ML17258A809
| ML17258A809 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 12/31/1980 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Grier B NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| References | |
| IEB-80-24, NUDOCS 8102230748 | |
| Download: ML17258A809 (66) | |
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
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i1aI 4 I a4 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN E.
MAIER VICE PRESIOENT TEI,EPHONE AREA COOE TI6 546.2700 December Director of Region 1
Attention:
Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director, Region 1
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406 31, 1980
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Subject:
IE Bulletin No. 80-24, "Prevention of Damage Due to Water Leakage Inside Containment".
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.
1 Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Grier:
IE Bulletin No. 80-24 contains requirements for submittal of documentati'on on several items related to open and closed cool-ing water systems within the containment building.
The attached enclosure contains the information requested.
Additionally, to assist in evaluating the value/impact of subject bulletin on licensees, manpower expended in conduct of the review and prepara-tion of this report was approximately 280 hours0.00324 days <br />0.0778 hours <br />4.62963e-4 weeks <br />1.0654e-4 months <br />.
Very truly yours, Jo E. Maier Subscribed and sworn to me on this 3/sunday of December 1980 GA R Y L'-.
R E I S S NOTARY PUBLIC, State of N. Y. Monroe Co.
My Commission Expires March 30, 19.,gg xc:
Mr. Victor Stello Jr., Director U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement.
Washington, DC 20555 8102200~
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I&E Bulletin 80-24 Res onse I.
- Actions To Be Taken B
Licensees Res onse To Item 1 of IEB 80-24 A.
Containment Buildin 0 en Coolin S stems There are two open cooling water systems in the R.E. Ginna Plant containment building.
One is the service water system and the other is the containment fire system.
The service water system provides cooling water for the containment building recirculation fans and the reactor compartment fans.
Besides the containment building and the above-mentioned equipment, the service water system provides cooling for the steam plant and reactor auxiliary systems.
The containment fire system provides fire protection capa-bility inside the containment building.
B.
Service Mater S stem Descri tion The service water system consists of four service water
- pumps, a dual loop header and isolation valves.
Three service water pumps meet plant cooling requirements during normal operation and a fourth pump is available for a spare.
The pumps circulate Lake Ontario water to the cooling loads through the two loop header system.
Table 1 is' list of the typical chemical content of Lake Ontario water.
The system is designed to provide redundant cooling capability and precludes a plant shutdown in the event of a loss of a system component or common mode failure.
The service water pumps are connected to 480V safeguards buses that are supplied by the emergency diesel generators
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in the event of loss of offsite power.
One service water pump per diesel is automatically started.
For this condition, the service water system is designed to supply cooling water to only the required emergency systems.
Under the conditions of safety injection initiation concurrent with a loss of outside power, any one pump operating on
.emergency. power is capable of supplying the required emergency cooling capacity,to the containment cooling systems, diesel generators and auxiliary feedwater pumps.
Since two service water pumps can be started (one from each diesel), starting of one pump is assured if the "single failure" is assumed to be the failure of one diesel generator to start.
Sets of two motor operated valves installed in series throughout the system distribution headers are provided to block flow to non-essential services in an emergency.
The isolation valves can be manually operated from the control room with loss of offsite power.
Motor operated gate valves provide primary isolation and are backed up by motor operated butterfly valves.
Automatic temperature control is provided for the containment recirculation fan coolers by modulating the service'water discharge flow from the common discharge header of the coolers.
In the event that a safety injection signal is initiated, an automatic bypass valve is provided around the modulating temperature control valve for the fan coolers.
Both the temperature control valve and the bypass valve are of the fail open type and both go full open when
'safety injection is initiated.
Manual gate or globe valves
C
3 are provided on the outlet side of all cooling services except the containment coolers which have butterfly valves on both inlet and outlet lines and are located outside of the containment building.
A common radiation monitor (R-16) is provided in the service water discharge line from the four containment. coolers and the reactor cavity coolers.
Individual coolers may be I
manually isolated to determine which unit is leaking if the monitor indicates radioactivity.
Service Water Isolation Valves 1A1 lA2 1A1 lA2 1B1 1B2 lA1 lA2 1B1 1B2 4663 4733 4609 4780 4616 4735 4615 4734 4614 4664 4670 4613 Train I.D.
Valve No
~Te Gate Butterfly Gate Butterfly Gate Butterfly Gate Butterfly Butterfly Gate Gate Butterfly M~CC os 1C/11M 1D/14J 1H/2M 1J/2M 1C/6F 1D/13C 1C/14J 1D/14M 1C/14M 1D/13F 1H/2J 1D/11J
All number 1A1 valves receive power from safeguards bus 14.
A safety injection ("A" train) signal with the normal 480V supply breaker. to bus 14 open, will close these valves when the 1A Diesel Generator energizes the bus.
All number 1A2 valves receive their operating power from safeguards Bus 16.
