ML17261B066

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Insp Rept 50-244/90-07 on 900416-20.Violation Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Implementation of Licensee Radiological Controls Program During Current Refueling Outage,Including Organization & Staffing
ML17261B066
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 04/25/1990
From: Oconnell P, Pasciak W
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17261B063 List:
References
50-244-90-07, 50-244-90-7, NUDOCS 9005080155
Download: ML17261B066 (7)


See also: IR 05000244/1990007

Text

U.S.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report

No.

50-244 90-07

Docket No.

50-244

License

No.

DPR-18

Category

Licensee:

Rochester

Gas

and Electric Cor oration

as

venue

oc es er

ew

or

Facility Name:

Ginna Nuclear

Power Plant

Inspection At:

Ontario

New York

Inspection

Conducted:

A ril 16 - 20

1990

I

Inspector:

onne

,

a ia ion

pecia is

a e

Approved by:~

~

ascia

,

ie

,

aci i ies

a ia ion

Protection Section

0/a~/ps

a

e

Ins ection Summar:

Ins ection conducted

A ril 16 - 20

1990

Ins ection

e or

o.

Areas Ins ected:

This inspection

was

a routine unannounced

inspection of the

imp emen ation of the licensee's

radiological controls program during the

current refueling outage.

Areas reviewed included: Organization

and

Staffing,

and External

and Internal

Exposure Controls.

The inspector also

provide6 input regarding

ALARA and the integration of radiological controls

into the maintenance

process

to the

NRC Maintenance

Team which was

concurrently conducting

NRC Maintenance

Team Inspection

No. 50-244/90-80.

Results:

Mithin the scope of this inspection

one violation was identified. The

vsolation involved

a fai1ure to set

an administrative

exposure limit in

accordance

with licensee

procedures.

9005080155

900427.

PDR

ADOC~ 05000244

0

PDC

'1. 0

1.2

Persons

Contacted

Licensee

Personnel

  • D. Filion
  • D. Filkins
  • A. Gillet

W.

Goodman

  • P. Lewis
  • R. Mecredy

F. Mis

  • J. Quigley

B. Quinn

  • M. Saporito
  • E. Selbig
  • R. Smith
  • J. Smith

S. Spector

  • J. St. Martin
  • K. Wachter
  • R. Watts
  • J. Widay

NRC Personnel

  • J. Carrasco
  • J. Jang

~A. Johnson

  • H. Kaplan
  • T. Moslak
  • T. Polich
  • N. Perry
  • R. Wessman

DETAILS

Radiochemist.

Manager,

Health Physics

and Chemistry

Erosion/Corrosion

Coordinator

Health Physics

Foreman

Nondestructive

Examination Outage Coordinator

Division Manager,

Nuclear Production

Health Physicist

Quality Services

Coordinator

Corporate Health Physicist

Supervisor,

Materials Engineering

Quality Control, Health Physics

and Chemistry

Senior Vice President,

Engineering

and Production

Manager, Materials Engineering

Plant Manager

Corrective Actions Coordinator

Eddy Current Coordinator

Director, Corporate Radiation Protection

'uperintendent,

Ginna Production

Reactor

Engineer

Region I

Radiation Specia/ist,

Region I

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Reactor Engineer,

Region I

Resident

Inspector,

Three Mile Island

Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Resident

Inspector,

Ginna

Office of Nuclear Reactor

Regulation

2.0

  • Attended the exit meeting

on April 20,

1990.

Other licensee

personnel

were also contacted

during the course of this

inspection.

~Pur

ese

The purpose of this routine,

unannounced

inspection

was to review the

implementation of the licensee's

radiological controls program during the

current refueling outage.

Areas reviewed included organization

and

staffing and external

and internal

exposure controls.

The inspector also

providel input regarding

ALARA and the integration of radiological controls

into the maintenance

process

to the

NRC Maintenance

Team which was

concurrently conducting

NRC Maintenance

Team Inspection

No. 50-244/90-80.

