or testi!ig, This aetio) cain O'I be couiit~a a'.

an independent event.

Tile rer,,oval of this tlaiismission l.ine was a

premeditated approved action that changed tile state of tile grid syst m,

ft is from this planned new state ti!at, one must start cou. ting ind pendent events.

In 's c" se t ie two independent events

!:ere a switching error and a previously undetected iiiaintenance error, Applicant provides an analysis which'demonstrates the abil',ty of the Nidway Substation to.)ithstand two independent bus failures and still maintain the ties between the grid and St. Lucie.

This academic 2/

exercise shows some of the inherent ilexibility incorporated into a breaker-and-a-half switchyard configuration.

This point has very little bearing on the capability of the grid with resp.ct to St. Lucie.

Hithout being quantitative, a bus failure is probably the least likely failure in a power system.

To postulate two such independent fai lures on equipment located so closely together without affecting any of the intervening electrical equipment is of 1'ow enough probability to be considered incredible for licensing purposes.

2/

~ Page 7

Applicant response to Board guestioa Al

"-.ppl icanz also provides an an

;lys.'s of::h"t ci'anr"-s n reliab',lii.v could be gained by brirging one of "'","- 'ucie

".;ns";:,i"sion lines direc ly to the 3

Ranch Svbs cat'lo/)."-

1!e ns a

) ysi s Qpp "ars co be caI oful.y cons t! Ucted to demonstrate no reliability can be gained by a'physical change

!n

".he grid system.

T:!e sclaff is not convinced that the modi ['i"d d-

. ((Jn

~ as're. ented, is the design that the appl ica! twould choose i.. the,";>>;ical aboard shou!'d require a grid connection for St. Lucie at ot!!e!'han ti!e i>idway Su'station.

A seemingly much mo! e pr acti cal a pproah !,- ul J have be n 7o inves i pa what lower voltage distribution systems in the area of St.

Lucie could be tapped for a connec;.ion to the nuclear units.

This concept would leave the three St.

Lucie to I!idway lines intact with no reduction in present reliability and would provide a relatively low cost alternative way to supply St. Lucie a grid connection at other than the llidway Substation with a definite increase in overall reliability.

The following is a hypothetical example of a way of providing a separate connection to grid other than at b)idway.

(The viability and pract'.cality of this or any other hypothetical example would ultimately have to be determined by the applicant.)

The source of this example is the grid configuration figure presented in attached

".6 to the applicants testimony.

on this question.

There is a

13SKv righ'.-of-way that crosses the St. Lucie-t~~idway lines and goe" between

! hite City and Jensen This line could be tapped at its inter""-ction ! ith t!!e S,.

~

to Mid"I~y ',ines.

Iidditional

~/ Page 8

hppl'icant response to Board guestion A'i, C

V0 r (l'.-

(- pq! Ov"" this end oT

(.'<<"

( <: -'ou<~

~"

A"c (s-aly

~

~ I

~

s

~

5 I ucjp, o ('..Qwaj 1 ines

',"oui d i'o" (: -'

I t '

BA<

i is i' oe!'i gn

~ *

,1 rea'<y

(,";eet

(,nc "1 7 ve(l((l ve'ill i(',( s nils 1 3.',~",, lne co(ll 0

(>6 l'u!I oA oA(

0f vile

.yj "i g 1 jnos o

'"<< l

';) " o"'o"

-(.u's there is only one vight of way allo:,ed to thc a,:plicant i'or cvossing f. om the mainland to HutcIlison Lsland, Tev'inatl n at 5t. Lucie would require a

transformer and some

"','.v switchgear.

!his 1 i<le wo(,ld Aot be ve]<eire( for bulk power output from the genelating ulits and therefore co<.ld oe aedicaied

,Q t,"e <e qrnci<< <)u,'.',s wi h <, equi ved po'<'!e.

trans

-'<.-;v cap;- bl, lty e<lua

( to the comblneQ e,ilevge!l<cy (oads 0

( tfle 1

'<'0 !!A!,s,

>(lls t. BA." <"-1 O'I>;.o,

< "y js <.'ell within the limits of a 138i'v

.1 jne, i do not believe it is necessavy to make this ov any simmlar modification to the St, Lucie design, however, this is the type of analysis (with 'further'support",ng details}

that I would have expected from< the applicant,

r r

~ ~

P 1

~r r

/

E r ~

For its part, the first;>a, f.aph of Gf.'C-17 appears to establish an UAai'inaf)!Q set of cGA(f>:.'>(!!s fG'lectrlca!

>.Owe!'ystems general 1 v ~

It reads as folio';!s {e>>'.t'!asis ad>ded):

An GAsi te Q! ec ric power

".ys te!0 an(l Bn 0 Tfsite e! eciric powel s J>s 'm ska >>

b 'l'uv 1 de(i io perm'! c "'u>lcilon! Ag 0" struct>.!res,

.">>s;e!"

~

~nd " "'A>"".>"n>,s 'floor.l>nt to 5"f tv.

The saTeiy Unc '0

'o Q!!cf> sJste;l

(."".".;,!ino i'." c:.',"!-

system is Aoi f!!rct o!1>no~)

si)

! I be io p!'Ovl(i6 suv 1"iQAt capacity and ca!)ai)l >.,v f,o assure thai (1) speci>ied acceptable 1Ue I des 1 gn

> i61 >.s a.d ( es" gA condli'!GAs ol'he reactoT coolart f)! Qssure boundary are not excee(ied as a

result of anticioaie(i o,"..Qraiional occ.rrences ard (2} thQ cor

. is coo >e(f aAd cont" fn>men I, Integri.y ard o'.her v ital functions are maintainedl in ihe event of postulated accidents, This paragrapn requires t!.ai an ass(.ss!T>ent

o. the sufficiency GT il G

> Ts lie P>"']i'r sJ" t c"! 'T'>

"'lt l 7!1(!

2 )s "i >~t

('>!

7, 'e OT>si'('s e'".

is not funcc:on'ing.

TA"" as essm"ni mus th> n co!!si("r i, e-.:fec'f:

"anticipated operational occurrences."

Bui loss of t!!e offsi-.e power system itself r>.ay reasonably be ccn>s-idered to be such an occuyrence.

Tile parties sf!o>'ld, therefore, Q>plain how the St.

L'>cie plant, can ccm>-

ply with the literal requirerents of this paragraph as wr;:iten. If it cannot, they should attempt to justify the situation in t rms of.tf!Q purpose of tf:e requirement.

STAFF RESPOND!SE TO BOAf(D 0IfESTIO>'f Ac The suggested literal interpretation of GOC-17 must be reconciled!"ith the other regulatory requirements of Part 50.

Aoperdix A of 10 CFR 50 pro-vides a definition of anticipated operational occurrences; One of the examples given is loss of all offsite power.

Clearly i all offsite power is lost, offsite power is not available to bring the reactor to a safe shutdown condition.

This is true not only of the St. Lucie'design but of all nuclear power generating stations.

The fact that this particular anticipat d operatiora.

occurrence can happen is one of the fundamental bases for the requirement of GDC-17 that a single-failure-proof onsiie power syste!!i lndepend.nt of the offsi'e system, be included in ihe design.

I believe the Staff s

interpretation and enforcemQ>>t of this aspect of GOC-17 is consistent Th applicant' esp"nse to th'; que"t-;on provides.."..;".=: I p-rtin'..".t obse!'vatl ons conc r. ng t'le p?'upos G!'n crl te! 10'!.

) ilc refe)'eilces GDC-24 and 39 which were issued on July 10, 1<'67 as the forerunn r" or" the present day GDC-17 provide an excellent vehicle for demonstrating the evolution of our pres "nt day i eqL!i )'9!l!ents.

How

~ ve)', i bel ieve he evoi ut 1 0,!

r;- C~r-17

's ':ot quite as straightforward as one could infer f) om t, e applicant's testimony.

have p) ov 1 ded Tabl " A2 (a <tac <ed)

<" s a di )ect G.'a "1 son 0 f GC'1 7 previous GDC-24 ano 39 of 1967.

Re,e)"ri";0 to T="e "2, I '))ve iden i',";od t';;0 majo) changes and one ma~or add'.tion fro~i) t le 1967 (DC.

The first maio) change noted in Table A2 concerns the onsito power system.

Genera' Design Criterion 39 (1967) applied a single acti;e fa'.lure criterion to the onsite power system.

The problem with this requirement was that an active or passive component ln dn elect) ical system is no where near as eas',ly defined as an active component in a r!echanicai system.

The most no'able a))aio y is probably pi'ping in the meci)anical system and cabling in th" elec

) ical system.

Piping is assigned an American Society of Vecha))ical Engineers (BSHE) code classification based upon what system in which it will be used.

The cnd result of this classification process 1s a fully documented qual'ifica'tion of the piping.

Once qualified by this process, the pi.ping is considered a passive ele)))ent in the mechanical system.

Tiie)e is "no <)))al~ous classification process for cabling.

Realizing this problem

~ the staff subsequently amended the de,inition of s1

>9 e

fa',lure in 10 CFR 60 Appendir, A to reflect the position that both c.ctive and r<lssivc corn>>onents sf!oui!I i,e incl):led in the single flil!)re eral vobis nf electric

>'e ys <.'e!!)s.

I I!e 5 <.a T

< ai 0 cev! s 0 cn" v i!era!

L'cs <<<) (,r I el':,".

0

'i (:'j '"'<. ~

! i)

'equirement for a fully single-failure-proof onsite power system.

This change pl )ced more con;e. v<".ti:e crite) ia on the ons'ite power svst.o<).

~ }

heir,ge AQ.Oc?

1A ab l O I S S..",i c, ~l i 'y'

'}>>

Sc" m" e'fol u.1O

""."- s ~ond Il 'or c-i II i

~ ilc'p>c+c' r,'I~,"'ate py

~ ~, >>.-

c--o

<S

(,o '

wc; a}1d otfslI;e Qcwev s ~stems, c <<'.e evc)1 v d re0:I "i'I '-c'eel'tS

}o th"..Se t"'0 sysTems ar qu1 tc (j1 f"el'e t.,IgaiII g the single"acti ve-fa t '

"e I."-ql! I eliIen1: (i.'d Aot fit elect? ical systeims.

<lhereas the evolIution of require}"::ents for tl?e onsite power sys.em are ccntained in.he lasi.;Oui'ol ds of pnragI.Bph Z Gi GDC 17 (i.e.

assuming c". s1Agle failure")., ti:e evclutior of r".(uire,c'nts for the V

o ffsitc po"!er system comprIse the cc;,,re

'c'.hir(t ltc~raora',..h (If ";c"."-17.

A single-failure-proof offs.'te po<!el~ systemi is neither attc?'enable nor i!ithin thc purview of the I'lRC, Faced with these realitic"s and 'e amibiguity of the single-active-failure requirement; the staff provided an explicit descr",ption of what is requiled as a minimum of he offsite po.!er system (i.e.

GDC-17, paragraph 3).

This evolution of requi;.e".Ie>>ts f'o" the offslte "ow."-r s"s;em is mucn more realistic than the original s Agie-act've-failur(

rcquiremeni..

The major addition noted in Table A2 is paragraph 4 of GDC-17.

This paragraph introduces the requirements for trails eni and steady-state stability studies which demonstrate the ability of the onsite and offsite power systems to withstand system pertabat1ons and requirements for the miniIIIum of two offsite power lines to r act and perform independently of one another.

The above described changes and additions,lorn the 1967 cl i.';c}ria to p-e-e"t cl'1t rla s 1 gA i 1can ly impl ov d, c i ari vied, c? Ad s;renghenced tile vequ I rely" A'cs or electric power systems.