A safety injection signal ("B" train) with the normal 480V supply breaker to Bus 16 open, will close these valves when the 1B Diesel Generator energizes the bus.
Neither train of valves can be opened until the safety injection signal is reset.
If safety injection occurred'ith the loss of offsite
- power, and only one service water pump started (one diesel failed to start),
the closing of these valves would insure adequate service water to the containment fan coolers, reactor compartment coolers, diesels and auxiliary feedwater I
pumps Alarms Containment Coolers-High Outlet temperature 217'F Containment Coolers-Low Service water flow 920 GPM (with SI)
Reactor Cavity Cooler-High Outlet Temperature (150'F)
Component Coolers-Low Service Water Flow (5000 GPM)
Safeguard Breaker Trip-Any Safeguard Breaker Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Cooling Water Filter Hi Diff.
Pressure (1.5 psi)
Seal Injection H20 Circ. Water Pump Filter Hi Diff.
Pressure (3.0 psi)
Safeguard Equip. Lock. off - (only for pumps selected for SI)
Service Water Pum s
Vertical Two Stage Capacity Speed Total Head Discharge Pressure Temperature Efficiency Minimum Flow Brake Horsepower 5300 GPM 1750 RPM 198 Feet 75 PSIG 804F 85.5%
160 GPM 308 C.
Materials Used In Containment Recirculation And Reactor Cavit Coolers and Pi in 1.
Pipe Containment ventilation spec.
125-1 for 8" and 2-1/2" Seamless or welded carbon steel-ASTM A53-64, grade B,
type S or E, schedule 40.
2.
Fittings 3
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Carbon steel, ASTM A234, grade WPC, schedule 40, butt weld.
Joints Butt weld, flange-1505 raised faced weld neck, forged steel ASTM A181, grade 1.
4.
Gaskets 1/8" neoprene, full face with bolt holes.
5.
Stud Bolts 6.
7.
ASTM A193-64, grade B7.
Hex Nuts ASTM A194-64, grade 2H.
Valves Rating 1505 Ends-butt weld Construction OS&Y Body ASTM A216, grade WCB Bonnet Bolted Stem ASTM A182, grade Trim Stainless steel disc nickel/alloy body seat 8.
,Reactor Compartment Coils Finned type tubes, 5/8" copper, 0.035" thick, 150 psig with 0 psig external, 90 psig external with 0 psig internal.
9.
Containment Recirculation Fan Cooler Coils Same as item 8 above.
Service Water S stem Zeaka e Ex erience There has been no detectable service water system leaks within the Ginna Plant containment building during the plant 11 year operating history.
- Further, the complete service water system was hydro tested in 1978 as a part of the 10 year inservice inspection program.
There were no leaks during this test.
Tests were recently (November 1980)
7 performed on the containment building recirculation fan cooling units using a fluorescein dye and black light to detect. possible leaks.
The fan coolers were tested one at a time and at which time the discharge valve was closed with the inlet valve fully open causing a trapped pressure of approximately 80'sig.
There were no leaks found in any of the units.
E.
Histor And T es Of Re airs To Containment Coolers And Service Water Pi in S stems F.
There is no history of repairs to coolers and service water piping systems within the containment building except for preventative maintenance.
Containment Buildin Fire S stem Descri tion At the request of the NRC a hose reel fire system has recently been installed in the containment, building.
This system is supplied by Lake Ontario water from the normal turbine building fire system through a 4" line that penetrates the containment building.
An air operated gate valve (AOV) located in the 4" line just outside of the containment penetration is normally closed and is designed to'ail close on the loss of the instrument air.
This valve is remotely controlled from the control room where it alarms when the l
valve is in the open position.
- However, should a containment isolation signal be generated, the valve will close.
Just upstream of the air operated valve is a manual operated gate valve that is normally open and which is alarmed in the control room when not, in the full open position.
Also, just
inside the containment penetration on the subject 4" line is another manual gate valve which is normally open and alarms in the control room when not in the full open position.
The manual gate valve outside of containment is a backup isolation valve to the air operated gate valve should the need arise to deenergize the containment fire system.
Inside of the containment building the 4" fire line feeds I
six hose reels of which two are on each of the major eleva-tions.
At each hose reel there is a gate valve which is normally closed thus, it requires manual action to energize each fire hose.
The containment fire system is rated at 125 psig and was hydro tested completely including the hoses at 200 psig on October 29, 1980 with satisfactory results.
This system will be maintained dry between the AOV and the hose reel stations during normal operation.
G.
Materials Used In Containment Fire S stem 1.
Pipe Seamless black steel, ASTM A53 or 106, grade B, type S
or E, ANSI B36.10, schedule 40, threaded ends.
Other (cross feed mains) seamless or welded carbon steel, ASTM A53 grade B, type S or E, schedule 40.
2..
Fittings S Joints 2-1/2" and larger-wrought carbon steel, ASTM A234, grade
- WPC, ANSI B16.9, butt weld, standard weight.
