ML17263A335

Notice of Violation from Various Insps in Apr & May 1993. Violations Noted:Second Svc Water Failure of Non Safety Related Crane Co Model 101 Xu Valve & Identified Locked Open safety-related Manual Valves in Failed Closed Position

ML17263A335
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	07/22/1993
From:	NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17263A334	List: ML17263A333 ML17263A335
References
50-244-93-08, 50-244-93-8, NUDOCS 9308020223
Download: ML17263A335 (51)

Text

Enclosure 1

NOTICE OF VIOLATION Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244 License No. DPR-18 During an NRC inspection conducted on various dates in April and May 1993 that concluded on June 18, 1993, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, the violation is listed below:

10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part that "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected."

Contrary to the above, in April 1992 after a second service water valve failure of a non safety-related Crane Company model 101 XU valve due to stem to disc separation by corrosion, adequate corrective actions were not taken to identify degradation or the impact of similar failures of safety-related valves in that on March 28, 1993, the licensee identified locked open safety-related manual valves 4669 and 4738 in failed closed position with stems to discs separated.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, AKIMDocument Control Desk, Washington, D.C.

20555 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice.

This reply should be clearly marked as a "Reply to a Notice of Violation" and should include for each violation: (1) the reason for the violation, or, ifcontested, the basis for the disputing the violation, (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved, (3) the corrective steps that willbe taken to avoid further violations, and (4) the date when full compliance willbe achieved. Ifan adequate reply is not received within the time specified in this Notice, an order may be issued to show cause why the licensee should not be modified, suspended, or revoked, or why such other action as may be proper should not be taken.

Where good cause is shown, consideration willbe given to extending the response time.

9308020223 930722

~~

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY A:GINENF.HG PDR ADOCK 05000244 Q

PDR Persons in Attendance at the July 16, 1993 Enforcement Conference Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation R. Marchionda, Superintendent, Production T. Marlow, Department Manager, Quality Performance R. Mecredy, Vice President, Ginna Nuclear Production T. Newberry, Lead Mechanical Engineer L. Sucheski, Structural Engineer J. Widay, Plant Manager, Ginna G. Wrobel, Manager, Nuclear Safety and Licensing New York State Public Service Conunission K. Roenick, Nuclear Engineer US Nuclear Regulatory Connnission W. Butler, Project Director, PD 1-3, NRR J. Carrasco, Reactor Engineer, Region I P. K. Eapen, Section Chief, Systems Section, Region I H. Gregg, Senior Reactor Engineer, Region I W. Hodges, Director, Division of Reactor Safety D. Holody, Enforcement Officer, Region I W. Lazarus, Section Chief, RPS-3B, DRP, Region I J. Luehman, Senior Enforcement Specialist, OE T. Moslak, Senior Resident Inspector, Ginna, Region I D. Screnci, Field Public Affairs Officer, Region I J. Tatum, Senior Reactor Engineer, NRR OFFICIAL RECORD COPY A:GINENF. HG

GINNA STATION ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM Inspection Report 93-08 July 16, )S93

AGENDA

~ Introduction

~ Background Information

~ Actions in Response to Earlier Valve Failures

~ Actions During 1993 Refueling Outage

~ Future Actions

~ Safety Implications

~ Plant Management Perspectives

~ Conclusions

~ Underground Piping Activities

~ Conclusions R. C. Mecredy T. A. Marlow T. A. Marlow R. A. Marchionda R. A. Marchionda G. J. Wrobel J. A. Widay R. C. Mecredy T. E. Newberry R. C. Mecredy

SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS)

NRC ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE JULY 16, 1993 Introduction Ginna SWS Design

~

Ginna Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)

Project Related to SWS Program Ginna RCM Project Related to Valve Improvement Project (VIP)

~

Status VIP Scope through 1992 101XU Failure Discovery 101XU Failure Evaluation

~

Comprehensive SWS 1993 Outage Preparation

~

Conclusion enfconf:1

GINNA SERVICE WATER SYSTEM (SWS) DESIGN

~

SWS Suction From Lake Ontario

~

SWS Loops are Cross-Tied SWS Supplies Essential and Non-Essential Users

~

SWS Isolates Non-Essential Users on SI and UV

~

SWS is Normal Supply to Standby Auxiliary Feedwater System

~

SWS is Alternate Supply to the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System

