ML17258A222

Forwards Safety Evaluation for SEP Topic VIII-4.Also Forwards Contractor Technical Evaluation, SEP Topic VIII-4,Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment, Re Ginna Nuclear Station,Unit 1

ML17258A222
Person / Time
Site:	Ginna
Issue date:	10/08/1981
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP.
Shared Package
ML17258A223	List: ML17258A222 ML17258A224
References
TASK-08-04, TASK-8-4, TASK-RR LSO5-81-10-102, NUDOCS 8110140345
Download: ML17258A222 (31)

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ARI'ZEDo: NO OOCKK>>T' FACIL>:50. 244 Robert'lnne't" Ginna>> Nucl cari Pl anti Unit 1 i Roch'estral' 05090244 AUTH<,NAMEI AUTHORi AFFIL'I'AT'ION CRUTCHFIELQii0:,

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forwards contr actor's te'chnicali e'valuationi "SEP: Tbpic" VIiII:-4iKilectr ical Pene>>tr at4ons>> of Reactor Containmie'n4i, Rr.l Ginns Nuclear~

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Docket No.

50-244 LS05 10-012' UNITEDSTATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 October 8, 1981 Mr.'ohn E. Maier, Vice President El ectr ic and Steam Production Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corporation'9 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR R.

ED GINNA NUCLEAR PONER PLANT Enclosure 1 is the staff's safety evaluation report for SEP Topic VIII-4.

The basis for Enclosure 1.is given in Enclosure 2.

Enclosure 2 is our contractor's technical evaluation'hat has been revised by the additional information and comments provided in your letters of June 9, 1981 and July 14, 1981.

Enclosure 1 is the staff's position with regard to tHe acceptability of

'he electrical penetrations for your facility.

The staff has concluded that your commitment to assure that your facility meets'current licensing criteria is an acceptable basis for considering this topic complete.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

As stated Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing cc w/enclosures:

See next page

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Nr. John E. Haier CC Harry H. Yoigt, Esquire

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and'NacRae 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N..W.

Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.

20036 Hr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center Nevi York, New York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1, Second Floor Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Director, Bureau of Nuclear Operations State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 115 South Avenue Rochester, New York 14604 Supervisor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West

Ontario, New York 14519 Resident Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

NRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 Hr. Thomas B. Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N. W.

Suite 600 Washington, D. C.

20006

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U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Coranission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D.. C.

20555

Enclosure 1

ENCLOSURE 1

SEP TOPIC VIII-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS 'OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT S

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I.;. INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Topic VIII-4, "Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment," is to assure that all electrical penetrations in the contain-ment structure are designed not to fail from electrical faults during a

high energy line break.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) the NRC staff performed an audit, comparing sample containment electrical penetrations in SEP facilities with current licensing criteria for protection against fault and overload currents following a postulated accident.

REVIEW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Section 2.0 of EGSG Report EGG-EA-5565, "Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment."

In addition, in licensing new plants, the staff requires compliance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1. 63 or an acceptable alternative method.

For each'ontainment electrical penetration, the protective systems should provide primary and backup circuit protection devices to orevent a single failure i'n conjunction with a circuit overload from impa'iring containment integrity.

The primary and backup protection devices must have trip time vs. current response characteristics which assure protection against penetra-tion failure.

The protection devices are to be periodically tested to verify trip setpoints and adequacy of response.

No single failure should allow excessive currents in the penetration conduc-torss that will degrade the penetrations'eals.

Where external control power is used for actuating the protection systems the power for primary and

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backup breakers should be derived from separate sources.

Overcurrent signals for tripping primary and backup system devices should be electrically in-dependent and physically separated.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplication of effort since some aspects of the review were performed under the related Topic III-12, Environmental gualification.

The related topic report contains the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject matter.

Theoretically, there are no safety topics that are dependent on the present topic information for their completion; however, the'results of the present topic have a definite impact upon the capability of equipment inside of containment to function after a high energy line break.

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES V.

The review guidelines are presented in Section 3.0 of EG&G Report EGG-EA-5565, "Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor. Containment.