2"
,and smaller - forged carbon steel, ASTM A105, grade II, ANSI B16.11, socket weld; 20005 class.
3.
Gaskets Asbsetos, full face with bolt holes, for OSSY valves.
4.
Stud Bolts t
Carbon steel, ASTM A-193, grade B7, NC threads.
5.
Hex Nuts Carbon steel, ASTM A-194, grade 2H, heavy pattern, NC
'threads.
6.
Flanges 2-1/2" and larger-forged steel, flat face weld neck, ASTM A-181, grade 1,
1505 class.
2-1/2" and smaller-forged carbon steel, ASTM A-105, grade II, socket weld, 1505 class.
7 ~
Gate Valves (all but. air operated)
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.Dresser Manufacturing Division,'odel M&H, style 81-02, OSSY, listed by UK, approved by Factory Mutual for fixe
- service, cold water working pressure 175 psig, hydro test to 350 psig, cast iron body, bronze trim, flanged ends.
8.
Air Operated Gate Borg Warner-4",
1505 carbon steel, butt weld, bolted
ASME SA-105.
9.
Check Valve Borg Warner-4",
ASME SA-105.
- 10.-
H.
Containment Fire S stem Leaka e Ex erience Passed 200 psig hydro test on October 29, 1980.
J.
Histor And T es Of Re airs To Containment Fire S stems None.
K.
Instrumentation And Procedures In Place To Detect Lea'ka e
Ieak detection within the R. E. Ginna Plant containment building is assured by several schemes available to the operators.
Several procedures are in place to aid the operator in locating a leak.
An immediate indication of containment recirculation fan leakage is the "containment fan cooler collection system".
Each.fan cooler has a demister which condenses moisture from the air volume passing through the fan plenum and directs it I
to a collection drain in the floor within the plenum.
The drain line is a measured volume terminating in the basement of the containment building at a remote controlled shutoff valve.
At the base of each drain column is a differential transmitter which measures the height of water in the measured column and transmits this height to an indicator on the control board.
At a predetermined
- height, 10%, the system alarms in the control room on "high alarm."
At 80% the "high-high" alarm is activated and at which time the operator will note the time and volume indicated and record these readings on the daily leakage log.
The operator will then open the'ump valve at the base of the drain collection
- system, drain the column to sump "A" (and ultimately to the
11-waste holdup tank) until fully drained, then close the valve.
Each of these fan coolers has a system of this type but, since each drain system has a different piping configura-tion, the volume at, the alarm point is different.
The volume of each of the fans is as follows:
1A fan cooler 1B fan cooler 1C fan cooler 1D fan cooler 2.13 gallons
~
2.11 gallons 2.14 gallons 2.87 gallons Daily a calculation is made using the number of dumps per unit times the gallons per dump for each unit to determine leakage accumulation.
The transmitters, indicators and alarm set points are calibrated at each refueling (once a
year).
Leaks outside of the containment recirculation fan cooler plenums collect in the floor drain system.
The floor drain system exists at four major elevations in the containment building with reactor sump "A" being the final collection point for the system.
Two pumps at the floor of sump "A" provide the means for water removal should there exist a significant water level.
Automatic start capability for these pumps is provided by a "float" level detection system.
An automatic start of either pump alarms and annunciates in the control room, on the control board.
"On-off" indicating lights for each pump provides the operator the information of which pump or if both pumps are running.
Additionally, the computer alarms, records the time of pump start and stop
12 and identifies the running pump(s).
Again, this information P
is recorded by the operator on the daily leakage log.
At each refueling, the sump "A" pumps are calibrated for auto start and stop'and each of the redundant sump "high level" alarms are calibrated.
The "A" pump is calibrated to start at a water level of 26" above the floor and stop at 17".
The "B" pump is set to start at 30" and stop at 17".
Both "high level" alarms are set at 40" above floor level.
In addition to the leakage detection system described
- above, two level transmitters with a span of 0-30 feet transmit.
sump level information to an indicator in the control room.
The power supply for these systems is supplied from an emergency safeguar'ds bus.
This system is also calibrated at each refueling.
Sump "B" is another possible leakage collection point. It is unlikely, however, that any significant leakage would accumulate in this sump before sump "A" since it is not connected to the containment building floor drain system.
The level indicating system in sump "B" manufactured by the Gem Co. consists of the "Bell" reed switch-sliding float system which activates indicator lights in the control room at 6", 55" 114" 173",
and 232".
A "high level" alarm annunciates in the control room at 6" above the floor.
Sump "B" level indication and alarm system is redundant and checked at each refueling.
Another method of detecting leakage within the containment building is with the dew point detectors.
There are six dew point detectors located throughout the building.
One detector is located 6'bove the basement floor, one 6'bove the intermediate floor, one 6'bove the operating floor, one 8'bove the operating flo'or, one 25'bove the operating floor and one 30'bove the operating floor.
