ML17262A330
| ML17262A330 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 01/23/1991 |
| From: | Bonnett F, Eselgroth P NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17262A331 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-244-91-01, 50-244-91-1, NUDOCS 9102010081 | |
| Download: ML17262A330 (16) | |
See also: IR 05000244/1991001
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
R.
E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POWER
STATION
EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE
INSPECTION
REPORT NO.:
FACILITY DOCKET NO.:
91-01
50-244
FACILITY LICENSE NO.:
DPR" 18
LICENSEE:
FACILITY:
INSPECTION DATES:
INSPECTOR:
Rochester
Gas
and Electric Company
49 East Avenue
Rochester,
New York 14649
R.
E. Ginna Nuclear
Power Plant
1503
Lake Road
Ontario,
14519
January
7 - 10,
1991
P. Bonnett, Operations
Engineer
LEAD INSPECTOR:
F.
Paul
Bo
, Opera
Engineer
Date
APPROVED BY:
Peter
selgr
, Chief
PWR Sectio
Operations
Branch
Division of Reactor Safety
/- zs-'P/
Date
INSPECTION SUMMARY:
Inspection
on January
7 - 10,
1991 (Report 50-244/91-01)
AREAS INSPECTED:
Routine,
announced
inspection of the corrective actions
taken
to address
deficiencies identified during the
EOP Team Inspection
(Report
50-244/89-80)
conducted
September
25 through October 4, 1989.
RESULTS:
Of the seven (7) items reviewed by the inspector five (5) items were
closed.
The two (2) items remaining
open
have
some corrective actions to be
taken 'for full closure.
Corporate
Engineering action is required to close
one
(1) of these
items
and site action is necessary
to close the last item.
Signi-
ficant improvement in the usability of these
procedures
was observed
during
procedure
walk-downs.
9loaOi008l
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I
DETAILS
1.0
PERSONS
CONTACTED
U.S. Nuclear
Re ulator
Commission
- P. Bonnett,
Operations
Engineer,
T. Moslak, Sr.
Resident
Inspector
- N. Perry,
Resident
Inspector
1'.2
R.
E. Ginna
2.0
S.
Adams, Technical
Manager
T. Alexander,
gC Engineer
Operations
"R. Carroll, Ginna Training Manager
M. Cavanaugh,
Fire Protection
~F. Maciuska,
Supervisor
License Training
- T. Schuler,
Operations
Manager
J. St. Martin, Corrective Action Coordinator
"S. Spector,
Plant Manager
"T. White,
Emergency
Procedure
Coordinator
J. Widay, Superintendent
Ginna Production
- Denotes those
present at the exit interview on January
10,
1991.
J
REVIEW OF
TEAM INSPECTION
50-244/89-80
OPEN
ITEMS
2.1
~Sco
e
The inspection
was conducted to determine
the adequacy of the licensee's
corrective actions
taken to address
the findings of the
Team Inspec-
tion conducted
September
25 through October
4,
1989.
To evaluate
the
licensee's
action the inspector
reviewed the
EOP Writer's and User's
Guide and specific
and performed
a walk-down of selected
and
Attachments.
The walk-downs were conducted with the assistance
of the
Coordinator.
2.2
~Findin
s
CLOSED (244/89-80-01):
Development of a Ginna procedure
in accordance
with the
ERG for "Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void in
Vessel
(without RVLIS)."
The original justification for the exclusion of ES-0.4,
"Natural Circula-
tion Cooldown With Steam Void in Vessel
(without RVLIS)," was based
on the
fact that
RVLIS was
a requirement of the Ginna Technical Specifications;
therefore the procedure
was not necessary.
This justification was not
considered
adequate
due to the possibility that
RVLIS could become in-
The licensee
modified procedure
ES-0.3 to provide guidance for
3
rapid cooldown and depressurization
with and without.RVLIS available.
The
modified procedure
combines
the guidance
given in.ES-0.3
and ES-0.4.