In suI}1mary, the Boald's inherpreta ion of GDC-17 p

~,

-1 3-(gJjrl 4~($ ~Q~QQQ(~(f f 1,%LQVQQ'Cgp f~

ll ll&lI'Qp fP0

'I at<'3" l ~~ 4i'.5 "lS not ".he int.~nr. 0;= G>",-]7 as;t l:.*> evil@."-"'".'<";"

~~".'<'".."s.

ff>s>La

>>'2 Ca~.ra! iSOII of Pace;.ni:

CDC 17 ':i'.h f'f'7 w9 (

'J7)

Cn Y'.lie>n >,s t

A 2~l (a>>)

Stl"dlaht

'I QI'I'i<at"d mid co'llPGil<".lts Lone. <lt to ">fcty. TAC s>afrty funct>on for e;"h cyst~n> f""-~!ng t>> otl ~ ~r sysicn'", nc f~"tlt>n!n>I sn'd! bc to prov!'u fic>e..t c4nsc ty w cap bi>lty C

lgn ILnitS tuld d

>gn Cc~di>!>>n.; Of >.he rc>fetor CQOI&t f>re'Nure L s>> >t:.L~j Src nct 4..cc~d~E r~

t tdt Gf s.at'c'> t4 cj:cr

~

~ ~ i The c.

It4 cic-Ic prowcr. uppHÃ, L.clud It'.g the bette:.ies.:u>d

>h cn".!te e!petr>c t.'is.

perfo~ their -~ety functions ac.nmlL~g a single faJurc.

r!cct+ic power f~m Ihc ttar><<sion nct work to thc on"!!e cl~trlc distr!but!on system shall be supplied by two phys>c.ily independent circula (not nw-.~anly on ""p-

<<ate ri<>hta Gf "'t>y) deSI>g>n. Cd and >CCAted iM to >ninircm to the extent p>.int!ca! t;lc

><"CIIh~ of t'heir simu!tanccus f>1I!ure under cnew>lag and

<<ostu>< ted rmid nt CcrrmOn tO bOth Cireuite IS SCOrn =hie. r lrh of tl:csc c!rcuiw shaH be desi"n~i to V~

nvdiab!e in s "ficicnt tL-..C fo!!o'-'".g a!<."1 of all ons!te rjtemsting cu..cnt "o<rcr sup.

pUcs and the other of:site electric po-er clr.

cuit. to

> "sure that s~ified accept" ble fuel

<lcs<gn ILuI'""and design condit!Cns of the r actor. Ccciac pre~aurc Lwunda-.y sw nct ex~cd. One of t.'.>cse CL<u!tc st aH " dc.

following a less.ofwoo! at sec!dent to sssurc that core cooling, con~eat In~sty.,

end other 14taI safety functions are main-tained.

Pro>"~ions shaH be included to maim~~"

the probability of IosLm c!ectric power from any of thc remaIM suppl!es rc a result of, or coincident;.th, th Ioas of power gener.

d by the nuclear power unit, the Iou of power

!Ccm the

-"a="~on tlctwor'. or t>le Ines t>! t~r'" frcm the on he electric toe "r suppllc",

= GDC 39 (2nd sentence) 39 (I

". sentence',

GDC 39 (2n>d sentellce

- anslte) 39 (2nd sentence

- offsi te)

I I

j P

I'~eel 1

Wino! changes Stl a',aht far.'hard I!ajar cha Ige Gjol ch<lnoe Major Mditian

l.

)

> '~

c~<<<d

'i c w

c c

~

~

~ ~

)

~

e iw ~

q ~

(>p'

~ '>'Qc>'t2<>

c <

'(iq r"'~> ~ ~ ~'.

<< ~.~<<>

II

<<.+

i

~ 'ii )

~

g

> I y q

~

~

~ << ~

V an>

)".

'c seers

)>a ".-

O,> hi%>'~,'>

> '>~<<>,

+'>

1 '

-'>)

>r,".c) a cl

<<s

<<c>

y

<<>>4 y<<) i,,>>

j

> <<><<" 4

~

> '<<g

. e,a'>>~f

',.>>'0 r L)>

> ~ si ~

)italo v>>

ta<<4>)

5) 5telils (diesel gener: 'r> j

'I'i>

) 1 5"a t pro! -.hi 1 i fy T )a-,'rv o

geAGraicv ';)il )

>fall to stapt QA dern>a>>d

".5 tak

') by

+l'>e 5'ff )'o be one 5e!

hundred d--".ands, '.e., lo 25/.

it -,.hese

",-:.cur =s ar

..ccuvate,

.h. n +l'," co.":b'rd,"-p'bi'ity fo all AC po",'er scenario is in th= rance 'o

-o lo pe)

) ega) d,

. ".e '. ai"'i

S

~

nda "

e" ic".I P tan for." ) lear

'."o:;el P Ian'5 sets preseAce OT ))azardous>>uteri;1 Qr ac'v>

)e In h>- >>ici >>'" o.; tne

)> Ai"

~

(

.)cted probabiiiF" va.'ue 0" aT. 1easi o

p'r y>:-ar d'or '0 pe) year

>0 a

conservati

>e ca)culation) must b= so considere!.

The "loss of all

~C noser" sequence is no" precisely )"lth>n >he ca'e ov" of ev n

> s coA

> empl a ted by the Stardard Revi e v P 1 an.

Ho<'>ever i t 5 ul:>7>a '".e result -- assuming that power is'not "i>>sly restored -- is an unvrotec" d

loss of coolant accident, the consequences o>

>vhich a!.e like)y to exceod the guidelines o>

10 CFR Part 100.

He do no): understand:Ihy this se~uence (i.e., loss of GTTsl'e poNel co.;blned ':li h fa iu)

OT dlesels s

a i j

~

Qppears to have a pvobabi I ', ty )vel 1 above the gui del 'e va 1 ues, sho) >1 6 no-taken i) c.o consideva>.ion in the design of the n) ant.

28/

lh pa) ties ar add ess ill5 polrt, s" i Ag

0) tll i ie

> v

)> easons

=or-ac'hering

('.f th>ey do) cont vary pos ition.

25/

Fit:patrick A fidavit of 0>Jne 12,

1978, p.

4.

Also see Pegulatory G>uiide 1.108, Section B.

25/

This corclusion further assumes that ih failure of t)!o diesel generai".rs to start ~;ouid be statisti>cally independent event, an assumption

~ ic.'1 leads to the lo';test iikel ihood of co>>bined failure, and ~;hich might be norconservative i

there exists tl e potential for coo'-,.On failure modes for the onsite systems.

27/

H~JR.'6 75/687, Section 2.2.3, paragraph II.

28/

)(e have acccp ed

+he Standard (ievi ".i') aA in af>other case.

PLl>hi 'l c S'rvics F1p(-, ri r gu

> de

> i Ae Vc~

', uC5 a5 Veasonan) e C(i:"9>>., v (I Ape C) k SI.-

tcie

~

+WC tncff has noi c+kiPc d tii I YRQVc

)~efnr~n, ed Iicccc;-'I ical rq'Jic. )i IitV 0

'c cie S '-"

OA b "'"u" nc

'I "I"C T -n '""-'"n "'" I"'"~}'" '

I'"~" "~\\.I as lasl: Acc.ion P( a'1

( I lli J

>4-44

<<Ad ct i" e".p 'cte J

+ ',".

IIU el i "Ql rel icbi 1I ity goals:.ill be e"tablished as a result o. this program In mu=h tl 0 same maI1Ael as c."Qs doAe foi'lctlci pated trQns ents Ml thout sc, am.

8 cc Usc.'his task act on elan is in its init'ial stages of devclG cmeAt..o crite', la hc v! been estc.blis>ied.

ite have theiefore adopted the 10" /year goai refe, encei above by the Appeal antjcicatioq Of 4 he result S

O j clP A 4c i "nd

'n vc Yc:~1 ire,'

che

.,Artcc

<<an t

I to d!>>,".onstrate ti)at this goal can be met by -.he St.

Lu,:ie LInit 2 desi9!i.

STAFF t(ESPc")~SE T0 APPLICA"c 'S ARS'A'".R T!) BI)""i0 QUEST:0!t Bl The applicant s ansv(er provides an Qncly:is of probabiliity of ac popover restore:tion verses time folio:ving a station balckout, In OI!r rev~-w of this analysis, we found an apparent disci'epancy betv(een the Florida Po;Ier R Light historica'.

data and thc coAsiant used in the probabH ity equat1 li sp c i,:cal 1 y,

",n res porse to Board cguestion 03, the applicant demonst. a;es an average duration of 26 minutes for its loss of offsite pover events, The applica!it then proceeds to use 1.6 Ihr as the cons'tafit in the probab i 1 jty equation This constant represents an average duration of 37.5 minutes i;hich is conservatiVe The 26 minutes ivould yield a constant equal to based upon tlie historicc".1 data.

2.3 hr Ie riei.e informed by the applicant thai the 37.5 minute figure used represented one standard devia-tion on the data base or conservat:sm.

Siecel Testimony, Septe..ber 21, 1979.

4/

Uso of the 2.3 hr time constant reduces tIe ~.v;.lic.='nt

". fi,urI". o

..6 h>Quis

~ ~

to lllee>. t!e IO

/ye>;t qoa ho

>'.. /

>!o>;>'.>

~

x

'l

~ 'e:o "

> "U di csel ge!14 ator un e! ial>'I I 1 tv U"ed in thu Roactor Sa fety 5'>>.J'Iy I

!. e.

3 x 10

)

and the 2.3 I!r resto. a+!

n tim". cons aA':,

!!e ".!"'.eri('>J I'ec>.i

>s

.>.5

>>Ours (essentially the fiaure presen'ed!

hy tI!e appl icant).

The s'.tznif'can:": of. those time periods is that i> it can be demonstrated

+I!at natur<'1 circulation of the primarv svstem can be maintained for at least the time pe! iod ca.culated, the pro-bability of core damage due to>>e sta>.ioA blac>'.U+ scenar:o wil"

~ a"!ai!i below

'I

'I A ~

i~

i0 per yea!

rrom tI'>e abo.e,.lculati>ors, 1'>hc i!,'p!ii.

>'t c"'>

".em'.:.St!>a'-'e r!-

mary system integrity (i.e. natural circul tion with no e'<cessive leakage) for four hours of station blackout ccnditions, the probability of core damage

-is wel below the 10 jyear goal For the St.

Lucie 2 design.

B2.

In line with the above discussion, th testimony is to analyz ev nts th>at would occur between the "loss of all AC poijer " and the violation o> either the fuel design 1 imits or the design cond-;ti ons of the 1 eac 'l cool aAt p!'essu) e boundary (or any po",ticn thereof).

In particular, tI!e pa! ties shoul;., if poss'i.ble.

re-concile th..".." d-::fer-:-q r,"soorses to u! stion B. 1(b) of our harch 10, 1978 order,'-

or,.if not, "o-'>>-'.

Up or;;cisely where t>h>e d;sagre;""::.ants lie.

29/

(References fn 24 reproduced belo>rl.)

The staff's judgment is that the'irst failure woUld be tlla't 0>

a primary pump seal, at about one hour after the loss of AC power -- resI!1ting in a small loss of coolant accident.

(Fitzpatrick Affidavit of June 12, 19/8,

p. 11).

':TAI:>"- I:ESr0liSF.

TO P>OARO 0"EST.Ci'> 02 Ny affidavit fi'Ied in rosporse to the Appeal Board's order of I~arch 10, 1978 gave the applicant credit

>or one hour following tI!

less of

~

3

~

'I

~

/

I

~

credit was taken from the applicant's PSAR section 9.2.2.3.1 which demonstrates

1 ~o co:;"c'<.Q}

c"oi}anT.;.,<" i>0 boa I compoP(!At cool ing water.

i A }'egv i ty for an, hour Q f ooej a(}, i'><A,o >

} z'>'ii "<?