EVALUATION As noted in the EG8G Report on this topic, with a LOCA environment inside containment, the backup protection for some penetrations does not conform

'o the current licensing criteria.

'However, the licensee has inplemented a corrective program which is described in their June 9,

1981 and July 14, 1981 submittals.

VI.

CONCLUSIONS As a result of our review we have concluded that a suitable program is in'lace to assure that the low voltage ac and dc penetrations conform to the current licensing criteria.

We also have concluded that the present design of the medium voltage penetrations is acceptable.

Enclosure 2

EGG-EA-5565 SEPTEf)BER 1981 SYSTEMATIC EYALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC YIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT, R. E.

GINNA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.

1 A. C.

Udy

.U.S. Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office ~ Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Ca

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This is an informal report intended for use as a preliminary or working document.

Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN No. A6425

~~ H&Z&idaho n

Q K&K&

Idaho. Inc.

'9 FOAM EGIIGG9S

{Rev. 11 TQI tNTERlM REPORT Accession No.

Report No EGG"EA"5565 Contract. Program or Project

Title:

Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)

N Subject of this Document:

Systematic Evaluation Program Topic YIII-.4, Electrical Penetrations.of,.Reactor

.Containment, R..:E..Ginna Nuclear. Station, Unit No.

1 Type of Document:

Informal Report Author(s):

A. C.

Udy Date of Document:

September 1981 Responsible NRC Individual and'NRC Office or Division:

Ray F. Scholl, Jr., Division of Licensing This document was prepared primarily for preliminary or internal use. Ithas not received fullreview and approval. Since there'may be substantive changes, this doc~ment should not be considered fin'al.

EG8G Idaho; Inc.

Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.

Under DOE Contract No.

DE-AC07-76 ID01670

'RC FIN No.

A6425 INTERlM REPORT

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SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM TOPIC VIII-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT R.E.

GINNA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.

1 Docket No. 50-244

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September 1981

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A. C. Udy Reliability and'tatist'ics Bran'ch

'ngineering Analysis Division EGEG Idaho, Inc.

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9-9-81

ABSTRACT This SEP technical evaluation', for the R. E. Ginna Nuclear Station, Unit No.

1 reviews the capability of the overcurrent protection devices to protect the electrical penetr ations of the reactor containment for postu-lated fault conditions concurrent with an accident condition.

.FOREWORD This report is supplied as part of the "Electrical, Instrumentation, and Control Systems Support for the Systematic Evaluation Program (II)"

being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Division of Licensing by EGIN Idaho, Inc.,

Re 1 i ab i 1 iiy 8 St at ist ics Branch.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded the work under the authorization BER 20-10-02-05 FIN A6425.

CONTENTS 1

~ 0 INTRODUCTION o ~i ~ ~

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1 2.0 CRITERIA o

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. 3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION..................................

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3 3.1 Typical Low Voltage (0-1000 VAC) Penetrations '......."...;..

5 3.2 3.1. 1 Penetration Number AE-6...........;....;

3.1.2 Penetration Number-.AE-5.................

3.1.3 Penetration Number CE-21................

3.1.4 Low Voltage Penetration Evaluation......

Typical Medium Voltage (~1000 VAC) Penetrations

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7 3.2.1 Medium Voltage Penetration Eva 3.3 Typical Direct Current Penetrations luation....*..;.......

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8 3.3.1 3.3.2 3.3.3 3.3.4 Penetration Number CE-18.....

Penetration Number CE-17.....

Penetration Number CE-23.....

Direct Current Penetration fva

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9 3.4 Other Penetrations...........................;;...........

9 4.

UMMARY S

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10 REFERENCES........................-.............

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111

SYSTEMATIC EVALUATION PROGRAM

. TOPJC VIII-4=.*.

ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS Of REACTOR CONTAINMENT R.E'.

GINNA NUCLEAR STATION, UNIT NO.

1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

This review is part of the Systematic Evaluation Program.(SEP); Topic VIII-4.

The evaluation provided by Rochester-Gas and Electr'ic (RGE) has demonstrated the adequacy of the penetrations

'and the circuit protect'ive devices during normal operation.