The
WOG Background
Document allows
a plant to use the natural circulation
guidance
provided by ES-0.2,
0.3 and 0.4 in
a manner that is most appro-
priate.
This includes combining the g'uidance into one procedure.
The
modified ES-0.3
was titled, "Natural Circulation Cooldown With Steam Void
in Vessel."
Further,
the licensee
employed
VOLIAN Enterprises
to perform
an independent
evaluation of the procedures
The inspector
reviewed the
results of the independent
evaluation
and the
new justification/deviation
documentation.
Further,
the inspector walked down this procedure
in the
control
room and reviewed the scenarios
used to verify and validate it on
the simulator.
The information provided to the inspector
was found to be
acceptable
and comprehensive.
The Justification/Deviation
Document
contained
a detailed explanation of the differences
between
the .generic
ES-0.3/ES-0.4
and the modified ES-0.3.
CLOSED (244/89-80-04):
Resolution of concern that the Hain Steam
Line
Radiation Monitor does not function until an alarm condition is reached.
The initial concern
was that the R-31 and
R-32 radiation monitor pen
recorders
did not start tracing until
a predetermined
setpoint
was
reached.
This also presented
a problem to the operators
trying to read or
trend the parameter
for the first five minutes of an event.
The inspector
reviewed Engineering
Work Request
(EWR) No.
5161 which modifies R-31 and
R-32 to provide continuous indication and alarm function.
This change
allows the operator to read,
trend
and evaluate
steamline radiation
conditions continuously.
It is scheduled
to be completed
by May 1993.
1
CLOSED (244/89-80-05):
Resolution of generic
weaknesses
and specific
weaknesses
related to the emergency
procedures.
Five generic
weaknesses
were identified in the team inspection.
They were
1) the level of detail
was not consistent
between
the attachments
to the
and the'OPs
themselves;
2) procedures
did not specify the need for a
special
key when it was required;
3) minor labeling problems;
4) the word
"normal" was excessively
used
and not clearly defined;
and 5) there
was
no
identification by which the operators
could determine
which main control
board valves indicate mid-position with both lights lit or extinguished.
Specific procedure
weaknesses
were listed in Attachment
2 of Report
No.
50-244/89-80.
The inspector discussed
with the
EOP coordinator the
corrective actions
made
by the licensee to address
the generic
weaknesses.
A review of the corrective actions regarding the specific weaknesses
identified in Report
No. 50-244/89-80,
Attachment
2 was performed.
Further,
the inspector walked down selected
procedures,
accompanied
by a
licensee
representative,
to verify licensee's
corrective action.
The
licensee's
corrections
were adequate.
The
and
EOP Attachments
reviewed by the inspector contained
the appropriate
level of detail,
specified
when special
keys were required,
and correctly utilized the word
"normal."
The usability of the procedures
was very much improved,
enhanced
with correct
component locations.
Valve and component labeling
~ t,
f
was in agreement
with procedural
steps.
Further,
the inspector
reviewed
an inter-office memo addressing
how operators
determine
the mid-position
indication for specific valves.
Based
on the
number
and type of valves
involved and the operators training and experience
the inspector deter-
mined that the present
system in place is adequate.
CLOSED (244/89-80-07):
Resolution of weaknesses
observed
during simulator
exercises'everal
weaknesses
were identified during the
team inspection.
Of these
weaknesses,
some simulator differences
were noted.
The inspector
noted
the corrections
made
and reviewed the status of the
one remaining
upgrade
item that is in the process of being incorporated into the simulator.
The
upgrade effects the Fire Status
Panel.
It wi 11 function with the proper
alarms
and strobe light as in the control
room.
This change
is scheduled
to be completed
by 4/30/91.
Another weakness
observed
during the
inspection
involved the criteria used to employ the proper methodology
in
training revised
EOPs.
The inspector
reviewed training procedure
TR-2.2,
"Instructional Setting,
Methods,
and Aids."