> o.". o i

}he staf i veco c'ed 1 he cons>>; vac is}!} i!}volvod in ~ ~ e~>>a ing ",'>> dini:<:;c co~d!itions <1f i'}<'. o}:}}}p vu~n;>'(;",erses thc s<1t" c co(}o t1c:"s of 'the pumip stopped., Ho } static cond'Ition encounte ever. in the absence oi"- direc test results for the vcd d}}ri}}gsta'Cion bl ackout i t<ie sta'ff }<as ufiwl 1 1( i}ig to attempt to extrapolate from the applicant's. analysis, This rem ins the staff ( ~ A I (<( 5 h h P ~ Pi> q> ( ( y g <( ~ 0 (,><<(,i I J 'pi,'('he applicant notes tt}at U}}it 1 diesel g(.neratov caA be ali(JAGd to Unit~ sa>etv busses and estimates that two mein could effec }"Gal Qnmelt 0> 0'}e d1esel generator in about one hour. The applicant has not taken any cvedi ~ for this capability in his analysis of pronability verses time for restoration of power to Unit 2 following a station blackout. r'owevev, prior to the completion of Tlap A-44, it 1s not clear what cvedit the staff could g1ve or this design feature. Station blackout at multi-unit sites should be analyzed in depth prior to determining the 'criteria governing reassignment of onsite power sources. Such an undertaking must be part of a comprehensive effort which in this case is TAP A-44. Beyond th1s, t'e site specific'ituatio}} of vequiring two man hours of ef ort to effect the transfer intvoduces operator evror as a factor in the p}'obabi lity of failure to restore power. Also, the applicant 's probability calculat'}ons assume tI}at the t;io Unit 2 diesel generators and resio} atioA of o fsito power a', e being wovked on si}}}}lita}}.'.A}:sly.The additional two men reoui} ed >iir tral}s ("<1r} l}}g }:('.>'> <>>'.>e> '~< ~ I ~ >'J.,oi' 'p l }i>}I v \\() v, > ('> (9 } '., ( w @<1 ln(>> J the inv i i abl e OA51 7e m(1}}}pow>ev~ f~ I Si }ol testi}}ony, Septe}}}ber 21, 197'3.

!I!!'!'I!1y, (,:le c" p bll l.y ol tran 41 1>'!4 ~ ( i~S'" '~(" (' O~S I)hg' <A u~>l t(' ve, y des it abl e des 1 gn f(".a ~ Ure es pec'Ia I I y (o!" t!!e ('"I i ' b", ((cI ouL sce. al" 0 Holv(1ver prior to co!;:el<-.t>o!! ",I I("-.P I!-;>4 it is Ao, CI>>ar,~"w f,iurh cvediii ~ h>> t staff could give fo: this cesign ;eature. Tn ( I h 1 a I Ih ies i INofly sflculd cofltain( a 2 is(:w"so 1! A, sup;".(I".'".."x b.'">" h dcia as" is ava i ~zb s c, I e,aied to tile ti.l'.e that n-:;I!-. b. roa(Iired io (st(ari a dies=1 (enerator a'ssu'ning 1 t Tailed io respond to tne !Alt'lal) auto-staa t slo!la!. The seal.f does noi nave an independent data basei>> order to ca!culaie a iiean-time-to-repair (STIR) for the diesel g n(.rators in I"uclear. Sel"vlcc. The Licensing Event Repor's (LERs) submitted in accordailc;.ith ihe <uidelines of. Regulatory Guide 1.16 "Reposing of Operati1!g inrorI'!ation - hpoeiidiv, A Tecilnrcai Specifications" have not required V!TTR d ia for diesel.generator failure 1'eports. Y Therefore, if NTTR data had been includ d in any LER on diesel generator failure ) i't would have been because the licensee volunteered suc.'1 info'rmation. Regulatory Guide 1.10S "P r.odic Tes.ing of Diesel Generator Units Use 's Onsite Electric Power Systems at Huclear Power Plants" (October 1976) established the requirelnent to r'eport'ural'on o": o!Itages (rom which !1T'iR can be calculated. This regulatory guide applies to all construction perIIIit applications following its data of issuance, -Ho operating nuclear p',ants,all into this categor'y.

Q 1) The.'.egul-tory V.-...-, -;r-';nts Voi-..-::: CO;..:-.,-t:=';, <<.) v~ ~ii.::;('d I,enu~-!O! y Gu'de 1 A I i ~ 10G and d.clded t'.Qt lt shoul 'e CC:isl dered ) o;" ~"':I'.fi tt'.Ag to operatlAO veaciors on a case 0'/ cas: i!asis. Iihi ~ i .. i '!' 0 t!'is pol '<.y dQcisio.'! aAd some operating plan.s i',2".'Q b en vequ'iv;!(i to meet the rec!Ulvel!Qnts Of 'tIl!s gUlde, The AUmber ol'!ants in~/01::ed ave llil'Ufiicient tu y!eid 2 statisticallymeaningful data base and addit'.Onaily. the outiige tiiPQ ret!Ovting requirement appli.s to current fal U es onlj iot pv:!v ous y i'Q~ov d f'ailules. The app! icant's d letii A of ce.tain d";es..! < Aera;cr "-illu "Q" duQ tc correct"'<<Q design measures is appropriate and there is mierit to ciie argus!Qnt that use oi" historical data for returning a diesel generator to service is conservative as no ur due time-pr ssure constva;nts er.".sted. B4. Finally, in the 1'.<'.t of the disci!ssion of poivt; 2 ali 3 above, the pa!"ti-s ~ are to revie!I possible measures for decreasing the lil;~'lihood of exceeding design limits on the reactor f.!el and pressure boundary ind r tho assumptlOA that there is some time available to activate an auxiliary ponev source sub-sequ nt to a total loss of AC poi er. STAFF

RESPONSE

TO BOARD OL!ESTION 84 The limiting event folio'ling station blaciout ls ioss of national c'l!"cUlatloA in the primary coolant system (i.e., loss of'ove cooling capability). Loss oi natural circulation is brought about by a s'.'gnificant loss o nriPi!ary coolant!Ihich!Iould escap through the reactor coolant pump seals. If. the leak rates through the seals can be shoi;n to provide at least four hcuvs before sUfficient inventory ls lost to stop natuval cir culat;on; i he probabil ity of

lost, ttie proIiaL.' s I;y,.:7 I 0" ': O i !l"it!!, ! el!'c l!a i-i 8 '5 ne~'. 'oib' and the J !.its ro'..'een r~stored);;o:,!1 'j Q!1 becb le the loss of capac i 'iy in the st<< t'io!!) b gati"'f i < s. Th'i" !a'.lure l ou! ke a ay the cperat" r 's a" i', ',"y '" con'-roi and a11 intel 1: g..nce on the plan". stat;!s ~ STAFF RESPO USE TO ".PPL'.Ci'.r'T'S f!!!Sl>F"", TO HQ.'," 0 0!.'ES "GI! B4 i Upon derznstra ion o" at least four hours of natur';1 ci! cul at ion folio i g sYa4on b I ackout, the sta i f coI'icuI's wit?: t h 'otential for exceeding desi gn 1 irk!its on the I"Qactcr fuel and pt essure bo:Indary is accepts',y 1 c>>!. C. SYSTEH RELIABILiTY DLiRING ALERT STAT'!S According tc tf e staff the applicant, is being requi r ed to define conditions in which it wi 1 1 pu-its power distribution syste! i ".'n ar< "al Qrt status" . 3O~ At such ti!!!es, loss of offsite power I;oui d pi esl!!1!"bly be more likely than normal. hie l.ish to be advised as. to the axiscence of.reasL!res that might be taken to assure, or at least to increase, the reliability of the

o. site pol-:er systems durir g an "al el t status" period.

30/ Fitzpatrick Affidavit of June 12, 1970; Enclosure 3. STAFF

RESPONSE

TO BOARD gUESTIO'i C The staff concurs with the applicants'nswer to this question in that the diesel generator could be !l!anuaily started in alit icipation of a loss of orf-sii tQ power. In fact, thQ staff has c!!forcQd su' a requirement i!I hie tech ni ~ + ~ le Ul I es the Leigill!lg of !!lan'1/ i acto. 'nd !)!List he arri vQd a '; on a ca:e hy

-22 bv case bas'.s. l".'ny diesel nenevator dleslg'ls 'Acluding ",:hose at St. Luci'aririot be run un",O.- ipd !i.e. Qt idle'. fol. <<yi -:nd.-.d per'ioris of tiv'2 ~ llo 1va ~ oi ~ 'g"~ rc'Qd 0')~r" "s!'1 w'l 1 l caus~ ir'. ~ ' '"' rou <"ton 0 lP resu t g in th formation cf g..!1 ':li.i varnisil depo'its on xhe cylind; walls, iAtake al d exhaust

valves, piistoils Qnd p" ston 1 iAc's tc.

QAd Qccu;""JlQ ioA of UnbUrAeo fuel 'in the tui"boer'larger "Qnd e41aus ~ . j's el)! Tile conscoU.'ilc" of r10 load or light load opera.icn are pctentia', \\ lp,"..en fai 1 "re d 0 the gum and vav:iish goo~,c; 1 r'c

Qnc, 1! 5 1 Q tf'l~ p! '14 I)v'eau! Y s'I Another facto.

to be cor'i.lered 'is that "alert."ta es" on happen relatively l"equently. lost 0!teA the Bier>>: state duration and cou"! d be tei'minated, for erar<iple, rly '><<r.up Q power ~.ste a could '~'ovid not be o! long o! anotiier gencratin".. unit ov units thus revevting th system back.to Q "novmal state". Onc>> in a while the alert state will be terminated by anotl er contingency even (such as loss of a critical transmission lin') Qnd th!e state of the system wH1 go to an "emergency state" where at 'lees part o!.tiie system has been lost. The above situation could place an undue numbe'r of cllallenges to the diesel generators where in retrospect most <auld have been unnecessary. En the instances where the staff has requived the manual starting of onsite diesel generators, the underlying cause has usually been a specific item of concern such as an impending tornado. The s a f also concu s wi h 'tlie QpplicaAts cor clusiolis tliQt.SUch Ale"sui es Qre not required. for St. Lucio. The bases for tnis conclusion are 'll:t Ao-lcadi running of the diesel generators for every ale.t state that thl'. grid system r.'.irht enter co<<ld unncressarily ham>ev th<<i!" r~~rfor;,ence in a real c-,l.v, encv: it '~!ould consume ons ite perso)j)jel t)!at rould be doi):,o othe)" i)",<pnrtant f;.Ac t)QAs.'- and t!e o)!s i 3 po)"e)'ystem)! j s sD c ')')ca: iy desi< Aed to aut t)s: iica! 1 v sta; t and perfo;m iig inten;i fu!lctj))1 iij.he prese<<ce of a single failu) e. D. C) '60T ll"- Il!PB"4'E! 1'":i 7 0F SYSTF i~i i'ELT/'.!)ILI i Y ! ha testimony should p!'Ovjde a O'cise, Up"to-date djscuss')oij of ex) stj "lg

measures, or those planned or tho Acar future, by.hich ihe ).eiiab',1 ity of the ap'jl icaAt s 'yste!!1 Nay Le enijanced.

i"art 1 cu: a! atte.t jc"j s~',0!'1'! be pa j d to the seemiAg! y excess v:.'vmb r Of pcrso)'ne I Prrol"s v)ij>' Qp+~'%l to have 1 d to t!je Vay i~, 1978 outage and to i)ave co;jtributod to tI)o Hay 16, 1977 disturbance. Q]Pf f g(')% ~ ~Q)'PQLWQ lf)+>e staff requ-'r:.ilg sam-". The 6ij'econd feature concerning appi'oved wr i tten proce(I res marks what ap'3ea".s LQ a major change 'n FPP<L pill1osophy. At thie June 5, 1-78 0'etlngi betwee!'. 'th sta I al'd."'L 0'1 the i'3y lil 157: loss Qi Qi fs e,."'I" at S.".. Lu ! e FPGL stated that written procedures iior iield eisoninel;;ere niot;I;ed arid not considered of bene it. 80th of th'e fe=.tures ,ii.e. ana lvsis and >'r'r'tton pl"0-cedures) are major lmprovemellts in FP5'pera lons. The third major contributor to overall power system 1'eliability is the novi operational system dispatch and control center. r"s described in the appli-cant's testimony, this center provides the syst m dispatcher with a tremen-dously powerful tool to aid in the optimum operation

and, on occasion) restoration of the power system.