A letter of July 21, 1980 provides 2

additional information on the penetration designs.

The objective of this review is to determine the c'apability of.the overcurrent protective devices to prevent exceeding the design rating of the electrical penetrations

-through the reactor containment during short circuit conditions at LOCA temperatures.

General Design Criteri'on 50,."Containment Design Basis" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants" to 10 CFR Part ~0 r

requires that penetr ations be designed so that the containment structure can, without exceeding the design leakage rate, accommodate the calculated

pressure, temperature, and other environmental conditions resulting from any loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA).

IEEE Standard 317, "Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations",

as augmented by Regula-tory Guide 1.63, provides a basis of electrical penetrations acceptable to the staff.

Specifically, this review will examine the protection of typical elec-trical penetrations in the containment structure to determine the ability of the protective devices to clear the circuit during a short circuit con-dition prior to exceeding the containment electrical penetration test or design ratings with initial assumed LOCA temperatures.

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2.0.'CRITERIA IEEE Standard 317, "Electric Penetration Assemblies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations" as supplemented by Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulatory Guide 1.63, "Electric.Penetration Assem=,

',blies in Containment Structures for Light-'Water-Cooled-.Nuclear Power Plants"

provides the basis acceptable to the NRC staff.

The following criteria are

.used in this report to determine compliance with current licensing require-ments:

l. - IEEE Standard.317, Paragraph '4:2:4--."The rated short circuit current and duration shall be the maximum short circuit current in amperes that the conductors of a circuit can car ry for a specified duration (based on tne operating time of the primary overcurrent protective device or apparatus of'the circuit) following'continuous operation at rated continuous current without the tem-

-perature of the conductors exceeding their short circuit design limit with all other conductors in the assembly carrying their rated continuous current under the speci-

. fied normal environmental conditions."

This paragraph is augmented by Regulatory Guide 1.63, Paragraph C-1--"The electric penetration assembly snould be designed to withstand, without loss of mechanical integrity, the maximum possible fault current versus time conditions that could occur given single random failures of circuit overload protection devices."

2.

IEEE Standard

317, Paragraph 4.2.5--"The rated maximum duration of rated short circuit current snail be the maximum time that the conductors of a circuit can carry rated short circuit current based on the operating time of the backup protective device or apparatus, during which the electrical integrity may be lost, but for which the penetration assembly shall maintain contain-ment integrity."

L Additional clarification of these criteria was provided to RGE on March 30, 1981. 3

3.0 DISCUSSION AND EVAL T ION In this evaluation, the results of typical containment penetrations being at LOCA temperatures concurrent with a random failure of the circuit protective devices-will be analyzed.-

1,2 RGE has provided information 'n typical penetrations.

Additional

material, submitted as a result of this review was provided on June 9,

1981 4 and July 14, 1981.

All penetrations but one were manufactured by Crouse--

Hinds,. who no longer makes these penetrations.

Crouse Hinds supplied RGE with-'est data, where available, and calculated data with a 10x safety'=-

factor where test data was not available.

'GE has established that before damage to the hermetic seal of the penetration

occurs, melting of the solder in the hermetic seal of the pene-trations must occur (361'F'80'C);

A, silver braze -is used for penetrations CE-21, CE-25 and CE-2I instead of solder (1100'F, 600'C).

This temperature is used because it:is the lowest =temperature that affects the-penetration seal.

Other materials," while affecting the strain relief of the penetration at lower temperatures, do not affect the hermetic seal.

Tne

-limiting temperature is determined by the analysis of the construction of the penetrations rather than testing.

The Ginna 1 Technical Specifica-tion allows for initial steady, state temperatures of the penetration envi-ronment up to 120'F (49'C).

Under accident conditions, a peak temperature of 285'F

( 140'C) is expected.

.In those penetrations with conductors larger than 82 copper, the limit

'I was not heat input but mechanical forces generated by electromagnetic coup-ling, and the limits put on these was determined by tests, with no mechani-cal 'failure of the penetration.

