ML17262A140

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Insp Rept 50-244/90-12 on 900727-0827.No Weaknesses Noted. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint/Surveillance,Security,Emergency Preparedness & Safety Assessment/Quality Verification
ML17262A140
Person / Time
Site: Ginna 
Issue date: 09/05/1990
From: Mccabe E
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17262A139 List:
References
50-244-90-12, NUDOCS 9009250222
Download: ML17262A140 (19)


See also: IR 05000244/1990012

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report

No:

50-244/90-12

License

No.

DPR-18

Licensee:

'ochester

Gas

and Electric Corporation

(RG&E)

Facility:

Dates:

Inspectors:

Approved by:

R.

E. Ginna Nuclear

Power Plant

July

17 through August 27,

1990

T. A. Moslak, Senior Resident

Inspector,

Ginna

N.

S. Perry,

Resident

Inspector,

Ginna

R. A. McBre t

eactor Engineer,

DRS

C.

McCabe,

ief, Reactor

Projects

Section

38

Date

OVERVIEW

PLANT OPERATIONS:

The plant operated

stably at approximately full power!.

Operations

were conducted

in

-a professional

manner, with ap'propriate

management

attention

and involvement.

Overall, plant housekeeping

was, very good.

I

I

RADIOLOGICAL CONTROLS:

Routine observations

of radiological controls were

made

throughout the inspection period.

No significant weaknesses

were noted.

MAINTENANCE/SURVEILLANCE: Review of licensee

actions

concerning

the failure

of the Service Water

Pump

1D Motor indicated timely management

response

in per-

forming a comprehensive

engineeringr evaluation to identify the root cause of

the fai lure.

Additionally, prudent actions

were taken

by licensee

management

to upgrade

the materials

used for the motor rewind and perform additional testing

to assure

increased

motor reliability.

SECURITY:

Observations

of the implementation of site security procedures

for

entry of motor vehicles into the protected

area identified no

weaknesses'MERGENCY

PREPAREDNESS:

The licensee's

Emergency Operations Facility and Media

Center were found to be suitably equipped

and well maintained.

SAFETY ASSESSMENT/

UALITY VERIFICATION:

An assessment

of independent

ver ifica-.

tion of maintenance

by the Nuclear Assurance

group provided useful

information

to plant management.

However,

no specific follow-up was requested

and

no formal

mechanism

was

used to follow-up the concerns identified.

9009250222

9005'05

PDR

ADOCK 05000244

PDC

TABLE OF

CONTENTS

1.

Plant Operations

(71707)

1. 1

Control

Room Observations.

'I

2.

Radiological

Control (71707)

3.

Maintenance/Surveillance

(62703, 61726,'3755,

92701).

PAGE

~

~

~

~

~

1

~

~

~

~

~

1

3. 1

Maintenance

Observations

.

3.2

Corrective Maintenance

Observations

3.2. 1

Service Water

Pump

1D Motor Failu

3.3

Surveillance

Observations

3.4

Inservice Inspection

Summary Report..

4.

Securi ty (71707)

4. 1

Vehicle Access Control

5.

Engineering/Technical

Support

(71707,

92701)

1

~

~

~

~

2

re..

.....

.....

2

2

3

5

5

5

5.1

Unresolved

Item 50-244/90-09-02,

AOV-745 Isolation Signal

(Closed).

5.2

Unresolved

Item 50-244/89-04-02,

Major Modification Backlog

( Closed)

.,6

6.

'afety Assessment/equality

Verification (71707,

90712,

90713,

40500)..

6

6. 1

Self-Assessment

Effectiveness

6.2

Personnel

Safety.

6.3

Periodic

and Special

Reports.

6.4

Written Reports of Nonroutine Events..

6.5

Unresolved

Item 50-244/90-11-02,

Unclear

LER 90-008 (Closed)...

7.

TMI Action

Item Fol low.-up (92701)...