These dew point detectors are calibrated for a range of +2'F to 142'F once each refueling.
The detector readings are transmitted to a recording indicator in the containment building integrated leak rate test panel located in the intermediate building at elevation 253'.
These readings are noted and recorded once every eight hours.
Procedures in place for detecting leakage are discussed in Section IIC.
Provisions For Testin Isolation Valves In Accordance With A endix J.
10CFR50 The manual isolation butterfly valves for the containment building recirculation fans described in Section B are not presently being tested in accordance with Appendix J 10CFR50.
- Recently, EWR (Engineering Work Request) 3258 was submitted for a study to be performed to determine a means to modify these systems to improve their testing capability.
II.
Actions Re ired For Plants With O en Coolin Water S stems Inside Containment Res onse To Item 2 of IEB 80-24 IEB 80-24 was received by the RG&E while the plant was at scheduled shutdown to perform routine maintenance and steam generator inspection.
Recognizing the impact of the bulletin on normal operating procedures in the event that the Ginna Plant was not in compliance, a "pre-critical" staff meeting was held prior to start-up by the Plant Operating Review Committee (PORC) on December 1,
1980 to discuss IEB 80-24.
In particular, items A through D of 2 were discussed.
Since the Ginna Plant's existing procedures and surveillance meet the requirements of these items, it was PORC's recommenda-tion that no additional or interim surveillance measures were necessary.
Slight changes to existing procedures have been made to incorporate necessary clarification.
The following context is an item by item response to 2 of IEB 80-24.
A.
Redundant Means.of Detectin and Prom tl Alertin Control Room 0 erators Of A Si ificant Accumulation Of Water In Containment The Ginna Plant containment has two sumps, sump "A" and sump "B", each with level detection systems.
Any significant level in either sump would provide the operator with knowledge of water accumulation in the containment.
Sump "B" is a shallower sump, with a floor elevation of 227'.
As described in section K of I, a "Gem" level detection system is used in sump "B" to provide indication and alarm to the control room.
This system is a redundant system in
15 that there are two separ'ate channels of indication and alarm powered by an emergency battery backed instrument bus.
Sump "A", at elevation 205', is at the lowest elevation in the containment building and is designed to be the first.
source of leakage indication since all building floor drains are di'rected to this sump.
There are two separate redundant level detection systems in sump "A".
One redundant level detection system utilizes sump pump start, running time and a high level alarm for leakage detection.
The other redundant level detection system measures water level from the bottom of the sump through a range up to 30 feet in height.
A detailed description of these systems is given in section K of I.
B.. Verif Existence Of Positive Means For Control Room 0 erators I
To Determine Flow From Containment Sum s Procedure S-12.4.
"Reactor Coolant System Surveillance Record Instructions" (attachment A) describes the steps to be taken by the control room operator to determine the amount of water discharged from the containment building.
Briefly the flow rate of the pumps is determined by measuring the interval between pump actuations and substituting this value into a formula provided in S-12.4.
Although there is no pump in sump "B", it is a small volume sump compared to sump "A".
Any significant amount of water directed toward this sump quickly fills the sump and overflows.
The overflow is diverted to sump "A" through the floor drain system.
From sump "A" a flow and volume determination is made
~ ~
16 C.
as described, in procedure S-12.4.
The level detection system of sump "B" enables the operator to closely approximate the volume of water in sump "B" but, more significantly, the sump "B" alarms would alert the operator of a leak in sump "B" K
vicinity and of an=-impending activation of sump "A" pumps.
In the worst case it is possible to bring the reactor to cold
- shutdown, open up the flow path to the reactor coolant drain tank suction piping from sump "B".
The discharge from these pumps can be pumped to the waste hold-up tank.
- A level detec-tion system on the waste hold-up tank used in conjunction with a calibrated level versus volume curve provides the necessary information to determine the amount of liquid discharge from the containment building sump "B".
Verif't Least Monthl Surveillance Procedures with A
ro riate 0 eratin Limitations to Assure Plant 0 erators have at Least Two Methods of Determinin Water Level in each Location Where Water Ma Accumulate The Ginna Plant Technical Specifications require the plant operators to monitor the reactor coolant system (RCS) for leakage.
The Technical Specifications specify a very low C
leakage limit and require an investigation within four hours H
in the event of an observation that would indicate a
"significant amount of leakage".
The tech specs provide parameter action levels for five detection methods including sump pump actuations, humidity detection (dew point) and condensate collection system operation.
To comply with the specifications, procedure S-12.4 RCS Leakage Surveillance Record Instructions (attachment A) is
implemented at least once every twenty-four hours.
This procedure provides calculation steps necessary for each of the leakage detection methods and requires operator action and observations to be recorded.
Calculations of parameters are related,to action levels in the procedure and the required actions necessary are described.