Smaller penetration conductors are not subject to failure by mechanical forces when used within their maximum current rating.

RGE also used the Insulated Power Cable Engineers Association publica-tion, P-32-382, entitled "Short Circuit CharacYeristics of Insulated Cable"

to determine separate limiting factors on the conductors of the penetration.

i<here, these figures were more conservative tnan the Crouse-Hind figures, they were used instead.

In supplying the value of the maximum short circuit current ava'ilable (I

), -RGE supplied values for-a three-phase (on a three-phase system) bol'ted 'fault; this type being able to supply the most heat into the penetra-tion.

The I value supplied by RGE takes both the symmetrical AC compon-sc ent and the peak DC offset component.

Jn the RGE analys is, the I'as sc held to the maximum value for all phases when only one phase can'ave the full.initial offset, and despite the fact that the DC component'decays.

--'his provides an additional safety factor in their calculations.-,RGE did not'assume that all other penetration conductors were carrying.their maximum rated current, but applied the normal operating current.

The following formula was.used snort-circuit before the penetration melting point of solder.

to determine the time allowed. for-a conductor temperature would exceed the I

2 T2 + 234 t = 0.0297 log T

+ 234 1

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(Formula 1)

'where sc A

Time allowed for the snort circuit seconds Short circuit,current amperes Conductor'rea circular mils T2 Maximum operating temperature

( 140 C, LOCA condition)

Maximum short circuit temperature (180 C, tem-perature for melting solder).

This is based upon e neating effect of the snort cuit current on the conductors.

It should be noted that tne short circuit temperature-time limits of the..conductors in this report vary from the values calculated by RGE 1

even tnough the same methods are used.

RGE has utilized an initial temper-ature of 40'C while tnis review 'uses an initial temperature of -140'C.(LOCA

.condition) for the penetration.

A pre-fault penetration conductor temper-ature equal to the peak LOCA containment atmosphere.

temperature is assigned, thus simplifying while accounting for an elevated conductor temperature caused by pre-existing current. Slow and above-normal ambient temperature.

3. 1. Typical Low Volta e (0-1000 VAC Penetrations.

RGE has provided information. on three.typical low-voltage AC penetrations.."1 r

3.1.1 Penetration Number AE-6; Thi.s penetration has b2 AWG con-ductors and was type-tested to 37,400 amperes for 3 cycles by the manufac-turer, Crouse-Hinds.

The I available on the identified 480-V circuit is 9600 amperes.

Using Formula 1,- this current can be carried for 0.06 sec-ond oefor e the penetration.conductor temperature exceeds the.melting. point of solder while under a

LOCA environment.

The pr imary circuit breaker responds within this time (.018 second).

The secondary circuit breaker does not.

For smaller fault currents, both the allowable time before the hermetic seal is damaged increases and the fault clearing time increases.

At all fault current levels, the primary breaker cleared, while the secon-dary breaker did not clear the fault within the allowable time.

As a result of this review, RGE has proposed to install a 70 ampere backup circuit breaker in series with the primary circuit breaker.

RGE 4

has'hown that the response of.this new circuit breaker is properly coordinated to protect the AE-6 penetration under any postulated fault condition.

3.1.2 Penetration Number AE-5.

This penetration has 88 AWG conductors and is calculated by the manufacturer to be able to withstand 1400 amperes for 0.54 second (including the Grouse-Hinds-supplied 10x 5

safety factor).

RGE does nW expect mechanical damage at less than 4662 amperes (this is equal to 1400 x 3.33 or 1/3 of the original safety factor).

The identified 480 VAC circuit is capable of supplying a maximum I

of 3500 amperes into the penetration.

The primary breaker can clear' Sc this fault in 0.018 second, while the secondary fuse clears the fau1t in 0.002 second.

The backup device will clear the fault before the primary protective device at this level of fault current.

It is calculated that the maximum I can be carried by this penetra-tion in a LOCA environment for 0.029 second before the penetration conductor temperature exceeds the melting point of solder.

Both protective devices will clear the fault within this time.

At lower levels of fault current, both devices clear the fault in time to prevent solder melting.