~

SWS Provides Cooling to Critical Loads During Accident Conditions 0

0 0

0 0

Spent Fuel Pit Heat Exchangers Component Cooling Heat Exchangers Emergency Diesel Generators Containment Recirculation Fan Coolers Safety Injection Pump Thrust Bearings

~

Review Flowpath on Modified PAID enfconf:2

S Rffll WASH

+'

013 409d fOAFW

~609~

7 4623 I 7 8 0 Q}f

~ 739 I616 473S 9826A

$ AFIV I625 I Cv

=S+C Fall 4627 CCOLEA 8 Cl

REC. Flfl CCOLER 47834

< Iede RELAI RLI

)~)

ECVPIII8 I E 47614 4 tf$ 7 atf COLIC

, SALABLE 6 I 1.1.'OLEA A

Jed6

~

~ 6C'I F 605 SERVICE

~ f02

~ 6CE 294 fER ILI2 4611 46C3 46C7 PLIIAPS

~60l 4608 lees

~ 760

~

~ 6668 5939 a

466 D~G 5940 8

~ 668*

4738

~ 789 PNIPS 4790 4.42 4763 4740 I 62 I750

~ 767 IIS2 4768 4748 l166 4716

~765 474 ~

476l I7SI 4769 8

RHA COOLER AHA COOLf.R A

C IIG COOLER 8

CHG C COLfR 8

SI COOLER C

SI COOLER A

SI COOLEA CV PEIIE f COOLtIG l73 ~

COOLER A

CCW

~ 61 Hr

-Erf WASH 46174

-~~SFP 4621 Hi ILIC 47'9 8

$ FP 8677 8690 Hr 8

CCW 4618 Hi EVE WISH 461da 8

SAFW COOLER

'6268 DEGAS Italy ILC A

8 R C11LW 4635 OSIER I

~

JI.IV lee3 C},'733 Q,

0 Cr

~ )

rrEC F all 4641 I CALFR 0 C'r REC I All 4642 COOLER Ra CORP

~ 757 COOLER 3,'4626 C t1$ 7 AFI COLIP Ild'8 GEII f>CIIEA 4676 SFII CIL 11141

{H.)-. 11IS CVC I 4673

- Ml-84>> 70 8 111$ 7

-~- IFI COIr 4187 AIR DRII

)~)

PIPIPS 4 el alee

)- -> 4

~

F IVF (m).ILrRBtrf 4EIG I Q 4732 A

pC)

> 7LIIBvrf 4649 4640

~ 615 I I CIILLER 4150

~~)

LIIIERr A 0 BIC

(>')

Clral fR

+)

> 7;<r I5'318 CV AIA IrlfR CO IER I105 IICL"ILI

)> ) 'PIIIIG

~66 ~

~ 61 ~

A

~ 077

~ 345 AFW 8

IC28 l344 SERVICE WATER SVPPLY HEADER enfconf:3

GINNA RCM PROJECT (Related to VIP)

FLOW CH,ART SYSTEM SELECTION CRITERjA SYSTEM RANKING SUMS SERVICE WATER SYSTEM EFFORTS enfconf:4

GINNA RCM DEMONSTRATION PROJECT SELECT SYSTEMS FOR STUDY COLLECT GINNA COMPONENT FAILURE DATA ANALYZE PLANT DATA WITH TSA MAKE SYSTEM MODELS EVALUATE INDUSTRY DATA EVALUATE PI.EX INFORMATION CRITICALITY ANALYSIS FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS DEVELOP RCM TASKS DEVELOP RCM TASKS DEVELOP RCM TASKS DEVELOP RCM TASKS SELECT COST EFFECTIVE RCM TASKS IMPLEMENT MONITORING AND PROCEDURE CHANGES enfconf:5

RCM SYSTEM RANKINGWITH RESPECT TO ATTRIBUTES Rankings Reactor Safety Regulatory Concerns Public Safety Human Factors Potential for Improvement SIS D/G RCS SW SIS ESFA RCS S/G ESFA D/G ESFA CNMT ESFA ESFA S/G Water Treatment S/G RCS CNMT D/G RCS Waste Liquid D/G Elect DC S/G SIS D/G 7.

