ML17258A400

Forwards SEP Topic VII-2,ESF Sys Control Logic & Design, Ginna Nuclear Power Plant 1, Informal Rept

ML17258A400
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	12/28/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
Shared Package
ML17258A401	List: ML17258A400 ML17258A402
References
CON-FIN-A-6425-1, TASK-07-02, TASK-7-2, TASK-RR LSO5-81-12-084, LSO5-81-12-84, NUDOCS 8112300017
Download: ML17258A400 (4)

Text

i,.4 December 28, 1981 Docket No. 50-244 LS05-81"12-084 Mr. John E. Maier Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas

& Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649 C

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SUBJECT:

SEP, TOPIC VII-2, ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES (ESF)

SYSTEM CONTROL LOGIC AND BESIGN, SAFETY EVALUATION FOR GINNA Enclosure 1 is our contractor's final technical evaluation of this topic for Ginna.

The comments and additional information provided by your October 23, 1981 letter have been used by our contractor in preparing the

'report.

Enclosure 2 is the staff's revised Safety Evaluation Report on this Topic, Enclosure 2 is based on Enclosure l.

The staff has concluded that the Ginna design satisfies the acceptance criteria and is, therefore acceptable.

Accordingly, this topic has been completed satisfactorily.

Sincerely,

Enclosure:

As stated Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing cc w/enclosure:

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TOPIC:, YII-2 ENGINE SAFETY FEATURES ESF SYSTEt NTROL LOGIC AND DESIGN I.

INTRODUCTION During the staff review of the Safety Injection System (SIS) reset (issue f4 in HUREG-0138) the staff determined that the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems (ESFAS) at both PilRs and Bl)Rs may have design features that raise questions about the indepdndence of redundant channels, the interaction of reset features and individual equipment controls,. and the interaction of the ESFAS logic that controls transfers between on-site and off-.site power sources.

Review of the as-built logic diagrams and schematics, operator action required to supplement the ESFAS automatic

actions, the startup and surveillance testing procedures for demonstrating ESFAS performance appeared to be required.

Several specific concerns exist with regard to the manual SIS reset feat-ure following a LOCA.

They are:

(1) If a loss of offsite power occurs after reset, operator action would be required to remove normal shutdown cooling loads from the emergency bus and re-establish emergency cooling loads.

Time would be critical if the loss of offsite power occurred within a few minutes following a LOCA.

(2) If loss of offsite power oc-

'curs after reset, some plants may not restart some essentia1 loads such as

'diesel cooling water.

(3) The plant may suffer a loss of ECCS delivery for some time period before emergency power picks up the ECCS.system.

It was also decided to review the ESF system control logic and design, in-cluding bypasses, reset features and interactions with transfers between onsite and offsite power sources.

Since these 'decisions were made in early 1977, the staff's plans for re-solving these issues have changed.

Two generic reviews of the diesel generator problems have been conducted by Inspection and Enforcement.

The second review includes consideration of bypasses and resets.

In ad-dition, Task Action Plan Generic Task B-24 is involved with reset and by-pass concerns.

Accordingly, this SEP Topic has been modified to reduce duplication of eKort.

As a result of the staff's review of the scope of the several related

.generic efforts and the other SEP Topics, it was decided that the only area that had not been covered was the independence of redundant logic trains.

Independence might be compromised by sharing input -signals and the use of. common controls such as mode switches, reset switches, and logic test facilities.

II.

REVIEW CRITERIA The current licensing criteria are presented in Section 2 of EGKG Report EGG-EA-5683 "ESF System Control Logic and Design".

III. RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES r

The scope'f review for this topic was limited to avoid dup)ication nf effort since some aspects of the-review were performed under related topics; The related topics and the subject matter are identified below.

Each of the related topic reports contain the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.

'I'II-6 Seismic gualification III-llSeismic gualification III-12 Environmental qualification IV-l.A Operation with Less than All Loops in Operation VI-4 Bypass and Reset of Engineered Safety Features (8-24)

VI-7.A.3 ECCS Actuation System VI-7.B ESF Switchover from Injection to Recirculation VI-l.C.l Independence of Onsite Power VI-7.C.2-Failure Node Analysis-ECCS VI-7.C.3 The effect of loop isolation valve closure on ECCS performance YI-7.0 Long Term Cooling Passive Failures (e.g..f)ooding)

VI-7;F Accumulator Isolation Valves VI-10.A Testing of Reactor Protection Systems YI-10.B Shared Systems VII-l.A Reactor Trip System Isolation VII-3'ystems Required for Safe Shutdown VIII-2 Onsite Emergency.Power Systems VIII-3 Emergency dc Power Systems VIII-4 Electiical Penetrations IX-3 Ventilation IX-6 Fire Protection The conclusion that suitable isolation devices are provided is a basic assumption for Topics VI-7.C.2 and VII-3.

IV. REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3 of Report EGG-EA-5683.

V.

EVALUATION A description of the isolation devices employed in the Ginna Plant. and a comparison with current desiqn criteria are presented in Report EGG-EA-5683.

I VI. CONCLUSION Because SEP Topic III-12 will address the qualification of electrical equipment and SEP Topic VI-4 addresses containinent isolation systems, the staff has concluded that the concern as to radiation monitor quali-fication is outside of the scope of this topic.

Accordingly, the staff has concluded that the design for electrical isolation at Ginna is accept--

able.