7.1

I.D.2.2 and I.D.2.3, Safety

Parameter

Display System...........

7.2

II.K.3.5.B, Reactor Coolant

Pump

(RCP) Trip

7.3

II.E.4. 1, Dedicated

Hydrogen Penetration.

7.4

II.D.3.4.3, Control

Room Habitability.

7.5

II.B.3.4, Post-accident

Sampling.

7.6

II.F. 1.2.C,

Containment

High Range Monitor...........,.........

6

7

7

7

8

8

8

8

8

8

9

1

d[

Table of Contents

PAGE

8.

Administrative (30703,

71707,

82701)

8.1

Licensee Activities.......

8.2

Emergency

Preparedness

~ .

8.3

Inspection

Hours

8.4

Exit Meetings ..

9

9

9

9

9

11

I

~

DETAILS

1.

Plant 0 erations

1.1

Control

Room Observations

The inspectors

found the

R.

E. Ginna Nuclear

Power Plant to be operated

safely

and in conformance with license

and regulatory requirements.

Control

room staffing w'as adequate

and operators

exercised

control

over access

to the control

room.

Operators

adhered

to approved pro-

cedures

and understood

the reasons

for lighted annunciators.

The

inspectors

reviewed control

room log books to obtain information con-

cerning trends

and activities,

and observed

recorder traces for ab-

normalities.

During normal work hours

and

on backshifts,

accessible

areas

of the plant were toured

and plant conditions

and activities

were observed with no inadequacies

identified.

The inspectors verified

compliance with plant technical specifications

and audited

selected

safety-related

tagouts.

Among the documents

reviewed included Ginna Station

Event Reports

(A-25. 1) Nos.

90-74 through 90-83.

Each Ginna Station

Event Report was reviewed to ensure plant personnel

took appropriate

corrective action

and observed

the appropriate

Limit-

ing Conditions for Operation.

No inadequacies

were identified.

2.

Radiolo ical Controls

The resident

inspectors periodically confirmed that radiation work permits

were effectively implemented,

dosimetry

was correctly worn in controlled

areas

and dosimeter

readings

were accurately

recorded,

access

to high radi-

ation areas

was adequately

controlled,

and postings

and labeling were in

compliance with procedures

and regulations.

Through observations

of ongoing

activities

and discussions

with plant personnel,

the inspectors

concluded

that radiological controls were conscientiously

implemented.

3.

Maintenance/Surveillance

3. 1

Maintenance

Observations

The inspectors

observed

portions of various safety-related

maintenance

activities to assess

whether redundant

components

were operable,

ac-

tivities did not violate limiting conditions for operation,

personnel

obtained required administrative

approvals

and tagouts

before initi-

ating work, personnel

used

approved

procedures

or the activity was

within the "skills of the trade," workers

implemented appropriate

radiological controls

and ignition/fire prevention controls,

and

equipment

was tested properly prior to returning it to service.

Por-

tions of the following activity were observed:

Maintenance

Procedure

(M)-11. 10, Major Inspection of Service

'ater

Pump,

Pump:

"D" Service

Water., Revision 20, effective

January

5,

1990,

observed

August 24,

1990.

No'nacceptable

conditions were identified.

3.2

Corrective Maintenance

Observations

3.2. 1

Service Water

Pum

1D Motor Failure

Following the failure of the Service Water

Pump

1D Motor on

August 4,

1990, the inspector

followed licensee's

actions

to diagnose

the cause

of the failure, oversee

repairs,

and

return the

pump to full service in a timely manner.

Upon determining that the motor required rewinding due to

a

phase-to-phase

short in the stator windings, engineers

and

quality assurance

personnel

from the corporate

and site

staffs were dispatched

to the repair facility (Relia'nce

Electric Company,

Cleveland,

Ohio) to evaluate

material

modifications to the motor stator

and

recommend additional

testing to assure

greater

motor reliabi-lity.

