ML17258A421

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Forwards Draft Evaluation of SEP Topic III-7.B, Design Codes,Design Criteria & Loading Combinations. Response to Liner Plate Integrity Problem Requested in 30 Days
ML17258A421
Person / Time
Site: Ginna Constellation icon.png
Issue date: 12/30/1981
From: Crutchfield D
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To: Maier J
ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
Shared Package
ML17258A423 List:
References
TASK-03-07.B, TASK-3-7.B, TASK-RR LSO5-81-12-101, NUDOCS 8201110006
Download: ML17258A421 (14)


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( I December 30, 1981 Docket No. 50-244 LS05 12-101 Mr. John E. Maier, Yice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

Dear Hr. Maier:

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SUBJECT:

SYSTBSTIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC III-7.B, DESIGN CODES, 1

DESIGN CRITERIA, AND LOADING COMBINATIONS - R. E.

GINNA Enclosed is a copy of our draft evaluation of SEP Topic III-7.B and our contractor's reports which form the basis for our SER.

You are requested to examine the IfIacts upon which the staff has based its evaluation and respond either by confirming that the facts are correct or by identifying errors and supplying the corrected information.

The SER identifies areas of codes where changes have occurred to decrease margins of safety.

It also identifies possible liner plate integrity problems due to a thermal discontinuity.

You should review how these codes were applied in the design of Ginna and assess the safety margins where code changes have been identified as potent)ally significant.

>le encourage you to supply any other material that might affect the staff's evaluation or be significant in the integrated assessment of your facility.

Your response to the liner plate integrity problem is requested in 30 days.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

As stated cc w/enclosure:

See next page 820fii0006 Sii230 PDR ADDCK 05000244 P,

PDR,J I'ennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing

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Nr. John E. Haier CC Harry H. Yoigt, Esquire LeBoeufLamb, Leiby and MacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.

W.

Suite 1100 Washington D. C.

20036 Nr. Hichael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attor ney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York New York 10047 Resident Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

NRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Conmission Washington, D. C.

20555 Director, Bureau of Nuclear Operations State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West

Ontario, New York 14519 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington',

D. C.

20555

tr SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC III-7.B R.

E.

GINNA TOPIC:

III-7.B, DESIGN CODES, DESIGN CRITERIA AND LOADING COMBINATIONS I.

INTRODUCTION SEP plants were generally designed and constructed during the time span from the late 1950's to late 1960's.

They were designed according to criteria and codes which differ from those accepted by the NRC for new pl ants.

The purpose of this topic is to assess the safety margins existing in Category I'structures as a result of changes in design codes and criteri a.

II.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The current licensing criteria which governs the safety issue in this topic is 10 CFR 50, Appendix A, GDC 1, 2, and 4 as interpreted by Standard Review Plan 3.8.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS The following SEP topics are related to III-7.B:

l.

I!I-2, Wind and Tornado Loadings 2.

III-3.A, Effects of High Water'nd Level on Structures 3.

III-4.A, Tornado Missiles 4.

III-5.A, Effects of High Energy Pipe Breaks Inside Containment 5.

III-5.B, Effects of High Energy Pipe Breaks Outside Containment 6.

III-6, Seismic Design Considerations 7.

V I-2.D, Mass and Energy Release for Postulated Pipe Break Inside Containment IV.

'VALUATION The evaluation is based on a Technical Evaluation Report (TER) prepared by the Franklin Research Center (FRC) in conjunction with the NRC staff through contract.

The report is entitled, "Design Codes, Design Criteria and Loading Combinations" and is attached to this Safety Evaluation Report as Enclosure, (1).

0

~ I We have compared structural design codes employed in the design of Category I structures at Ginna to present codes.

This was done through generic code versus code comparison without investigating specifically how the original code was applied to the Ginna design; however, after reviewing drawings of structures at Ginna, we concluded that certain portions of the codes were not applicable to Ginna because the types of structures to which the codes are referring were non-existent at Ginna.

We have compared the loads and loading combinations employed in the design of Ginna as described in the Ginna FSAR to those required today.

A result of these'omparisons is that a number of code changes could potentially impact significantly margins of safety (denoted by scale A and Ax in Enclosure 1).

This can be attributed to several factors such as:

1)

New codes have imposed stricter limitations than old, 2)

New codes have included sections governing-design of certain types of structures which were not included in the older codes, 3)

Design loads required today were not included in the plant design, and 4)

Certain load combinations judged to be significant were not included in plant design.

In Enclosure (1),

some items have been judged to potentially impact margins of safety regarding the containment as a result of comparing ACI 318-63 to ASME BPV Section 3, Division 2.

These items are discussed in Section ll of the report.

One item, cc-3421.5 of the BPV Code, Sec-tion III, Division 2, 1980, is not significant based upon the additional information contained in Enclosure (2).

The code changes of concern from Enclosure (1) are:

(See next page)

Structural Elements to be Examined Code Chan e Affectin These Elements New Code Old Code Beams a.

Composite Beams AISC 1980 AISC 1963 1.

Shear connectors in composite beams 1.11. 4 1 11.4 2.

Composite beams or girders with formed steel deck

1. 11. 5 b.