I The procedure provides for calculation of leakage flow rate by comparison of temperature changes between dew point temperature, lake water temperature and containment building air temperature.
Also included is the calculation method for utilizing the condensate collection system for leakage detection.
In the event that the leakage is greater than the capability of the condensate collection system, or if the leakage is remote from the 'condensate collection system,
. the Sump "A" level detection and collection systems are utilized to determine the leakage rate and amount.
Pro-cedure S-12.4 describes the calculation method and the actions required'when employing the sump A system for leakage detections.
Emergency procedure E-38, "Loss of Service Water", describes the required operator action once it has been determined that service water system leakage is inside containment.
Review Leaka e Detection S stems and Procedures and Provide Abilit to Prom tl Detect Water Leaka e in Containment and to Isolate the Leakin Com onents or S stem All leak detection systems within the containment were reviewed and include the following:
18 2.
3.
5.
sump "A" level switches for pump start and high level alarms sump "A" level indication sump "B" level lights and alarms containment fan cooler level collection transmitter dew point sensors Each of the above systems including any associated indicators are calibrated at each refueling in accordance with a calibra-tion procedure (CP).
Service water isolation procedures are not written for specific coolers of the service water system,
- however, a service water loop header isolation procedure is in place.
In all cases once a cooling component of the service water system is identified as leaking, it can be isolated by simply closing the inlet and I
outlet manual service water isolation valves.
There is yet to be a procedure written for isolation of the fire system.
As mentioned previously, the fire system is a newly installed system and work is still being done t'o com-plete the alarm, indication and control portions of the system.
Until such time (Scheduled for completion in February
- 81) that the fire system is turned over to the "operations" department, all valves are closed and the system inside con-tainment.is inoperative.
The manual isolation valve upstream of the fire line penetration is locked closed with administra-tive constraint (red tag-hold closed).
In an extreme emergency, and after administrative clearance; all valves could be opened manually including the air operated control valve to energize the containment building fire system.
E.
If measures Described in A throu h D Above are not Im lemented, Conduct Interim Surveillance Measures.
The R. E. Ginna Plant. meets the requirements of A through D
of section 2 above and it has been concluded that interim surveillance measures are not needed at this time.
F.
Establish Procedures to Notif the NRC of An Service Water S stem Leaks Within Containment Via a S ecial Licensee Event
~Re art Previous to the issuance of IEB 80-24, the Ginna Plant exist-ing facilities and procedures generally satisfied the new requirements of 'the Bulletin.
A few procedure changes were necessary for complete compliance.
Administrative procedures A-25, "Reporting of Unusual Plant Conditions,"
and A-25.1, "Ginna Station Event Report",
have been revised to include a 24-hour report and a 14 day written report to the NRC as a special licensee event report for service water leaks inside of containment.
These changes were initiated by Procedure Change Notices (PCN) number 80-2048 and 2049, respectively.
Surveillance procedure S-12.2, "Operator Action in the Event, of Indication of Significant Increase in Leakage",
was revised by PCN number 2047.
This procedure directs the operator to have a chemist take a sample of the discharge of the sump pumps upon an increase in operating frequency.
The chemist will determine the source of the water and the operator will take appropriate action to stop the leak.
- 20 Alarm Response Procedure AR/C-18, "Containment Sump "A" Pump Auto Start",
has been modified by Procedure Change Notifica-tion (PCN) number 80-2024 to include a step that directs the operator to check the "A" sump level indicators if pump operation is longer than normal.
- Also, a statement has been added to the procedure stating that "In the event that either the detection or removal systems become inoperable, it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures instituted.
Alarm Response Procedure AR/C-19 "Containment Sump "A" Hi Level" has been modified by Procedure Change Notice (PCN) number 80-2025 to include a step instructing the operator to check sump "A" level indicators if pump operation is longer than normal.
- Also, a statement has been included in this procedure stating that "In the event either the detection or removal systems become inoperable, it is recommended that continued power operation be limited to seven days and added surveillance measures be instituted".
Procedure S-12.3, "Operator Action for Significant Leakage that Cannot be Located", instructs the operator to monitor systems until such time that the leakage source becomes obvious and the necessary, repairs are made.
Included in the procedure is a log sheet for hourly entries of tank levels necessary to determine leak location.
One step in the evaluation of leakage events at Ginna, is consideration for the capabilities of handling the liquid discharge from Containment.
Since the waste evaporator capacity is low
(less than 2 gpm), leakage rates on the'order of 1.0 gpm warrant evaluation and possible containment, entry depending upon the circumstances of the leak.
Procedure AR/C-20, "Containment Sump B Hi Level" has been revised to instruct the operator to take the following actions upon activation of a hi-level alarm in sump B:
Observe level indications for sump B and sump A.
2.
. Check for system leakage increase from procedure S-12.4 3.
5.
previous status'nd document review in official leakage log.
Check sump B suction valves closed.
Write Trouble Report to have sump B pumped out at next refueling.