In order to utilize this control center to its full pot ntial, extensive operator trail>ing is required. The appli-cant has purchased a training simulator and is conducting training plograms for the operating staff. This complex and povierful tool can only be as effective as those who operate it. 'l(ith prooerly trained personnel, the dis-patcher coniusion and lack of system status inforl!!ation that, contributed to the tiay 16, 1.77 grid disturbance are el i!I-':nated.

IV. CQ,'tCLUS I"'he St. Lucio Unit 2 dosion pn +n t~ A ~ r:t' KQ -I?';. rc.,u I.:Permits GB" '7. Upon <IeIiilonst> 2 a < ol > cc'/ ~ice'.i:. I c'.est '!'esul is tIl"" rect f s (tt coolant p"f!Ip sea! ~ ?

p

~ ' S Can enure ? S 'c tio!')~>t ~ I t t c.~,<!,t Con!'!'" M M ( < t'" oi; s i t.e powder "yst(".i> \\'Ii1 b'av 4<<dergo!le ) ~ hO<.ct .~ it can be s concluced c!lat Jle p)'oc')1 1 li'T "= "I,~ !! ~i: ~lor< L)1 1 y of core dc.!l!ag dJe to 2 s ta 5 i on blackout i s hbelow the Standard .",evict! Pla! 2.' ".:."'c-1 'a; h -: ' c<A .'.3 r<u~".:rical reliability goal o<F 10 per year. <lite (o,ior ' Unit. 2 oper~tion) IItaJcr C."';,'.1c' 1 s io sii !Al t iicc".Atly <Acroase 1't, cc 1 S oveI all rol iab11 I tv ~ .!'.e cna!1"."-s '!!!c!udo <;h aed1 t'.on < a mission system v;hich overl'.Vs - ~ c,.',ta preV!Ous 2SO substa'tl on soutIl t0 'e t' ?'" re .he tiamti a."e, incre.";sinr It;V s<" .o.'r< Tr"m 1:<',2 t'li'v ><V(( traIls Fer capab i 1 i tc'Pi th Georgia and therefore strcnocr Gr <ies duriAg syst"I" dlsturbanc s an'" a sophi sticated cent> a1 ized d i spate 1 so n1~ <~ a cn ant control center The s"-". aT< coA-elusion of tI<e acceptability of St. Lucie Un'"-' m ucie Unit 2 electric poNer systems remains urchanged. ,c

f ~ I + i )8' Plr rr/ l(~[<T l> ~ <lit i'l,l~ t'i'll l>r, ( A<I~1 Pl f,",I, '" $ g>fa >'Tfllif C" C, ':.:: *' ~ I hlvlJ ~ ~ 4 ~ ~ l I I ( \\ I ~ \\ 4 'Vl s EiblJCAT IGii B.S. Electrical Engine ring, 197'i; i~I. S ~ Eliectr i cal Engineer; ng, 197"; llajor: El ecti ical Po;!er Systems io: i.hea'"rn Un iver. ity, Bos ton, !lass. iIor".l; ast:. rn Unive..ty, Boston, !i.".=-. Engineer) ng p!'~r. <q~nx~~i ~iins v r!rq;-zr<<i~ P J.- . 'C. 'ro,",i 1972 - 1974 I worked for Yanl:ee At:!; c =']ectric CJ"'iiy in '."-: tbo.v, ."lassacliusetts. I ivas assigned to tho E,ectrica'. and C)ntrol En,"ineerin"., Group and my duties included worn on the Yal 'QQ operating n.c'cesar plants and the Seabrool'roject. (Prior to this-I spent 3 years with Yankee s a coopera- 'tlve education student whi 1 e attending Northeastern Un i vers-;'ty). 'I From 197~k io tlie present I iiave v!orked for the i!uclear Regulatory Commission involved in the technical review of electrical systems (onsite and offsite power, and Instrumentation and control). Through 1976 I w~s a member of the Electrical I Instrumentation and Control Systems Branch. This Branch i:as spl t in January ~ 1977 into an ISC branch and a power branch. Since this split I have been a mem-ber of the Power Systems Branch. Hy present title is Senior Reactor Systems Engineer (Electrical). Following the Three Vile island accident, I have been assigned to th Three Hile Isliand Site Support Group. Q !i]ember of tlie EEE and al so i epresent the '<<RC as a me"ib'-'r of IE'" E "ucl ear Pov!er Engireering Coi~ziiittee Subcommittee 4 "Au> iliary Power Systems". This

0>wy OU l ('>w > r t)r ~ 17<>< a', w~< g a~pz ~,<f or more ident ilied p '<<.'Qv sourc"s Ea"'ablQ (l"I opera.'il'l<j ind oen('Iona ly 0f the ons tte or stan(Jby Do)ier sou, ces and encom"asses L'hG ('r(o, I tfansmission lines (overilcad or un(!="-r(:ro 'nd}, tvansmtss'ion line ".'0'i:Grs, tr ans former s, s::!itchyard co:;",.on"nis and control syst""':As sl'i'I c. ya bat+9 s systems, thQ m.". in genera:or, and dI "connect sl'< tches, t'roYtded to sUpply electric "0'; er +0 safetv-ve 3t"d ar(, 0 he Gql'>,"I Gnt, The PSB 0!il 1 revleN the, folio"!'fng features- 0f the pl'eferred i"0'~; r system, 1. The prefevred po>> v system a<fanaem'nt is revie',!ed to (Leterm"<nG that the requir d minimum of t<n separate circuits from the tvansrIlissjon net~nrk to the standby power d]stribution system ls proYlded, Ln detel m tni fig the adeo" c" 0 f thi s sys i;Gm the 'in"Gpendeflce ol the

o: i Po) c;Pc:<<ts:s <<.;:.-..-i'i."d,i.;",~';!,a(..'oui ..i.:-.".r',r..;<< y(ii) p4i ~ ( i(., e ". i- ~ ga ~ i~) (ip ( <i i.q ~( J ~i ti!',~)( ~ ye ii)c'iin~g ot h 5 iiiluitapieO ii '. i i! ' k!i i ~ iii' iii(: Ci i i.,i ', ir O i <<iie i.~ z i~(.i!ii ilv I or,".o;;er "ources from cf e gr!d, locat",c!A o" Pi-ats"oi'-;:av, tr',As-m<<"-s'Qn ~ 'nes and '.'"~rs t"""(~ or!i'"- "~ t"h"2"d "'it~1 "on'ec'~"!s (b. eai;ers and bus (ajran(ements',i, switcI!y'rd contro't systems and power suppl les, lioc" v io'n 0'r swi'cchoear (i". plant} ~ in'rconnectiuns ti',een s'-.!i "ch".eair, -,-: bl e ", out"; nns, i".in ~".Aerator d'con ~ A ~ t anid the disc n-ec. Control sscam ano pol c, si.'!:p~ v, II. JiCCEPTAHCE CRIT""P(II'i In general, the preferr' po:.er systeim! is acceptable "hen !t can be con-cluded that tm separate paths from ihe transmission net,~ork to ";he standby poi'(er dl siPi but'ton System are p Qv ded in Qccordan e '.i'ith General D sign Cr,.erion 1 ~; ade(;uat ",'."s';c-1 -nd "1 ctr'ical sep ra+ion .;ist'; and the system has +he capacity, capabil ity, and reliability to supply power to all'afety loads and o.her required ecu i pimient, Details of th applicat',cn of the acceptanc criter'.a to the areas of review described in subs ction I are as follows; 1. system 9"sinn Aeauiremen;s a. C Aieral Desi."n <: '," r',a "-:",.'4, 35, ."-.8, l'1 and ~!4 se'orth Pe(',u'i P meAts foP the safety systems whos sourc" 0f poweP i s