Based

en their

engineering

evaluation

and through disc'ussions

with qVendor

representatives,

the licensee's

staff upgraded

the w'inding

insulation

from Class

F 'to Class

H to enhance

the motor's

thermal

endurance.

To provide assurance

that the changes

in materials did not

affect the motor's operating characteristics,

additional

dynamic testing to augment static

bench tests

was performed

at

RGEE's request.

Dynamic testing included

a dynamometer

performance test,

a heat

run test,

and several

tests at

full load.

Upon satisfactory

completion of testing,

the

motor was returned

to the site, installed,

tested

in-place

and returned to full service

on August 24,

1990.

Based

upon observation of the licensee's

actions,

discussions

with cognizant licensee

representatives,

and review of sup-

porting documentation,

the inspector concluded that the

licensee

acted expeditiously to repair the motor and took

prudent

measures

to improve motor reliability.

3.3

Surveillance

Observations

Inspectors

observed portions of survei llances to verify proper cali-

bration of test instrumentation,

use of approved

procedures,

perform-

ance of work by qualified personnel,

conformance

to limiting conditions

for operation,

and correct

system restoration

following testing.

Portions of the following survei llances

were observed:

4

Periodic Test (PT)-2.10,

Safety Injection System Quarterly Test,

Revision 2, effective June

29,

1990,

observed

August 1,

1990.

PT-32A, Reactor Trip Breaker Testing - "A" Train," Revision 8,

effective June

8,

1990,

observed

August 3,

1990.

No unacceptable

conditions were identified.

3.4

Inservice Ins ection

Summar

Re ort

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

inservice inspection

summary

report for the first refueling outage of the third inspection interval.

The

ASME Code,

Section XI, 1986 Edition, is the applicable

code for

the interval

and the report was submitted to the

NRC within the time

frame mandated

by Article 6000 of Section XI.

Examination methods

included visual, liquid penetrant,

magnetic par-

ticle, ultrasonic,

radiographic,

eddy current,

functional,

and,system

hydrostatic

pressure

and leakage tests.

Inservice inspection

( ISI)

activities during the

1990 refueling outage

were performed

on Code

Class

1, 2,

& 3 components,

high energy piping,

s'team generator

tubes

and snubbers.

I

Examinations

performed

on Class

1,

2 and

3 components

and

on h'igh

energy piping were as follows.

I

Ninety-three (93) examinations

were performed

on 63 Class

1 com-

ponents.

One hundred nineteen

(119) examinations

were performed

on

75

Class

2 components.

Twenty-one (21) Class

3 components

were examined

by the YT-3

visual examination

technique.

Seventy-four

(74) examinations

were performed

on 23 high energy

components.

Steam generator

tubes in the "A" and "B" steam generators

were examined

with the eddy current method.

The status of the

Steam Generator

(S/G)

tubes before

and after the examinations

follows:

Steam Generator

"A"

~Pre-outa

e

Post-outa

e

~Chan

e

Total

Tubes

3260

Out of Service

Tubes (plugged)

173

Sleeved

Tubes

172

Open Unsleeved

Tubes

2915

3260

197

223

2840

+24

+51

-75

Steam Generator

"B"

Total

Tubes

3260

Out of Service

Tubes (plugged)

340

Sleeved

Tubes

642

Open Unsleeved

Tubes

2278

3260

332

832

.

+190

2096

-182

"Tubes recovered

by removing the plugs

and sleeving

the tubes.

S/G "A" Work Sco

e

Hot Leg to ¹1 Tube Support Plate

Full Length

(20% Random

Sample)

Previous Indications

> 20%

sleeves

Ninimum

~Re uired

2915

583

9

35

Number

~Ies ected

2915

585

9

35

S/G "B" - Work Sco

e

Hot Leg to ¹1 Tube Support Plate

Full Length

(20% Random

Sampl'e)

Previous Indications

> 20%

Sleeves

4

Replugged

Tubes (Full Length)

Four hydrostatic tests

and associated

performed

on the following:

2278

456

19

129

28

VT-2 visual

2278

460

19

I

129

28

examinations

were

~

Charging

Sy'tem through Regenerative

Heat Exchanger

~

CVCS Holdup Tank "A"

~

CVCS Holdup Tank "B"

~

CVCS Holdup Tank "C"

A total of 147 snubber

components

were inspected

requiring

148 VT-3

examinations.