Complete procedure A-25.1, Ginna Station Special Event Report.
III. For Plants with Closed Coolin Water S stems.Inside of Containment Provide a Summar of Ex erience with Coolin Water S stem Leaka e into Containment The component cooling water system is the one closed cooling water system inside containment at the R. E. Ginna Plant.
This system provides cooling to the reactor coolant pump
- bearings, thermal barrier and oil cooler, the reactor support pads and the nonregenerative heat exchanger.
The component cooling water surge tank has a level indication system with level readout and alarm in the control room.
Any significant leak in the system would quickly be detected.
There is 'no history of any leaks inside of containment in this e
- system, additionally, the system was satisfactorily hydro-tested during the refueling outage of 1979.
ATTACHMENT A ROCHESTER GAS AND EZECTRIC CORPORATION GINNA STATION CONTROLLED COPY NUMBER PROCEDURE NO.
S-12.4 REV. NO.
RCS LEAKAGE SURVEIZLANCE RECORD INSTRUCTIONS TECHNICAZ REVIEW PORC Q/C REVIEW DATE APPROVED FOR USE PLANT SUPERINTENDENT DATE QA NON-QA CATEGORY A-3 THIS PROCEDURE CONTAINS 8
PAGES I IFETIME REVIEWED BY NONPERMANENT DATE REC.
CENTRAL RECORDS DATE DESP.
DATE
S-12.4:1 S-12.4 RCS LEAKAGE SURVEILLANCE RECORD INSTRUCTIONS
1.0 PURPOSE
. 1.2 2.0 To provide instructions for use of the Reactor Coolant System leakage. Surveillance
- Record, Form 49-61.
To ensure proper leak rate documentation.
REFERENCES:
2.1 3.0 1echnical Specifications, Section 3.1.5
~Leaka e
INITIALCONDITIONS:
3.1 4.0 The Reactor Coolant System Leakage Surveillance Record shall be maintained whenever the reactor is at 5 percent power or above.
PRECAUTIONS:
4.1 5.0 5.1 5.2 The RCS leakage surveillance record should be maintained at. hot shutdown or above, if possible.
INSTRUCTIONS:
l I '1 An entry must be made in the leak rate columns of the RCS leakage Surveillance Record at least, once a day. If there is no auto make-up on a particular day, a calculated entry is to be made.
This is to document that a check has been made to determine that the leak rate is within specifica-tions each day.
Containment Particulate - R11 5.2.1 5.2.2 5.2.3 5.3 At 1200 and 2400 HRS, log the average for the previous 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and perform the necessary calculations.
To calculate the GPM leakage, follow the formula provided, using the 2400 hour0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br /> average readings.
Obtain the krypton 88 activity from Health Physics Department.
If R-11 i's out of service, particulate filter from R-10-A may be counted in the laboratory to determine if there is a significant change in leak rate.
Containment Gas R12 5.3.1 At 1200 and 2400 HRS, log the average for the previous 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> and perform the necessary calculations.
S-12.4:2 5.3.2 5.4 5.4.1 1
To calculate the GPM leakage, follow the formula provided using the 2400 hour0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br /> average readings.
Obtain the Xenon 133 activity from Health Physics Department.
System Inventory Reasons for Addition:
5.4.1.1 A - Auto Make-up 5.4.1.2 B - Borate 5.4.1.3 D - Dilution 5.4.2 Diversions 5.4.2.1 Log Y-Yes or N-No 5.4.3 Gallons Added 5.4.3.1 Log the number of gallons added from the RMW and B.A.
integrators.
5.4.4 Calculated Ieak Rate 5.4.4.1 Obtain this from the change in level of the VCT if no diversion. It can be calculated using the following formula:
Level 12 al. 1' Additions in al. durin time eriod Tame (In Minutes) between level readings 5.4.4.2 Valve LCV-112A can be switched to VCT position to calculate a leak rate.
5.4.4.3 In the above formula 12 gal./1% is generally the con-servative number used for the leak rate calculation.
If an exact number is necessary, refer to Attachment I and II of this procedure.
CAUTION:
When LCV-112A is in VCT position, DO NOT let VCT go above 70 percent.
5.4.5 Identified leak rate 5.4.5.1 This, is the sum of the leak rates calculated from the
- CPLR, and any other known leak rates.
5.4.6 5.4.6.1 Unidentified leak rate This is the difference in leak rates between the cal-culated leak rate and the identified leak rate.
S-12.4:3 5.4.6.2 At 0000 and, 2400 hours0.0278 days <br />0.667 hours <br />0.00397 weeks <br />9.132e-4 months <br />, log the complete RMW and B.A.
Integrator Readings.
Also, calculate the total number of gallons added to the system.
Divide this total by 1400 to calculate the GPM unless diversion has occurred.