~ ~ < ~ sys m veo un'a nc,'.~

nia ! 1 be s vc A i.on (a<sou!PTng s'indby po"c.-r is no ava) i.".ul<2) the

~~~<. +~g.. pf <r~'q n f<, ~ 4 ~. < u< ~ ~ " a< ~ v<<< ~<!<< i~<<< 4 failure,. To utilize this requi;e-..eni, tiie s ln:.'1 e fat! Ure (s a$ SUMed to occu do';i<nstrea"l of th 9referr.."d 005~r "eed br~akers c~t ~'~i ~ scrfety'uses, -spy e~.- ~~~~cc~ptabjl i'ty of the preferred,::o".er s>';-.te", des i':n in,this r'res'rd is based on Crtte.ion I7 and its -;.abi coSDonents and systems requ I ts con; or<<<",ance ':! i ttl (.-nera 1 ~J IPi)1 il ' PI <<~d'i <1 ired by these Gene.al Des'tgn C it"re, b. General t."sign Criter"',on 17 reouires t;N physically independent 'l1'cuit~ <PCA'i the offsite grid on<e of "'hich is des'i n<ed to Le ~lt,=-g3+old= >;>Win a ",s s ct',ons fol]o<iing a loss-of-co.lant a~>E?5~. << RE'/IEi<>> PKKURES'- = To'assure that the requirements of General Design Criterion 17 are satisfied;the-following eYi N'teps should be ta' (as applicable for a g~. OLzev.fest}.; a. The electrical schematics should be examined to assure that at least t~Io separate circuits f,"o,".he tr~nsmiss fon net',~vrk to the standby pvver district ton -y tc.-,i buses are provided (a svitchyard may.-~~ -m!>Z.o~hes-t:;ths),

I rs(s<<<< I ~ <<h ~ I)rsc ":swl ~ ~ si - Ih I<<v IIT. ~ %It O ~ II, ~ 'v J Ill<<v I I ss I isss J i (vss I ~ ~ w <<'v I rsI ~ ~ ill - ss 4s, Is4ir (vis layouc uri'.,ci,n-ls "nd "je") l')~J Lioral g '.: ~c nisi'0 at lees~ t;~ inde~."ndGt). CIrru.ts '.".om th'!r-lsjte gtiid to t'~e ~ s ~ >>l~ >>iI il's +rill<<r<<t I ~ w>> <<is>>ks>>5 ~ << I I ~ I III<<aw<>l 4'Sasis' 4 list I j aJLt I vss svsIv <<I 'shl ) III<< ~ s sv v ~ Is<< s< 0" s a"'"at r>g".' <<'."ay> id ail v on op."'t i . f th>> should ieav the s',rite!";!<~,d in opposite s,":.".;s a d should terii'inat at transform ",'ocated on opposite =-ides o;" the reactor -; turbi;,;=. t rl9 ss I ~ I I << 't rl 9 V rs Yl ' I 's s<<s Ils~ (t l<<<<s'ss <<+>>t 'I' i's li 'I'hysical separation becomes less thI~ ";he ideal., attention "i.:!ted ' od to'rds Qssut'ing t""-t no s',nI." ~ e esl(!rtt such Bs a to'nel falling or a line break".ng cat) s<l.bruit 'Tleously ai fect bot! ci) cu,ts ln such a !"ay th"t neither c" n be returned ".o service in title to prevent fuel design limits or design conditions of the reacto< coolant pressure boundary from being e:;ceeded. c. As ti e s".Atchyard may be coPl.:".Qn both cilrcuitsfr m th 0 I fsite grid to the safety-related distrilbution buses the electrical schematics of the snitchyard breaker control system and po!~er supply and the br eaker ar rangemlent itself should b czar')ined'for the possibility of simultaneous failure of bo:h circuits f) om single eYents sulc! Bs a breake not op, Qtitlg dut'Itlg Iault coirdit I ns, loss of a control c$ rcu'it poll=r supply, e c.

UNITED STATES OF AtZRICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO."~EMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY 4 LICENSING BOARD In the t~atter of: FLORIDA POMER 8 LIGHT COMPANY (St. Lucie Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 2) ) Docket No. 50-389 Testirony of Edward J. Fowlkes Septeaber 2l, l979

Testimony of Edward James Fowlkes Relating to ASLAB Memrandum and Order of April 5, 1979, on Electrical Grid Stability and Boer enc Power S stems (Question Bl Failure of Offsite Power) l. My naze is Edward James Fowlkes. 2. I am a Supervisory Electrical Engineer serving as the Chief, 3. Interconnection 4 Special Investigations Branch in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Office of Electric Power Regulation/ 5. Division of Interconnection and Systems Analysis. Hy education and 6. professional qualifications statement is attached to this testimony 7. and herein incorporated by reference.

SCOPE OF TESTDGNX 3 ~ 4. The purpose of this testimony is to address Question Bl as stated in the Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Memorandum and Order of April 5,

1979, a statement of which is provided in my accompanying Affidavit.

5. 7 ~ 8. 9. Offsite Power Supply to tne St. Lucie 1,579 YN Nuclear Plant From the Midway 500/230/138 kV Substation Evaluation 10. 12. 13. 15. 16. 17-18. 19. Presently and in 1983, the proposed operational date for the ,St. Lucie No. 2, 802 HN, nuclear. unit, there are three heavy duty, . (952 MVA} conservatively designed 230 kV lines, respectively 11.62, 11.77 and ll.75 miles in length. A breaker-and-a-half 230 kU circuit breaker arrangement is.used to terminate the lines at both ends and in no case are the lines in the same three-breaker bay. At Midway'ubstation, excluding the St. Lucie 230 kV lines, there will be one 500 kV line, via a 500/230 kV 1,500 HVA "FOA auto transformer with two low-side circuit breakers; five 230 kV lines, and two 138 kV line, connected via two 230/138 kY 224 MVA .2Q.. auto transformers. Specifically these lines are (Ratings in 21. parenthesis):

~Lee hh Terminations Voltage 2. 3 ~ 4. 5-6. 7 ~ 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 26..4 53.74 50.39 53.31 53.26 47.9 7.33 Midway - Hartin (2,650 MVA) 500 kV Midway - Halabar No. 1 (387 HVA) 230 kV Midway - Halabar No. 2 (387 HYA) 230 kV (These t::o lin s ar cn a co.;;7on Bight-o;-Nay north to Halabar substati") Midway - End'ntcwn Pratt & lrthitney-Ranch (840 t!YA) 230 kV Hidway Ranch (773 tCA) 230 kU (These two lines utilize a common Right-of-way south to the Ranch Substation) Midway - Sherman Hartin 230 kU Endiantown (420 HVA) 230 kV Midway - Plumosus (178 HVA) 138 kU Midway - Hartman (City of Foi t Pierce) 138 kv e 19. 20. These lines will provide eight sources (over four transfer paths) of FP&L system and other Peninsula Florida system supply 21 ~ of offsite power to the Midway - St. Lucie substation. The 230 22. 23. 24. kV lines terminate at Midway and St. Lucie in four substation bays -. arranged in a breaker-and-a-half'protective 'scheme. To dis-I connect one line's terminal, two circuit breakers must open. Should 25. one of the two breakers fail to clear, at most one line (generator ,-.26..; at St. Lucie) would be'disconnected from service. Ef a'us side" -" """" ~a 'ss" 27. associated line breaker fails to clear, the associated bus will 28.... ,be,pleared, however, this would. not-affect the continuity of any -'9.. other line (generator -at St. Lucie) except the faulted line . 30.... ,.initiating protective relay action.- For all double contingency ~ L ae 31 ~ . 32. 33. \\4 . (n-2),possibilities at the Midway substation, at most one Mid-way to St. Lucie 230 kY line's operation is affected and at least six line sources remain to Midway and at least, two 230 kV lines to St. Lucie. Midway substat'on double contingencies

considered wei e: 2. 3 ~ 4 ~ 5. 6. 70 8. 9. 10. (1) 230 kV or 138 kV line fault with bus side breaker failure; (2) 230 kY or 138 kV line fault with mid-bay (not adjacent to bus) failure; (3) 500 kV line fault with stuck breaker; (4) 230/138 kV bus fault with breaker failure; (5) 500 kV bus fault with breaker failure: (6) double 230 kV line or 500 kV plus 230 kV line fault; and, (7) double 230/138 kV bus fault. 23. These outage conditions -are within the scope (SEBC & FC" Planning 12... C,'iteria) of those normally considered to provide an adequate 13. bulk power supply system. Xn normal utility system operation, 14. all facilities operational, the double contingency would be 15. caused by the simultaneous failure of two components,

however,

. 16. ,....this condition could also evolve-from the unscheduled -(forced) 17. outage of one dur ing the scheduled (maintenance) outage of another. 18. Even with a triple contingency(n-3), excluding the loss of all 19. three Midway to St.Lucie 230 kY lines, at the Midway substation, 20. a highly unlikely event not normally considered as a design 21.

event, 3 to 4 230 kU lines (depending on which mid-bay breaker 22.

fails to clear) remain connected to the Midway substation and 2-3 230 kV lines continue operation between Midway and St 24. Lucie. 25. Therefore, it may be concluded that, short of a sustained loss of all Midway to St. L'ucie 230 kV lines, the loss of all 27. 28. Midway supply lines and thence all offsite St. Lucie plant supply is an event substantially beyond normal electric 29. utility design criteria.

It would require the simultaneous occurrence of more 2.- 3 ~ 5.

6. -

~ 7 ~ ,8. than three disabling events at Midway substation or system

collapse, including a disturbance event causing the islanding and loss of generation to the FP&L Midway substation to cause the complete loss of all offsite power to St; Lucie.

Shor t of. the destruction of the Midway substation, eigh't essentially independent. transmission failure events must occur to lose Midway If substation. 9. To quantify the approxiL+te failure frequency of transmission 10. supply to the Midway and St. Lucie substation, a limited scope transmission reliability assessment was made of the transmission 12. 3 14. system supplying Midway substation through to the St. Lucie 230 kV substation. To simplify calculations, the following.assumptions were made: 15. ~ (1) Circuit breaker,

relay, bus and transformer failure events 16.

, 17.. 18. were not included. This was partially because no source of '00/230 kV transformer. failure rates and:repair. times was available. A bus fault concurrent with a break failure 19. must occur to affect a line. 20. .(2) While the Midway Halabar 230 kU lines and'the. Hidway-21. Ranch and Midway - =Indiantown - Ranch 230 kY lines" 22. 23. 24. (3) , 25. occupy common right-of-ways, failure independence was assumed 'he failure event improvement provided by the 138 kV lines (Midway - Plumosus and Midway - Hartman) was excluded;

l. (4) Because of the sparsity of line failure event data provided 2 ~ by FPEL, 230 kV line failure rate and repair characteristics 3. in Institute of Electrical and Electronics -Engineers (IEEE) 4. - publication on trans~sion. system reliability.calculations" 5. were used (Vol. PAS-87, No. 3, March 1968, "A Method for 6. 7o Calculating Transmission System Peliability" Stephen A. Mallard and Virginia C. Thomas - Table I). The Transmission 8..... Inter.ruption Summary provide by. FPM.. only covered the, few 9. 10. 230 kV Midway substation line (138 kV also provided) failures that occurred during the 1975-1978 period. System outages are not incorporated in the data base. ... 12. . (5);;The 230 kV line failure -rate.(outages.per unit..per year) used.. 13. was the weighted average of forced normal weather and forced 14.. adverse weather"outages; The impact of the adverse weather '""'" ~ "'""'5. component.'(152.63. times the normal component) was incorporated ~ 16. .based up U.S. Department Comm rce/Neather Bureau/Climatological=--=~.. 17. 18 ~,: ~~ ]9 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. Services Division data provided in Technical Paper Ho. 19, .Wean. Number of Thunderstorm Days in'%be United States""' September 1952 which showed Miami, Florida with a mean annual number of.thunderstorm days of 91-.. Therefore, the adverse weather failure rate component was given a 25$ weight. The 230 kV line failure rate used was 0.1105915 outages per mile-year consisting of normal and adverse weather components respectively of 0.00285 and 0.435. The normal and adverse 'I wkly I iQ ~

2. 3 ~ 5. 6. weather repair times respectively were 4.43 and 15.2 hours which when weighted accordingly provided an equivalent repair. tiaa of 7.115 hours. Failure rates calculated with the FPEL 230 kV data varied between 0.0 and. 6.25 per year with most about 0.5 per year (0.01 outages/mile-y ar for 50 mile line) 7. (6) The same failure rate (230 kV) was used for the Midway-8. Martin 500 kV line 9.= - (7) Scheduled outage and overloads due..the outage of.another 10. facility effects were not included; Following are the line failure rates (outages per year)

12. 'used in the calculations".,

Thecomponent repair:.time was.'7.115, 13. hours for all lines. 14. Line Terminations. Outages Per Year

15. l.

16: 2. 17 e. >3,%p 18. 19. 20. 5. .21. 6. 22M>> 23...7 24.'8 25. 9. 26..--10. Midway Halabar No. 1, 50.39 miles Midway Malabar No. 2, 53.74 miles Midway - Hartin 500 kV,'26;4-miles:;- Hidway - Sherman - Martin 230 kV'-. "- Indiantown, 47.9 miles Midway -.Indiantown,. 24.12 miles Zndiantown - Pratt 8 Whitney - Ranch, 29.19 miles 1 ~ J Midway - Ranch, 53.26 miles Hidway - St. Lucie No:; 1,-11.62 miles Midway St. Lucie No. 2, 11.77 miles Midway - St. Lucie Ne.,3,- 11.75 miles ~ 8 Q $ v 5.5727 5.9432 2.9196- "-. 5.2973 2.6675 3.2282 5.8901 1.2851 1.3017 1.2995.