3.0

4.0

Or anization

and Staffin

The inspector reviewed the adequacy of the staffing levels of both

permanent

and contractor Radiation Protection Technicians

(RPTs}. The

inspector discussed

the staffing levels with cognizant

personnel

and

observed

several

radiation protection

(RP) work briefings

and

RPT job

coverage of ongoing work. In general

the staffing level of RPTs appeared

to

be adequate

to provide coverage for those activities observed

by the

inspector.

The licensee

has

made

improvements in the staffing of the ALARA group

compared to the previous outage

by having

a

RPT dedicated full time to

ALARA planning

and having another

RPT dedicate

approximately

75% of his

time to ALARA planning.

Discussions with individuals from the

ALARA group

and review of Radiation

Work Permit

(RWP)

and Special

Work Permit

(SWP)

entry logs indicated that additional

outage staffing of ALARA RPTs to

ensure that

ALARA considerations

are

made in the field would be helpful.

The ALARA Supervisor stated that tentative staffing plans for the next

refueling outage include hiring additional

RPTs for this purpose.

Shortly before the current outage

two positions in the licensee's

RP

management

organization

became

vacant.

These positions

included the

Dosimetry Foreman

and the Respiratory Protection

and Internal Dosimetry

Health Physicist.

The loss of these

two individuals has placed

an extra

workload on the remaining two Health Physicists

and the Health Physics

(HP)

and Chemistry Manager

and

may have contributed to some of the concerns

noted in the Section 4.0 of this report.

The licensee

plans

on filling the

position of Respiratory Protection

and Internal Dosimetry Health Physicist

as

soon

as possible.

The licensee is evaluating restructuring the

responsibilities of the Dosimetry Foreman

and it is uncertain whether this

position will be filled. The licensee

plans

on adding the position of

Operations

Health Physicist to enhance

supervisory oversight of the

RPTs.

External

and Internal

Ex osure Controls

The inspector conducted

several

tours throughout the controlled areas of

the facility. The inspector verified that areas

were properly posted

. barricaded,

or locked

as required.

The inspector did note one area where

the area postinq could have

been better situated.

The inspector noted that

the High Radiation Area posting

on top of the pressurizer

cubicle had

been

moved to the side

and was not readily visible to individuals entering the

ressurizer

cubicle from the top.

The

RPT on the refueling floor stated

hat the posting

had previously been positioned over the entrance

but,

apparently,

someone

had moved the posting.

The inspector noted that the licensee

had recently identified two instances

where High Radiation Areas,

which were required

by procedure to be locked,

were found unlocked.

The licensee

had not completed their analysis of the

the root causes

or appropriate corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

This item will be reviewed during a future inspection.

The inspector reviewed the dosimetry records of selected individuals and

determined that

NRC Form-4s

had satisfactorily been completed for the

individuals prior to allowing them to exceed

1250

mRem per calendar

quarter.

While reviewing these

records the inspector noted that

on March 24,

1990

an

individual with 1672

mRem of occupational

exposure

from other licensed

facilities for the first calendar quarter of 1990 was given

an

administrative'ose limit of 1973

mRem for the first calendar quarter of

1990. This resulted

in the individual's exposure

being administratively

limited to 3645

mRem for the first calendar quarter of 1990.

The inspector

verified that the individual received

a dose of only 144

mRem during the

eriod of March 24 to 31

1990 and therefore the individual's total dose of

816

mRem for the first calendar quarter did not exceed the regulatory

limit of 3000

mRem per calendar quarter.

The inspector discussed

this matter with the Dosimetry Clerk and the Health

Physicist

who was supervisinq

the Dosimetry Clerks. Apparently,

an exposure

received at

a previous facility during the first calendar quarter of 1990

had been overlooked

when the individual's administrative

dose limit was

set.