3. 1.3 Penetration Number CE-21.

This penetration has 500 NCM-conductors and was type-teste'd by the'anufacturer and extrapolated by RGE

'to withstand 44,000 amperes for 10 cycles.

The 480 VAC circuit 'identified by RGE as typical can supply a maximum I of 20,000 amperes=:

Both the'-- -=-

'primary and secondary breakers will clear'he postulated fault within 0.45 and 0.50 second, respectively.

It is calculated that the 20,000-ampere fault current can be carried by this penetration in a LOCA environment for 6.46 seconds before the pene-tration conductor temperature exceeds the melting point of the silver braze.

Both the primary and the secondary circuit breaKer will act in time to pre-vent damage to the hermetic seal of this penetration at this current level.

Both circuit breakers respond faster than the penetration heat build-up limit for all current levels.

Since all in-containment components of this identified circuit are environmentally qualified for class lE service, NRC position 2

can be applied.

This position requires only a single class lE circuit breaker for penetration protection where all components served by that penetration are qualified to class lE requirements.

3. 1.4 Low-Volta e Penetration Evaluation.

With the initial temperature of the penetrations at 140'C (LOCA), penetrations AE-5 and

CE-21 are designed and ut>lized within the criteria descr~

ed in Sec-tion 2.0 of this report.

The protective devices for penetration AE-6, 7

while not designed

.and utilized within the criteria described in Sec-s tion 2.0 of this report, supply power for class 1E coinponents, and therefore, are acceptable per NRC position 2. 3 N

3.2 Typical Medi'um Volta e (~1000 VAC).Penetration.

Penetration numbers CE-25 and CE-27 nave been identified by RGE as typical of niedium-voltage (4160 V) penetrations.

These penetrations are used in parallel to supply power to one 6000 horsepower (HP) reactor coolant pump'(RCP).

These pumps are the only medium-voltage load within containment.

Cons'truction of these penetr ations is of tne same materials and methods as discussed in Section 3.0.

The hermetic seal is silver brazed (T2

= 600'C).

Each penetration, containing three 750,000-MCN conductors,

~ ly

.was type-tested by the manufacturer and found to have no damage at 80,000 amperes for 10 cycles (0.167 second).

P The maximum I available (including that available from the source and from the subtraiisient and transient response of the 6000 HP motor fed Dack through the single. remaining penetration and cable) is 46,000 asym-metrical/36,800 symmetrical amperes.

The primary breaker overcurrent relay trips in 0.018 second, and theoackup breaker overcurrent relay trips in 0.17 second should the primary oreaker not clear the fault (both values based on 36,800 amperes).'It is calculated that the available 46,000-ampere asymmetrical fault current can oe carried by this penetration for 2.75 second before penetr a-tion seal failure would occur.

Using the time-current characteristics, assuming 46,000 amperes is constant tnroughout the clearing time, the pri-mary breaker overcurrent will clear the fault in 0.018 second while the secondary breaker overcurrent will clear the fault in 0.17 second.

3.2. 1 Medium Volta e Penetration Evaluation.

Penetrations CE-25 and CE-27 are designed and utilized within the criteria described in Sec-tion 2.0 of this report.

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Additionally, RGE has committed to improve the protect n characteris-4 ties for low magnitude fau~urrents.

This will be acco ished by-installing a redundant set of overcurrent relays between the primary pro-tective relays and the penetration.

This set oj relays will actuate the.-..

ba'ckup breaker.

RGE has shown that with this additional set of relays, the response of the circuit protective devices is properly coordinated to..pro-.

tect the CE-25 and CE-27 penetrations under any postulated fault conditions.

3.3 Typical Direct Current Penetr ations.

RGE has provided information of three typical direct-current power penetrations.

.- These penetrations are of the same construction as in Section 3.0, and the same methods of.

determining the limiting heating factors were. used.

. 3.3.1 Penetration Number CE-18.

This penetrat.ion,. constructed with nuiober 2 conductors, provides 125 V

DC power to the liftcoil and was type-tested to be able to withstand a current in excess of 30,000 amperes for 3 cycles'with no mechanical damage.