This procedure
contains
the
guidance
used to determine
the level
and type of operations training
'equired
to address
EOP changes.
Simulated communications with Auxiliary
Operators
(AO) using radios
and the proper time duration for the
AO to
complete the simulated task were corrected
in the simulator.
Radios
and
a
book that gives approximate, times for AOs to perform specific functions
are
used
by the simulator staff.
Lastly, the lack of crew training with
an actual
STA has
been corrected
by scheduling
STA training with all
crews.
CLOSED (244/89-80-08):
Resolution of weaknesses
related to the Writer'
Guide and User's
Guide.=
This item concerned initial weaknesses
with the Writer's and User's
Guides.
The inspector discussed
with the
EOP Coordinator the actions that
were taken to correct these
weaknesses.
The inspector
reviewed both the
Writer's Guide (A-502. 1) and User's
Guide (A-503.1).
Both procedures
were
subsequently
revised to reflect those actions.
The inspector
found these
procedure
changes
adequate.
OPEN (244/89-80-03):
Evaluation of accessibility of valves required to be
manipulated during implementation of the emergency
procedures,
and
installation of improvements,
as required.
The
EOP Coordinator provided the results of an evaluation that was
conducted
on all local operations
performed
by Auxiliary Operators
during
the implementation of the emergency
procedures.
This review identified
three areas
where operator accessibility
was less
than optimal.
They are
I) the isolation of main steamline
upstream traps;
2) operation of the
S/G
ARVs; and 3) the isolation of the
TDAFW Pump
steam
supply valves.
In
regard to the main steamline
upstream traps,
the licensee
has initiated
a
Technical
Support
Request
(TSR) No.91-003
and
a Maintenance
Work Request
~t
U
f
(MWR) No.
9024172 for the installation of two (2)
new valves downstream of
the existing valves.
For the actions involving the S/G ARVs and
pump steam
supply valves,
Engineering
Work Request
No.
S277
has
been
submitted to evaluate,
design
and install platforms to allow easy
access
to these
valves.
The inspector
reques'ted
documentation
to show when these
items would be completed.
The
EOP coordinator informed the inspector that
the requested
documents
are currently in the corporate
design
and review
process
and not yet available.
A completion date
has not been establi-
shed.
The inspector
has determined that this item will remain
open until
the corporate
documents that address
the installation of these
items are
reviewed by the
NRC.
3.0
Open (244/89-80-06):
Evaluation of Site Contingency procedures
related to
firefighting.
The fire procedures
of Ginna are contained within the series of site
contingency procedures.
The team inspection identified that due to the
vast
number of Site Contingency
(SC) procedures
and the complex index, the
operators
generally ignored them.
The licensee
agreed to evaluate
the
current organization of these
procedures.
The lice'nsee
determined that
the procedures
relating to firefighting plans
and strategies
do not have
to be maintained
in the current format and would be improved by
reformatting for simplicity.
The inspector
met with a licensee
representative
responsible
for reformatting the
SC procedures.
He informed
the inspector that
a sub-committee
has
been established
to develop the
new
Site Contingency plan.
They determined that procedures
relating to
firefighting plans
and strategies
do not have to be maintained
in the
current format.
All SC procedures,
except those that relate to
Appendix
R, are being reformatted.
The
new format is to be
a
map of
specific areas
and
a one-page
data
sheet for that
arear'he
map details
the location of emergency
and safety equipment,
potential
hazards,
fire
barriers,
and major components.
This format would reduce
the size of
usable
information into a single binder.
Copies of the binder would be
kept in the control
room and fire brigade locker.
The prototype
has
been
completed
and reviewed
by the appropriate
departments.
It has received
positive appraisals
and work has started'to
complete
a map of an entire
area.
The committee plans to have this task completed
on or before
12-31-92.
This item will remain
open until formal documentation of the
proposed
reformatted plan is provided to the
NRC.