5.5 5.5.1 5.5.2 5.5.3 5.6 5.6.1 5.6.2 5.6.3 5.6.4 5.6.5 5.7 5.7.1 5.7.2 Leakage from identified areas During each shift, log the leak rates in GPM from the PRT,
- RCDT, CPLR, and any other identified leakages, if large enough to be calculated.
If a change is evident, take pressurizer relief tank temperature, pressure and level twice per eight-hour shift.
In 'addition to the above, any time the PRT is drained, filled, or vented, take a complete set of. read-ings and record time of the event.
If a change is evident, maintain a RCDT pump operation data sheet containing the following information:
- Date, pump start time, elapsed time between pump starts, and GPM leakage into tank.
The GPM leakage may be determined by dividing the elapsed time in minutes into 56 gallons.
56 gallons is,the amount of water pumped from the tank per auto operation by the 1A RCDT pump.,
Containment Dewpoint Temperature
,II Log the recorder temperatures once per shift.
The average dewpoint is self-explanatory.
The change in-dewpoint average is the difference between the current average and the previous average.
An in-crease in the average dewpoint temperature is identified by a (+) positive sign; a decrease is identified by a
(-) negative sign.
To calculate the moisture gain or loss, refer to the tables of dewpoint temperatures
('F) vs. containment moisture (gal.).
(These tables are located in the control room RCS leakage surveillance log book.)
Find the average dewpoint temperature and take the difference between the readings in gallons.
To calculate the GPM, divide the moisture gain or loss in gallons by 480 minutes.
This provides the leak rate.
A decrease in moisture in containment is signified by a negative (-) sign and an increase is shown by a positive
(+) sign.
Containment Temperature Log the recorder temperatures once per shift.
The average temperature is self-explanatory.
S-12.4:4 5.7.3 5.8 5.8.1 5.8.2 5.9 Calculation of the temperature difference is self-explanatory.
Zake temperature Log the temperature once per shift.
The temperature difference calculations are self-explanatory.
Containment.
Pressure'.9.1 Record the pressure once per shift from PI-944 located in the Control Room.
5.10 5.10.1 Containment Condensate Collectors.
Log the time, and drain the Condensate Collector that annunciates on hi-hi alarm.
5.10.2 5.10.3 5.10.4 5.10.5 5.10.6 5.11 5.11.1 An increase in frequency of Hi-Hi alarm with an increase of containment particulate activity could indicate in-creased RCS leakage into containment..
A change in frequency of Hi-Hi alarms can also be caused by a change in the lake temperature.
If the condensate collector alarms are occurring fre-quently and the cause has been identified as non-radio-active water, their usefulness in detecting a small leak from the primary system will be masked by the large amount of water being dumped.
Therefore, the dump valves may be left open and the Sump A actuations be used to calculate the total water inventory and track for any increase in leakage.
If it is desired to continue recording actuation times after a column has been filled, a fifth column is provided for that purpose.
Indicate in'parentheses the number of the applicable condensate collector.
Total fluid released is calculated by summing the number of dumps of each unit inserted into the formula provided on the log sheet.
The GPM is calculated by dividing the total by 1440.
Containment Sump.Pump Actuations The interval between the last two actuations
'is the time, difference between actuations.
5.11.2 Log the date and time of the last pump actuation.
S-12.4:5 If no actuations occured that day, omit the remainder of the steps.
- Otherwise, log the time and date of the present pump actuation.
.The calculation of the interval between pump actuations is self-explanatory.
An increase or decrease in pump actuation time is cal-culated by substitutions into the formula provided.
The GPM is calculated according to formula provided.
~
~
Rochester Ges end Electr(c Costerotlon G)XXASTATIOX UXITgl HCS LEAKAGESIIRVEILLAXCEHECQRC SECTION A
'YSTEhl INVENTORY Oate Re(sr le S IS,J ter trssrecrtere
~ (ME esse NCADINO eA NCAOINO ssc e0 0
CALLONS ADDCO RA Aero CALCULATCD LCAIC NATC IOCNT LCAN NATC UNIDCN'r I CAN NATC RNV INT'CCRATDR FULt. CA'INTCCRATOR 2600 HR5 ~
0000 HR5.
TOTAL CA(,LONSI 20 HR LCACACC RATC, IF NO OIVCRSIOH TOTAL CAL
'I060 2600 HR5.