Hybrid Girders Stress in flange Com ression Elements With width-to-thickness ratio higher than speci-fied in 1.9.1. 2

1. 10. 6 AISC 1980 1.9.1. 2 and Appendix C
1. 10. 6 AISC 1963 1.9.1 Tension Members When load is transmitted by bolts or rivets AZSC 1980 1.14. 2. 2 AZSC 1963 Connections AISC 1980 AZSC 1963 a.

Beam ends with top flange coped, if subject to shear

1. 5. l. 2. 2 b.

Connections carrying moment or restrained member connection

1. 15. 5. 2
l. 15. 5. 3 1 15 5.4
  • Double dash

(

) indicates that no provisions were provided in the older code.

Structural Elements to be Examined Code Chan e Affectin These Elements New Code Old Code Members Desi ned to 0 crate in an Inelastic Re ime Spacing of lateral bracing Short Brackets and Corbels having a shear span-to-.

depth ratio of unity or less Shear Walls used as a

primary load-carrying member AISC 1980 2..9 ACI 349-76

11. 13 ACI 349-76
11. 16 AISC 1963 2.8 ACI 318"63 ACI 318-63 Precast Concrete Structural
Elements, where shear is not a member of diagonal tension ACZ 349-76 ll.15 ACI 318-63 Concrete Re ions Sub'ect to Hi h Tem eratures ACI 349-76 ACI 318-63 TimeMependent and position-dependent temperature variations Appendix A Columns with Spliced Reinforcement subject to stress reversals; fy in compression to 1/2 fy, in tension Steel Embedments used to transmit load to concrete Containment and Other Elements transmittin In-lane shear ACI 349-76
7. 10. 3 ACI 349-76 Appendix B BaPV Code Section IZI, Div. 2, 1980 CC-3421.5 ACI 318-63 805 ACI 318-63 ACI 318-63 Re ion of shell carrying concentrated forces normal to the shell surface (see case study 13 for details)

B&PV Code, Section IZZ, Div. 2, 1980 CC-3421. 6 ACZ'18-63 1707

Structural Elements to be Examined Code Chan e Affectin These Elements New Code Old Code Be ion of shell under torsion BQPV Code Section III<

Div. 2, 1980 CC-3421. 7 ACI 318-63 921 Elements Sub'ect to Biaxial Tension BSPV Code,Section III, Div. 2, 1980 CC-3532.1.2 ACI 318-63 Brackets and Corbels BaPV Code,Section III, Div. 2, 1980 CC-3421.8 ACI 318-63 Section 10 of Enclosure (1) address load and load combination changes which occurred as a result of code changes and identifies specific plant structures for which various load combinations may be signifi-cant.

Based upon a lack of detailed information on the stress results for loads and load combinations used during design of structures at Ginna, these loads and load combinations may be potentially significant.

Enclosure (2) provides details of a reanalysis of the containment for combined seismic and LOCA loadings which was performed by our contrac-tor, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory.

A major conclusion contained in Enclosure (2) is that the thermal discontinuity which exists in the liner plate at the point where the insulation stops results in high thermal stress for postulated LOCA temperatures and could result in liner buckling or failure.

The discontinuation of the insulation creates a force imbalance in the liner plate due to unequal thermal expansion and possible loss of liner plate integrity.

Further analyses may be performed if the results of Topic VI-2e0 change significantly from those assumed in Enclosure (2).

CONCLUSIONS We conclude that after comparing design codes, criteria, loads and load combinations, a number of changes have occurred which could poten-tially impact margins of safety.

These changes are identified above.

These differences between plant design and current licensing criteria should be resolved as follows:

1)

Review Seismic Category 1 Structures at Ginna to determine if any of the structural elements for which a concern exists are a part of the facility design of Ginna.

For those that are, assess the impact of the code changes on margins of safety on a plant specific

basis, and 2)

Examine on a sampling basis the margins of safety of Seismic Category 1 structures for loads and load combinations not covered by another SEP topic and denoted by Ax in Enclosure (1).

Regarding the ability of the Ginna containment to resist the seismic and LOCA loads described in Enclosure (1) modifications are required to prevent possible loss of liner plate integrity.

GINHA SER ADDENDA - SEP TOPIC III-7.B To be inserted before Section 10.2 in FRC report:

4 Current criteria 'require consideration during plant design of thirteen load combinations for most structures, as shown in the load combination tables.

These specific requirements were not in effect at the time when SEP plants were designed.

Consequently, other sets of load-combinations were used.

In comparing actual and current criteria, an attempt was made to match each of the load combinations actually considered to its nearest counterpart under present requirements.

For example, consider a plant where the SSE was addressed in combination with other loads, but not, in combination with the effects of a LOCA (load combination 13).

The load combination tables would reflect this by showing that load case 9 was addressed, but that load case 13 was not. If six load cases were considered, only six (nearest counterpart) load cases are indicated in the table-not partial fulfillment of all 13.

The scale rankings assigned to loads and load combinations in tables are intended as an appraisal of plant status, with respect to demonstration of

, compliance with current desi gn criteria, based on information available to the NRC prior to the inception of the SEP review.

A number of structurally related SEP topics review some loads and load combinations in detail based upon current calculational methods.

In order that a consistant basis for the tables be maintained, they are based upon load combination considered in the original design of the facility, or in the case of facility modifications, they are based upon the combinations used in the design of the modification.

Loads which were not included in the original design or have increased in magnitude and have not been specifically addressed in another SEP topic should be addressed by the licensee.

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