The maximum I available to sc this penetration is identified as 270 amperes.

At-this-270-ampere:current, the two primary (both + and-- leads) 50-ampere. fuses will-clear'the

'lan'e-to-line fault in 0.18 second or should these fuses fail, the secondary 150-ampere fuse will clear the fault in 0.5?6 second..

It is calculated that the 270-ampere fault current can be carried by this penetration for 79.2 seconds before damage to the hermetic seal of the penetration occurs.

The primary and secondary fuses will clear this fault and all faults of less magnitude before the penetration temperature exceeds its qualification limit.

3.3.2 Penetration Number CE-17.

This penetration, constructed with numoer 8 conductors, provides 125 V

DC power for the rod drive circuit, and is calculated to be able to withstand 1400 amperes for 0.54 second.

The maximum I available to this. penetration 'is 260 amperes..

At this

current, the primary fuse will clear the line-to-line fault in 0.0004 second or, snould this fuse fail, the secondary fuse will clear the fault in 0.0043 second.

It is calculated th he 260-ampere fault current be carried by tnis penetration for 5.28 seconds before damage to the hermetic seal of the penetration occurs.

Both the primary and the secondary fuses will clear this fault and all faults of less magnitude before.the penetration temper-ature exceeds its qualification limit.

3.3.3 Penetration Number CE-23.

Tnis penetration, constructed with 410 conductors, provides 125 Y

DC control power and is calculated to be. able, to withstand 1250 amperes for 0.27 second.

The maximum, Isc, available at the penetration is 600 aNperes.

At this'current, the primary fuse will clear the fault in 0.014 second.

The secondary fuse will not melt in time to prevent damage to the penetration

( 700 seconds operating time at 600 amperes).

It is calculated that the-600-ampere. fault-current can. be carried by this penetration for 0.39 second.

. Tne primary fuse will, and the, secondary fuse will not,= clear-this f'ault and all faults of-. less magnitude before the temperature of the.penetration will exceed ihe melting point of solder.

As a result of this review, RGE has proposed to install a new. primary fuse (25A).

The existing primary fuse (30A) will then be the secondary fuse.

The two fuses will oe in. series with penetration numoer CE-23.

AGE nas snown that the response times for these two fuses are properly coor-dinated to protect the CE-23 penetration under any postulated fault condi-tion.

3.3.4 Direct Current Penetration Evaluation.

With the initial temperature of tne penetrations at 140'C as expected with a LOCA, penetra-tions CE-17, CE-18 and CE-23 are designed and uti]ized within the criteria

=

described in Section 2.0 of this report.

3.4 Other Penetrations.

RGE also provided information on penetration numbers AE-10, CE-l, and CE-8.

Penetration numbers AE-10 and CE-1 are 1

part of instrumentation (10-50 mADC) current loops.

The transmitters of these are current-limited to 50 milliamperes while each penetration conduc-tor is rated at 12 amperes continuous.

Penetration number CE-19 is triaxial

e I

instrumentation

signals, a

the circuit described is equ>

ent-limited to less than 200 watts (i.e., the source of the signal would fail before 200 watts output is reached).

A maximum I of 1 ampere would be carried sc on a penetration conductor rated at 10 amperes continuous.

No mechanical failures are postulated for these penetrations (construction and materials similar to the power penetrations previously described) even under accident conditions within containment.

A recent modification installed a low-voltage power, control, and instrumentation penetration that is IEEE-Standard-317-1972-qualified for an in-containment television monitor system.

This penetration, for which application data was noi submitted, is none the less qualified to IEEE Stan-dard 317-1972, assuming it is being used within specification limits.

4.0 SUI<i1ARY This evaluation looks at the capability of the protective devices to prevent exceeding the design ratings of the selected penetrations in the event of (a) a LOCA event, (b) a fault current through the penetration

and, simultaneously, (c) a random failure of the circuit.protective devices to clear the fault.

The environmental qualification tests of the penetrations is tne subject of SEP Topic III-12.