SIS Elect DC Elect DC SW SIS Heat Steam 10.

CNMT CNMT Spray Elect DC Fire Protection Main Steam HVAC SW CNMT 12.

S/G Elect AC Elect DC Extr. Steam CNMT Spray enfconf:6

RCM SUMS SYSTEM SELECTION

~

Auxiliary Feedwater System

~

Safety Injection System

~

Residual Heat Removal System

~

Diesel Generator

~

Service Water System enfconf:7

1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 enfconf:8

[ RCM History Reviews ]

I 1989 AI&OCCW Heat Exchanger, SFP Heat Exchanger Eddy Current Inspection I

(6/89)

SW Project Planning (SW Operability, MOVs, Bolting)

I (7/89) GL 89-13 I (4/90)

SW Hx Fouling Inspection I

(5/90)

First 101XU Failure (NSR) - Valve V-4675 I (9/90)

Attend EPRI Seminar on Service Water Reliability Improvements I

(1/91)

SW RCM Analysis Complete I

(5/91) SW Valve Refurbishment/replacement Scope (101XUs)

[

5/91 - SW Valve Planning/Scheduling

]

I (8/91)

SWSROP Complete I

(12/91)

NRC SW Inspection I (4/92)

Second 101XU Failure (NSR) - Valve V-4690 I (4/93)

SW Valve & Comp. Insp - Phase 5

I SW Valve & Comp Insp -

Phase 6 Service Water System

GP'WA VALVEINSPECTION PROGIU84 SCOPE OBJECTIVES DETAILS IMPLEMENTATIONSTATUS enfconf:9

TYPICALGINNA OUTAGE VALVE/ACTUATORPROGRAM D fin

~

Prioritized Manual Valves (Checks, Gates, Globe)

Disassembly 0

Inspection Refurbishment

~

MOV Actuators o

Disassembly 0

Inspection 0

Refurbishment 0

Diagnostic Testing Q~gtitv,g Continued Documentary on Actual Conditions of Valves

~

Upgrade based on Vendor Improvements Upgraded Based on Industry Operating Experience

~D~il Root Cause Analysis for Major Defects

~

New Plant Procedures Spare Parts Planning Results Incorporated into RCM Living Program I

I mn (Next Slide) enfconf:10

VALVEINSPECTION/REFURBISHMENT PROGRAM YEARS 1989 SCOPE 34 Valves 21 MOV Actuators 31 MOV MOVATS Diagnostic SYSTEMS RCS, RHR, SI 1990 39 Valves 24 MOV Actuators 28 MOV MOVATS Diagnostic AFW, CCW, CS, CVCS, SI, RHR 1991 69 Valves 23 MOV Actuators 29 MOV MOVATS Diagnostic SI, AFW, SBAFW, MFW, CW, SW (4 Act., 2 Vlvs) 1992 40 Valves 11 MOV Actuators 15 MOV MOVATS Diagnostic AFW, CW, MFW, SI, SBAFW, SW (4 Act., 2 Vlvs) enfconf:11

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION

~Di ~vry 101XU Failure Discovery A

m n

~

Applicability of Failure as Generic Concern Known at RGEcE

~

No Additional Industry Failure Data Available

~Ev I i~i'eneric Assessment on Safeguards Equipment 0

Emergency Diesel Generators 0

Auxiliary Feedwater System 0

Safety Injection System

~F~gk

~

1992 Outage Feedback Motivation Focused on Comprehensive SWS Corrective Action

~r~r

~

Review 1993 Service Water Outage Preparations Ec Logistics

~

Conclusion enfconf:12

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION DISCOVERY Ma 1

~

First Failure - Valve V-4675 Valve V-4675 Inlet to Turbine Generator Seal Oil Heat Exchanger F

1 r Valve V-4675 Closed for Maintenance V v ri 1

n i'ost-Maintenance Restoration Valve V-4675 Inspection Temporary Repair Performed enfconf:13

enfconf:14 CRANE, GATE V~i i, MODEL NO.