The examinations

were performed to comply with the

licensee's

Technical Specification

requirements.

Fifteen (15) snubbers

were functionally tested,

of which

12 were mechanical

snubbers

and

3

were hydraulic snubbers.

The

summary report identified three

items (one

( 1) Class

1 and two

(2) Class

2 items) which contained unsatisfactory

conditions

and which

resulted

in an expanded

inspection

sample in each

case.

Additionally,

the originally rejected

components

were put into an acceptable

condi-

tion.

A number of Class

1,

2 and

3 items (40) were identified as containing

Code Rejectable

Indications which did not result in expanded

examina-

tion samples.

The components

were either repaired

and

made acceptable

or evaluated

and dispositioned

use-as-is.

The inspector

agreed with

each disposition but questioned

why the rejectable

findings did not

result in an expanded

inspection

sample.

RG&E's repair program covers

both "Service Induced"

and

"Code Reject-

able" repairs.

A "Service

Induced Reject" occurs

when

an item in the

ISI program contains

an indication that exceeds

applicable

acceptance

standards

and was caused

during the service life of the item.

A ser-

vice induced reject results

in an expanded

inspection

sample.

A "Code

Reject" occurs

when

an item contains

indications or other rejectable

.

conditions that were not service

induced.

That type of reject does

not result in an expanded

inspection

sample..

For each of the

code

rejectable

items the licensee

had identified the nature of the reject-

able condition and

had documentation

which confirmed that the condition

was present prior to placing the item in service

and

was not service

induced.

The inspector

had

no further questions

regarding this matter.

The licensee's

summary report was found to be complete,

and information

that is not included in the report is readily available

from the lic-

ensee.

No unacceptable

conditions were identified.

I

e

'~securie

e

i

During this inspection,

the resident

inspectors verified x-ray machines

and metal

and explosive detectors

were operable,

protected

area and'ital

area barriers

were well maintained,

personnel

were properly badged

for

unescorted

or escorted

access,

and compensatory

measures

were implemented

when necessary.

4. 1

Vehicle Access Control

The inspector witnessed,

on three

separate

occasions,

site security

processing

privately owned vehicles'nto

the protected

area.

Through

these

observations,

the inspector determined that site security properly

interrogated

the vehicle's

owner, thoroughly inspected

the vehicles,

and closely escorted

the owner whilein the protected

area.

Security

personnel

meticulously inspected materials off-loaded from the vehicles

and closely monitored escorted

personnel activities.

Overall, the licensee's

security staff rigorously implemented site

security procedures.

En ineerin /Technical

Su

ort

5.1

Unresolved'Item

50-244/90-09-02

AOV-745 Isolation Si nal

Closed

RG&E modified the

Emergency

Procedures

to direct operators

to verify

the valve closed,

or manually close it, and committed to install

a

containment isolation signal

to the valve by the end of the

1992 re-

fueling outage.

The valve was returned to operable

status

and will

be kept normally closed;

alignment procedures

have

been

changed.

NRC

review concluded that the actions

taken

and planned

were conservative

and adequate.-

5.2

Unresolved

Item 50-244/89-04-02

Major Modification Backlo

Closed

The inspector

reviewed the current list of modifications which are

planned to be performed at the site

and di scussed it with cognizant

licensee

representatives.

The list has

been prioritized based

on the

system which became effective

on January

17,

1989.

Guideline

No.

OMG-2, Revision 0, entitled "Integrated Prioritization of Modifications

and Activities" is the controlling document

and identifies the actions

necessary

to implement the plan.

