ML17258A857
| ML17258A857 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/17/1980 |
| From: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17258A856 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8103090712 | |
| Download: ML17258A857 (14) | |
Text
SUPPLEMENT NO.
1 TO THE FEBRUARY 14 1979 FIRE PROTECTION SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION U. S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO.
DPR-18 ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION ROBERT E.
GINNA NUCLEAR POttER PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-244 pete.
December 17, 1980
<'il
INTRODUCTION On February 14, 1979, the Commission issued Amendment No.
24 to Provisional Operating License No.
DPR-18 for the R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.
This amendment added a license condition regarding completion of facility modifi-cations to improve the fire protection program.
These modifications were identified in Paragraphs 3.1.1 through 3.1.49 of the NRC's Fire Protection Safety Evaluation (FPSE) for the Ginna Plant, also dated February 14, 1979.
The FPSE identified certain items as incomplete and requiring further infor-mation from the licensee and evaluation by the NRC staff.
By letter dated June 19, 1980, the licensee provided information concerning open fire protection items.
This supplement to the FPSE addresses most of those items that were previously identified as incomplete.
t DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION The section numbers indicated are those corresponding to the section numbers in the FPSE.
WATER SUPPRESSION SYSTEM ITEM 3. 1.2 In the
- SER, we were concerned that the suppression systems to be installed in various plant areas 'would not meet the design requirements and water flow rates of NFPA 13 and NFPA 15, and that if they were not automatically=
- actuated, they may not be operating fast enough to pr.event damage to safety-related systems.
In addition, the lack of electrical. supervision or chain and lock control of fire protection system isolation valves would increase the possibility of closed valves affecting fire suppression system perform-ance.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided additional information.
The licensee committed to having the water suppression systems conform to NFPA Codes 13 and 15.
Also, the proposed systems will be automatically
- actuated, including the existing cable tunnel water suppression system.
Isolation valves will be chained and locked open or electrically supervised.
The water flow rates will follow the NFPA 15 ouidelines.
To accomplish this, the top uppermost sprinklers will supply 0.3 gpm per square foot over the tray area.
When side nozzles are used,
- 0. 15 gpm per square foot coverage will be used, which is acceptable.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the licensee's proposal to comply with the design guidelines of NFPA 13 and 15, to convert the manual systems to automatic, and to provide water flow rates that follow NFPA 13 and 15 is acceptable with regards to fire protection and is, therefore, acceptable.
BATTERY ROOM VENTILATION ITEM 3.1.11 In the
- SER, we were concerned that the recirculating type venti lation system ior the battery rooms would allow hydrogen generated within the room to reach a hazardous concentration.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided information on battery room venti lation and the prevention of hydrogen gas accumulation.
The licensee proposes,to use "sail-type" flow switches in the exhaust duct of each battery room.
Loss of exhaust air signaI wi 11 alarm in the control room.
The minimum air flow will be based on engineering calculations for the maximum hydrogen generation rate credible for the battery room.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the licensee's.proposal to install exhaust air alarms and to provide flow swtiches will prevent a hazardous con-centration of hydrogen, and therefore, is acceptable.
CONTROL ROOM SEPARATION.. ITEM 3.'1.21 In the
- SER, we were concerned tha-
-'.he unrated walls separating the control room from the turbine building would be inadequate to prevent a fire in either
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8, I
4
, ~ r as,'~ the turbine building or the kitchen from affecting redundant safe shutdown circuits in the control room.
'>le were also concerned that the design of the water curtain which the. licensee proposed to install to protect the unrated walls would not provide timely response or sufficient water spray density to preclude damage to safe shutdown systems from a fire in the turbine bui lding.
By letter dated June a, 1980 the licensee provided additionaI.information";.,:,!$ ".'-,'- +t The water'discharge density is according to the guidelines given in NFPR Standard 15 and therefore acceptable.
The design of the water curtain wil'1 ".'.,:~~~~+~4~~),
be in accordance with NFPA Standard 15.
The system will be actuated by a"-.';;=,j<; j>.-"~;:~~<<>:"
heat detection system.
The detector heads will have a heat collector canopy directly over it to assist in decreasing delayed actuation.. The fit'e.':.'.-'. ~~/>~~>,";~,
water piping will be hydraulically designed to accommodate two hose streams',"'.,',;.:jN
>~l~'s, operating with the water curtain.
The fire pump has the capacity to supply--',"'",-;,,~~=,
the required pressure and water flow.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the water curtain protection '"
proposed by the licensee will adequately protect the wall between the control
'.'oom and the turbine building and, therefore, is acceptable with regards. to fire protection.
PIPING ANO OUCT PENETRATIONS ITEM 3.1.24 In the SER,.we were concerned that the piping and duct, penetration seals did not provide adequate resistance to prevent
- a. fire from propagating through the rated fire barriers.
By letter dat d June 4, 1980, the licensee referenced FM Report 24963 dated;.
August 5, 1975; FM Report J.I.
1ASg6.AC dated May 10, 1978; FM Report 26543'.. ',. ".;-'-.";,:,
dated October 28, 1975; and Construction Technology Laboratories Reports numbered SF-20 and SF-150L dated October. 1976, submitted to us on December 2T",",'",,"";:,"..j.".'$f.
1979.
These reports describe the results of testing electrical and piping "')','.-'.".,';,';@~,'"-"
penetration seals using a silicone foam material as the fill,which is the,-',"'"<<j~,",
material the licensee proposes to use.
The penetratioa seals at Ginna. are
.'-~<~'g>%/~;~<'.",~
of tHe dgsign
'and type tested and described in the above mentioned test,
'Zejortp~.,'>~-,4+'P'he tests followed the ASTME-119 fire test method.