101-XLi

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION DISCOVERY A rill 1

~

Second Failure Assumed Valve V-4690 o

Valve V-4690 Inlet to Turbine Lube Oil Cooler "B" Filr D Valve V-4690 Close to Provide for Eddy Current Inspection Valve V-4690 Realigned for Service "B" Lube Oil Cooler MCB Alarm

~

Safety Evaluation Performed (Undocumented) enfconf:15

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION ASSESSMENT

~Ma 1991 Research Generic Application of 101XU With Respect To Safety Related Service Water System

~

Plant Superintendent Letter (5/22/91) o Scope EWR-5098 Bolting Replacement Valves 0

Strategy Isolation of Service Water System Coordination of Service Water Projects Procurement Milestone Schedule Vlv 1

f r

mn 1

W m

n V-4669 V-4760 V-4612 V-4611 V-4621 V-4738 V-4739 QjzZ 4tl 4N 4tl 4N 6H 3 It 3 tl 101XU 101XU 101XU 101XU 101XU 101XU 101XU enfconf:16

101XU FAIL&&PRESENTATION ASSESSMENT

~

June 13, 1991 - Plant Service Water System Project Manager Meeting Minutes EWR-5098 To Replace Additional Valves V lv rih W

m n

V-4738 V-4739 V-4675 3

If 31f 3

Il 101XU 101XU 101XU enfconf: 17

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION Emergency Diesel Generators Evaluation April 1991 D t ili f F i n I il Twice Per Shift Operator Logs of SW Pressure Jacket Water Heat Exchanger Lube Oil Heat Exchanger Monthly PT Diesel Engine Parameter Trending Jacket Water Temp Lube Oil Temp

~

Diesel Panel Alarms "A" Diesel AR-D/6-A-9 Jacket Water Temp AR-D/6-A-11 Lube Oil Temp "B" Diesel AR-D/6-B-9 Jacket Water.Temp AR-D/6-B-11 Lube Oil Temp n n

~

Four Inch Normal Supply in Addition to Cross-Ties

~

Fire Water System Backup - Capability

~

EOP Support enfconf:18

101XU PRESENTATION Auxiliary Feedwater System April 1991 D

Standby Auxiliary Feedwater Backup EOP Support Bearing Flow Verified by Operator Twice Per Shift

~

Monthly Periodic Tests Cycles Not Closed MOV Actuated 101XU Valves Cycles Manual 101 XU Valves Functionality of Valves Verified by Downstream Flush SERVICE WATER ~

A MDAFWP TO 4027 4345 N.C. I101XU)

(101XU) L.C.

DRAIN VALVE PUMP CONDENSATE WATER PUMP SERVICE WATER ~

B MDAFWP TO 4028 4344 CONDENSATE N.C. 101XU 101XU L.C.

DRAIN VALVE PUMP SERVICE WATER ~

TDAFWP TO 4 013 N.C 101XU 4098 CONDENSATE

{101XUI L C WATER DRAIN VALVE enfconf:19

IOIXUFAILUIMPRESENTATION Safety Injection System Evaluation April 1991 Redundant Supply Monthly PT - Bearing Temp Checked Periodic Test Procedure Requires Restoration Valves Upon Safety Injection Immediately

~

Quarterly PT - Bearing Temp Checked, Vibration Recorded Annual Bearing Flush per M-11.12.2, "¹1-A, 1-B, I-C Safety Injection Pump O.B. Jacketed Bearing Service Water Cooling System Maintenance"

~

Indirect Visual Feedback (sweating) enfconf:20

101XU FAILUIMPRESENTATION 1992 Outage Feedback Second Failure Confirmed Valve V-4690 Air Condition Water Chiller