EXIT MEETING
At the conclusion of the site inspection,
on- January
10.,
1991,
an exit
meeting
was held with the licensee's
senior available representatives
(denoted in Paragraph
1.0) to discuss
the
scope
and findings as detailed
in this report.
-v
VO
Written material
was not provided to the licensee
by the inspector at any
time during this inspection.
Based
on the
NRC Region I review of this
report and discussions
held with the licensee
representatives
during this
inspection, it was determined that this report does not contain informa-
tion subject to
10 CFR 2.790 restrictions.
I'
Document
Document
Number
Title
ATTACHMENT 1
DOCUMENTS'REVIEWED
Rev No./Date
OWNERS
GROUP:
WOG Emergency
Response
Guidelines
lA
EMERGENCY
E-0
E-1
E-2
E-3
OPERATING PROCEDURES:
Reactor Trip or Safety Injection
Loss of Reactor
or Secondary
Coolant
Faulted
Steam Generator Isolation
Tube Rupture
14/12-19-90
9/O4-O9-9O
4/04'-09-90
10/04-09-90
EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY ACTIONS PROCEDURES:
ECA-1.2
LOCA Outside Containment
ECA-2. 1
Uncontrolled Depressurization
of Both Steam
Generators
ECA-3. 1
SGTR with Loss of Reactor Coolant-Subcooled
Recovery Desired
SGTR,with Loss of Reactor Coolant-Saturated
Recovery Desired
SGTR without Pressurizer
Pressure
Control
ECA-3.2
ECA-3.3
EMERGENCY SUB-PROCEDURES:
ES-l.l
SI Termination
Post-SGTR
Cooldown Using Backfill
Post-SGTR
Cooldown Using Steam
Dumps
CRITICAL SAFETY FUNCTION STATUS TREES:
F-0.3
Heat Sink. CSFST
F-0.4
Integrity CSFST
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES:
AP-CCW.2
Loss of CCW During Power Operation
AP-CCW.3
Loss of
CCW Plant Shutdown
AP-CR. 1
Control
Room Inaccessibility
AP-IA.1
Loss of Instrument Air
AP-RHR. 1
Loss of
FUNCTIONAL RESTORATION GUIDELINES PROCEDURE:
FR-H.1
Response
to Loss of Secondary
Heat Sink
FR-P. 1
Response
to Imminent Pressurized
Thermal
Shock
Condition
FR-P.2
Response
to Anticipated Pressurized
Thermal
Shock Condition
FR-S.1
Response
to Nuclear
Power Generation/ATWS
2/04-09-90
5/04-09-90
6/O4-O9-9O
8/04-09-90
5/04-09-90
6/04-09"90
2/07-21-89
4/04-09"90
2/01-12-90
1/07-21-89
9/09-04-90
5/04-09"90
2/04"09-90
4/04"09-90
8/12-19"89
7/12-19-89
10/06-27-90
4/12-19-89
8/06-01-90
f
Jl
ATTACHMENT 1
DOCUMENTS REVIEWED
Document
Document
Number
Title
E UIPMENT RESTORATION PROCEDURES:
ER-ELEC.4
TSC D/G Feed to Bus
16 to Supply Charging
Pumps
ER-INST.2 Loss of Annunciator
ER-NIS. 1
SR Malfunction
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES:
A-502. 1
Emergency
& Abnormal Operating
Procedures
Writer'
Guide
A"503. 1
Emergency
5 Abnormal Operating
Procedures
User's
Guide
ATTACHMENTS:
CV/CVI
DC Loads
D/G Stop
Letdown
N2
RCP Start
SD-1
Rev No./Date
2/09-28"89
1/05-13-89
5/04-18-90
6/05"31-90
9/05-31-90
1/04"04-90
1/04-04-90
1/04-04"90
2/06-20"90
1/04-04-90
1/01-04"90
2/06-20-90
P'