Based

on the assigned priority,

projects

have

been

scheduled for the next five refueling outages

from

1991 through

1995.

Additionally, the list has

been

broken

down to

pre-outage

and outage activities for each of the five years.

Activi-

ties which can

be performed

when the plant is operating

are listed

under pre-outage activities,

and those which cannot

be accomplished

until the plant is shut

down are listed as outage activities.

The

published five year schedule

is periodically updated

and revised

based

on work activity progress

and changing plant conditions which affect

the established priorities.

Planning

and scheduling of modifications appeared

to be adequately

controlled to assure

that work activities are properly performed

and

that sufficient resources

are allocated to the scheduled activities.

6.

Safet

Assessment/

ualit

Verification

6.1

Self-Assessment

Effectiveness

The inspector

reviewed the status of findings identified in a self-

assessment

performed

by the Nuclear Assurance

group.

In April 1990,

the Nuclear Assurance

group performed

an assessment

of the use of

independent verification when performing certain maintenance activities.

The assessment

credited the maintenance

planners with satisfactorily

implementing the program,

but was critical of the lack of formal,

integrated training for all Maintenance

Department

personnel

to assure

a

common understanding

of independent verification methods.

It con-

cluded that procedural

guidance

on independent verification and the

procedures

that utilize it need clarification.

Comprehensive

formal

training was

recommended.

Though the assessment

provided useful in-

formation to plant management,

no follow-up was requested

and

no formal

mechanism

was

used to follow-up these

concerns.

Although a standard corrective action tracking system exists for regu-

latory and licensee-identified

findings, this system

was not used for

follow-up on the self-assessment

findings.

Not using the formal

0

mechanism

to address

these findings provides

an inconsistent

approach

to problem resolution

and

was assessed

as

a weakness

in administrative

control.

6.2

Personnel

Safet

On July 17,

1990, for the

second

time since

1967,

the Ginna Nuclear

Power Plant achieved

one million work conservative

hours without an

accident.

Senior corporate

and plant management

were. outside

the

guard

house that morning at 5:30 to greet

and congratulate all plant

.

workers.

Plant management attributes this good record to the awareness

of management

and workers of the importance of safety.

NRC review

assessed

this achievement

and its recognition

by management

as indica-

tors of good performance.

6.3

Periodic

and

S ecial

Re orts

Periodic

and special

reports

submitted

by the licensee

pursuant to

Technical Specifications 6.9. 1 and 6.9.3 were reviewed.

Inspectors

verified that the reports

contained

information required

by the

HRC,

that test results

and/or supporting information w'ere consistent with

design predictions

and performance

specifications,

and that reported

information was accurate.

The following report

w'as reviewed:

>

Monthly Operating

Report for 'July 1990.

No unacceptable

conditions were identified.

6.4

Written

Re orts of Nonroutine Events

Written reports

submitted to the

NRC were reviewed to determine

whether

details were clear ly reported,

causes

properly identified and correc-

tive actions

were appropriate.

The inspectors

also

assessed

whether

potential

safety

consequences

had

been properly evaluated,

generic

implications were indicated,

events warranted onsite follow-up, re-

porting requirements

of 10

CFR 50.72 were applicable,

and requirements

of 10

CFR 73 had been properly met.

The following LERs were reviewed (Note:

date indicated .is event date):

90-008 (Revision 01), Safeguards

Buses

Degraded

Voltage Relays

Miscalibrated

Due To Procedure

Inadequacy

Causes

a Condition

Prohibited

By Plant Technical Specifications,

May 24,

1990.

This

LER is closed out in Detail 6.5 of this report.90-010,

Inadvertent

Closure of "A" Steam Generator

Main Feedwater

Regulating

Valve Due to Controller Malfunction Causes

a Reactor

Trip on

Low Steam Generator

Water Level, June 9,

1990.