~

Contractor Pilot Replacement Program Two 101XU Valves Replaced o

V-4649 o

V-4650 Inspection Results Corrosion Evident Stem to Disc T-Slot Intact

~

M-11. 12.2 Annual Bearing Flush Safety Injection Pumps (SIPs) Results AllSIP Bearings Clean Flow Present Evaluation Remained Valid No Change in Program Direction enfconf:21

SAFETY INJFC! ION PUiVIP THRU.>

i B E A R IN G COOLING SUPPLY LOOP HEADER 4739 4789 4795A 4795 4790 4738 DISCMARGE SUPPLY LOOP HEADER onf nnf"7')

l993 SWS OUTAGE PREP TIONPRO ECT IST IOI XV I'AILVRE (HSR) 0 RADIDC RA PH dddd 0

0 SHE VALVE SCOPE DEFINED HRC SVSOPI 0

0 ddDO 2nd IOIXU FAILURE (HSR)

COHPLETE

$ 2$

0 OVTACL'PROI'OSED OHLT)

ERR 5(II TENP COOLIIIC STSTEII IHITIATE EDR Sdl I CONCEPTUAL PACKAGE DCI/'SA NODIFY I'PS AS BACA'UP COOLIHC TO SFP HD EER S27S CRC COIL REPLACEIIENT CRC COIL LEAKS 4

EVALUATION REPLACEIIENT DECISION POINT PROCEDURES REPLACE AlL CRC COILS EER 5098 8'PLT VALVE REPLACENENT CONCEPTUAL DESICN (0/00)

P.O.

XOHOX (I I'ALVES)

DESIGN DETzlIL P.O, ENERTECII (S VALI'ES)

DELIVERI'P XOIIOX VALVL'S REPLACED IDOD IDIJ DTOO EWR 5405 SWS PIPE ACCESS COHCDPTVAL PACDADD E 2'R 5105 DEFERRED TO IDDI AIAO VALVE IMPROVEMENT PROC RAM

DESICH, EHCIHEEII, PROCURE FOR I002 REPLACEIIEHT PILOT IDD2 AIRO REPIACE TBO I0IXU'2 (ddld.dd50)

I'ALI'L'COPE REDUCED DVE TO PARTIAL SIIS OVTACE I DD5 AIDO SDS "0 LOOP DVTACL'SIC1.

IDIIAIDIIIIIDI IIII SURVEILLANCE TESTING OPERA TION

• Ml)NTENlNCE NONITORINC IOIXUS PROCURE DTIII VALVES TO REPLACE IOI XV'D PROCURE CDAIVERCIA5LY DEDIC/ITED COIITIIICIA A,LY hfDFIFToR HDDIFY DDRHEIS FDR HOT'S I

$/9 g L 1 >TLI I. C H 8 5/Dl I/02 I/BS onCnnnC 'N

101XU FAILURE PRESENTATION Overall Conclusions

~

Had Experienced Component Failures Recognized 101XUs Installed in Safety Related Systems

~

Recognized Need for Inspection and Replacement Program Prior to Confirming Second Failure

~

Evaluation to Detect Functional Failure on Safeguards Equipment

~

1992 Outage Feedback - Two 101XUs Found Operable

~

1993 SWS Program Established Sensitive to 101XU Valves

~

Failures Detected (Self Identified) During 1993 AI&O

~

Though Redundancy Reduced, No Functional Failures Occurred

~

Aggressive Corrective Action Performed During 1993 AIBA FURTHER DETECTION, FURTHER CORRECTIVE ACTION enfconf:24

GIN%A VALVEINSPECTION PROGIUM (PHASE 5)

~

41 Valve Refurbish/Replacements

~

7 Actuators

~

25 MOV Diagnostics e

450 Total Valves

~R>i~1 Slight to Severe Corrosion of Valve Body Guides Slight to Severe Corrosion of Carbon Steel Disc's Silt and Corrosion Build-up Inside Some Valves and Pipes Some Pitting, Scratches, and Cracks in Seat Surfaces