0000 HRS.
+
CFN SECTION IS
'EAKAGE FROM IDENTIFIED AREAS sss ATI IIIIIT ~ I ITIVE T
~
Is 55 0 I ss AT INIA
~
RCHARKSr SECTION C
CONTAINMENTCONDENSATE COLLECTORS SECTION 0
COHTAIHMEHTSUMP PUMP ACTUATIOHS oessr TlIIC I000 Durst ts ls 0 I00 I 04rr Tlss 0 lose 04ssr 0IIIC lees DU ISSI TINC I
I TOTAI. FLUID RCT At 0 TD 5466 ~ A I~ CJRRCHT IHTCRVAL HRS 2, LA57 FUNF ACTUATIONI OATC TINC 5
Sll ll ls Sll l
t000(~ (2.(SI i tctl(~ O.(It ~
2, FRCSCHT FUII~ ACTUATION DATC TINC 0, NCN INTCRVAL HR$,,
TISSC
~
~
'1002 (~ (2.16l ~
1005(~ g.ttt e TOTAL a
- 5. 5TCF 0 5TCF I
% IHCRCASC 5TCF I (1001 ~
OR Cs OCCRC*5C 0, CFN ~ (00 CAL.'ACTUATION)(
I Ne STct ~
I 2 so NIN I TOTAI.
"~
RCNARKSI
, (0.6567)
CQNTA(NMKNTOE)N
$$OINT Rtcoxott ro)HT YESTtROAY CARRYOVER SECTION E
~F AVE
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~OOK ro<< NOIS TO)IX VALUX5 N0'7 0 r.N CNA<<ot reo<<
~KRVIOUS TRICK SHIFT 1 SHIFT 2 SHIFT 3 xtcototR roINT Yt5TRROAY CARRYOVER COHTAIHA(EHT 7
8 TEA(PERATIIRE 9
10
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,IF TEA(P.
r osre i 01 CON'7AIN<<t<<7
~etllUAC NI~ ere WCO SHIFT 1 SHIFT 2 SHIFT 3 Rt)IARKSI 1 ~ Tt5TSROAT'5 2500 HR. AYC TOOAT'5 )200 HR AYC SECTION
'F'OHTAIHS(EHT PARTICIILATES Rll R10-A ia service Yos Ho olrrt et<<ct ntr 1. 57tr I)
- 2. (
STtr 1 P
0
- TOOAT'5 1 00 HR, AVC 5
TODAl 5 14XI HR AVC
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)
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~
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(
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COHTAIH)SEHT GAS R'12 1, TR5TSROAT'5 ll00 HR, AYC 2, TOOAY'5 1200 HR. AVC o)rrttt<<ct STtr 1 STtr I)
(
STtr I
)
(1001 'e
") (1001
~
- TOOAY'5 1100 Hto AYC
$, TOOAY'5'2l00 HR. AYC olrrtat<<ct ntr 5 -STtr A 1
(
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(
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ICrN. 0ACXCROUNO Cr<<I 1).n e ) 0 SI A
IICeCC Xt<<ON 122 IN itAC OR COOLANT RRHARKSI OR Q INC (AN)
~I otC
'5 UIC OR (r<<)
re OtC I 1).nalo 5) crw RXSULTSA TSST RRVIt<<
OATt O,A,
~ Ilee Pe<<revere Reve(ver Cee<<el ReeetA Dleree<<lee Oeee Ore(IIy CAAIrel Rerl~
P.
S-12.4 UOZ UME CONTROZ TANK Lpg'F 1'K.P c)2 3.0" l3'.4.3 I
Le.vc.t..TAP Sphere Cylinder O2 H2 V=nH(+
)
8 6-'
= D
.7854.j 2
2 13 43 (65.4
~ 13
~ 43
)
8 6
V = 65.4
.7854
.82 '
= 42.19 (534.65
+ 30.06)
V = 23825 cu. inches
= 13.79.cu. ft.
Gallons
= 7.48052 (cu. ft.)
= 7.48052 (13.79)
= 104.16 gallons V = 275461 Cu. inches
=
159.4 cu. ft..
= 7.48052 (159.4 cu. ft.)
= 1192..39 gallons Gallons/Inch
= 14.54.
4
Total Volume of Tank =
- 13. 79 ft3 = '03. 16.gal.
3 =
13.79 ft3 =
103.16 gal.
159.4 ft
= 1192.29 gal.
186.98 ft
= 1398.71 gal.
Level Indicator 0
10 20 30
.40
- 50 60 70 80 90 100 Gallons in Tank 146.780 257.284 367.788 478.292 588.796 699.300 809.804 920.308 1030.812 1141.316 1251.820 1105.04 Gallons Gallons/% Level Change
= 11.25 Gallons
Table 1
Lake Ontario Typical Chemical Content Parameters Ammonia Nitrogen Organic Nitrogen Total Hardness Ortho Phosphate Total Phosphate Dissolved Oil Alkalinity Silica Sulfate Conductivity Sodium Iron Copper
~1 0-0.15 ppm 0-0.25 ppm 100-175 ppm 0-.10 ppm 0-.10 ppm 0-10 ppm 50-125 ppm 0.1-1.0 ppm 20-45 ppm 250-400 umohs 10-25 ppm 0.01-0.70 ppm 0.01-0.20 ppm 0.01-0.03 ppm 30-50 ppm 0.002-0.020 ppm 5-10 ppm 2'-4 ppb 15-40 ppm
.05-.30 ppm 50-100 ppb
<100 ppb
I