This event

was reviewed in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/90-09.90-011, Fire Damper

Found Missing During Surveillance Test

PT-13.26,

Due to Not Being Installed,

Causes

a Condition Pro-

hibited By Technical Specification,

June

19,

1990.

This event

was reviewed in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/90-11.

The inspectors

concluded that the reports

were accurate

and met regu-

latory requirements.

No unacceptable

conditions were identified.

6.5

Unresolved

Item 50-244/90-11-02

Unclear

LER 90-008

Closed

RGKE submitted

a revision to the

LER to address

applicable Technical

Specification action statements

and to clarify recalibration

method-

ology.

NRC review of this

LER revision concluded that the additional

information was adequate

to address

the concerns.

Licensee corrective

actions

were acceptable.

7.

TMI Action Item Follow-u

7. 1

I.D.2.2 and I.D.2.3

Safet

Parameter

Dis la

S stem

SPDS

The

NRC staff concluded that

RGEE .has satisfactorily met all r'equire-

ments for an

SPDS specified in NUREG-0737,

Supple'ment

1,

as documented

in June

29,

1990 letter from Allen Johnson,

NRC Project Manage'r to

Dr. Robert

C. Mecredy,

RG&E.

This'tem is closed.

7.2

II.K.3.5;B

Reactor

Coolant

Pum

RCP

Tri

As stated

in an April 24,

1989 letter from Mr. Patrick Sears,

NRC

Project Manager,

to Dr. Robert

C. Mecredy,

the

NRC staff found RG5E's

plant-specific

RCP trip setpoint development

acceptable.

This item

is closed.

7.3

II.E.4. 1

Dedicated

H dro en Penetration

As stated

in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/81-13,

the hydrogen

recom-

biners are located inside containment,

therefore this requirement is

not applicable.

This item is closed.

7.4

III.D.3.4'

Control

Room Habitabilit

NRC Inspection

Report 5-244/84-22 initially reviewed this requirement

and left two concerns

open.

One concern

was closed

in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/85-10

and the other in 86-07.

This item is closed.

7.5

II.B.3.4

Post-accident

Sam lin

I

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/85-08 initially reviewed this requirement

and left four concerns

open.

Two concerns

were closed in

NRC Inspec-

tion Report 50-244/87-05,

one in 87-20,

and

one in 88-20.

This item

i s closed.

7.6

II.F. 1.2.C

Containment

Hi

h

Ran

e Monitor

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/85-08 initially reviewed this requirement

and left two concerns

open.

One concern

was closed in

NRC Inspection

Report 50-244/87-05

and the other in 87-20.

This item is closed.

8.

Administrative

8. 1

Licensee Activities

The plant operated

at approximately full power throughout the inspec-

tion period.

On August 4,

1990 the "D" service water

pump breaker

tripped due to

a short in the motor's windings.

The

pump motor was

rewound

and more extensive testing

was conducted

before the

pump was

returned to service

on August .25,

1990.

No further problems

were

encountered

during this inspection

period.

8.2

Emer enc

Pre aredness

On August 14,

1990,

the inspector toured the

RGKE Emergency Operations

Facility at 49 East Avenue,

Rochester,

with the

RGKE Emergency

Pre-

paredness

staff.

The facility was found to be fully equipped,and

well maintained.

The most current revisions of controlled copies of

procedures

and drawings were

on file.

Communication

systems

were in

working order.

No problem areas

were identified.

8.3

Ins ection

Hours

This inspection

involved

145 inspection

hours,

including

5 backshift

and 3.5 deep backshift hours.

At periodic intervals

and at the conclusion of the inspection,

meetings

were held with senior station

management

to discuss

the

scope

and

findings of this inspection.

In addition,

NRC exit meetings

were

held for the following inspections

during this inspection period:

50-244/90-15

on August 17,

1990,

50-244/90-16

on August 10,

1990,

and

50-244/90-17

on August

18,

1990.