+

Larger Valves Having Carbon Steel Discs Had Corrosion; However, Larger Volume of Metal Resulted in Lower Probability of Failure

+

Stainless Steel and Bronze Components Did Not Experience Abnormal Degradation

+

Did Not Observe Significant Pipe Wall Thinning or

, Pitting

+

Severe Carbon Steel Disc Corrosion Did Not Occur on Closed Valves in the Service Water System

+

Carbon Steel Disc Corrosion Did Not Occur on Valves Installed in Non-Service System

SERVICE WATER VALVEINSPECTION AS-FOUND CONDITIONS VALV MOV-4780 MOV-4609 MOV-4611 V-4640 MOV-4013 MOV-4027 MOV-4028 V-4098 MOV-4613 V-4760 V-4669 V~8B V-4345.

V-4344 V-4739 V-4738 MOV-4615 V-4635 V-9626A V-4618 V-4779 V-4625 V-4626 MOV-4664 V-4757 V-4627 V-4628 V-4756 V-4641 V-4642 Rockwell Rockwell Crane 101XU Crane 155 Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Velan Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 101XU Crane 155 Atwood Morrill Borg Warner Crane 150 Crane 155 Crane 47'h XU Crane 47'h XU Crane 47'Fi XU Atwood Morrill Atwood Morrill Atwood Morrill Crane 150 Atwood Morrill Atwood Morrill Scale Build-up Prevent Full Closure Good Condition Good Condition No Corrosion, Seat Defects Slight Corrosion Wedge, Silt Slight Corrosion Wedge, Silt Slight Corrosion Wedge, Silt Good Condition Extensive Corrosion Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Disc and Stem Separated Good Condition, Corrosion Guide Good Condition Good Condition Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Disc and Stem Separated Seat Defects Good Condition Good Condition Seat Defects Good Condition Good Condition, Lapped Seats Seat Defects Corroded Guide and Bolting Good Condition Good Condition Good Condition Good Condition, Seat Pitting Good Condition Good Condition rmeafc oaf:2

SERVICE WATER VALVEINSPECTION AS-FOUND CONDITIONS (contd)

VALV MOV-4663 V-4678 V-4675 V-4690 V-4732 V-4689 V-4674 V-4758 V-4636 Crane 101 XU Crane 101 XU Crane 101 XU Crane 101 XU Crane 101 XU Crane 101 XU Crane 143 'A XR Atwood Morrill Atwood Morrill Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Corrosion Disc & Guide Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Corrosion Disc & Guide Extensive Corrosion Disc & Guide Plug Unscrewed From Stem Good Condition Good Condition Valves Replaced

CRANE 101XU VALVES A

li i'

27 Original Equipment Valves Were Installed

~

17 Valves Installed in Service Water System 7 Installed in Component Cooling Water System 3 Installed in Auxiliary Feedwater System In i n

~

6 Valves Scheduled for Inspection

~

8 Service Water Valves Added to Inspection Scope

~

3 Auxiliary Feedwater Valves Added to Scope

~

1 Component Cooling Water Valve Added to Scope

CRANE 101XU VALVES Present Status 14 Valves in Service Water System Were Replaced With Crane 47 '/2 Valves 3 Valves in Auxiliary Feedwater System Were Inspection and Refurbished

~

1 Valve in Component Cooling System Inspected, and Refurbished

~

3 Valves in the Service Water System Were Not Inspected

+

Two Are Normally Closed Valves, Not Required to be Open

+

Remaining Valve is Normally Open on an Instrumented Heat Exchanger Where Failure Would be Detected

SERVICE WATER VALVEINSPECTION Future Activities 1994 Replace the Remaining 13 Crane 101XU Valves

~

Replace the Remaining Four Butterfly Valves Remove "A" Loop from Service and Perform Phase 6 Inspection Scope 1995

~

Complete Phase 7 of Valve Inspection Program rmcnfcoaf:6

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS 1.

Was SI Pump Damaged During PT-2.7 With Valve V-4739 Closed?

No.

SI Pump Does Not Operate During PT-2.7.

Subsequent Testing of SI Pump Indicates Acceptable Performance.