2 ~ Lines 4. and

5. were considered as a parallel combination in series with Line 6.

This result was taken as a parallel ccmbina".ion '3.:..:-:wi"'h Lines l., 2., 3., and 7;: to"Midway substation, resulti..g in a combined unavailability of all lines and,.failure,frequency (events 5. per year) respectively of 652.2066 x 10 and 4.0178 x 10 6. events per year (Hean Time Between Failures (HTBF) of 248,890,3'0 7. .4 years). Lines 8., 9.. and 10. were combined in parallel with th's 9. combination taken in series with the above to St. Lucie 230 !'.V . 10.. substation. The resultant unavailability of all lines, failure

• "1'l.--: frequency and HTBF respectively-were 1.1653 x 10 -

, '4;3058 x \\ i12. 10 events per year and 232,244.79 years; 'Ihese results 13.. apply only to the specified.transmission line components without .~14. consideration of generation being available.to,.supply. the. lines. .15; -.:- =.- Attachment Nos. 2"and' discussion design.considerations as they-i16. apply and are used in Peninsula Florida and the FP&L interconnections 17. with other Peninsula Florida systems.

REFERENCES 2 ~ 3 ~ 4. 5. 6. 70 1978 Power System Statement (FPC Form No. 12) from Florida Power E Light Company 2. 1978 Power System Statement from Florida Power Corporation 3. 1978 Power System Statement from Tampa Electric Company.

4. 'pril 1, l979, Coord'nated Bulk Power Supply Program, 1979-1998 from Sosutheastern Electric Reliability Council.

8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18; 19. 20. 5. 6. 7 ~ ~ ~ 8. April 1, 1978, Bulk Power Supply Progran, 1978-1997 from Southeastern Electric Reliability Council, August 11979, 1979 Ten-Year Plan-State. of Florida-Electrical Generating Facilities and Associated Transmission Lines, Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group.. March 1979, Report of Special Transient: Stability Study"- for 1978 Summer Peak, to the System Planning Committee by the Special 1978 Transient Stability Task Force. January 1979, Transmission. Loadflow Analysis. Repor t -... 1982 5 1987 Summer Periods by Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group,. System Plannng Committee,. Trans-mission Task Force. ~ 21 ----9 22; 23. August. 23, 1978, -Peninsula Florida Generation Reliability:;

Study, 1978-1987 by Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group, Inc.

'24. "25. 26. 27. "10" A'Method for Calculating-transmission System Reliability"---"-~" " Stephen A. Mallard'nd'irginia-.C. Thomas;. IEEEl:Trans =-.-'~" actions on Power Appuratus and Systems, Vol. PAS-87-, No. 3 pp. 824-834, March 1968. ~ .---.-28.- -'l 29. 30. 31. A-Probability Method for Transmission and Distribution -= ~-'s.- Outage Calculations, Z.G. Todd. IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems, Vol. 83, pp. 695-701, July 1964. 32 33+ 35. 12. On Procedures for Reliability Evaluations of Trarsmission

Systems, Rober t J, Ringlee and Sheila D..Goode..

IEEE Transactions on Power Apparatus and Systems,- Vol. PAS-89, No. 4, pp. 527-536, April 1970

11-l. 2. 3 ~ 4. 5. 6. 7 ~ 13. Power-System Reliability Calculations, Roy Billinton, Robert J. Rin lee'ower System Heliaby Evaluation,.Roy B'linton Gordon and Beach, Science Publishers, Inc., New York 1970. g and Allen J. hood. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973. 8. 9. 10. 15. Transient Stability Evaluation of the Impact of the New 230 kV Tie Between FP&L and Georgia Power Company, Florida. Power & Light Company, August 3l:, 1979 11. 12, 13. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.- 22. 16. 17. 18. Review of the. Performance. of Various Electrical Configurations between St. Lucie Plant and the FPL Grid, Florida Power & Light Company, August 31, 1979 Testimony of Frederick George Flugger relating to ASLAB Memorandum and Order of April 5.;- 1979,-.-on'=. Em rgency Grid Stability and Emergency Power Systems (Questions A2, Bl, B2,-B3;'-and B4 of ALAB 537} June 22, 1979. Joint Testimony of Michel P.

Armand, Ernest L. Bivans;= and <lilfred E:

Coe Relating to Questions Al and D of ALAB 537. June 1, 1979

Edward J. Fowlkes Professional Qualifications Statement Yiy name is Edward J. Fowlkes. I am Supervisory Electrical 2. Engineering. serving as the Chief, Interconnection 4 Special Investigations 3. Branch in the Federal Energy Regulatory Com~ssion's Office of Electric Power Regulation/Division of Interconnection and Systems Analysis. 5. The ISI Branch. analyzes and evaluates; (1)- transmission, inter-6. connection and operational characteristics of electric power systems. 7. 'ssociated with FERC, or other proceedings'nd investigations upon. 8. request; (2) FERC licensing jurisdiction over.electric transmission 9. . lines associated with hydroelectric projects;

and, (3) benefits..

10'. available throug'n incr eased coordination and -pooling of electric-..

• ll;-

.-" power systems. Prior to my Federal employment beginning in 1971. 12; "with FERC's. predecessor the Federal Power Commission/Bureau of-13; 'Pomei /Power Supply &'Reliability Division, I was employed. by; tha.-.-;;:.:, / 10.'Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., in Poughkeepsie, New York. 15. =- I received a Bachelor of. Science Degree in Electrical 16;- - --Engineering (Powe~ption) -in-:1964, from Howard. University. in..., 17. Mashington, D.C. and a thster of Enginering Degree. in Electric 18. Power Engineering in 1971 from,Rensselaer .Polytechnic. Institute l9; - in Troy, New York. In<1968-69';-"I':attended the-General'Electri.c-, 2"; Company's Power System Engineering Course in Schenectady,. New 21. York. I am a registered Professional Engineer in the State of 22. New York and a member of the Institute of Electrical.and 23. Electronics Engineers.

Attachment No. I UNITED STATES OF AYSRICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COYJGSSION BEFORE TPS ATOMIC SAFETY AND LIC NSINQ APPEAL BOARD In The Matter Of: FLORIDA POWER A LIGHT COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-389 (St. Lucie Nucler Power Plant,'nit No. 2) AFFIDAVIT OF EDWARD J. FONLKES I am Edward J. Fowlkes, Chief, Interconnection & Special 2. 'Investigations 'Branch for the 'Federal Energy" Regulatory-Coamission's ' 30 4. 6. 70 8. 10. Office of Electric Power Regulation/Division of Interconnection and Systems Analysis. My education and professional qualifications appear as an attachment..to this testimony. I am participating here at the request of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Counsel for the NRC staff to provide assistance in their assessment of the adequacy of the Florida Power & Light Company and the Peninsula Florida transmission system for the offsite,emergency power requirements of the 802 l."~l S". Lucie Ho. 2 nuclear unit.

Attachment; Yo. 1 Page 2 of 0 1 ~ 24 30 The purpose of this affidavit is to respond to @:estion Bl concerning the failure of St. Lucie nuclear plan" offsite power in the-Atomic Safety and Licensing Board t'emorandum and O'er of April 5, 1979 (ALAB-537). ( UESTIOH Bl 6. 7 ~ 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. ld. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 2'1 ~ 22. 23 24'5. 26. As we see i", the likelihood of loss of all AC power at St. Lucie may be expressed. as the prcduct of two factors: (1) the probability. , that there will be an offsite pover failure involving the FPL ne"= work generally or tne Hidway substation in particular and a resulting loss of station pover which probability seems based on historical events, to lie in the range 1.0 an-. 0.1 per year; and (2) the probability that neither of the two onsite AC power , systems (diesel genera~mrs) will start.. --The probability that:" - '. any one diesel generator will fail to star t on d mand is taken by the staff to be one per hundred demands, i.e., ya-2 ~2 If these figures are accurate, then the combined probability for the "loss of all AC power" scenario is in the range 10 ~ to 10 per year. ~26 In, this regard., the staff's Standani - Review;Plan for Nuclear Power*-Plants. sets forth numerical guidel'ines for determining whether an event "resulting from the presence of hazardous mat'erials o'r activi'ties in the vicinity of'-the plant" = should be considered 4'n desigrring the plant (i;e., whether it; is a "design basis" even"). ~2-Urder these guidelines, events --- with a realistically calculated probability value of at least 10 Tper year (or 10-6 . per year a conservat;ive calculation). must be so considered. 27.- 28. 29. 30'. =3(f o, 32.. .33 3Q, 35-. 36. 37-. 38,' - The "loss of all AC pover ",sequence is not precis'ely'within the category of events contemplated by the Standard Review Plan. However, its ultimate. result assuming that power. is not- - timely restor'ed is an unprotected loss of coolant'-accident" " = = ..-..the consequences of which* are =likely to. exceed-"the-'guidelines of 10 CFR Part 100. Me*do not understand why this sequence of- -'-- events (i.e., loss of'offsite 'power combined with failure of diesels to start), which appears to have a probability well above ",.the guideline values,, should not be-takerr into considerat;ion in -= ='- 'he design of the plant. ~28 'Ihe parties are to address this point, setting forth ~heir reasons for adhering (if they do) to a contrary position. "

Attachment No. 1 Page 3 of 4 3 ~ 5. 6. 7 ~ 8. 26/ 9. 27/ 1. 25/ 2. Fitzpatrick Affidavic of--nunc M, 1978,

p. 4.

Also see. Regulatory Guide l."08, Section B. This conclusion furt'.~er assumes that the fa'lure of two diesel generators to start would 'be statistically independent 'events, an assumption w;".ich leads to the lowest likelihood of combined failure, and which might be nonconser vative if there exists the potential for common failure modes for the onsite systems. NUREG 75/087, Section 2.2.3, paragraph Ii. 10. 11. 12. 13. 28/ Ne have accepted the Standard Review Plan guideline values as reasonable in another case. Public-Service Electric and Gas Company (Hope Creek Units 1 and 2 ALAS 29, o NBC 229 234 (1977).

Attachment Ho. 1 Page 4 of 4 I, Edwar d J.

Fowlkes, being first duly sworn, depose and say that statements of this affadavit are true to the best of my knowledge and belief, 'nd that if asked questions

thereon, my answers in r esponse thereto would be as contained he. ein.

g I-'~g Edward J. P6wlkes Nashington, D. C. ) zT ... Subscribed and sworn to before..me.this;. 4/.... day:. of September, 1979. 1 J I J ~'.aV JT J J' ~ itot ary Public

Attachment !lo. 2 Page l of 15 1.

'iscussion of'-the Bulk Electr ic -Power Su "Plannin and Desi nPro ram 2.

All of the following contingency analysis tests are incorporated 3. in the FP&L and Peninsula Florida -systems bulk electric power suppply planning"and design process. hhile extensive. FGC studies of the 1983 5. Peninsula Florida system have not been performed because of the 6. tentative nature of area utility plans, such studies,.E have. been 7 ~ informed, are planned to be completed by early 1980. " 8. -- ---. "-.Zn the process of-designing the. bulk. power. supply, facilities. 9. generation and transmission, the power system is analyzed at peak 10. as well as lower load conditions. Zn the case of Peninsula Florida 11. systems such analysis is done on an individual utility basis as well - -'2.'"- -as a Peninsula Florida.:basis (Florida Electric-Power.'oordinating 13. Group). Once the level of generation needed is established,- the tran'smission system must; be analyzed to provide an adequate means. 15. '" for'ra'nsferring the supply to:the load.(l% and ifVAR).-.The -trans- --- 16..:-'--mission system desi'gn mUst-be-thoroughly.coordinated;with the, -. --, 17. generation expansion program and visa versa. " '18. '""'st'ablishment of an adequate transmission system must consider- -"'. 19. both normal and unusual conditions both of &e available generation-

20. '-" and of"the transmission-system.

--Compounding -this.analysis are 'the- -.- -..,.;-.>;."-~:, 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. ever present possibilities that,a-planned generation, or transmission facility will not be available as planned (institutional, environmental or other -regulatory delay). The abnormal design conditions evaluated seek to account for scheduled outages (generation, transmission line -or substation maintenance) and -forced (unscheduled) outages of generation or transmission ~ acil'ies. Such ..a'y is is perfor...ed