The penetrations identified with power-limited instrumentation circuits are deemed suitable under all postulated conditions.

After tne proposed modifications to the circuit protective devices are completed, with a LOCA environment inside containment all penetrations are designed and utilized within the criteria described in Section 2.0 of inis report;'which assumes a snort circuit and random failure of circuit protec-tive devices.

RGE is, investigating improvements for the protection of oti>er penetra-tion circuits as a result of this SEP topic."

No completion date has been estaolished, but any modifications are expected to be similar to those discussed in this report and in reference 4.

10

a

~

IV The review of TopicOI-12, "Environmental iioalificon" may resolt in changes to the electrical penetration design and therefore, the resolu-.

tion of the subject SEP topic will be deferred to the integrated assessment, at which time, any requirements imposed as a i.esult of tnis review will take into consideration design cnanges resulting from other topics.

5.0 REFERENCES

2.

AGE letter, Harry G. Saddock, Systematic Evaluation Program Topic VIII-4, "Electrical Penetrations of Reactor Containment",

R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No.

1, Docket No. 50-244, April 12, 1979.

RGE letter, C.

D. White, Jr., to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regula-tion, U.S.

NRC, "SEP Topic VII-4--Electrical Penetration of Reactor Containment," July 21, 1980.

3.

NRC letter to

RGE, "SEP Topic VIII-4," March 30, 1981.

RGK letter, J.

E. tlaier to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

NRC, "SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations,"

June 9, 1981.

5.

6.

RGE letter, J.

E. Naier to Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,

NRC, "SEP Topic VIII-4, Electrical Penetrations,"

July 14, 1981.

IPCEA Publication P-32-382, "Short. Circuit Characteristics of Insulated Cable."

7.

9.

General Design Criterion 16, "Containment Design" of Appendix A, "General Design Criteria of Nuclear Power Plants,"

10 CFR Part 50, "Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities."

Nuclear Regulatory Cqmmission Standard Review Plan, Section 8.3.'1, "AC Power Systems (Onsite)."

Regulatory Guide 1.63, Revision 2, "Electrical Penetration Assemnlies in Containment Structures for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power. Plants."

10.

IEEE Standard 317-1976, "IEEE Standard for Electric Penetration Assem-blies in Containment Structures for Nuclear Power Generating Stations."

October 8, 1981 Docket No.

50-244 LS05 10-012 Mr. John E. Haier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas 5 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINMENT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR R. E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLAt)T Enclosure 1 is the staff's safety evaluation report for SEP Topic VIII-4.

The basis for Enclosure 1 is given in Enclosure 2.

Enclosure 2 is our contractor's technical evaluation that has been revised by the additional information and comments provided in your letters of June 9, 1981 and July 14, 1981.

Enclosure 1 is the staff's position with regard to the acceptability of the electrical penetrations for your facility.

The staff has concluded that your commitment to assure that your facility meets current licensing criteria is an acceptable basis for considering this topic complete.

Sincerely,

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/enclosures:

See next page Dennis fl. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing 55C9 I i/i go~)

Aoo:

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Docket No. 50-244 LS05 Hr. John E. Haier, Vice President Electric and Steam Production Rochester Gas II1 Electric Corporation 89 East Avenue Rochester, New York 14649

SUBJECT:

SEP TOPIC VIII-4, ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF REACTOR CONTAINHENT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT FOR R. E.

GINNA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Enclosure 1 is the staff's safety evaluation report for SEP Topic VIII-4.

The basis for Enclosure 1 is-=given in Enclosure 2.

Enclosure 2 is our contractor's technical evaluation that has been revised by the additional information and comments provided in your letters of June 9, 1981 and July 14, 1981.

Enclosure 1 is the staff's position wigh regard to the acceptability of the electrical

$enetrations for your facility.

The staff has concluded that your commitments to assure that your facility meets current licensing criteria is an acceptable basis for considering this topic complete.

Sincerely,!

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/enclosures:

See next page Dennis H. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.

5 Division of Licensing OFFICE/

SURNAME/

DATEf Pelf1.: dk SEPB:D RHermann

/AF/l.../81...... dt'8/.9/8.]........