2.

Could SI Pump Have Operated ifAccident Occurred During PT-2.7?

Yes.

Procedure A-1101 Provides Assurance of System Realignment.

Conservatively Estimate Time to Realign:

20 Minutes-5 RENT Personnel in Field During Test Design Analysis DA-ME-93-101 Indicates Pump Operation for at Least 20 Minutes Without SW Cooling High Confidence of Extended (Hours Indefinite)

Operational Capability Without Service Water Cooling Based On:

~

Test of Comparable (TDAFW) Pump

~

Pump Vendor Correspondence

~

"Cool" Water Being Pumped (175'F)

~

High Pump Recirculation Flowrate

==

Conclusion:==

SI Pumps Operable - Valve V-4739 Operable gwcafcoaf:I

SAFETY IMPLICATIONS (contd) 3.

What IfValve V-4739 Failure During Previous PT?

Failure of Both Valves V-4738 and V-4739 Detectable By SI Pump Monthly PTs 4.

What ifValve V-4739 Failed During Postulated Accident?

High Confidence of Extended Operational Capability Pumping Cool Water FR-C.1 and FR-C.2 Provide Guidance for Loss of SI:

~

Heat Removal and Depressurization Via Steam Generators

~

Inventory Control Via Charging and Accumulators Not Explicitly Analyzed in UFSAR Accident Analysis Beyond Design Basis gwcnfcoafQ

COMPARISON OF PUMPS/BEARINGS SI Pump:

3-WTS-811 With Double Ball Thrust Bearing 3550 RPM TDAFW:

3-WTL-87 With Double Ball Thrust Bearing 4650 RPM gwcnfconf:3

PLANT MANAGEMENTPERSPECTIVES L

n rn

- Opportunities for Improvement e

Passive Failure Identification In-Situ Diagnostics Enhanced Inspection Program Increased Sensitivity for Generic Application A

li

~

Nuclear Network

~

Voluntary LER F

r A

~

Completion of Valve Improvement Program

~

Augmented Preventive Maintenance Schedule

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Conclusions

~

RGLE has implemented a comprehensive valve inspection, refurbishment, and upgrade program

~

Although not documented, plant management did assess the common mode safety impact of noA-safety-related valve "failure on safety systems

~

Required safety functions were not compromised by 1993 outage 'findings

Underground Piping Purpose of Discussion:

l. Describe the potential underground leak from the Ginna Service Water System and its safety assessment.

2.

Discuss RGBs plans.

=

Background===

Leak Identification:

l. Standing water was identified on the floor of the Screenhouse basement in WR/TR ¹9122322.

The water was entering through the wall penetration for the Circulating Water lines.

2.

The water was analyzed for the presence of chlorine both during a SW chlorination period and a non-chlorination period.

The concentration and trend of chlorine in the water indicated that it can be SW.

For the purpose of assessing safety, the water in the Screenhouse basement is assumed to be entirely SW.

3.

NCR 92-001 now controls this issue.

Piping Design:

1. The underground Service Water pipe is constructed per AWWAC301-58 from 3/16" structural steel plate seam welded with a concrete liner. The pipe is wrapped with a high strength wire mesh and cast or grouted on the exterior with concrete.

The end connections are bell and spigot type with the joint mortared on the exterior.

See Price Brothers drawing D-340-A (attached) 2.

The pipe is laid into a concrete cradle with horizontal changes of direction placed in concrete thrust blocks.

See RGB drawings 33013-54-J and 33013-53-8 as separate illustrations and SK-BUGRDL attached.

Also attached is a copy of an original construction photograph.

~

~

~

~

~

~

c

/~

~

~

~

~

z t

0

~

~

I~

0 ~ ~

I

~

~

~

I I

~

~

I I

~

~ 1 t

~

t 0

fI

~ f

~':

rior.i.

I.

wil

~ ~:,

r

,I."4@~'.

'.'g

~

I ~'

~

I r

/ ~

4g SI.'-.

b~

~.

