ML17256A562
| ML17256A562 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Ginna  |
| Issue date: | 03/16/1983 |
| From: | Maier J ROCHESTER GAS & ELECTRIC CORP. |
| To: | Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TASK-03-05.A, TASK-3-5.A, TASK-RR NUDOCS 8303230244 | |
| Download: ML17256A562 (10) | |
Text
REGULATORY FORMATION DISTRIBUTION S EM (RIDS)
ACCESSION NBR'8303230204 DOC DATE'3/03/16 NOTARIZED:
NO DOCKET
~
FACILt50"24M Robert Emmet Ginna Nuclear Planti Unit 1i Rochester G
05000204 AUTH,NAME AUTHOR AFFILIATION MAIERiJ ~ E ~
Rochester Gas 8 Electric Corp, REC IP ~ NAME RECIPIENT AFFILIATION
.CRUTCHF IELDiD, Operating Reactors Branch 5
SUBJECT:
Responds to 820222 l equest for addi info resulting from
,review of SER for SEP Topic III-5 A, "Effect of Pipe Break on SysiStructures 8
Components Inside Containment
~
Rerouting of certain instrumentation circuits warrented, DISTRIBUTION CODE:
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L aA ~ Oatk1 llllll ill llllllllllll 8Z, ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION
~ 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649 JOHN C. MAIER Vite President 7CCCS'ttONC ARCA CODC 7ld 546.2700 March 16, 1983 Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Attention:
Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No.
5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555
Subject:
SEP Topic III-5.A, High Energy Line Break Inside Containment R.
E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-244
Dear Mr. Crutchfield:
This submittal is provided in response to the NRC's February 22, 1982 Safety Evaluation Report for SEP Topic III-5.A, "Effects of Pipe Break on Systems, Structures, and Components Inside Containment."
Enclosure 2 to that SER requested additional information, needed to complete the evaluation of this topic.
The requested information is, for the most part, being provided in the attachment.
A report describing the fracture mechanics evaluation for the pressurizer surge line and the accumulator line has been completed.
However, final retyping and editing are still in process.
The fracture mechanics evaluation will be submitted by mid-April under separate cover.
A synopsis of the resolution of the open items follows:
The lines with check valves originally relied upon to prevent primary system blowdown were re-evaluated.
It has been shown that no failures would be expected, other than those already being resolved for the postulated CVCS letdown line break.
2 ~
Postulated breaks in the CVCS letdown line (and other high energy lines in the same vicinity) or a two-inch accumulator level tap could possibly cause loss of certain instrumentation.
RGGE proposes to reroute the required instrumentation circuits away from the dynamic effects of the postulated piping failures.
( 8303230244 8303i6 PDR ADQCK 05000244 P
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ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORP.
March 16, 1983 Mr. Dennis M. Crutchfield SHEET NO.
3.
Postulated failure locations in the steam generator blowdown lines were chosen at the terminal ends, and two highest, stress intermediate locations.
These postulated breaks would not affect instrumentation required to mitigate the event and maintain safe plant shutdown.
4.
The pressurizer surge line and the accumulator line were analyzed using fracture mechanics.
It has been shown that the crack sizes which would remain stable provided leak rates which could be detected by presently available detection systems.
The details of the first three investigations are provided in the enclosure.
Based on these
- analyses, RG6E considers that the rerouting of certain instrumentation circuits is warranted.
The schedule for this modification will be coordinated with work being contemplated in the fire protection area.
Otherwise, RG&E considers SEP topic III-5.A resolved.
Very truly yours, Jo n E. Maier
I d
Attachment:
SEP Topic III-5.A, High Energy Line Breaks Inside Containment Issue 1:
Check valves 393,
- 295, 297, and 383A in the CVCS system were assumed to function during RGEE's High Energy Line Break Study, to prevent the potential for pipe whip outside the reactor loop compartments.
RGGE has evaluated the consequences of their potential failure, and determined that sufficient mitigation equipment is available, even in the event of an additional single failure.
The piping between the containment. penetrations and check valves 393 (charging to loop B hot leg),
295 (charging to loop B cold leg),
and 297 (auxiliary pressurizer spray), is located in the same general vicinity as the letdown line piping.
The analysis of the potential effects of a postu-lated CVCS letdown line break are described in "issue 3"
below.
The same proposed modifications will be effective in mitigating the effects of breaks in these other CVCS lines.
The piping between check valves 383A (alternate charging to loop A) and the containment could possibly affect cabling associated with MOV 852A (loop A low head safety injection).
Even in the event of a failure of MOV 852B to open, the high head safety injection system would be available.
The high head safety injection system is sufficient to provide emer-gency core cooling for this postulated break size (2"),
without need for low head safety injection.
RG6E thus concludes that this issue is resolved, assuming
, implementation of modifications associated with protection from dynamic effects of the CVCS letdown line.
Issue 2:
The "A" accumulator level tap with LT938 is in the vicinity of safety-related cable trays and conduit.
RGGE has evaluated the effects of a break in this 2" line, and determined that additional protection for the cable trays and conduit may be warranted.
Although the failure of the accumulator level tap in itself does not result in a transient, pressurizer pressure and level, and RCS pressure instrumentation could be affected.
- Thus, RG&E proposes that instrumentation rerouting being considered to resolve "issue 3" below be coordinated to ensure sufficient, safe shutdown monitoring equipment is available in the event of a postulated accumulator level tap break.
Issue 3:
The CVCS letdown line is located in the basement of containment, and is routed in the vicinity of safety-related cable trays and conduit.
RGEE has evaluated the possible effects of a postulated failure of the letdown line, and concluded that additional protection of certain instrumentation may be warranted.
In order to ensure that Safety Injection is initiated, and Reactor Coolant System pressure can be
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monitored, RG&E proposes that certain instrumentation cables for pressurizer
- pressure, pressurizer level and RC wi'de range pressure, be rerouted from the basement level to the intermediate floor elevation of containment.
Is Since safe shutdown instrumentation is also presently being studied as part of RG&E's fire protection review for Appendix R to 10CFR 50, a final decision as to the specific cabling and detailed routing cannot.be made at this time.
Once any necessary fire protection modifications are decided, the results of this high energy line break modifications will also be incorporated.
sue 4:
The steam generator blowdown lines are located on the intermediate floor of containment..
The "A" line is not in the vicinity of any required safety-related equipment.
The "B" line, however does pass near some safety-related cable tray, and conduit.
RG&E has calculated the stresses in the "B".line as part of the piping Seismic Upgrade Program.
The stresses in the line are lower than 0.8
('1.2S
+
S ); thus, breaks need only be postulated at the terminal en'nd the two intermediate highest stress locations.
Based on the fact that neither breaks at the terminal ends nor at the intermediate high-stress locations, which are located insi'de the loop compartments, will damage required safety-related instrumentation, no modifications are required to resolve this issue.
Issue 5:
The pressurizer surge line and accumulator line were analyzed using fracture mechanics.
It has been concluded that leakage from cracks in these systems can be detected using presently-installed leak detection
- systems, and that crack sizes resulting in these detectable leaks will remain stable.
The analysis has been completed.
Final typing and editing are presently underway, and it is expected that. the report can be submitted to the NRC by mid-April.
Based on the results of the analyses, RG&E has concluded that. no modifications are required to resolve this issue.
I ~
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