PB:DL WRussell ORB05:DL:PH B8 :DL:

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Mr. John E. Maier CC Harry H. Voigt, Esquire

LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby and'HacRae 1333 New H'ampshire Avenue, N. M.

Suite 1100 Washington, D. C.

20036 Nr. Michael Slade 12 Trailwood Circle Rochester, New York 14618 Ezra Bialik Assistant Attorney General Environmental Protection Bureau New York State Department of Law 2 World Trade Center New York, New York 10047 Jeffrey Cohen New York State Energy Office Swan Street Building Core 1, Second Floor Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223

Director, Bureau of Nucl ear Operations State of New York Energy Office Agency Building 2 Empire State Plaza

Albany, New York 12223 Rochester Public Library 11.5 South Avenue

'ochester, New York 14604 Super visor of the Town of Ontario 107 Ridge Road West Ontari'o, New York 14519 Resident, Inspector R. E. Ginna Plant c/o U. S.

NRC 1503 Lake Road

Ontario, New York 14519 Hr. Thomas B. Cochran Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.

1725 I Street, N. M.

Suite 600 Mashington, D. C.

20006

~ ~

U. S. Environmental Protection Agency Region II Office ATTN:

Regional Radiation Representative 26 Federal Plaza New York, New York 10007 Herbert Grossman, Esq.,

Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Mashington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Richard F. Cole Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Washington, D. C.

20555 Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Comnission Mashington, D.. C.

20555

ENCLOSURE 1

SEP TOPIC VIII-4 ELECTRICAL PENETRATIONS OF-REACTOR CONTAINMENT I.

INTRODUCTION The safety objective of Topic VIII-4, "Electrical Penetrations c=-

Containment," is to assure that all electrical penetrations in t-ment structure are designed not to fail from electrical faults c high energy line break.

As part of the Systematic Evaluation Program (SEP) the NRC staff an audit, comparing sample containment electrical penetrations

'acilities with current licensing criteria for protection again and overload currents following a postulated accident.

II.

REVI EW CRITERIA The review criteria are presented in Section 2.0 of EG8G Report "Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment."

In addit-'=...

licensing new plants, the staff requires compliance with the rec=:

of Regulatory Guide 1. 63 or an acceptable alternative method.

For each containment electrical penetration, the protective syst provide primary and backup circuit protection devices to Qreven~

failure in conjunction with a circuit overload from impairing cc-integrity.

The primary and backup protection devices must have vs. current response characteristics which assure protection ag- =.--

tion failure.

The protection devices are to be periodically tes verify trip setpoints and adequacy of response.

No single failure should allow excessive currents in the penetr-tors that will degrade the penetrations'seals.

Where external c

is used for actuating the protection systems the power for prima--

backup breakers should be derived from separate sources.

Overcu for tripping primary and backup system devices should be electr-.

dependent and physically separated.

III.

RELATED SAFETY TOPICS AND INTERFACES The scope of review for this topic was limited to avoid duplica~

effort since some aspects of the review were performed under the Topic III-12, Environmental gualification.

The related topic re=

the acceptance criteria and review guidance for its subject mat

Theoretically, there are no safety topics that are dependent on the present topic information for their completion;

however, the results of the present topic have a definite impact upon the capability of equipment inside of containment to function after a high energy line. break.

IV.

REVIEW GUIDELINES The review guidelines are presented in Section 3.0 of EG&G Report EGG-EA-5565, "Electrical Penetrations of the Reactor Containment.

V.

EVALUATION As noted in the EG8G Report'on this topic, with a LOCA environment inside containment, the backup protection for some penetrations does not conform to the current licensing, criteria.

However, the licensee has inplemented a corrective program which is described in their June 9,

1981 and July 14, 1981 submittals.

VI:

CONCLUSIONS As a result of. our review'we have concluded that a suitable program 'is in place to assure that the low voltage ac and dc penetrations conform to the current, licensing criteria.

We also have concluded that the present

'design of the medium voltage penetrations is.acceptable.