~

r OOW 4

~

rJfg~4

~

.~

A

~

~ )~c

~ +:

~+

~~

.f j5'lveg

'ttp.'

v' r

~

Af

':~++

~ '

(J

A.ssessment Piping Design Assessment:

1.

The most likely location for a leak is through one of the bell and spigot joints to the elbows that bring the Service Water line under the Circulating Water lines.

The leak is not considered likely in the weld since the prestressed exterior provides a major portion of the structural strength and the inner concrete liner provides resistance to water passing through to the location of the weld defect.

2.

Nuclear Network was searched for the topics "underground" or "buried pipe". A variety of construction methods, materials and failures are present.

The construction methods described are significantly different than at Ginna Station.

Based on this search, the industry has not experienced significant leakage or required extensive maintenance of the type of piping found at Ginna Station.

Screenhouse In-Leakage Assessment:

1.

The Screenhouse in-leakage has been at nominally 1

gpm, depending on the amount of groundwater contributing to the sump flow. Note that in monitoring the sump flow, an increase to 5 gpm prompts further action immediately.

2.

Leakage from the Service Water system has been evaluated in EWR 10110.

This EWR examined the 1993 SI alignment SW system flow test data.

The components most sensitive to leakage from the system headers are the Contahament Air Coolers.

The design required flow is 970 gpm per cooler and the test had a minimum cooler flow of 1080 gpm. Significant leakage on the order of 200-300 gpm over the test conditions (including the current SW header condition) could be experienced without affecting design requirements.

3.

The system was justified for continued operation in NCR 92-001 based on the adequacy of Service Water supply, the monitoring measures to identify significant leakage increases, and the significant structural design capability of the underground piping.

Actions to Date Evaluated Design:

1. As described above, the design has significant structural strength and the pressure boundary is not susceptable to general degradation.

2.

The weakest pressure retaining element is the bell and spigot joint particularly where there are changes in direction not in thrust blocks.

Monitoring:

1.

Quantified leak into screen house via sump actuations, Operators record the basement sump elapsed time from an installed counter as part of their rounds.

2. Established an action limitof 5 gpm to ensure that any change in the leak characteristic is evaluated prior to signi6cantly degrading the margin above the required Service Water flow rate.

Actions Planned through '94 Outage Monitoring:

1.

Continue monitoring Screenhouse basement sump actuations.

2. Evaluate and implement, where appropriate, techniques for more precisely locating the source of the water.

This may include taking core samples of the soil or utilizing a dye or tracer.

Inspection:

l. Resolve any comments on the design provided for installing access flanges to the underground piping and install the flanges.

2.

Select the robotic inspection device for verifying the internal material condition ofthe piping and perform the inspection.

Repairs:

1. Ifthe material condition of the pipe is as expected without Qssures in the concrete liner and no signi6cant gap in the seam at the beB and spigot joint, a continued program of monitoring and inspection may be invoked.

2. Ifthere is material degradation of the pipe, the appropriate repair willbe implemented.

The most probable path willbe to use a "sleeve" design that can be installed from the flanged access without excavation.

Conclusions Underground Leak and Safety Assessment:

1. Any SW underground leak is most likely located at one of the bell and spigot joints near the Circulating Water lines.

2.

The Screenhouse in-leakage is monitored and stable.

3. The Screenhouse in-leakage is small when compared. to the allowable of 200-300 gpm.

Plans:

1. Continue monitoring Screenhouse basement sump flow.

2.

Inspect the internal material condition of both underground headers.

3. Repair as indicated by signiQcant changes in leak status or results of material condition inspection.

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Conclusions

~

Ginna underground service water system piping leakage is believed to be small and stable

~

Sudden increase in leakage is highly unlikely

~

Substantial flow margin availability

~

1994 outage inspection program still under development

~

Additional monitoring planned

~

Inspection of piping internals will rectify absence of anomalies in pipe condition

ENFORCEMENT CONFERENCE Conclusions (continued)

~

Based on piping design, lack of identifiable catastrophic failure mechanism, and large margin of safety to required flow, current safe operation is assured

~

RGBE will keep NRC staff informed of plans