h. ou=h use of 27 load flow and sta5ility computer programs.

Attachment llo. 2 Page 2 of 15 Load flow is used to determine the distribution pattern of the 3 ~

5. ~

electric power throught the transmi sion system and losses with a specified generation'schedule (economic dispatch and spinning reserve allocation) and unit availability, system load level (HN) and transmission facility availability. Such analysis will d termine if 6. with specified availability of facilities, at a specific system load 7. level, whether the transmission system components operating within 8. their capability limits (MVA) and voltage limits. The spectrum 9. of situations analyzed would include: 10. Base Case 11. (all generation and transmission facilities available) 12. A. Pea< Load 13. B. Lower Load Level 10. Sin le Contin enc 3.5. A. Single line outage 16. B. Single generator outage 17. Double Contin ency ~ ~ . E8; -'A.' Double line outage (generally restricted to.a double-circuit- --, - -.:,.. 19. transmi;ssion line outage or two si:ngle-circuit lines on a 20. common right-of-way) 21'. 'B Double generator outage ('this-would account for situations- ~ .;-..-n" 22'3. where a unit was scheduled out and another unit-,had-to be taken off line where both units, may. not be at the san. site and where the second unit was not lost due 25. to fault or sudden trip)

Attachment No. 2 Page 3 of 15 1. C. Single line outage and generator outage (this would 2. account for conditions wherein a line or gene.ator 3 ~ 4, was scheduled out and a line or generator was forced cut of service) 5. D. Other Multiple Outages 6. (outages of more than two bulk power supply facilities 7 ~ 8. 9. may be considered depending on anticipated area, or regional conditions but are not generally design criteria) 10. Area Transfer Caoabilit 11. - A. -Intra system transfer capability..(to determine the..capability. 12. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. to transfer power from one utility system subarea to another. ~ ~ 'Such analysis 14. may be useful in developing restoration plans and in determining limiting facilities) B. Inter system transfer capability -(to determine

the, import or export capability between utility systems or regions)

'he preceeding contingencies are evaluated both at peak and -- 19. '. '1~ower'load conditions in the process of analyzing the bulk power.- 20.'- 21. 22. 23'supply system. adequacy..and its adherence to design criteria,: In.,-... all cases, it is presum d that if a facility or facilities are cutaged because of a fault condition, the system is.transiently stable and the effect of interconnected utility systems are 24. represented through appropriate model equivalents. ,These load

Attachment Ho. 2 Page 4 of 15 1. flow contingency studies are also performed as a routine 2. pa. t of nonrel system operation's periodic security analy"is 3. via on-line ibad flows a~.. modern system operations control. 4.

centers, for each capability period-summer and winter, on the 5.

mid range system plan 3-7. years in future and on the longer.- 6. range system 9-15 years in the future. The extensiveness 7. 'f'the contingency testing-will..depend.cn.the study requirements 8. and reasons precipitating the particular study. The stability of 9. the system(s), the ability to survive major disturbances without 10. uncontrolled losses of generator or load and without system

Xl; "collapse, is determined:through,-t;ransient.stability modelling.

C " o'c ~

12. '

Transient -stability pr ograms are. design to evaluate electric, 13. power system dynamics resultingfrom.sudden losses of bulk power 14. supply facilities and loads due to faults or other sudden con-15. tingencies. These may include: 16. Loss of 17; A". Generation Outage of a critical transmission line caused by. a fault 19.- h A4 'ii ~ 20 'V ~ B. Outage of a-critical transmission. line, caused by a fault during the scheduled outage of another:critical line. -- 21. C. 22."- '-".'3 Sudden loss of'all 'lines on a common right-of-way (ths could include the unlikely loss of, three or. more lines occupying a common right-of-way). e

Attachment No. 2 Page 5 of 15 D. Delayed clearing of a fault at ary point on the system 2 ~ due to failure of a circuit breaker to open (this accounts 3 ~ for. system dynamics that may result if the primary protective 6. relay system dynamics that rray result if the primary protective I and the back-up protective welaying and associated circuit breaker(s) must operate to clear the fault) 7 ~ 8. 9, E. Sudden loss of a substation plus transformation including any generating capacity connected thereto. The substation

loss, from a practical view point would be limited to a 10.

single voltage level at a multivoltage level substation. The evaluation of the foregoing events would be directed towards.-- 12; the transient analysis of the power system(s) and wouhi model the 13. generatol", load and protective relay dynamic performance to veri'fy that-': "-- f '14.;:-:no: uncontrolled system separati'ons, loss of generation,,'acility 15. overloads or system collapse occurs. Also modelled would be the 16. performance'f under frequency relay-response consonant with encountered ~ 17.-~ situations-.,"-The fact that. the. analysis. shows-that. underfzequency relays.: 18, operate as planned is an appropriate result dictated by the extent 19 - transmission. and generation supply....The analysis may.also be used to....., " '0. Nvelop the appropriate -under'-equency relay, load shedding scheme."

i.;,

Attachment Ho. 2 Page 6 of l5 L. Florida Peninsula Desi n Criteria For S stem Planning and 3o 6. 8. The Florida Power R Light Company along with the other Florida Peninsula systems design their transmission facilities to meet the Florida Electric Power Coordinating Group (FCG) criteria which parallels the SERG Regional Criteria. The FCG planning criteria is for the operating systems in Florida is set out in the.FCG Planning Handbook. 10. SERG Regional Criteria the objective of the criteria is to assure that cascading outages do not result from any ll. forseeable contingencies'herein cascading.,is defined as the; uncontrolled successive loss of system elements as a result of 13. a contingency at any location Cascading results in an 14. 15. 16. uncontrolled, widespread .collapse..af. system generation and load, which collapse cannot be'estrained from subsequently spreading beyond a predetermined area through appropriate 17. engineer ing

models, (load flow and'r ansient stability 18.

studies). 19. 'Pursuant to the SERG Regional 'Criteria, electric systems are -to be j h h C 20. planned to prevent cascading should any of the following contingencies 21. occur: 1. Loss of Generat'ion the sudden loss of,the entire generating capacity at any one plant.

Attachment Ifo. 2 Page ( of 15 l. 2. 2. Loss of Load - the sudden loss of a large load or major or major load center. 3 ~ 4. 5.6.. 7 ~ 8. ~ 9-10. 11. 12. 13. 15. 16. 3. Loss of Transmission A. The outage of the most critical transmission line due to a thr ee-phase fault concur rent with the outage of any other critical transmission line. B. The sudden loss of all transmission lines on a common right-of-way. C. The sudden loss of a substation (limited to a single voltage level w'thin the substation including transfora~tion from that voltage level), including any generation capacity connected thereto. D. The delayed clearirg of a thr e-phase fault at any system location due to the failure of a first-protective-zone circuit breaker to open to clear the fault. 17. Plannin Criteria 18. 19. A. More Probable Contin~encies - to be sustained without load loss other than that, connected to the lost element.. 20 Loss of eneration sudden loss, of-any one -generator 21. 2. Loss of transmission 22. 23. a. single line outage of any one transmiss'on line. b. loss of any one transformer, bank at. any one generating plant or bulk transmission -substation. - 25. B;"'ess Probable Contingencies.- to be sustained with possible 26. loss of some load. 27. 28. l. Loss of eneration sudden loss of any on generator while any one. generator is out, of service. -29. ~ 2; 'Loss of transmission - loss of'any two double-circuit tower. 30. transmission lines. 31 ~ 3. Loss of peneration and transmission loss of any one trans-32. 33 mission line during the scheduled-outage of any one generator..

Attachment No. 2 Page 8 of 15 These regional criteria serve as minimu."~ for all SEEC systems and 2. discussion with FPQ. staff indicated they were at least consonant with the FQ" Criteria which is followed by FPhL. Because of the ~ 4. -.limited interconnection capability between Florida Subr egion 5. 6. 70 electric systems and electric systems in tne remainder of SERG which are interconnected, with all other electr ic systems east of the line formed by the eastern borders of Hontana,

Nyoming, 8.,'Colorado and New Hex'co excluding Texas, presently major losses 9.

.of Peninsula Florida generation. (lmgest plant Turkey Point 10. . ~EL), 2066 N4 or largest unit Crystal River No. 3 (FLPC), 11;

824. tR) would result in the separate of the Florida -systems 12; = = 14.. from the remainder of the Eastern interconnection. This assumes that the specified plant and units were operating at their rated capabilities and there were no scheduled 15. 16." transfers to Florida. Xn 1983, the present scheduled operational date for the .- 17,.... ;.,St. Lucie No. 2, 802 HI)=nuclear..unit,, the.lavgest, Florida.Sub-.. 18. region plant and unit respectively will be the FLPC's.2,280 t% . 19....,...Crystal River plant and.its.Crystal Rivj.r.,No. 3,, 824.W, nuclear. 20-1: 21'2. 23. 24, 25. 26 unit. However, for-transient stability study purposes;- the largest Florida peninsula. plants in 1983 would be Turkey Point (2,066 Yd), St. Lucie (1,579 !$), Hartin (1,550 HM) bhnatee (1,528 H~l), and Crystal River 500 kV-Nos.3 & 4 (1,464 MW). By then, the Installed Interconnection Capability (IiC) and the E.. r"ency Transfer Cap"b'lity (='C) bet..een Florida and Georgia will increase as follows:

Attachm nt, No. 2 Page 9 of 15 IIC ETC Florida to Souther n . 1'979 1983 YiW YtN 200 900 50 ' 550 Scuthern to Florida 1979 300 100 >983 1000 600 The interconnections between Pen'sula Florida and the remainder of the Eastern Interconnection will be: Yulee (FP&L) - Kingsland (GOPC).. Suwanee (FPC) - Pinegrove (GOPC) Port St. Joe (FPC) Callaway (GUPC) Suwanee Plant (FPC) - Twin Lakes (GUPC) Jasper (FPC) Pinegrove (GOPC) 'asper (FPC) Traver (GOPC) 230 kv 230 kv 230 kv 115 kV 115 kU" 115 kV. 1/ Jennings (FPC) - Valdosta (GOPC) 69 kV Monicello (FPC) Boston (GOPC). 69 kv 1/ City of Quincy (FPC) - Attapulgus (GOPC),, 69 kV 1/ Normally Open Interconnections