Based on the data in these test reports, we conclude'hat'the-"penetrattoii".,:
~~ 'q@
.=-;".'eal designs have been properly verified and, therefore, are acdeptabTe with" ".-.,";-'",'.-,-'.
regards to fire protection.
CONSTRUCTION JOINTS ITEM 3.1.25 In the
- SER, we were concerned that the construction joints between the con-tainment and the adjoining walls of the intermediate and auxiliary buildings may not provide a fire rated separation between the adjoining areas.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided additional information in the form of a reference to the Southwest Research Institute fire test report numbered CTM-0200, dated January 17, 1979.
This report was submitted to us on Oecember 21, 1979 and it describes the results of testing construc-tion joint seals using silicone foam material, which is the material the licensee proposes to use.
The joint seal tested was 6 inches in depth and 6 inches in width and successfully passed the ASTM E-119 fire test.
The construction seals at Ginna are 12 inches in depth and less than 4 inches wide, therefore, the seals are of a more conservative design than that tested.
Based on the test results, the licensee's proposal to upgrade the construc-tion joint seals with silicone material as the filler is acceptable.
RC PUMP LUBE OIL COLLECTION SYSTEM ITEM 3.1.39 In the SER we were concerned that a fire involving reactor coolant pump lubricating oil could damage safe shutdown instrumentation.
and valves which are loca.ed inside the shield wall.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided information on the RC pump oil collection system.
The licensee proposes to install. an oil-tight enclosure around the high-pressure oil lift system and to provide splash guards with drip pans to control leakage from. the oil cooler, piping, upper and lower oil pots and the oil fill/drain valve.
The oil collection system will be seismically designed.
In addition, strainers will be installed to prevent clogging of the drain pipes.
Based on our review, we conclude that the licensee's RCP oi 1 collection system meets our fire protection guidelines and, therefore, is acceptable HYGROGEN P IPING ITEM 3.1.48
'I In the SER we were concerned that the fai lure of the hydrogen piping routed throuoh the Auxiliary Building may present an exposure fire hazard to redun-dant safe shutdown equipment and/or circuits.
By 'ietter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided information on the potential hazards of the hydrogen piping in safety related areas.
The hydrogen pipes supplying the volume control tank does not pass through safety related areas.
The licensee stated that the hydrogen line to the hydrogen reccmbiner does not present an exposure to safety related areas during normal plant operations.
Based on our review, we conclude that the hydrogen piping does not offer hazards that jeopardize safe shutdown equipment and/or circuits and, there-fore, is acceptable.
h
CABLE SEPARATION ITEM 3.2.2 In our SER, we were concerned that an exposure fire could affect cables and/or equipment required for safe shutdown.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided information on cable/
equipment separation and also referenced the results of the safe shutdown analysis submitted previously on Oecember 28, 1979.
Oue evaluation of the safe shutdown will be reported in a subsequent safety evaluation after we receive the information from the licensee.
We consider item 3.2.2 to be included under open item 3.2.1, safe shutdown analysis.
Based on our review, we conclude that item 3.2.2 should be consolidated under item 3.2. 1, which will be evaluated at a later date and, therefore, item 3.2.2 will no longer be carried as an open item.
ELECTRICAL CABLE PENETRATION ITEM 3.2.5 In the
- SER, we were concerned that electrical cable penetration seals were not of a fire rated design.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided information on the penetration seals.
The seals are cf two basic types,
- namely, seals installed in 1975 using 81SCO silicone RTV foam rubber and seals installed since September, 1979, using OOW CORNING silicone RTV foam rubber.
The licensee
... verified, and we, agree,,that the seal designs at Ginna are either similar to or more conservative than the seal designs testea"by" tiie AST!'E-119"'fi're test method for a three hour rating.
Based on our review, we conclude that the licensee has verified that the electrical cable penetration seals are of a 3-hour fire rated design as tested by the ASTM E-119 fire test method and, therefore, are acceptable,.
BACKFLOW PROTECTION ITEM 3.2.6 In our SER, we were concerned that the plant's drain system would allow combustible liquids to spread to certain safety related areas.
By letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided informat'on and drawings for. the proposed modifications.
The liceosee proposes to use either check
- valves, or to install piping, pumps, and valves in separate drain sumps for areas containing significant quantitites of fuel oil.
The separate drain sumps and pumps will on an individual basis, collect and handle the combust-ible liquids safely away from safety related areas.
Based on our evaluation, we conclude that the licensee's proposal to install check valves or separate drain sumps with a sump pump will safely handle the combustible liquids away from safety related areas and, therefore, is accept-able.
J
.FIRE PUMP PERFORMANCE ITEM 3.2.7 In the
- SER, we were concerned that the fire pumps would not perform their intended function because of a deteriorated physical condition.
Sy letter dated June 4, 1980, the licensee provided us with information on the fire pump installation.
The licensee, by inspection, determined that the internals of both fire pumps were found to be in need of replacement.
The licensee ccmmitted to having the fire pumps repaired and we-tested prior to November 1,
1980.
8ased on our review, we conclude that the licensee's.proposal to replace both of the fire pump internals satisfactorily resolves our concern for their physical condition and is; therefore, acceptable, CONCLUSION 8ased o'n our review, we conclude that all of the incomplete items in the
- FPSE, except the design of the dedicated safe shutdown capability, have been accept-ably resolved subject to implementation of the approved modifications.
The safe shutdown system capability will be required in accordance with 10 CFR 50.48 and Appendix R, both of which become effective February 17, 1981.
The required completion dates for the modifications associ ated with the items accepted in this supplement are specified by paragraph (d) of 10 CFR 50.48 using the date of this supplement, as the date, of the NRC.sta.ff.,Firg.ppotectjon Safety Evaluation Report accepting or requiring such features.
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