The licensee's

oversight of this area

was deficient because

the

program did not require supervisory

or any other type of review of

~

~

~

~

ersonnel

exposure

records to ensure that correct administrative

dose

imits were assigned.

In this instance it was fortuitous that

an

individual's quarterly dose

had not exceeded

the regulatory limit.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's

dosimetry procedures

and noted that

procedure

HP-1.2,

"External

Exposure Limits", requires in Section 6.2.4.2

that personnel

having

a completed

Form NRC-4 shall

be administratively

limited to 2000

mRem per calendar quarter.

The licensee's

assigning

an

incorrect administrative

dose limit of 3645

mRem per calendar quarter to

an individual is as

an apparent violation of Technical Specification 6. 11,

Radiation Protection

Program,

which requires

'that radiation control

procedures

shall

be adhered to for all operations

involving personnel

radiation exposure.

(50-244/90-07-01)

The inspector observed

the

RP coverage for eddy current testing

and tube

plugging on the steam generators.

While contractor

RPTs provided RP'job

coverage for these activities, the licensee

appointed

permanent

RPTs

as

coordinators for these activities.

The inspector did note

some discrepancy

between

RPTs regarding the timing of individuals who insert their arms

inside the steam generator

manway.

One

RPT stated that he would time

individuals whenever .any portion of an individual was inserted into the

manway entrance.

Another

RPT stated that he only timed individuals when

they inserted their arm beyond the elbow into the manway. Another RPT

stated that timing was only required

when individuals were working for more

than five minutes with their arm inside the manway.

5

5.0

The inspector also observed that calculated

stay time information

for

whole body and extremity exposures

was not available at the control points

for both steam generators.

In addition, the licensee

was not utilizing

alarming or- remote reading dosimeters

to monitor the accumulation of dose

to the individuals. In light of the fact that the licensee

was controlling

individual exposures

based primarily on survey data

and calculated

stay

times it appeared

that more emphasis

needed to be placed

on determining

stay times

and timing entries for both whole body and extremity exposures.

The licensee

stated that they would evaluate their requirements

for timing

arm entries into the steam generators

and that they were evaluating the

purchase of remote reading dosimeters for steam generator

work.

The inspector

reviewed the licensee's

program to determine the air quality

of the supplied breathing air for the containment

and auxiliary building

constant flow breathing air system.

The licensee

has procedures

to ensure

that the breathing air system air quality meets or exceeds

the Compressed

Gas Association requirements for Grade

D air. The .inspector verified that

the licensee

had followed these

procedures

prior to initiating the supplied

air system for the steam generator

workers.

The inspector reviewed the licensee's

method of trackinq individual

exposures

to concentrations

of airborne radioactivity, i.e. the number of

hours individuals are exposed to the maximum permissible concentration

(MPC-hours). While the licensee

has

made

improvements

in this area over the

~

~

ast year,

a further improvement

needs to be made in this area.

Currently

he licensee prints out

a weekly report of the MPC-hour exposures for all

individuals.

These reports total the MPC-hour exposures

from the beginning

of the previous

week through the end of the previous

week, i.e.

Sunday

through Saturday.

These reports

are

used to ensure

the licensee

takes

corrective actions for individual exposures

greater

than

40 MPC-hours in

any seven consecutive

days,

as required

by 10 CFR 20. 103(b)(2).

The inspector

noted that

an individual could receive

a MPC-hour exposure

late in the first week and another

MPC-hour exposure early in the second

week with the total exposure

bein~ greater than

40 MPC-hours in seven

consecutive

days

and the licensee

s program would not identify the need to

take corrective actions.

The inspector verified that no individual had

been

exposed to more than

40 MPC-hours in any seven consecutive

days.

The

licensee

stated that they would revise the method of tracking MPC-hour

exposures

to address this discrepancy.

~Erat

N tI

The inspector

met with licensee representatives,

denoted in Section

1.0 of

the report,

on April 20,

1990.

The inspector

summarized

the purpose,

scope

and findings of the inspection.