Attachment No. 2 Page 10 of 15 Restricting discussion to the Souther n to Florida subregion capabilities, 2. . the IIC and ETC values respectively increase by 700 tel/333.33$ and 3 ~ 500 Htl/600~+. These increased values result frcm transmission reinforcements between the Florida and Southern Subregions: (1) 1980 operation of the Yulee (FPL) - Kingsland (Georgia Power Corp. - GUPC) 6. - 10 mil'e 230 kV line, and (2) -1982 uprate to 230 kV and retermination 7 ~ 8. 9. to Calloway (GUPC) of the Port St. Joe (FLPC) 4'ewa 37.75 mile 115 kV line and other Florida Subregion transmission reinforcements. Between December 31, 1978 and December 31, 1983, 748.56 niles of 230 kV operated 10. 'ti"ansmission line will be added to the Florida Subregion either.as ~ ~ new 'line additions or uprating of existing 115 kY lines. In addition, 125.4 miles of 500'V transmission, all on the FP&L system, will be . 13.: --'added. Of the planned Florida,- 230 kV line additions,. 342.40'.' . 14. " miles/45.7~p additions are on the. FP&L=system. The FP&L 500 kY additions',. 15. 16; 17.- 18. -19 20. through 1983 plus 199 miles planned for addition during the 1984-1988 period will establish 500 kV as the FP&L primary transmission level I --."in,-their North Central, Eastern,.Southeast, and. Miami Divisions,......,.. In 1978, these Divisions. constituted.76+.(33;379.9 G~Pd). of system . energy-supplied and 78$.(6540'W);;.of the,.systems non coincident peak demand. 21., While appropriate transient stability and load flow studies 22. for the 1983 and subsequent periods must be performed to 23. satisfy from an engineering viewpoint compliance with planning 24. criteria, it is reasonable to. presume that with the planned 25. Florida - Georg a transmission 'nterface reinforce. rents along 26. with those in Florida, for the loss of the Crystal River No. 3, 824 L'%, Att1. Pag chment No. 2 11 of 15 2. 3 ~ 5. 6. 7 ~ 8. 9. 10. nuclear unit, the Florida systems should remain interconnected with the Eastern Inte. connection. In 1983, for the.loss of the Crystal River No. 3 unit, about 778.1 HIti (96K) of the instantaneous electrical energy balance adjustment will come from outside the Florida system thr ough the Florida Georgia interface and in terms of the planned 1983 interface capability of 1000 tP/ ~ (IIC), the Florida systems should. remain interconnected with the Eastern Interconnection as long as: (1) no major interfac lines are out of service'2) no major trans'.ssion paths from the 'l'orida - Georgia inter face. scut:h.are unavailable; and- (3).the. scheduled Georgia to Florida tr.ansfer is less than about 400 Ni. 12.-- -- The 'loss'f thi's unit,might-occur as a result of at 3.east one of two-13. - - events: -"(1) by-tripping of the.urLit-or (.2) loss of,. both 500 kV. lines 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23 wh C r ~ ~ 'rom the plant (outage of one 500 kV line due to fault during the maintainance outage of the other 5GO. kY line), however, this would also cause the loss of the Crystal River No. 4, 640 i&i, coal fired unit, planned for installation in 1982, as well resulting in a total loss of 1,464't@. This would exceed in generation loss magnitude as would the-lo'ss of St. Lucie Nos. 1 and 2, -1,579 Mti, the largest situation provided in the August 31, 1979 FPQ. analysis. Ther,efrom, I would presume that from a transient stability viewpoint, that initiation of Peninsula Florida separation from the Eastern Inter connection would begin in less than 3.87 seconds and the-automatic underfrequency relaying will cperate to h=d rirm lead.

Attachment No. 2 Page 12 of l5 The preceeding discussion does not ind'cate the design adequacy, with 2.. respect to SERC Regioral Criteria for loss of generation, load or transmission. This can only be determined through transient stability studies. Yy discussion with both FPAL and FCG staff concluded that 5. .FCG studies for 1980-85 period had not been done but were scheduled for . 6.... later. this year.

However, the transient stability evaluation by FPAL 7.

confirms in part. that no separation ~ould occur or firm load shedding 8. with an import of 300 !M and the loss of 800 tPl. 9. Spinning reserve cr'teria for the Peninsula Florida system is described 10. - by'the FCG.Operating Committee-in the FCG Operating Handbook'hich is"used'-" 'l. in conjunction with the North Anmerican Power Sys-ems Interconnection 12. Committee (NAPSIC) Operating Manual. Ilhile I have not seen the FCG - 13. Operating-Handbook, the SERC Coordinated Bulk Power Supply Program of ' 14.-- .Apzil 11, 1979. under item 7-A,"; Coordinahion of Operations", for.-the.. 15. Florida Subregion summarizes several of the coordinated practic s including 16. the Operating Reserve Policy. Daily Operating Reserve is that amount of 17. generating capability and/or equivalent load relief over and above fore-18. casted daily peak load which is available to respond'.to load 19.

- connected and responsive immediately to load changes and capable

20. - of becoming fuUy loaded in response to a frequency decline of-0-.5 Hz-21.

(to 59.5 Hz from nominal or scheduled frequency of 60 Hz); and, (2) 22. ~ Supplemental Reserve -: any gener ating capability and/or load'3. relief measure which can;be made-fully responsive to. its 24. planned for reserve capability within 30 minutes.

13 Attachment No. 2 Page 13 of 3.5 1. The Daily Operating Reserve maintained by the combined systems 2. 3 0 4, (Florida Subregion systems) is equal to, or greater

than, the sum of the Peak Capabiltiy Ratings of the two largest units in service.

Spinning Reserve is rraintained at, or greater

than, the 5.

Peak Capability Rating of the largest generating unit in service. 6-; - The balance of the Daily Operating =Reserve is Supplemental 7. Reserve and upon the loss of a unit, Supplemental Reserve is 8. 9. converted to Spinning Reserve, if required, to restore the recommended level of Spinning Reserve. ~ 10, Daily Operating Reserve .and Spinning Reserve requirements are 11.'" 'llocated among participants, weighted 50% in proportion to each 12; partcipant's maximum demand for the preceeding-year and 50$ 13. for the Peak Capability of his:largest unit. The effect on.a ~ 14. '-- par ticipantrs spinning reserve allocation -est be fully.considered =- 15, before agreeing to sell power to another participant; the protection

16. " "wf anew unit undergoing"shakedown is the owner's responsibiltiy;.

17. -.-'based upon 5$ governors;:,no more. than 16.6$ of-',the Continuous 18.

- -19. Capability.of a unit can be assigned.-to-any-one unit; and, each participant.'s Daily Operating Reserve allocation should be

20. '- avail'able to other participants-without. restriction by transformer, 21.

line or other limitations.

attachment No. 2 age 14 of 15 In the event that Spanning Reserve and e, 1 "aster n Inter connection

2. 'ransmission support is insufficient, the Peninsula Florida

3. "

system has a Load Preservation Program encorporating .automatic underfrequency relaying (UFH). Througn UFR operation a 5. minimum of 2,859 Nl (16.6~), 2,829 Nf (16.4~+) and 4,438 51M (25.7$ ) 6. of load will autorwtically be shed respectively by a frequency 7 ~ decline ta 59.0 Hz, 58.7, Hz and 58.5 Hz..This represents 58.7$ of 8. the 1979 s~er peak load and would leave at least 41.3$ (7,124.4 HW) 9. of load and generation operable for restoration of lost generation l0. and/or load. In addition, each Florida Subregion system has ll=.

generating-units capable of operating for extended. periods isolated 12. frcm the system and carrying their own auxiliary power loads, which 13 should reduce system restoration time.

~ Attachment No. 2 Page 15 of 15 Largest Peninsula Florida Generating 1/ Unit and Plant 1978 '1985 Lar gest Plant 1978 2/ FP&L Turkey Point 2066 Kd 1979 1981 FP&L Turkey Point 3/ 2066 H!l Largest , Unit 2/ FLPC Crystal River No. 3 797 K-l FLPC* Crystal River No. 3 824 Kl Largest Plant 1982 1983 FLPC Crystal River 4/ 2280 tS 1984 1985 FLPC Crystal River 5/ 2920 HW Lar gest Unit FLPC Crystal River No. 3 824 Ki FLPC Crystal=River Na. 3 824MN '"-1/ "April 1, 1979,- Southeaster n >Electric. Reliability..Gouncil (SERG)., ="- Coordinated Bulk Power Supply Program=for the.1979 1998 period..., 2/ FP&L Florida Power & Light Company; FLPC - Florida Power Corporation.. " -'3/. 'U~os;- 1 & 2 (367 K< 6)--connected to N.E. and.N.M. 230 kV busses; ...-..'nit Nos. 3 & 4 (666 HN 6) connected to S. E. and S. N. 230 kV busses; - bus tie br eakers between both North and Scuth bus sections. 4/ Unit Nos. 1 & 2 (383 HN, 433 K<) on 230 kV;, Unit Nos. 3 & 4 (824 Mi<, '40 K/) on 500 kV; No kV to 230 -kV connection at plant substation. 5/ Unit Nos. 1, 2 & 5 (383 HM, 640 tM) on 230 kV; Unit Nos. 3 & 4 on 500 kV; No 500 kV to 230 kV connection at plant substation.

Attachment No. 3 Page 1 of 5 Florida Power 5 Light Company..

Interconnection with Other Peninsula Florida Sy stems The Florida-Power A Light Company (FPEL) has a total 2. installed generating capacity of 10,491 tfA and additions

3. 'hrough 1983 (hartin Nos.. 1 h 2, 775 t% 0, 1980'and 1981; Dade Solid Haste Facility, 00 E1, 1980; and, St. Lucie No..2, 802 N1, 5.

1983) of 2,392 t@/.will raise the total system capacity to 13,333 6. t4id. The Florida Subregion generation and load (sxr.ver peak) are 7. projected to grow by 1983 respectively fr m-21,800-VJ and 17,261 .8., HH to 26,782 KH and 21,528 HM..Between, FP&L and o-;her Peninsula. 9.'lorida systems there are six0een interconnections (Table I) 10.. operating at 69 kV to 230 kV. Presently, three of these inter-11.. -..connections are for limited area..backup protection and're noraally-

12. open. Therefore, there are 7-230 kV, 2-138 kV, 1-115 kV, and" . 13 - 69 kV normally closed" interconnections with-Peninsula Florida 14. generating utilities. By the spring of 1980; the Yulee to Kingsland 15.. -(Georgia Power Company).230 kV 'line will be operational, providing

16. -- one more source of emergency supply to FPQ..directly and other 17.

Peninsula Florida system. 18, As part of the ongoing assessment of the. adequacy.'.of the 19. Peninsula Florida system',. the 'January 1979 FIorida Electric Power'. .20....,Coordinating Group (FCG)iSystem:Planning-Cormnittee/Transmission 21. , Task Force's Transmission. Load flow Analysis Report,. 1982 4 1987. 22. Summer Periods evaluated among other through the single-line-23. outage adequacy of the 1982 Peninsula Florida transmission system

Attachment lIo. 3 Page. 2 of 5 Interconnections Bc ween Florida Power 5 Light Company and Ohter Peninsula Florida Systems - 1979 Generation Florida Power Corporation 3 647 MW l. Sanford Plant - North Longwood 2. Brevard - Holopaw Canoe Creek Nest Lake Wales (from Brevard, there are two 230 kV lines via Malabar to Midway sub-station) 3. Sanford. Plant - urner I.

a. Columbia - Live Oak Tap.

East Oak b. Taps off of Palatka Plant Deland 115 kV line (1) Barberville (2) Deland East Jacksonville Electric Authorit - 1884 MW 230 kv 230 kV 230 kv 69 kv 115/69 kv 115 kv 1. Baldwin - Normandy 2. Baldwin 115/230 kV Duval-iformandy 3. Putnam Plan Or ngedale Greenland (JEA) Ro'binwood Acreas 115 kV 230 kv 230 kv Tampa Electric Comtian 2 505 MW l. Ringling - Manatee Plant Ruskin 2. Ringling Gillette Ruskin 230/69 kv = 230 kv Orlando Utilities Commission 742 MW 1. Cape Canave al Plant Indian River Lake Worth Utilities Au hority - 141 MW 1. Hypoluxo Plant Sub (from Hypoluxo, there is a 138 kV line to Ranch 138/230 kV) 230 kv 138 kV

A P tachment '.lo. 3 ge3of 5 Cit of Vero Beach 133 i~N l. Nest (138 kV) South Sub. i'ort Pierce Utilities Authority - 116 i%i Hartman (138 kV) Sub. No. 1 (from Har man, here is e, 138 kV 1-'ne to Midvay 138/230 kV and a 138 kV line via Nest, to lIolabar 138/230 kV City of. Honestead 52 hR 1. Lucy NcGinn Sub. 69 kV 138/69 kV 138 kv

Attachment No. 3 Page" 0 of 5 2. 3 ~ 6. 7 ~ 8. 9. 10. and the Area-Transfer-Capability (import capability) of the major systems. Tnat study concluded the following: Sin le-Line-Outgoes The Peninsula Florida 1982 svstem performed adequately and within design limits for all but three contingenc'es which pro-duced up to 5C overloads on three.acilities: a) L/0 (FP&L) Sanford-North Lonmrood 230'V (FLPC) Turner - Lake Err'15 kV loaded to 1034 of rating and low voltages experienced in FLPC's eastern division. 12. 13. . 15. '6.. b) L/0 (FP&L) Rin lin - Laurelwood 230 kV (FPKL) Ringling Charlotter 230 kV loaded to 100$ of rating, c) L/0 )loodmore (FLPC) - Pine Hills (ORLA) 230 kV) (ORLA) Southwood Turkey Lake'15'kV line loads to 105$ of its emeer gency rating. ....17...'..-.Zb should be noted that none of: these-overloads exceeds 5$ and -:-'- 18. therefore are not considered aajor overloads; Furthermore, they .;19. gould only occur if peak load conditions. existed coincident with' 20. the specific line outage and even so, adjustments could be made 21. in generation schedules to alleviate the'overload condition.

~ t Attachment No. 3 Page 5 of 5 FP&L's L-,. ort Case 3 ~ 'I 4. 5. 6. 8. 9-10. 12. The Big Bend to Gillette 230 kV line loaded to 442 MVA, 10@ of its ratir>>g when 1,100 Yi.l:~as imported by FP&L. The import -to FP&L was simulated such that Florida Power Corporation, Tampa Electric Company, and Jacksonville Electric Authority each exported one-third.(367 MN) of the power. The Big Bend - Gillette 230 kV line includes an inter tie with the Ta~ipa Electric Company (TEC) at the Ruskin substation, one of two TEC interconnection. points with FP&L, so that the about 40 MVA overload probably-could be reduced by-reducing the..- TEC's share of the import by about 40-50 MN. The FP&L 1,100 K< import level (11.1$ of FP&L's -1982 peak 13; load=represented)-mu3+ cover most combinations of two unit outages - on the FPK system except the-unavailabil'y of St-. Lucie Nos. 1..- 15. & 2 (1,589 t%I), Manatee Nos.- 1 & 2 (1,528 YN), Turkey Point Nos. 16. =18. 19. - -3 & 4 (1,332 HM) Maratin Nos.=l & 2 (1,550 tS) and some combina-, ~.-tions of these. However, it is..unlikely. that

a. 1100 M4 import..

requirement would occur because of the maintenance outage of one unit plus the forced outage. of another.unit during. peak: load. periods. ~ \\ ~ ~ ~

p t~ I J'}}